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PREFACE 
An old story about a great teacher of philosophy, Morris Raphael Cohen, goes like this. One 
year after the last lecture in Cohen’s introductory philosophy course, a student approached 
and protested, “Professor Cohen, you have destroyed everything I believed in, but you have 
given me nothing to replace it.” Cohen is said to have replied, “Sir, you will recall that one of 
the labors of Hercules was to clean the Augean stables. You will further recall that he was not 
required to refill them.” 
 I’m with the student. People who are curious about the subject may want a historical 
view of philosophy, but they also may want to know what, other than that very history, 
philosophy has left them. In fact, the history of philosophy has informed and even helped to 
create broad areas of contemporary intellectual life; it seems a disservice both to students and 
to the subject to keep those contributions secret. The aim of this text is to provide an 
introduction to philosophy that shows both the historical development and modern fruition of 
a few central questions. The issues I consider are these: 
 What is a demonstration, and why do proofs provide knowledge? 
 How can we use experience to gain knowledge or to alter our beliefs in a rational 
way? 
 What is the nature of minds and of mental events and mental states? 
In our century the tradition of philosophical reflection on these questions has helped to create 
the subjects of cognitive psychology, computer science, artificial intelligence, mathematical 
logic, and the Bayesian branch of statistics. The aim of this book is to make these connections 
accessible to qualified students and to give enough detail to challenge the very best of them. I 
have selected the topics because the philosophical issues seem especially central and 
enduring and because many of the contemporary fields they have given rise to are open-
ended and exciting. Other connections between the history of philosophy and contemporary 
subjects, for example the connection with modern physics, are treated much more briefly. 
Others are not treated at all for lack of space. I particularly regret the absence of chapters on 
ethics, economics, and law. 
 This book is meant to be used in conjunction with selections from the greats, and 
suggestions for both historical and contemporary readings accompany most chapters. The 
book is intended as an introduction, the whole of which can be read by a well-educated high 
school graduate who is willing to do some work. It is not, however, particularly easy. 
Philosophy is not easy. My experience is that much of this book can be read with profit by 
more advanced students interested in epistemology and metaphysics, and by those who come 
to philosophy after training in some other discipline. I have tried in every case to make the 
issues and views clear, simple, and coherent, even when that sometimes required ignoring 
real complexities in the philosophical tradition or ignoring alternative interpretations. I have 
avoided disingenuous defenses of arguments that I think unsound, even though this 
sometimes has the effect of slighting certain passages to which excellent scholars have 
devoted careers. A textbook is not the place to develop original views on contemporary 
issues. Nonetheless, parts of this book may interest professional philosophers for what those 
parts have to say about some contemporary topics. This is particularly true, I hope, of 
chapters 10, 11, and 13. 
 Especially challenging or difficult sections and chapters of the book are marked with 
an asterisk. They include material that I believe is essential to a real understanding of the 
problems, theories, and achievements that have issued from philosophical inquiry, but they 
require more tolerance for mathematical details than do the other parts of the book. 
Sometimes other chapters use concepts from sections with asterisks, and I leave it to 
instructors or readers to fill in any background that they omit. Each chapter is accompanied 
by a bibliography of suggested readings. The bibliographies are not meant to be exhaustive or 
even representative. Their purpose is only to provide the reader with a list of volumes that 
together offer an introduction to the literature on various topics. 
 I thank Kevin Kelly for a great deal of help in thinking about how to present the 
philosophical issues in historical context, for influencing my views about many topics, and 
for many of the illustrations. Andrea Woody read the entire manuscript in pieces and as a 
whole and suggested a great many improvements. She also helped to construct the 
bibliographies. Douglas Stalker gave me detailed and valuable comments on a first draft. 
Alison Kost read and commented on much of the manuscript. Martha Scheines read, revised, 
and proofread a preliminary draft. Alan Thwaits made especially valuable stylistic 
suggestions and corrected several errors. Versions of this hook were used in introductory 
philosophy courses for three years at Carnegie-Mellon University, and I am grateful to the 
students who endured them. 
 The third printing of this book has benefited from a reading of the first by Thomas 
Richardson, who pointed out a number of errors, and by Clifton McIntosh, who found still 
others. Michael Friedman’s work led me to revise the presentation of Kant, and a review 
essay by David Carrier prompted me to remove a note. 
 
  
Part I 
THE IDEA OF PROOF 
Chapter 1 
PROOFS 
INTRODUCTION 
Philosophy is concerned with very general questions about the structure of the world, with 
how we can best acquire knowledge about the world, and with how we should act in the 
world. The first topic, the structure of the world, is traditionally known as metaphysics. The 
second topic, how we can acquire knowledge of the world, is traditionally called 
epistemology. The third topic, what actions and dispositions are best, is the subject of ethics. 
The first two studies, metaphysics and epistemology, inevitably go together. What one thinks 
about the structure of the world has a lot to do with how one thinks inquiry should proceed, 
and vice versa. These topics in turn involve issues about the nature of the mind, for it is the 
mind that knows. Considerations of ethics depend in part on our metaphysical conception of 
the world and ourselves, on our conception of mind, and on how we believe knowledge to be 
acquired. 
 These traditional branches of philosophy no doubt seem very abstract and vague. 
They may seem superfluous as well: Isn’t the question of the structure of the world part of 
physics? Aren’t questions about how we acquire knowledge and about our minds part of 
psychology? Indeed they are. What, then, are metaphysics and epistemology, and what are the 
methods by which these subjects are supposed to be pursued? How are they different from 
physics and psychology and other scientific subjects? Questions such as these are often 
evaded in introductions to philosophy, but let me try to answer them. 
 First, there are a lot of questions that are usually not addressed in physics or 
psychology or other scientific subjects but that still seem to have something to do with them. 
Consider the following examples: 
• How can we know there are particles too small to observe? 
• What constitutes a scientific explanation? 
• How do we know that the process of science leads to the truth, whatever the truth may 
be? 
• What is meant by “truth”? 
• Does what is true depend on what is believed? 
• How can anyone know there are other minds? 
• What facts determine whether a person at one moment of time is the same person as a 
person at another moment of time? 
• What are the limits of knowledge? 
• How can anyone know whether she is following a rule? 
• What is a proof? 
• What does “impossible” mean? 
• What is required for beliefs to be rational? 
• What is the best way to conduct inquiry? 
• What is a computation? 
The questions have something to do with physics or psychology (or with mathematics or 
linguistics), but they aren’t questions you will find addressed in textbooks on these subjects. 
The questions seem somehow too fundamental to be answered in the sciences; they seem to 
be the kind of questions that we just do not know how to answer by a planned program of 
observations or experiments. And yet the questions don’t seem unimportant; how we answer 
them might lead us to conduct physics, psychology, mathematics or other scientific 
disciplines very differently. These are the sorts of questions particular scientific disciplines 
usually either ignore or else presume to answer more or less without argument. And they are 
a sample, a small sample, of the questions that concern philosophy. 
 If these questions are so vague and so general that we have no idea of how to conduct 
experiments or systematic observations to find their answers, what can philosophers possibly 
have done with them that is of any value? The philosophical tradition contains a wealth of 
proposed answers to fundamental questions about metaphysics and epistemology. Sometimes 
the answers are supported by arguments based on a variety of unsystematic observations, 
sometimes by reasons that ought to be quite unconvincing in themselves. The answers face 
the objections that they are either unclear or inconsistent, that the arguments produced for 
them are unsound, or that some other body of unsystematic observations conflict with them. 
Occasionally an answer or system of answers is worked out precisely and fully enough that it 
can deservedly be called a theory, and a variety of consequences of the theory can be 
rigorously drawn, sometimes by mathematical methods. What is the use of this sort of 
philosophical speculation? On occasion the tradition of attempts at philosophical answers has 
led to theories that seem so forceful and so fruitful that they become the foundation for entire 
scientific disciplines; enter our culture, our science, our politics; and guide our lives. That is 
the case, for example, with the discipline of computer science, created by the results of more 
than 2,000 years of attempts to answer one apparently trivial question: What is a 
demonstration, a proof? An entire branch of modern statistics, often called Bayesian 
statistics, arose through philosophical efforts to answer the question, What is rational belief? 
The theory of rational decision making, at the heart of modern economics, has the same 
ancestry. Contemporary cognitive science, which tries to study the human mind through 
computer models of human behavior and thought, is the result of joining a philosophical 
tradition of speculation about the structure of mind with the fruits of philosophical inquiry 
into the nature of proof. 
 So one answer to why philosophy was worth doing is simply that it was the most 
creative subject: rigorous philosophical speculation formed the basis for much of 
contemporary science; it literally created new sciences. Moreover, the role of philosophy in 
forming computer science, Bayesian statistics, the theory of rational decision making, and 
cognitive science isn’t ancient history. These subjects were all informed by developments in 
philosophy within the last 100 years. 
 But if that is why philosophy was worth doing, why is it still worth doing? Because 
not everything is settled and there may be fruitful alternatives even to what has been settled. 
In this chapter and those that follow we will see some of the history of speculation and 
argument that generated a number of contemporary scientific disciplines. We will also see 
that there can be reasonable doubts about the foundations of some of these disciplines. And 
we will see a vast space of further topics that require philosophical reflection, conjecture, and 
argument. 
FORMS OF REASONING AND SOME FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS 
Part of the process by which we acquire knowledge is the process of reasoning. There are 
many ways in which we reason, or argue for conclusions. Some ways seem more certain and 
convincing than others. Some forms of reasoning seem to show that if certain premises are 
assumed, then a conclusion necessarily follows. Such reasoning claims to be deductive. 
Correct deductive arguments show that if their premises are true, their conclusions are true. 
Such arguments are said to be valid. (If an argument tries to demonstrate that a conclusion 
follows necessarily from certain premises but fails to do so, the argument is said to be 
invalid.) If, in addition to being valid, an argument has premises that are true, then the 
argument is said to be sound. Valid deductive arguments guarantee that if their premises are 
true, their conclusions are true. So if one believes the premises of a valid deductive argument, 
one ought to believe the conclusion as well. The paradigm of deductive reasoning is 
mathematical proofs, but deductive reasoning is not confined to the discipline of 
mathematics. Deductive reasoning is used in every natural science, in every social science, 
and in all applied sciences. In all of these subjects, the kind of deductive reasoning 
characteristic of mathematics has an important role, but deductive reasoning can also be 
found entirely outside of mathematical contexts. Whatever the subject, some assumptions 
may necessitate the truth of other claims, and the reasoning that reveals such necessary 
connections is deductive. We also find attempts at such reasoning throughout the law and in 
theology, economics, and everyday life. 
 There are many forms of reasoning that are not deductive. Sometimes we argue that a 
conclusion ought to be believed because it provides the best explanation for phenomena; 
sometimes we argue that a conclusion ought to be believed because of some analogy with 
something already known to be true; sometimes we argue from statistical samples to larger 
populations. These forms of reasoning are called inductive. In inductive reasoning, the 
premises or assumptions do not necessitate the conclusions. 
 Of the many ways in which we reason, deductive reasoning, characteristic of 
mathematics, has historically seemed the most fundamental, the very first thing a philosopher 
should try to understand. It has seemed fundamental for two reasons. First, unlike other forms 
of reasoning, valid deductive reasoning provides a guarantee: we can be certain that if the 
premises of such an argument are true, the conclusion is also true. In contrast, various forms 
of inductive reasoning may provide useful knowledge, but they do not provide a comparable 
guarantee that if their premises are true, then so are their conclusions. Second, the very 
possibility of deductive reasoning must be somehow connected with the structure of the 
world. For deductive reasoning is reasoning in which the assumptions, or premises, 
necessitate the conclusions. But how can the world and language be so structured that some 
claims make others necessary? What is it about the postulates of arithmetic, for example, that 
makes 2 + 2 = 4 a necessary consequence of them? What is it about the world and the 
language in which we express the postulates of arithmetic that guarantees us that if we count 
2 things in one pile and 2 in another, then the count of all things in one pile or the other is 4? 
 Such questions may seem trivial or bizarre or just irritating, but we will see that 
efforts to answer them have led to the rich structure of modern logic and mathematics, and to 
the entire subject of computer science. If such questions could be answered, we might obtain 
a deeper understanding of the relations between our words and thoughts on the one hand and 
the world they are supposed to be about on the other. So some of the fundamental questions 
that philosophy has pursued for 2,500 years are these: 
• How can we determine whether or not a piece of reasoning from premises to a 
conclusion is a valid deductive argument? 
• How can we determine whether or not a conclusion is necessitated by a set of 
premises? If a conclusion is necessitated by a set of premises, how can we find a valid 
deductive argument that demonstrates that necessary connection? 
• What features of the structure of the world, the structure of language, and the relation 
between words and thoughts and things make deductive reasoning possible? 
To answer these questions is to provide a theory of deductive reasoning. Any such theory will 
be part metaphysics and part epistemology. It will tell us something about sorts of things 
there are in the world (objects? properties? relations? numbers? sets? propositions? relations 
of necessity? meanings?) and how we can know about them or use them to produce 
knowledge. 
 The next few chapters of this book are devoted to these questions. In the remainder of 
this chapter I will consider a variety of purported deductive arguments that have played an 
important role in one or another area of the history of thought. The examples are important 
for several reasons. They give us cases where want to be able to distinguish valid from 
invalid arguments. They also provide concepts that are important throughout the history of 
philosophy and that are essential to material presented later in this book. Finally, they start us 
on the way to analyzing the fundamental issues of how we learn about the structure of the 
world. 
 This chapter will present some examples of arguments that are good proofs, some 
examples of arguments that are defective but can be remedied, and some arguments that are 
not proofs at all. Part of what we are concerned with is to find conditions that separate valid 
deductive arguments from invalid deductive arguments. Any theory of deductive reasoning 
we construct should provide a way to distinguish the arguments that seem valid from the 
arguments that seem invalid. To get some practice for this part of the task of theory building, 
we will look at simple cases in which we want to form a theory that will include some 
examples and exclude a number of other examples. The cases we will consider first don’t 
have to do with the idea of deductive reasoning, but they do illustrate many aspects of what a 
theory of deductive reasoning ought to provide: they separate the correct instances, the 
positive examples, of a concept from the incorrect instances, the negative examples. 
 Here is a very simple case. Suppose you are given this sequence of numbers: 1, 2, 5, 
10, 17, 26, 37, 50, 65, 82. What is the general rule for continuing the sequence? In this case 
the numbers listed are positive examples to be included in a formula, and all the numbers 
between 1 and 
The Socratic method 
Socrates was Plato’s teacher. About 399 B.C., at the age of 70, he was put to death by the 
citizens of Athens, ostensibly for impiety and corrupting the youth of the city but probably in 
fact for his political views and for the political actions of some of his students. Plato authored 
a series of philosophical dialogues in which Socrates is always the major figure. Socrates, as 
Plato depicted him, was concerned with such questions as, What is knowledge? What is 
virtue? His procedure for inquiring into such questions was to collect positive cases, of virtue 
for example, and negative cases as well. He then attempted to formulate conditions that will 
include all of the positive examples and none of the negative examples. If further examples 
were found that conflict with a proposed condition (that is, positive examples the condition 
does not include or negative examples the condition does include), Socrates (or other 
characters in Plato’s dialogues) then tried a new condition. Plato’s Socrates applied the 
method to understanding natural objects and kinds and also moral kinds, such as virtue. 
 Plato held that true understanding of anything, of virtue for example, requires more 
than a theory that includes all the positive examples of virtue and excludes all the negative 
examples. One must also know why the positive examples of virtue are positive examples, 
i.e., what ties them together. 
82 not in the list are negative examples that should not be included. (The sequence can be 
generated by the formula n2 + i, for n = 0, 1, 2, 3, and so on.) 
 Let’s consider a very different kind of example, one where there are again a number 
of positive examples and a number of negative examples. Suppose you are given the positive 
and negative examples of arches shown in figure 1.1. How could you state conditions that 
include the positive examples but exclude the negative examples? You might try something 
like this: ‘X is an arch if and only if X consists of two series of blocks, and in each series each 
block except the first is supported by another block of that series, and no block in one series 
touches any block in the other series, and there is a block supported by a block in each 
series.” 
 Here is still another kind of example. Artificial languages, such as programming 
languages or simple codes, are constructed out of vocabulary elements. A statement in such a 
language is a finite sequence of vocabulary elements. But not every sequence of vocabulary 
elements will make sense in the language. In BASIC or Pascal you can’t just write down any 
sequence of symbols and have a well-formed statement. The same is true in natural 
languages, such as English. Not just any string of words in English makes an English 
sentence. Suppose you learned that the examples in table 1.1 are positive and negative 
examples of well-formed sequences in some unknown code, and suppose you also knew that 
there are an infinite number of other well-formed sequences in the code. What do you guess 
is the condition for a well-formed sequence in this code? Can you find a general condition 
that includes all of the positive examples and none of the negative examples? 
 For several reasons the philosophical problem with which we are concerned is more 
difficult than any of these examples. We want a theory that will separate valid deductive 
arguments from deductive arguments that are not valid. The problem is intrinsically difficult 
because the forms of deductive argument are very complex. It is also difficult because we are 
not always sure whether or not to count specific arguments as valid. And finally, this 
philosophical problem is intrinsically more difficult because we not only want a theory that 
will separate valid demonstrations from invalid ones, we also want to know why and how 
valid demonstrations ensure that if their premises are true then necessarily their conclusions 
are true. 
 In keeping with the Socratic method, the first thing to do in trying to understand the 
nature of demonstration is to collect a few examples. The histories of philosophy, science, 
mathematics, and religion are filled with arguments that claim to be proofs of their 
conclusions. Unfortunately, the arguments don’t come labeled “valid” or “invalid,” and we 
must decide for ourselves, after examination, whether an argument is good, bad, or good 
enough to be reformulated into a valid argument. We will next consider a series of examples 
of simple arguments from geometry, theology, metaphysics, and set theory. The point of the 
examples is always to move toward an understanding of the three questions above. 
GEOMETRY 
Euclid’s geometry is still studied in secondary schools, although not always in the form in 
which he developed it. Euclid developed geometry as an axiomatic system. After a sequence 
of definitions, Euclid’s Elements gives a sequence of assumptions. Some of these have 
nothing to do with geometry in particular. Euclid calls them “common notions.” Others have 
specifically geometrical content. Euclid calls them “postulates.” The theorems of geometry 
are deduced from the common notions and the postulates. Euclid’s aim is that his 
assumptions will be sufficient to necessitate, or as we now say, entail, all the truths of 
geometry. We aspire for completeness. This means that every question about geometry 
expressible in Euclid’s terms can be answered by his assumptions if only the proof of the 
answer can be found. Some of Euclid’s definitions, common notions, postulates, and the first 
proposition he proves from them are given below: 
Plato and Euclid 
Plato, who died about 347 B.C., is recognized as the first systematic Western philosopher. 
During the height of the Athenian empire Plato directed a school, the Academy, devoted to 
both mathematics and philosophy. No study of philosophy was possible in the Academy 
without a study of mathematics. The principal mathematical subject was geometry, although 
arithmetic and other mathematical subjects were also studied. It seems likely that textbooks 
on geometry were produced in Plato’s Academy and that these texts attempted to systematize 
the subject and derive geometrical theorems from simpler assumptions (the Greeks called the 
simple parts of a thing its elements). Euclid studied in the Academy around 300 B.C., and his 
book, The Elements, is thought to be derived from earlier texts of the school. Euclid later 
established his own mathematical school in Alexandria, Egypt. 
Definitions 
1. A point is that which has no part. 
2. A line is breadthless length. 
3. The extremities of a line are points. 
4. A straight line is a line that lies evenly with the points on itself. 
5. A surface is that which has length and breadth only. 
6. The extremities of a surface are lines. 
7. A plane surface is a surface that lies evenly with the straight lines on itself. 
8. A plane angle is the inclination to one another of two lines in a plane that meet one 
another and do not lie in a straight line. 
9. And when the lines containing the angle are straight, the angle is called rectilinear. 
10. When a straight line set up on a straight line makes the adjacent angles equal to one 
another, each of the equal angles is right, and the straight line standing on the other is called a 
perpendicular to that on which it stands. 
11. An obtuse angle is an angle greater than a right angle. 
12. An acute angle is an angle less than a right angle. 
13. A boundary is that which is an extremity of anything. 
14. A figure is that which is contained by any boundary or boundaries. 
15. A circle is a plane figure contained by one line such that all the straight lines falling 
upon it from one point among those lying within the figure are equal to one another. 
16. And the point is called the center of the circle. 
. 
. 
. 
19. Rectilinear figures are those contained by straight lines, trilateral figures being those 
contained by three. 
20. Of trilateral figures, an equilateral triangle is that which has its three sides equal. 
. 
. 
. 
23. Parallel straight lines are straight lines that, being in the same plane and being 
produced indefinitely in both directions, do not meet one another in either direction. 
Common notions 
1. Things that are equal to the same thing are also equal to one another. 
2. If equals be added to equals, the wholes are equal. 
3. If equals be subtracted from equals, the remainders are equal. 
4. Things which coincide with one another are equal to one another. 
5. The whole is greater than the part. 
Postulates 
1. It is possible to draw a straight line from any point to any point. 
2. It is possible to produce a finite straight line continuously in a straight line. 
3. It is possible to describe a circle with any center and distance. 
4. All right angles are equal to one another. 
5. If a straight line falling on two straight lines make the interior angles on the same side 
less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if produced indefinitely, meet on the side of 
the angles less than the two right angles. 
Proposition 1 For every straight-line segment, there exists an equilateral triangle having 
that line segment as one side. 
Proof Let AB be the given finite straight line. Thus it is required to construct an equilateral 
triangle on the straight line AB. Let circle BCD be drawn with center A and distance AB 
(postulate 3). Again, let circle ACE be drawn with center B and distance BA (postulate 3). 
And from point C, at which the circles cut one another, to points A, B, let the straight lines 
CA, CB be joined (postulate 1). (see figure 1.2.) Now since point A is the center of the circle 
CDB, AC is equal to AB. Again, since point B is the center of circle CAE, BC is equal to BA. 
But CA was also proved equal to AB. Therefore, each of the straight lines CA, CB is equal to 
AB. And things that are equal to the same thing are also equal to one another (common notion 
1). Therefore, CA is also equal to CB. Therefore, the three straight lines CA, AB, BC are equal 
to one another. Therefore, triangle ABC is equilateral, and it has been constructed on the 
given straight line AB.1 Q.E.D. 
 Lest we forget, the central philosophical questions we have about Euclid’s proposition 
concern whether or not his assumptions do in fact necessitate that for any line segment there 
exists an equilateral triangle having that segment as a side, and if they do necessitate this 
proposition, why and how the necessitation occurs. We will not even begin to consider 
theories that attempt to answer this question until the next chapter. For the present, note some 
things about Euclid’s proof of his first proposition. 
• The proof is like a short essay in which one sentence follows another in sequence. 
• Each sentence of the proof is justified either by preceding sentences of the proof or by 
the definitions, postulates, or common notions. 
• The conclusion to be proved is stated in the last sentence of the proof. 
• The proposition proved is logically quite complex. It asserts that for every line 
segment L, there exists an object T that is an equilateral triangle, and that T and L stand in a 
particular relation, namely that the equilateral triangle T has line segment L as one side. 
• Euclid actually claims to prove something stronger. What he claims to prove is that if 
his postulates are understood to guarantee a method for finding a line segment connecting any 
two points (as with a ruler) and a method for constructing a circle of any specified radius (as 
with a compass), then there is a procedure that will actually construct an equilateral triangle 
having any given line segment as one side. Euclid’s proof that such triangles exist is 
constructive. It shows they exist by giving a general procedure, or algorithm, for constructing 
them. 
• The proof comes with a picture (figure 1.2). The picture illustrates the idea of the 
proof and makes the sentences in the proof easier to understand. Yet the picture itself does 
not seem to be part of the argument for the proposition, only a way of making the argument 
more easily understood. 
 Before we leave Euclid (although we will consider him and this very proof again in 
the later chapters), I should note some important features of his definitions. Some of the 
definitions define geometrical notions, such as “point” and “line,” that are used in the 
propositions of Euclid’s geometry. These notions are defined in terms of other notions that 
the reader is supposed to understand already. Definition 1 says, “A point is that which has no 
part.” Unless we have a prior understanding of “part” that is mathematically exact (which is 
not very likely), this definition can be of no use in Euclid’s proofs. Why is it there? 
Presumably to aid our intuitions in reading the subsequent propositions and proofs. Most of 
Euclid’s definitions are like this; they define a geometrical notion in terms of some other 
undefined notions. (In fact, there are quite a few undefined notions used in the definitions.) 
But some of Euclid’s definitions define geometric notions at least partly in terms of other 
geometric notions. Thus definition 15, the definition of a circle, defines circles in terms of the 
notions of figure, boundary, line, equality of straight lines, and incidence (“falling upon”) of a 
straight line and a line. 
 We have seen in Euclid’s system and his first proposition something that is almost a 
demonstration of a conclusion from premises. We have also seen that his argument has a 
special structure, different, for example, from the structure a poem might have, and that it 
contains features designed as psychological aids to the reader. We have also seen that it is 
hopeless to try to define every term but that it is not in the least pointless to try to give 
informal explanations of the meanings of technical terms used in an argument. 
Study Questions 
1. List the undefined terms that occur in Euclid’s definitions. 
2. The key idea in Euclid’s proof is to use point C, where the circle centered at A and the 
circle centered at B intersect, as the third vertex (besides A and B) of an equilateral triangle. 
Does anything in Euclid’s axioms guarantee that the circle centered on A and the circle 
centered on B intersect? 
3. Describe an imaginary world in which proposition 1 is false. (Hint: Imagine a space 
that has only one dimension.) Which of Euclid’s postulates, if any, are also false in this 
world? 
4. Are there contexts in which a proof consists of nothing more than a picture? Consider 
questions about whether or not a plane surface can be completely covered by tiles of a fixed 
shape, hexagons or pentagons, for example. 
5. One of the aims of Euclid’s formulation of geometry seems to have been to derive all 
of geometry from assumptions that are very simple and whose truth seems self-evident. Do 
any of Euclid’s five postulates seem less simple and less self-evident than the others? Why? 
GOD AND SAINT ANSELM 
From the first centuries after Christ until the seventeenth century, most civilized Europeans 
believed in nothing so firmly as the existence of God. Despite the scarcity of doubters, 
Christian intellectuals still sought proofs of God’s existence and wrote arguments against real 
or imagined atheists. Some of these attempts at demonstrations of the existence of God are 
still presented in religious schools nowadays, even though most logicians regard them as 
simple fallacies. However, at least one of the medieval proofs of the existence of God, Saint 
Anselm’s (1033–1109), is still of some logical interest. Let’s consider it. 
 Anselm gave his proof of the existence of God in several forms. Two versions of the 
argument are given in the following passage: 
And so, O Lord, since thou givest understanding to faith, give me to understand—as far as 
thou knowest it to be good for me—that thou dost exist, as we believe, and that thou art what 
we believe thee to be. Now we believe that thou art a being than which none greater can be 
thought. Or can it be that there is no such being since “the fool hath said in his heart, ‘there is 
no God’” [Psalms 14:1; 53:1]. But when this same fool hears what I am saying—“A being 
than which none greater can be thought”—he understands what he hears, and what he 
understands is in his understanding, even if he does not understand that it exists. For it is one 
thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another thing to understand that it exists. 
When a painter considers beforehand what he is going to paint, he has it in his understanding, 
but he does not suppose that what he has not yet painted already exists. But when he has 
painted it, he both has it in his understanding and understands that what he has now produced 
exists. Even the fool, then, must be convinced that a being than which none greater can be 
thought exists at least in his understanding, since when he hears this he understands it, and 
whatever is understood is in the understanding. But clearly that than which a greater cannot 
be thought cannot exist in the understanding alone. For if it is actually in the understanding 
alone, it can be thought of as existing also in reality, and this is greater. Therefore, if that than 
which a greater cannot be thought is in the understanding alone, this same thing than which a 
greater cannot be thought is that than which a greater can he thought. But obviously this is 
impossible. Without doubt, therefore, there exists, both in the understanding and in reality, 
something than which a greater cannot be thought. 
 God cannot be thought of as nonexistent. And certainly it exists so truly that it cannot 
be thought of as nonexistent. For something can be thought of as existing, which cannot be 
thought of as not existing, and this is greater than that which can be thought of as not 
existing. Thus if that than which a greater cannot be thought can be thought of as not existing, 
this very thing than which a greater cannot be thought is not that than which a greater cannot 
be thought. But this is contradictory. So, then, there truly is a being than which a greater 
cannot be thought—so truly that it cannot even be thought of as not existing.2 
 Anselm’s argument in the second paragraph just cited might be outlined in the 
following way: 
Premise 1: A being that cannot be thought of as not existing is greater than a being that can 
be thought of as not existing. 
Therefore, if God can be thought of as not existing, then a greater being that cannot be 
thought of as not existing can be thought of. 
Premise 2: God is the being than which nothing greater can be thought of. 
Conclusion: God cannot be thought of as not existing. 
The sentence in the reconstruction beginning with “Therefore” does not really follow from 
premise 1. It requires the further assumption, which Anselm clearly believed but did not state, 
that it is possible to think of a being than which nothing greater can be conceived or thought 
of. 
 The argument of the first paragraph seems slightly different, and more complicated. I 
outline it as follows: 
Premise 1: We can conceive of a being than which none greater can be conceived. 
Premise 2: Whatever is conceived exists in the understanding of the conceiver. 
Premise 3: That which exists in the understanding of a conceiver and also exists in reality is 
greater than an otherwise similar thing that exists only in the understanding of a conceiver. 
Therefore, a being conceived, than which none greater can be conceived, must exist in reality 
as well as in the understanding. 
Premise 4: God is a being than which none greater can be conceived. 
Conclusion: God exists in reality. 
The arguments seem very different from Euclid’s proof. Anselm’s presentation is not 
axiomatic. There is no system of definitions and postulates. In some other respects, however, 
Anselm’s arguments have similarities to Euclid’s geometric proof. Note the following about 
Anselm’s arguments: 
• Anselm’s arguments are meant to be demonstrations of their conclusions from 
perfectly uncontroversial premises. The arguments aim to show that the truth of the premises 
necessitates the truth of the conclusions. 
• In the first argument, the discussion of the painter and the painting is not essential to 
the proof. Anselm includes the discussion of a painter and painting to help the reader 
understand what he, Anselm, means by distinguishing between an object existing in the 
understanding and understanding that an object exists. The painter discussion therefore plays 
a role in Anselm’s proof much like the role played by the drawing in Euclid’s proof: it is 
there to help the reader see what is going on, but it is not essential to the argument. 
• Like Euclid’s proof, Anselm’s arguments can be viewed as little essays in which, if 
we discount explanatory remarks and digressions, each claim is intended to follow either 
from previous claims or from claims that every reader will accept. 
Study Questions 
I. Anselm seems to have thought that his arguments establish that there is one and only 
one being than which none greater can be conceived. But his premises do not appear to 
necessitate that conclusion; we could consistently suppose that there are many distinct beings 
each of which is such that none greater can be conceived. What plausible premises might 
Anselm add that would ensure that at most one being is such that none greater can be 
conceived? 
2. One famous objection to Anselm’s argument is this: If Anselm’s argument were valid, 
then by the same form of reasoning, we could prove that a perfect island exists. But the island 
than which none greater can be conceived does not exist in reality. Therefore, something 
must be wrong with Anselm’s proof of the existence of God. Give an explicit argument that 
follows the form of Anselm’s and leads to the conclusion that there exists an island than 
which none greater can be conceived. Is the objection a good one? Has Anselm any plausible 
reply? 
3. Giving a convincing counterexample to an argument shows that either the premises of 
the argument are false or the premises do not necessitate the truth of the conclusion. But the 
“perfect island” objection does not show specifically what is wrong with Anselm’s argument. 
Try to explain specifically what is wrong with your proof that there exists a perfect island. 
GOD AND SAINT THOMAS 
Let me add another example to our collection of demonstrations. The most famous proofs of 
the existence of God are due to Saint Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225–1274). Aquinas gave five 
proofs, which are sometimes referred to as the “five ways.” They are presented in relatively 
concise form in his Summa Theologica. Four of the five arguments have essentially the same 
form, and the fifth is particularly obscure. I will consider only the first argument. In reading 
the argument, you must bear in mind that Aquinas had a very different picture of the physical 
universe than ours, and he assumed that his readers would fully share his picture. That picture 
derives from Aristotle. According to the picture Aquinas derived from Aristotelian physics, 
objects do not move unless acted on by another object. Further, Aristotle distinguished 
between the properties an object actually has and the properties it has the potential to have. 
Any change in an object consists in the object coming actually to have properties that it 
previously had only potentially. 
 In translation Aquinas’s argument is as follows: 
The existence of God can be proved in five ways. 
 The first and most manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and 
evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever 
Aquinas and Aristotle 
Aristotle was a student of Plato’s. After Plato’s death, Aristotle left Athens and subsequently 
became tutor to Alexander of Macedonia, later Alexander the Great. When Alexander 
conquered Greece, Aristotle returned to Athens and opened his own school. With the collapse 
of the Macedonian empire, Aristotle had to flee Athens, and he died a year later. During his 
life he wrote extensively on logic, scientific method and philosophy of science, metaphysics, 
physics, biology, cosmology, rhetoric, ethics and other topics. Saint Thomas Aquinas helped 
to make Aristotle’s philosophy acceptable to Christian Europe in the late Middle Ages. 
Writing in the thirteenth century, Aquinas gave Christianized versions of Aristotle’s 
cosmology, physics, and metaphysics. The result of the efforts of Aquinas and others was to 
integrate Aristotelian thought into the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church in the late 
Middle Ages. Aristotle’s doctrines also became central in the teachings of the first 
universities, which began in Europe during the thirteenth century. The tradition of Christian 
Aristotelian thought that extends from the Middle Ages to the seventeenth century is known 
as scholasticism. 
is moved is moved by another, for nothing can be moved except it is in potentiality to that 
towards which it is moved; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in actuality. For motion 
is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can 
be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus 
that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, 
and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at 
once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what 
is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially 
cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should he 
both mover and moved, i.e., that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is moved must be 
moved by another. If that by which it is moved be itself moved, then this also must needs be 
moved by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go to infinity, because then 
there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover, seeing that subsequent 
movers move only inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover; as the staff moves only 
because it is moved by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, moved by 
no other; and this everyone understands to be God.3 
 Aquinas’s attempted demonstration again shares many of the features of Euclid’s and 
Anselm’s arguments. From premises that are supposed, at the time, to be uncontroversial, a 
conclusion is intended to follow necessarily. The argument is again a little essay, with claims 
succeeding one another in a logical sequence. The example of heat is another illustration, like 
Anselm’s painter and Euclid’s diagram, intended to further the reader’s understanding, but it 
is not an essential part of the argument. 
 Aquinas’s argument illustrates that a proof (or attempted proof) may have another 
proof contained within it. Thus the remarks about potentiality and actuality are designed to 
serve as an argument for the conclusion that nothing moves itself, and that conclusion in turn 
serves as a premise in the argument for the existence of an unmoved mover. 
 Neglecting Aquinas’s remarks about potentiality, which serve as a sub-argument for 
premise 2, we can outline the argument in the following way: 
Premise 1: Some things move. 
Premise 2: Anything that moves does so because of something else. 
Therefore, if whatever moves something itself moves, it must be moved by a third thing. 
Therefore, if there were an infinite sequence of movers, there would be no first mover, and 
hence no movers at all. 
Therefore, there cannot be an infinite sequence of movers. 
Conclusion: There is a first, unmoved mover. 
 One way to show that the premises of the argument do not necessitate Aquinas’s 
conclusion is to imagine some way in which the premises of the argument could be true and 
the conclusion could at the same time be false. With this argument, that is easy to do. We can 
imagine that if object A moves object B, object B moves object A. In that case no third object 
would be required to explain the motion of B. We can also imagine an infinite chain of 
objects in which the first object is moved by the second, the second by the third, the third by 
the fourth, and so on forever. Neither of these imaginary circumstances is self-contradictory 
(although Aquinas would certainly have denied their possibility). So we can criticize 
Aquinas’s argument on at least two counts: 
• The first “therefore” doesn’t follow. The two premises are consistent with the 
assumption that if one thing moves another, then the second, and not any third thing, moves 
the first. 
• The second “therefore” doesn’t follow. We can consistently imagine an infinite 
sequence of movers without there being an endpoint, a “first mover,” just as we can 
consistently imagine the infinite sequence of positive and negative integers in which there is 
no first number. 
Study Questions 
I. If we ignore other difficulties with Aquinas’s argument, would it show that there is 
one and only one unmoved mover? 
2. Why should the fact that we can imagine circumstances in which the premises of the 
argument are true and the conclusion is false tell against the value of the proposed proof? 
Does the fact that we can imagine such circumstances show that the premises do not 
necessitate the conclusion? If we could not consistently imagine circumstances in which the 
premises were true and the conclusion false, would that show that the premises do necessitate 
the conclusion? Why or why not? 
3. Read the following argument, also from Saint Thomas. Outline the argument (follow 
the examples in this chapter). Explain why the premises do not necessitate the conclusion. 
(When Saint Thomas uses the term “efficient cause,” he is using an idea of Aristotle’s. You 
will not misunderstand the passage if you simply read the term as meaning “cause.” By 
“ultimate cause” of an effect, Aquinas means the cause that is nearest in time to the effect.) 
The second way [to prove the existence of God] is from the nature of efficient cause. In the 
world of sensible things we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known 
(neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for 
so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to 
go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the 
intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether 
intermediate cause be several, or one only. Now to take away the cause is to take away the 
effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate 
nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there 
will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate 
efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient 
cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.4 
INFINITY 
Evidently, Aquinas had trouble thinking through the meaning of infinity. He wasn’t alone, 
and the history of reasoning about infinity offers other examples for our collection. Paradoxes 
and puzzles about the infinite are very ancient, predating even Plato’s writings. Some ancient 
puzzles about motion are attributed to Zeno of Elea, who lived in the fifth century before 
Christ. Some of Zeno’s paradoxes involve subtle difficulties about the notion of infinity that 
were only resolved by mathematicians in the nineteenth century. In each case the paradox 
appears to be a proof of something absurd. One of Zeno’s paradoxes, known as the Achilles 
paradox, is very simple. 
 Suppose Achilles races a tortoise. Let the tortoise travel with speed s. The tortoise is 
permitted to travel a certain distance d before Achilles begins the race. In order to catch the 
tortoise, Achilles must first travel distance d, which will require time t(d). In that time the 
tortoise will have moved a distance s × t(d). To catch the tortoise after reaching point d, 
Achilles must first reach point d + (s × t(d)) from point d. That will take Achilles an amount 
of time equal to t(s × t(d)). In that time the tortoise will have moved a further distances s × t(s 
× t(d)). If we continue in this way, it always requires a finite time for Achilles to move from 
where he is at a moment to where the tortoise is at that same moment. In that amount of time, 
while Achilles is catching up to where the tortoise was, the tortoise will have moved a further 
distance. The motions generate the sequence pictured in figure 1.3. So there is no moment at 
which Achilles will catch the tortoise. 
 Zeno’s argument looks like a deductive proof, but since the conclusion is false, we 
know that either some assumption of the argument must be false or there must be a fallacy 
hidden somewhere in the argument. Since the premises are apparently banal, it seems that 
there must be a fallacy: the premises don’t necessitate the conclusion. Zeno’s argument points 
out that corresponding to Achilles' motion and the motion of the tortoise, there is an infinite 
series of distances between Achilles and the tortoise. No distance in this series is zero, but as 
the series goes on, the distances between Achilles and the tortoise get smaller and smaller. 
There is a corresponding infinite sequence of temporal intervals in which each interval in the 
sequence represents the time it takes for Achilles to run from the place where he is at one 
moment to the place where the tortoise is at that same moment. Zeno concludes from this that 
Achilles cannot catch the tortoise, and this is where the fallacy lies. We are familiar with 
infinite sequences of positive quantities that add up to a finite quantity. The decimal 
expansion of the fraction 1/3, for example, is equal to 0.3 + 0.03 + 0.003 + 0.0003 +   , where 
the sequence continues forever. With the help of modern mathematics, we would say that the 
sequence of distances between Achilles and the tortoise converges to zero and the sum of the 
sequence of temporal intervals is some finite number. That sum, whatever it is, represents the 
time required for Achilles to catch the tortoise. 
 The concept of infinity also created problems for later philosophical writers interested 
in the properties of God. Benedict Spinoza was a seventeenth century pantheist; he held that 
God consists of everything there is. Individual minds and bodies are, in Spinoza’s terms, 
modes of God’s existence. 
 Spinoza was troubled by the following objection to his view: 
We showed that apart from God no substance can be or can be conceived; and hence we 
deduced that extended substance is one of God’s infinite attributes. 
 However, for a fuller explanation, I will refute my opponents’ arguments, which all 
come down to this. First, they think that corporeal substance, insofar as it is substance, is 
made up of of parts, and therefore they deny that it can be infinite, and consequently that it 
can pertain to God. This they illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one or two. 
They say that if corporeal substance is infinite, suppose it to be divided into two parts. Each 
of these parts will be either finite or infinite. If the former, then the infinite is made up of two 
finite parts, which 
Spinoza and Euclid 
Spinoza (1632–1677) was the child of Spanish Jews who had moved to Holland to avoid 
religious persecution. He himself was ostracized from the Jewish community for his opinions 
about God. Spinoza earned his living as a lens grinder, but he was well known to his 
intellectually prominent contemporaries and was offered university positions, which he 
refused. 
 Spinoza’s major work, The Ethics, develops a view of nature in which there is a single 
substance, God. Most remarkable to a modern reader, Spinoza’s Ethics is presented in the 
same format as Euclid’s Elements. There are definitions, postulates, propositions, and 
proof’s, or at least attempted proofs. In putting his theological views in this form, Spinoza 
exemplified the view, common among the great intellects of his time, that reasoning about 
metaphysical and epistemological questions should be rigorously scientific, and Euclid’s 
geometry represented, even then, the ideal deductive science. 
is absurd. If the latter, then there is than an infinite twice as great as another infinite, which is 
also absurd.5 
Spinoza was unsure whether or not this argument is valid. He responded, rather implausibly, 
that even though everything corporeal is an attribute of God, God does not have parts. 
 The argument Spinoza must address has a special form. It sets out to prove something, 
in this case that God is not corporeal. It proceeds by assuming the denial of what is to be 
proved. That is, it proceeds by assuming that God is corporeal. From that assumption, 
perhaps with the aid of other assumptions that are thought to be obvious, the argument then 
tries to establish something thought to be false. The idea is that if the denial of a claim 
necessitates something false, then the claim itself must be true. This form of argument is 
known as reductio ad ubsurdum (reduction to the absurd), or more briefly, as a reductio 
argument. 
 We can outline the argument of Spinoza’s opponents in the following way: 
Assumption: God is corporeal. 
Premise: Whatever is corporeal can be divided into two parts. 
Premise: God is infinite. 
Hence, an infinity can be divided into parts. 
Premise: Every part is either infinite or finite. 
Premise: The whole is the union of its parts. 
Hence, either an infinity is the union of two finite parts, which is impossible, or an infinity is 
the union of two lesser infinities, which is also impossible. 
Conclusion: the assumption is false, i.e., God is not corporeal. 
We can see that the argument is invalid, and for several different reasons, all having to do 
with the next to last sentence, beginning “Hence.” First and most simply, the last step before 
the conclusion omits a possible case: the infinity might be divided into two parts, one of 
which is finite and the other infinite. Second, an infinite collection of objects can be divided 
into two subcollections, each of which is infinite. The integers, for example, consist of all 
negative integers together with all nonnegative integers. The set of all negative integers is 
infinite, and the set of all nonnegative integers is also infinite. 
INFINITY AND CARDINALITY* 
Spinoza’s argument does raise an interesting and fundamental question about the infinite: 
Can one infinity be larger than another infinity? In the nineteenth century this question 
engendered a number of simple proofs that created a revolution in our understanding of 
infinity, and since the question touches on an issue that runs through the history of 
philosophy, it is worth considering some of the relevant ideas and arguments here. 
 What do we mean when we say that one set or collection is larger than another? 
Consider the two collections below: 
{A, B, C, D} 
{X, Y, Z, U, V} 
Clearly, the second set is bigger that the first set, but what makes it so? One answer is this: If 
we try to match each member of the first set with a unique member of the second set, we can 
do so. For example, we can match A with X, B with Y, C with Z, and D with U. But if we try 
to match each member of the second set with a unique member of the first set, we run out of 
distinct things. For example, we can match X with A, Y with B, Z with C, and U with D. But 
then we still have V left over; whatever member of the first set we choose to match with V, 
that member will already have been matched with X, Y, Z, or U. We say that there is a one-to-
one mapping from the first set into the second set, but there is no one-to-one mapping from 
the second set into the first. 
 I will take this as our definition of “larger than” for sets: 
Definition Set K is larger than set L if and only if there is a one-to-one mapping relating 
each member of L to a distinct member of K but there is no one-to-one mapping relating each 
member of K to a. distinct member of L. 
 Continuing with this idea, we can say what it means for two sets to be of the same 
size. Two sets are of the same size if the first is not larger than the second and also the second 
is not larger than the first. When neither of two sets is larger than the other in this sense, we 
say they have the same cardinality. 
Definition Any two sets K, L have the same cardinality if and only if there is a one-to-one 
mapping relating each member of K to a distinct member of L and there is a one-to-one 
mapping relating each member of L to a distinct member of K. 
For finite sets, the notion of cardinality is just our ordinary notion of the size of a set. All sets 
with 4 members have the same cardinality, all sets with 5 members have the same cardinality, 
sets with 5 members are larger than sets with 4 members, and so on. 
 An obvious property of finite sets is this: If K and L are finite sets and if K is a proper 
subset of L (that is, every member of K is a member of L but some member of L is not a 
member of K), then L is larger than K. The set {X, Y, Z}, for example, is larger than the set 
{X, Y}. Infinite sets behave differently. An infinite set can have the same cardinality as one of 
its proper subsets. Consider an example, the set of positive integers, and a proper subset of it, 
the set of even positive integers. There is a one-to-one correspondence that takes every 
positive integer to a distinct even positive integer, and the same correspondence viewed in the 
other direction takes every even positive integer to a distinct positive integer: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ... 
↕ ↕ ↕ ↕ ↕ ↕ ↕ ↕ ↕ ↕  
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 ... 
The rule of correspondence is that each positive integer n is mapped to the even positive 
integer 2n. So the set of positive integers has the same cardinality as the set of even positive 
integers. You can also easily show that the set of positive integers has the same cardinality as 
the set of odd positive integers, and also the same cardinality as the set of all integers, 
whether positive, zero, or negative. All of these distinct infinite sets have the same size. 
 The property of having the same cardinality as a proper subset of itself neatly 
separates the finite from the infinite. Finite sets can’t have that property, whereas every 
infinite set will have it for some of its proper subsets. The distinction is sometimes used to 
define the notion of an infinite set: 
Definition A set is infinite if and only if it can be put into one-to-one correspondence with 
a proper subset of itself. 
 Now an obvious question raised by Spinoza’s argument is this: Are some infinities 
larger than other infinities? In view of the considerations we have just discussed, we can 
understand that question in the following way: Are there two infinite sets that cannot be put 
into one-to-one correspondence with one another? In the nineteenth century, Georg Cantor 
(1845–1918) proved that there are. I will consider simple versions of two of his proofs. One 
concerns the number of subsets of any set. It is easy to see that any finite set has more distinct 
subsets that it has members. The set {A}, for example, has only one member, but it has two 
distinct subsets, namely itself and the empty set. The set {A, B) has two members, but it has 
four distinct subsets. Given any finite set S with n members, we can count the distinct subsets 
of n in the following way. Imagine forming an arbitrary subset U of S. For any member of S 
there are two choices: either the member is in U or it isn’t in U. To determine U, we have to 
make that choice for each of the n members of S, so we have n choices, each with 2 options. 
Every distinct way of making the choices results in a distinct subset of S, so there are 2n 
distinct subsets. And for all n, 2n is greater than n. Cantor extends the conclusion to sets with 
infinite cardinality: 
Cantor’s first theorem For any set K, the set, denoted β(K), whose members are all 
subsets of K is larger than K. 
Proof Suppose the theorem is false. Then there is some set W such that the set β(W) of all 
subsets of W is not larger than W. So β(W) can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with 
W, i.e., for every member of β(W) there will be a corresponding distinct member of W. Let g 
denote such a correspondence or mapping. So g maps the set of all subsets of W, β(W), one-
to-one into W. Let g−1 denote the inverse of g. The inverse mapping g−1 maps members of W 
to subsets of W, and for all subsets S of W, g−1 (g(s)) = S. if K is any subset of W, then K is a 
member of β(W), and so g puts K into correspondence with some member of W, which I 
denote by g(K). Then the following subset of W, which I will call R, must exist: R = {x in W 
such that x  g−1(x)}. Remember that because g is a one-to-one correspondence, for each x 
there can be only one set S such that x = g(S). 
 Now consider R as defined. R is a subset of W, so R is a member of β(W). So g, which 
I have assumed to exist, puts R in correspondence with some member g(R) of W. Every 
member of W is either a member of R or not a member of R. Hence g(R) is either a member 
of R or not a member of R. Suppose that g(R) is a member of R. Then since R is the set of all 
members x of W such that x is not a member of g−1 (x), it must he the case that g(R) is a 
member of W, which is not a member of R. So if g(R) is a member of R, then g(R) is not a 
member of R, which is a contradiction. Hence g(R) cannot be a member of R. But if g(R) is 
not a member of R, then since R is the set of all members x of W such that x  g−1 (x), it 
follows that g(R) is a member of R (because g(R) satisfies the necessary and sufficient 
condition for being a member of R). 
 Hence the assumption entails that there exist a set whose existence implies a 
contradiction. Since a contradiction must be false, the assumption must be false. Q.E.D. 
 The proof of Cantor’s first theorem is more complex than any of those we have 
considered previously. It is a reductio argument; that is, the theorem is proved by assuming 
its denial and deducing a contradiction. It has as an immediate corollary the result that there 
are infinite sets of different size. 
 Cantor gave a particular example of two infinite sets one of which is larger than the 
other. His example does not consider a set and the corresponding set of all subsets of that set. 
Instead, it concerns the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, ... and the set of all functions defined on 
the natural numbers. Cantor proved that the set of all functions taking natural numbers as 
arguments and having natural numbers as values is larger than the set of all natural numbers 
itself. To understand his argument we need a few definitions. 
Definition A function of one argument is any set of ordered pairs of objects such that for all 
a, b, c, if <a, b> and <a, c> are both in the set, then b = c. Equivalently, a function is a set of 
ordered pairs in which there arc no two ordered pairs with the same first member but different 
second members. 
Definition Two functions are one and the same if they arc the same set of ordered pairs. 
The set of first members of ordered pairs in a function is called the domain of the function, 
while the set of all second members of ordered pairs in a function is called the range of the 
function. 
Definition A function is one-to-one if and only if for all a, b, and c, if <a, b> and <c, b> are 
in the function, then a = c. 
Definition A function on the natural numbers is a set of ordered pairs whose domain is the 
natural numbers and whose range is contained in the set of natural numbers. 
Cantor’s second theorem The set F of all functions on the natural numbers is larger than 
the set N of all natural numbers. 
Proof Suppose that the proposition is false. Then we can form a one-to-one correspondence 
between the natural numbers and the functions in F so that each function in F is assigned a 
number and no two functions in F are assigned the same number. So let the functions in F be 
denoted by w1 (x), w2(x), .... Consider an infinite table in which each row is infinitely long 
and there are infinitely many rows. The ith row lists in order the values of the ith function for 
x = 1, x = 2, and so on. Such a table is illustrated in figure 1.4. 
 I will show that there is a function z on the natural numbers that is not in this table. I 
define z as follows: Make z(l), the value of z for the number 1, equal to any value different 
from w1 (l) (for example, z = w1(1) + 1). Make z(2) equal to any value different from w2(2). 
And for every number k, make z(k) equal to a value different from wk(k). I thereby alter the 
diagonal of the table in figure 1.4 to form a new counterdiagonal. 
 Then for every function w1 in the table, the value of z differs from that function for 
some argument. Hence z is a function on the natural numbers that is not in the table. But since 
the table contains the supposed enumeration of the functions in F, z is not in F, which is a 
contradiction. Since we cannot consistently suppose that the proposition is false, it is true. 
Q.E.D. 
Study Questions 
1. Prove that it follows from Cantor’s first theorem that there are two infinite sets of 
different size. 
2. Cantor’s second theorem is called a diagonalization argument because it can be 
depicted as involving a change in a diagonal. Can you picture what is going on in Cantor’s 
first theorem as also involving a diagonal? (Hint: Think of a table with a list of the members 
of W along the top and a list of the members of β(W) along the left-hand side. In each square, 
enter a I if the member of β(W) for that row has the member of W for that column as its value 
according to the assumed one-to-one correspondence g. Otherwise, enter 0 in the square. 
Now explain what the argument in the proof of Cantor’s first theorem amounts to in terms of 
this table.) 
3. What is the point of the picture in the proof of Cantor’s second theorem? 
4. Give a proof that there cannot exist a barber who shaves all and only those who do not 
shave themselves. (Hint: The argument is a simplified version of the proof strategy used for 
Cantor’s first theorem.) Can your proof be viewed as a diagonalization argument? 
CONCLUSION 
I began with a set of questions that I have not yet answered: 
1. How can we determine whether or not a piece of reasoning from premises to a 
conclusion is a valid deductive argument? 
2. How can we determine whether or not a conclusion is necessitated by a set of 
premises? If a conclusion is necessitated by a set of premises, how can we find a valid 
deductive argument that demonstrates that necessary connection? 
3. What features of the structure of the world, the structure of language, and the relation 
between words and thoughts and things make deductive reasoning possible? 
My initial approach to these questions has been Socratic: I have sought for examples of 
arguments that present valid demonstrations and arguments that fail to demonstrate their 
conclusions. In each example a set of assumptions, it is claimed, necessitate a conclusion. 
Sometimes this claim is not correct, but it still seems plausible that the argument could be 
revised so that the premises do necessitate the conclusion. Thus Euclid’s proof of his first 
proposition fails to show that the two circles he constructs intersect, and for that reason his 
postulates and common notions do not necessitate the first proposition. But it seems plausible 
that we could add axioms to Euclid’s postulates so that the resulting system would permit us 
to deduce proposition 1. Modern reformulations of Euclid’s theory do just that. On the other 
hand, some attempts at proof just seem to involve fundamental mistakes of reasoning. Other 
attempts at proof may leave us uncertain. Thus after reading and thinking about Anselm’s 
proof of the existence of God, many people are left uncertain as to whether or not the proof is 
valid. (Of course, the proof could be valid—which means that if the premises of the argument 
are true, then necessarily the conclusion is true—even though the premises of the argument 
are in fact false.) 
 I have yet to formulate a theory that will agree with, and in some sense explain, our 
judgment about which demonstrations are valid and which are not. In the next chapter we will 
consider the first such theory ever formulated, Aristotle’s theory of the syllogism. 
Review Questions 
l. Why is deductive reasoning often thought to be the first kind of reasoning that 
philosophy should try to understand? 
2. What are three fundamental questions about deductive reasoning? 
3. Explain what we want a theory of deductive reasoning to accomplish. 
4. Why is finding a good theory of deductive reasoning more difficult than finding 
conditions that will include the positive and exclude the negative examples in the coding 
problem, the series problem, and the arch problem? 
5. What is the Socratic method? 
6. What features are common to the good deductive arguments considered in this 
chapter? 
7. What is the role of the illustrations that accompany some of the arguments given in 
this chapter? 
8. What was Aquinas’s relation to Aristotle? 
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Positive and negative examples of arches 
Figure 1.2 
Figure 1.3 
Achilles and the tortoise. A = Achilles, T = the tortoise, and the lines = the distance 
remaining between Achilles and the tortoise. 
Figure 1.4 
Cantor’s diagonalization argument 
Table 1.1 
Sequences in a code 
Positive examples (well formed) Negative examples (not well formed) 
AA AAAA 
BB BBBB 
AABB BBBBAA 
AAABB AABBBB 
BBAA AAAAAA 
BBAAA BBBBBB 
BBAAABB AAAAAAAAABB 
BBAAABBB BBAAAAAAAAA 
AABBB AAAAAAAAA 
AABBAAA BBBBBBBBB 
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AAAAA  
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B  
 
  
Chapter 2 
ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF DEMONSTRATION AND PROOF 
ARISTOTLE AND GREEK SCIENCE 
In the fourth century before Christ the entire human population consisted of perhaps 130 
million people. Mediterranean civilization was spread around the coast of Greece and the 
Greek islands and in areas of modern Italy, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and northern 
Egypt. Most travel of any distance was by open boat with one or two square rigged sails and 
oarsmen. Such ships carried the produce of one region to another; they also carried soldiers 
for the almost perpetual wars of the area. 
 What was known around 400 B.C.? A wide variety of practical arts, including metal 
production and metal working sophisticated enough to make good hand tools, weapons, and 
armor; carpentry sophisticated enough to make sea-going boats; the principles of navigation, 
architectural engineering, quarrying, and stone work; methods of manufacturing cloth and 
paper; methods of animal husbandry, fishing, and peasant agriculture. 
 And what about science? In mathematics, knowledge consisted principally of 
geometry and the theory of numbers. Many physical laws of mechanics and hydraulics were 
understood and used, but astronomy was the most developed subject in the physical sciences. 
Ancient astronomy was based on naked-eye observations of the positions of the stars and on 
observations using simple instruments. Astronomy developed because it was easy to make a 
large number of relevant observations, because the motions of the planets, moon, and sun 
could be studied as applications of geometry, and because astronomy was of practical use in 
navigation. Other scientific subjects like biology and medicine were also studied, and broad 
speculations about the structure of the universe and the structure of matter were common. 
 In this setting Aristotle developed a science of biology, a theory of cosmology, a 
theory of motion, and a theory of the constitution of matter. Aristotle also produced 
something that proved to be far more important than his scientific contributions: a theory of 
how to conduct inquiry. He provided answers to questions such as these: What is chance? 
What is causality? What is a scientific explanation? What is a demonstration? How can 
experience be used to provide knowledge? What is a proof? 
 Aristotle’s scientific contributions were surpassed in many areas. By about A.D. 100 
Ptolemy had developed a theory of the motion of the planets that was more detailed and 
precise than anything Aristotle suggested. Ptolemy also contributed to optics, and Arab 
scientists of the Middle Ages extended optical studies. Archimedes made more enduring 
contributions to physics than did Aristotle, and medieval Christian thinkers developed a 
theory of motion that improved on Aristotle’s. But in contrast, Aristotle’s general conception 
of how science is to he conducted influenced Western civilization almost until the eighteenth 
century. For roughly 2,300 years Aristotle’s writings set the standards for scientific 
explanation and for deductive arguments. Aristotle’s theory of scientific method deserves our 
attention, for it is the first fully developed account of human knowledge, and it contains the 
first substantial theory of proof we know of. 
 At the very core of Aristotle’s understanding of how inquiry should be conducted is a 
theory of proof or deductive argument. Aristotle’s logical theory, which endured until late in 
the nineteenth century, is still worth studying because it is comparatively easy to understand 
and, from a modern point of view, it is correct in special cases. (For similar reasons, 
introductory physics courses present Newton’s dynamics, even though that theory has been 
superseded.) But before we turn to Aristotle’s logical theory, we should consider his general 
conception of how science should be constructed and justified. That conception is in many 
ways very different from our own understanding, but in other ways it is quite modern. It is 
not only interesting in itself; it may also help us to understand why Aristotle thought that his 
theory of proof was correct and complete. 
THE PLATONIC CONCEPTION OF KNOWLEDGE 
Aristotle was Plato’s pupil, and it is not surprising that these two great thinkers shared certain 
views. In particular, Plato and Aristotle shared a view about the logical structure of 
knowledge. 
 For Plato, the paradigmatic scientific question is of the form, “What is x?” Here x 
might be filled by some important moral characteristic, such as virtue or courage or justice, or 
by some description of a kind of thing found in nature, such as a human or earth or water, or 
even some mathematical object, such as a triangle. Plato wrote a series of dialogues in which 
questions of this kind are pursued. The Meno, for example, considers the question, What is 
virtue? 
 Plato believed that acceptable answers to such questions must have a particular form. 
Any acceptable answer must give a combination of features shared by all things that are x and 
by no things that are not x. In Plato’s conception, it is quite unsatisfactory to answer the 
question, What is virtue? by giving a list of virtues. A proper answer to the question must 
specify what it is that all things in any such list share and that makes them, and nothing else, 
virtues. 
 How are we to answer such questions? How are we to come to know what is virtue, 
what is water, what is justice? Plato held that knowledge requires certainty. By “certainty” he 
did not mean simply an unalterable conviction. Someone can have an unalterable conviction 
whether or not what they believe is the truth. They might simply be dogmatic or stubborn or 
stupid. Certainty, as Plato understood it, requires not only that one have a belief hut also that 
the belief he true and that it have been acquired by an infallible method. An infallible method 
is one that never leads to a false conclusion: whenever anyone comes to a conclusion by such 
a method, that conclusion is true. 
 Plato rightly concluded that experience can never provide us with the kind of certainty 
that he required for knowledge. No matter how carefully or thoroughly we observe or 
experiment, conclusions drawn from experience are not infallible. Both in science and in 
everyday life we sometimes drawn erroneous conclusions from our experience. Experience, 
Plato held, can form the basis of opinion, but not the basis of knowledge. 
 If we know anything, then, we cannot come to know it through experience. Plato held 
that we really don’t ever come to know anything. Anything we know, we always knew. The 
psychological process by which someone seems to come to know something, the process that 
we sometimes mistake for learning from experience, is really a process of recollection, 
according to Plato. Examples provided by experience stimulate us to remember truths that 
were stamped on our souls before our birth. Recollection is infallible because nothing but 
truth was stamped on our souls. 
 That is how we know, according to Plato. But what is it that. we know? We tend to 
think that knowledge is about the world, about the things and events and processes and 
relationships and causal powers in the world. Plato thought otherwise. The clearest examples 
of knowledge available to Plato were geometry and relations among numbers. According to 
Euclidean geometry, two points determine a straight-line segment, a triangle is a figure with 
three straight-line segments as sides, and the sum of the internal angles of a triangle equal 
two right angles. But any physical triangle we try to construct will be imperfect. Lines in 
nature aren’t perfectly straight; the sum of the internal angles of the figures we make or draw 
aren’t exactly the sum of two right angles. Plato in effect argued as follows: Since geometry 
is known, it must he true. Accordingly, whatever geometry is about, it must be true of its 
subject. But since geometry is not true of the objects of the physical world, it is not about 
them. So it is about something else. 
 Plato called the objects of knowledge forms. In Plato’s conception, the forms aren’t in 
the world, and they certainty are not parts, aspects, or properties of things in the world. They 
are quite literally not of the world. Of course, the objects and properties of this world have 
some relation to the forms, but the relation is obscure. Plato says that worldly things 
participate in forms. The idea, very roughly, is that earthly things are crude models of forms, 
the way a chalk drawing of a triangle is a crude model of a Euclidean triangle. 
 Aristotle shared with Plato the view that knowledge requires certainty, and also the 
view that what we seek to know are combinations of properties or features that make a thing 
an x—a man or a triangle or whatever may be the topic of inquiry. But Aristotle brought the 
forms down to earth, and the result was a conception of nature and of scientific inquiry that is 
rather different from Plato’s. 
ARISTOTLE’S CONCEPTION OF NATURE 
In Aristotle’s conception, if a thing changes, it acquires some new property or loses some old 
property. For change to be possible, there must exist something that can be identified as one 
and the same thing before and after the change. So what is the same before and after the 
change must itself be unchanged. Aristotle calls substance whatever endures through change 
and has properties attached to it. Attributes or properties are features that can attach to a 
substance at one time and not attach to it at other times. Substance that has no properties and 
is completely unformed, Aristotle calls prime matter. Aristotle’s conception of the 
fundamental stuff of the universe can be very roughly pictured as gobs of stuff enduring 
through time but having various attributes stuck to it at any moment. Of course, Aristotle 
didn’t think of properties as literally stuck to substance, like notices on a bulletin board. 
 It is tempting to think that the world is put together in the same way that our 
descriptions of it are assembled. In English, as in Greek, we assemble sentences from noun 
phrases and verb phrases. Noun phrases typically occur as subjects in sentences. They include 
common nouns such as “cat,” “dog,” “noon,” “eclipse,” “tree.” Verb phrases typically occur 
as predicates that are applied to subjects; they include verbs and verbs together with 
adjectives or adverbs, such as “is black,” “is mean,” “occurs rarely,” “is deciduous.” If we put 
subject terms together with predicate terms in the appropriate way and introduce extra 
grammatical words (such as “the”) in the appropriate places, we get sentences: 
The cat is black. 
The dog is mean. 
Eclipses occur rarely. 
Vines are deciduous. 
 Aristotle thought that the fundamental distinctions in the world are indeed reflected in 
fundamental distinctions in language. He held, for example, that the particular objects, such 
as a mean dog, are constituted by matter and by form. A mean dog is matter formed into a 
dog that is mean. 
 We have devices in our language for turning a sentence into a new subject for a new 
predicate. We can say, for example: 
The animal that is a cat is trained. 
The mean dog is four-legged. 
The deciduous vines are broad leafed. 
According to Aristotle, the world has the same feature. When form is applied to matter, the 
combination becomes the matter or substance for the application of still other forms. When 
we have a black cat, for example, we have a particular object constituted by matter and form. 
That object can then be the matter that we cause another form to obtain. So if we train the 
black cat, the black cat is caused to acquire a further form; in other words, the black cat is 
formed into a trained black cat. 
 Aristotle thought of nature in terms of hierarchies. In particular, he thought of 
complex entities as built up by the application of a sequence of forms to bare, unformed 
matter. Suppose that there is bare matter with no form of any sort. If that bare matter is 
formed into something living, the result is living matter. If living matter is formed into an 
animal, the result is something animate. If animate matter is given canine form, the result is a 
dog. If instead animate matter is formed into something with a rational soul, the result is a 
human. We can picture the process by means of a kind of diagram. 
 
(Diagrams consisting of nodes connected by directed lines are now called directed graphs. If 
the connections are just lines and not arrows, so that the order does not matter, the diagram is 
simply called a graph.) 
 Another fundamental idea in Aristotle’s conception of nature is the distinction 
between the properties that a thing has accidentally and the properties that a thing has 
essentially. A thing has a property accidentally if it could possibly not have had that property. 
It is an accidental property of a dog that it is a trained dog. Fido, the trained dog, would still 
be Fido if it had not been trained. In Aristotle’s terms, it is an accidental feature of Ronald 
Reagan that he was elected president. Ronald Reagan would still be Ronald Reagan if he had 
not been elected president. Essential attributes of a thing are those features without which the 
thing would lose its identity. Fido is essentially a dog. Anything that is not a dog could not be 
Fido. Any creature that is by nature not furred, not four-legged, or not born of a bitch is not a 
dog, and hence is not Fido. These are essential properties of Fido. Similarly, Ronald Reagan 
is essentially a man, and anything that is not a man could not be Ronald Reagan. 
 For each part of nature, there is a hierarchy that includes only the essential attributes 
or forms of objects and ignores accidental attributes. According to Aristotle, the goal of 
science is to find the structure of the appropriate hierarchy for any subject, whether it is 
astronomy, biology, or cosmology. 
 Aristotle thought that natural processes have natural ends or purposes. An acorn does 
not have leaves or roots or bark, but it has the potential to acquire leaves and roots and bark, 
and in the natural course of things, it will come to be an oak tree that actually has those 
features. A human infant does not have language or reason, but it has the potential to acquire 
both, and in the natural course of things, it will do so. Aristotle thought of all natural 
processes in the same way; each has an end, and in the natural course of things, that end will 
be achieved. 
 Aristotle’s conception of nature involves a conception of causality different from our 
own. Consider questions such as “Why does the sun give warmth?” or “Why does water boil 
when heated?” or “Why do stars twinkle?” or “Why are vines deciduous?” These questions 
are requests for causal explanations. Often causal questions are about how something came to 
be or how it came to be a certain way. In Aristotle’s view, there is not just one sort of answer 
to be given to these questions; there are four different sorts, corresponding to four different 
senses of “cause.” Each question asks about an object or kind of object and about an attribute 
of that object or objects of that kind. 
 An object has a specific attribute just in case the object is obtained by imposing a 
specific form on an appropriate substance. So one sort of cause is the form of the object 
responsible for the attribute, and another sort of cause is the matter on which the form is 
imposed. The first is called the formal cause, and the second is called the material cause. 
Aristotle tended to think of formal causes as internal principles of development in natural 
objects, as whatever it is, aside from matter, that determines that acorns grow up to be oak 
trees rather than hemlock trees, for example. 
 For an attribute to be acquired by a thing, some action must take place to impose a 
further form on matter. An acorn doesn’t become a oak tree unless it is covered with earth in 
a place where rain and sun fall. A block of marble does not become a statue of Venus without 
the action of a chisel. For Aristotle, the efficient cause of a thing possessing a certain attribute 
is the process by which the matter of the thing acquires the appropriate form. Efficient causes 
are the kinds of events or processes that we nowadays think of as causes. 
 According to Aristotle, natural processes have purposes or ends, just as human 
activities have purposes. The qualities and attributes that things take on in the normal course 
of events are attributes they have so that these purposes or ends will be achieved. One aspect 
of the explanation of why the sun gives warmth, for example, is the purpose or goal of that 
state of affairs. One might hold, for example, that the sun gives warmth so that life can 
endure on earth. Aristotle did not mean, of course, that the sun deliberately intends or plans to 
make life prosper on earth. The plan is nature’s, not the sun’s. Whatever it is for the purpose 
of which an object has an attribute, Aristotle calls the final cause of the thing’s having the 
attribute. 
 The doctrine of four causes forms one of the centerpieces of Aristotle’s conception of 
science. Scientific inquiry is an attempt to answer “why” questions. When such questions are 
about why something comes to be, they are ambiguous, according to Aristotle: their meaning 
depends on whether one is asking for the material, efficient, final, or formal cause. 
 Aristotle’s conception of causality and his conception of scientific explanation as the 
statement and demonstration of causes formed a framework for understanding scientific 
inquiry that lasted until the eighteenth century. Together with his theory of proof, these 
conceptions make up an important part of the background against which modern philosophy 
was formed. I will return to them again in the next chapter when I describe seventeenth-
century approaches to the idea of a proof, and I will consider them yet again in later chapters 
when I take .up the subject of inductive inference. 
Study Questions 
1. Does the sentence “Sam and Suzy love one another” consist of a predicate applied to 
a subject? What about the sentence “Equals added to equals are equal”? 
2. Biological taxonomy describes hierarchies of species, genera, and so on. Do such 
classifications exemplify Aristotle’s conception of nature? 
3. Use your own judgement to determine which of the following attributes of water are 
essential properties of water and which are accidental properties of water. 
 It covers most of the surface of the earth. 
 It is composed of molecules having two atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen. 
 It can be obtained from wells. 
 It boils at 100 degrees centigrade at one atmosphere pressure. 
 It is sold in bottles by Perrier. 
 It is sometimes drunk with scotch. 
 It is of two kinds, salt and fresh. 
4. What do you suppose are the four Aristotelian causes that explain why mammals give 
milk? 
ARISTOTLE’S CONCEPTION OF SCIENCE 
Aristotle thought that the science of any subject should constitute a system of knowledge 
claims. Fundamental claims, or axioms, could be used to deduce less fundamental claims. 
The scientific explanation of a general fact about the world consists in a valid deductive 
argument that has a description of that general fact as its conclusion and has true, 
fundamental claims as its premises. Different sciences might have quite different axiomatic 
systems; there is one theory for biology, another for the constitution of matter, another for 
astronomy, and so on. These diverse theories may share certain fundamental assumptions, but 
they will also have postulates that are peculiar to their respective subject matters. Aristotle 
supposed that the axioms of a scientific subject would be divided more or less as Euclid 
divided his axioms into common notions and postulates of a peculiarly geometric character. 
 Aristotle’s conception of scientific explanation can be illustrated with a simple 
example. 
 
Each link in this picture corresponds to a general truth about the generation of humans: 
 All humans are animals. 
 All animals are living things. 
 All living things are composed of matter. 
Further, each of these sentences predicates- something essential of its subject. It is not an 
accidental feature of humans that they arc animals, nor is it an accidental feature of animals 
that they are living things, nor is it an accidental feature of living things that they are 
material. Next observe that each point in the illustration represents a kind of thing obtained 
by imposing additional form on the matter that is the kind of thing at the point above it. Thus, 
in Aristotle’s terms, living things result from imposing a nutritive soul upon elemental matter. 
Imposing an animate soul upon a living thing results in an animal, and so on. Finally, the 
imposition of a form upon matter is brought about by a characteristic kind of efficient cause. 
Thus the form of a nutritive soul is imposed upon matter by mixing the elements (for 
Aristotle, these were earth, air, fire, and water) in the proper proportions. 
 What can be demonstrated from this simple theory? An Aristotelian demonstration 
might go like the following: 
All humans are animals. 
All animals arc living things. 
Therefore, all humans are living things. 
All humans are living things. 
All living things are composed of matter. 
Therefore, all humans are composed of matter. 
This is not a very subtle or elaborate deduction, and Aristotle clearly intended that scientific 
demonstration should include more intricate arguments, such as those we find in Euclid’s 
geometry. A central philosophical problem for Aristotle was therefore to give an account of 
the inferences that make for a valid deduction. 
The axiomatic method 
The idea that a good scientific theory should constitute a system in which less fundamental 
claims can be deduced from more fundamental claims is not so foreign to modern science. 
We still have something of that conception in modern physics. Newton’s dynamics was 
originally formulated by Newton as an axiomatic system. The theory of relativity and the 
theory of quantum mechanics have been formulated as axiomatic systems. Non-Euclidean 
geometries have been developed as axiomatic theories. In contemporary psychology, theories 
about how to measure psychological properties have been formulated as axiomatic systems. 
In economics and statistics, theories of rational decision making are often expressed 
axiomatically. 
 Theories are sometimes first formulated as axiomatic systems. More often, axiomatic 
presentations are given when there is an understanding of the theory but that understanding 
needs to be clarified and made rigorous. Axiomatic presentations may enable one to see 
clearly the fundamental claims of a theory and to examine how other claims of the system can 
be validly deduced from them. 
ARISTOTLE’S LOGIC 
Aristotle’s logic concerns sentences that have a simple structure consisting of a quantifier 
such as “all” or “some” or “no” (as in “none”), a subject term such as “humans” or 
“Socrates,” and a predicate term such as “are animals” or “is not snub-nosed” or “are mortal.” 
For example, “All humans are mortal” or “Socrates is not snub-nosed” are the kind of 
sentences whose logic Aristotle described. 
 The characteristic form of inference in Aristotle’s logic is the syllogism, which 
consists of a pair of sentences that serve as premises and a sentence that serves as the 
conclusion. You have seen an example of syllogistic argument in the previous section. Here 
is another: 
Syllogism 1 
All humans are animals. 
All animals are mortal. 
Therefore, all humans are mortal. 
This is a valid syllogism. What makes it valid is that if the premises are true, then it follows 
necessarily that the conclusion is also true. If the premises happen to be false in a valid 
syllogism, then the conclusion may he either true or false. What matters is that in every 
conceivable case in which the premises could he true, the conclusion would also be true. 
 You can see why this syllogism counts as valid by drawing some circles. (This is not 
a device that Aristotle used. It was first developed during the Renaissance). Suppose you 
introduce a circle H to represent the set of all humans, another circle A to represent the set of 
all animals, and a third circle M to represent the set of all mortal things. The first premise 
says that the set of all men is contained in the set of all animals. So put circle H inside circle 
A to represent the state of affairs required for the first premise to be true (figure 2.1). The 
second premise says that the set of all animals is contained in the set of all mortal things. So 
put circle M around circle A to represent the state of affairs required for the second premise to 
be true (figure 2.2). Now consider the figure drawn (2.2). To represent the state of affairs 
required to make both premises true, you had to put H inside A and A inside M. So 
necessarily H is inside M, which is what the conclusion asserts. What makes a syllogism 
valid is that in any way you represent circumstances so that both of the premises are true, the 
conclusion is true as well. 
 Here is another valid syllogism: 
Syllogism 2 
All humans are animals. 
Some humans are quiet. 
Therefore, some quiet things are animals. 
Represent the class of all humans by the circle H, and the class all animals by the circle A, 
and the class of all quiet things by the circle Q. The first premise, as before, says that H is 
contained in A. The second premise is different. It says that there are things that are both 
human and quiet. This can only be represented by having circle Q, representing the set of all 
quiet things, intersect circle H, representing the set of all humans. So every representation 
that makes the first two premises of the syllogism both true has Q intersecting H and H 
contained in A (figure 2.3). But then Q must necessarily intersect A, which is what the 
conclusion asserts. 
 By contrast the following syllogism is not valid, even though all its premises and its 
conclusion are true: 
Syllogism 3 
All humans are animals. 
Some animals are mortal. 
Therefore, all humans are mortal. 
To see that the syllogism is not valid, remember that for validity there must be no possible 
way of arranging the circles representing the sets of things that are human, H, animals, A, and 
mortal, M, so that in that representation of possible circumstances the premises are both true 
but the conclusion of the syllogism is false. The first premise says, as before, that H is 
included in A. The second premise says that circles A and M intersect. One way in which the 
two premises could imaginably be true is given in figure 2.4. In this figure M intersects A, 
and H is included in A, but M does not include any of H. The figure represents an imaginable 
circumstance in which all humans are animals, some animals are mortal, but some humans (in 
fact, all humans) are immortal. The circumstances represented are not those that obtain in our 
world, where in fact all humans are mortal, but they are consistently imaginable 
circumstances, and they show that the truth of the premises of the syllogism do not by 
themselves necessitate the truth of the conclusion of the syllogism. 
 That a syllogism is valid does not imply that its premises are true or that its 
conclusion is true. A valid syllogism may have false premises and a true conclusion, false 
premises and a false conclusion, or true premises and a true conclusion. What it may not have 
is true premises and a false conclusion. What it means for a syllogism to be valid is that if its 
premises were true, its conclusion would of necessity be true. So if the premises are actually 
true and the syllogism is valid, then the conclusion must actually be true. 
 Here is an example of a valid syllogism in which the premises are in fact false but the 
conclusion is true: 
All humans are apes. 
All apes have opposing thumbs. 
Therefore, all humans have opposing thumbs. 
Here is an example of a valid syllogism in which the premises are false and the conclusion is 
false: 
All humans are apes. 
All apes are stockbrokers. 
Therefore, all humans are stockbrokers. 
 Aristotle realized that the validity of a syllogism has nothing to do with what the 
predicate terms and the subject terms mean, but has everything to do with what quantifiers 
occur in the premises and the conclusion and with where one and the same term occurs in 
both the premises and the conclusion. The first syllogism we considered has the following 
form: 
All A are B. 
All B are C. 
Therefore, all A are C. 
Any syllogism of this form will be valid, no matter what classes A, B, and C denote. A could 
be stars, B olives, C dragons. The following syllogism is silly, but valid. 
All stars are dragons. 
All dragons are olives. 
Therefore, all stars arc olives. 
By contrast, the following form is not valid. 
All A are B. 
Some B are C. 
Therefore, some A are C. 
It is easy to see that this form of syllogistic argument is not valid by considering an example 
of that form in which the premises are true but the conclusion is false: 
All men are mammals. 
Some mammals are female. 
Therefore, some men are female. 
Study Questions 
1. Give new examples of valid syllogisms with the following properties: (a) The 
premises are false and the conclusion is true. (b) The premises are false and the conclusion is 
false. (c) One premise is false, one premise is true, and the conclusion is false. 
2. Give examples of invalid syllogisms with the following properties: (a) The premises 
are true and the conclusion is true. (b) The premises are false and the conclusion is true. 
THE THEORY OF THE SYLLOGISM 
Aristotle described fourteen valid forms of syllogistic argument. Medieval logicians gave 
each of them names, such as Barbara and Celerant. In Aristotle’s logical theory there are 
four expressions, now called quantifiers, that can be prefixed to a subject-predicate phrase. 
The quantifiers are “all,” “no,” “some,” and “not all.” The traditional abbreviations for these 
quantifiers are respectively A, E, I, and O. By prefixing one of the quantifiers to a subject-
predicate phrase, we obtain a sentence. An Aristotelian syllogism consists of three such 
sentences: two premises and a conclusion. (The names of the syllogisms contain a code for 
the quantifiers in the sentences in syllogisms of that form. The vowels in the names indicate 
the kind of quantifier in the second premise, the first premise, and the conclusion. Thus 
Darapti is a syllogism with two premises having “all” as their quantifier and a conclusion 
having “some” as its quantifier.) 
 These syllogisms are written so that the conclusion is always “(Quantifier) A are C.” 
The term that occurs in the subject place in the conclusion (A in the examples below) is called 
the minor term. The term that occurs in the predicate place in the conclusion (C in the 
examples below) is called the major term. The term that occurs in the premises but not in the 
conclusion (B in the examples) is called the middle term. 
 The form of a syllogistic argument is determined entirely by the quantifiers attached 
to each sentence and by the positions of the terms in the premises. If we ignore the quantifiers 
for the moment, it is easy to see that there are four different patterns or figures (as they are 
called) in which the major, middle, and minor terms can be distributed (table 2.1 ). The valid 
Aristotelian syllogisms, with their medieval names, are listed in table 2.2. You may notice 
that the table of valid syllogisms contains no syllogisms having the pattern of figure 4. 
Aristotle did not include a study of syllogisms of this figure. 
 There are four possible quantifiers, any of which can attach to any sentence in a 
syllogism of any figure. Each syllogism has three sentences, and there are four choices of 
quantifier for the first sentence, four choices for the second sentence, and four choices for the 
third sentence, and thus there are 4 × 4 × 4 = 64 distinct syllogistic forms in each figure. And 
since there are four figures, there are 256 distinct forms of syllogistic arguments altogether. 
Of the 192 syllogistic forms in the first three figures, Aristotle held that only the 14 illustrated 
are valid. All others are invalid. How did Aristotle come to this conclusion? 
 Aristotle held that the valid syllogisms of the first figure are perfect, by which he 
meant that their validity is obvious and self-evident and requires no proof. Assuming this is 
true, it remains to show that the other syllogistic forms he gives are also valid and that other 
syllogistic forms in the first three figures are invalid. To show the first, Aristotle assumed 
certain rules of conversion, which are really logical rules for inferring one sentence from 
another. Aristotle’s rules of conversion include the following: 
Rule 1 From “No X are Y,” infer “No Y are X.” 
Rule 2 From “All X are Y,” infer “Some Y are X.” 
Rule 3 From “Some X are Y,” infer “Some Y are X.” 
 With these three rules, some of the valid syllogisms of the second and third figures 
can be derived from the valid syllogisms of the first figure. Aristotle’s strategy is to start with 
the premises of a second- or third-figure syllogism and to use the rules of conversion to 
derive the premises of a first-figure perfect syllogism. If the perfect syllogism shares its 
conclusion with the original second- or third-figure syllogism, it follows that the original 
syllogism is valid (assuming the first-figure perfect syllogisms are valid and that the rules of 
conversion preserve truth). 
 For example, Cesare can be transformed into Celarent by using the first rule of 
conversion on the second premise. That is, from “No C are B” we infer “No B are C” by rule 
I to obtain. Celarent. 
Cesare Celarent 
All A are B All A are B 
No C are B No B are C 
No A are C No A are C 
In the same way, other valid syllogisms of the second and third figure can be converted into a 
syllogism of the first figure (with the same conclusion) with the rules of conversion. 
 How did Aristotle show that the many syllogistic forms of the second and third 
figures that do not occur in the table above are not valid? To answer that, we have to be 
clearer about what it means for an argument form to be valid. The syllogistic forms in the 
table above are not sentences, they are abstract schemes that would become sentences if 
genuine terms were substituted for A, B, and C. An argument is valid if and only if it is not 
possible for its premises to be true and its conclusion false. A syllogistic argument form is 
valid provided that, however we substitute real terms for the abstract A, B, and C in the 
syllogistic form, if the result is a syllogism with true premises, then the resulting conclusion is 
also true. So in order to show that a syllogistic form is not valid, Aristotle needed only to find 
examples of syllogisms of that form in which the premises are both true and the conclusion is 
false. 
 Consider the following form of syllogistic argument: 
No A are B 
All B are C 
No A are C 
Aristotle shows that this form is not valid by considering the following example: 
No horse is a man. 
All men are animals. 
No horses are animals. 
In this case it is obvious that both of the premises are true but the conclusion is false. Hence 
the syllogistic form is not valid. 
Study Questions 
1.  By providing an example in which the premises are clearly true and the conclusion is 
clearly false, show that each of the following syllogistic forms is invalid: 
No A are B No A are B No A are B 
All B are C All B are C All B are C 
No A are C Some A are C No all A are C 
2. Use the valid syllogistic forms of the first figure and the rules of conversion to show 
the validity of the form Camestres and the form Felapton. 
3. Do the rules of conversion given in the text suffice to show the validity of the forms 
Baroco and Bocardo? Why or why not? 
4. Find the valid syllogistic forms in the fourth figure.* 
LIMITATIONS OF ARISTOTLE’S SYLLOGISTIC THEORY OF DEDUCTIVE 
ARGUMENT 
Although the theory of the syllogism is an interesting and impressive theory of deductive 
inference, it is not comprehensive. It does not include arguments that we and Aristotle’s 
contemporaries recognize as valid. In other respects it is too comprehensive: Aristotle counts 
as valid some arguments that we would not count as valid. 
 Aristotle developed his theory of the syllogism as part of a theory of scientific 
demonstration. One of the great ironies of intellectual history is that while geometry was the 
paradigmatic Greek science and Euclid lived only a generation after Aristotle, the theory of 
the syllogism cannot account for even the simplest demonstrations in Euclid’s Elements. 
There are several reasons why. 
 First, the propositions of geometry are not all of a simple subject-predicate form. In 
fact, rather few of them are. Instead, geometrical propositions deal with relations among 
objects. Second, the propositions of geometry do not all have just one quantifier; they may 
essentially involve repeated uses of “all” and “there exists.” Third, proofs require devices for 
referring to the same object in different ways within the same sentence. Recall from chapter 1 
the content of Euclid’s first proposition: 
Proposition 1 For every straight line segment, there exists an equilateral triangle having 
that line segment as one side. 
To treat this claim as the conclusion of a syllogism, Aristotle would have to treat this 
sentence as having a single quantifier, “all”; a subject, “straight line segment”; and a 
predicate, “thing for which there exists an equilateral triangle having that thing as one side.” 
Aristotle would therefore have to interpret the conclusion of Euclid’s first proof as of the 
form 
All A are C. 
That is, 
All straight line segments are things for which there exists an equilateral triangle having that 
thing as one side. 
If we look at the table of valid syllogistic forms, we see that a conclusion of this form can 
only be obtained from a syllogism of the form Barbara. So for Aristotle’s theory of deductive 
argument to apply, Euclid’s proof would have to provide some middle term B and axioms or 
subconclusions of the following forms: 
All A are B 
All B are C 
Or more concretely, 
All straight line segments are B. 
All B are things for which there exists an equilateral triangle having that thing as one side. 
 But that is not how Euclid’s proof works. Recall that if the line segment has endpoints 
P and Q, Euclid constructs a circle centered on P and another circle centered on Q, each 
having the line segment as a radius. One of his postulates says that for every point and every 
length, a circle centered on that point having that length as radius exists (or can be 
constructed). Then Euclid assumes that there is a point at which the circle centered on Q and 
the circle centered on P intersect one another. This point, call it S, must be the same distance 
from P as P is from Q, and also the same distance from Q as Q is from P. By the construction 
and the definition of circle, the distance from Q to P is the same as the distance from P to Q, 
so point S must be the same distance from Q as P is from Q. Then Euclid uses the axiom that 
things equal to the same thing are equal to one another to infer that the distance from S to P is 
the distance from P to Q. So the distances PQ, PS, and QS are all equal. Another axiom 
guarantees that for all pairs of points there is a line segment connecting the points, and the 
definition of a triangle shows that the figure thus shown to exist is a triangle. 
 Aristotle might let B stand for “thing with endpoints that are the centers of circles 
with radii equal to the distance between the points.” Then Aristotle would need to show that 
Euclid’s proof contains a syllogistic demonstration of each of the following: 
All straight line segments are things with endpoints that are centers of circles with radii equal 
to the distance between the points. 
All things for which there exists an equilateral triangle having that thing as one side are 
things with endpoints that are the centers of circles with radii equal to the distance between 
the points. 
Each of these will again have to be established by means of a syllogism of the form Barbara. 
But however many times we compound syllogisms of the Barbara form, we will never obtain 
a proof that looks at all like the argument that Euclid provided. 
 Aristotle’s theory also fails to cover several other types of arguments. Recall that 
Aristotle proves that the syllogistic forms of the second and third figures shown in table 2.2 
are valid forms. What is the form of those proofs? The proof I illustrated has the following 
form: 
If Celarent is valid, then Cesare is valid. 
Celarent is valid. 
Therefore, Cesare is valid. 
This is a perfectly valid deductive argument. It has the following form: 
If P then Q 
P 
Therefore Q 
Here P and Q stand for any complete sentences that are either true or false. This argument is 
not one of Aristotle’s valid syllogistic forms. So Aristotle’s own proof of the properties of his 
logical system uses logical principles that his system can neither represent nor account for. 
The argument just sketched depends on the logical properties of “If ... then___,” where the 
ellipsis and the blank are filled by sentences. This form of argument is sometimes called a 
“hypothetical syllogism.” 
 There is a third difficulty with Aristotle’s theory of the syllogism. Look at the first 
four valid syllogisms of the third figure: Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, and Datisi. Each of them 
has an existential conclusion; that is, in each case the conclusion says that something exists 
having specified properties. So, for example, in Darapti we have the following inference: 
All B are A 
All B are C 
Some A are C 
Aristotle meant “Some A are C” to be read as “There exist some things that are A and C.” So 
understood, it is not clear that Darapti is a valid form of inference. Consider the following 
example: 
All unicorns are animals with hoofs. 
All unicorns are horses with one horn. 
Therefore, some animals with hoofs are horses with one horn. 
This looks like an argument in which the premises are true but the conclusion is false. The 
problem is with the second rule of conversion: 
From “All X are Y,” infer “Some Y are X.” 
We don’t think it is legitimate to infer “Some little people are leprechauns” from “All 
leprechauns are little people.” We don’t think it is legitimate to infer “Some numbers that are 
divisible by two are both even and odd” from “All numbers that are both even and odd are 
divisible by two.” We reason all the time (both in fairy tales and in mathematics) about all 
things of a certain kind, even when we don’t believe or mean to imply that things of that kind 
exist. In fact, in mathematics we often reason about such things just to prove that they don’t 
exist! Aristotle would have agreed with our practice, but his theory seems not to agree. 
AFTER ARISTOTLE 
Aristotle’s theory of deductive reasoning may have had many flaws. Yet despite minor 
improvements in the theory of syllogistic reasoning and some other developments in logical 
theory, no fundamental advances appeared for the next 2,400 years. Aristotle’s successors at 
the Lyceum and after them the Stoic philosophers developed some of the principles of the 
logic of propositions. Their principles were understood by medieval logicians. For example, 
it was recognized that for any propositions P and Q, one could infer Q from premises 
consisting of the assertion of P and the assertion of “If P then Q.” Medieval logicians even 
gave this form of inference a name, modus ponens: 
Modus ponens From “P” and “If P then Q,” infer “Q.” 
Other related logical principles were also understood, for example, the principle modus 
tollens: 
Modus tollens From “Not Q” and “If P then Q,” infer “Not P.” 
 Theophrastus, who succeeded Aristotle as the head of the Lyceum, gave conditions 
for the truth of sentences compounded of simpler sentences. He proposed that any sentence of 
the form “If P then Q” is false only when P is true and Q is false. In any other circumstance, 
“If P then Q” is true. So in Theophrastus’ view, “If P then Q” is true if P and Q are both 
false, if P is false and Q is true, and if both P and Q are true. In Theophrastus’ conception, 
therefore, the truth or falsity of “If P then Q” is a function of the truth values (true or false) of 
P and Q. In other words, the truth value (true or false) of “If P then Q” is uniquely 
determined by the truth values of P and Q, just as the numerical value of the sum X + Y is 
uniquely determined by the numerical values of X and Y. Sentences of the form “If ... 
then___” are now known as conditional sentences or simply conditionals. The account of 
conditionals as truth functions of the simpler sentences from which they are composed was 
not widely accepted by logicians of the Middle Ages. They held instead that “If P then Q” is 
true only if the truth of P necessitates the truth of Q. With that understanding, the truth value 
of “If P then Q” is not a function of the truth values of P and Q. It isn’t the truth or falsity of 
P and Q alone that determines the truth or falsity of “If P then Q,” but whether the truth of P 
necessitates the truth of Q. 
 Further principles about inference with quantifiers were also recognized by Aristotle’s 
successors. For example, they recognized the principle that from a universal claim one may 
infer any instance of it. From “Everything is such that if it is human, then it is mortal” one 
may infer “If Socrates is human, then Socrates is mortal.” 
 Logic was extensively studied in the late Middle Ages from the twelfth through the 
fourteenth centuries. The theory of the syllogism was understood and extended in minor 
ways, and tracts were written on various sorts of quantifiers. Medieval logicians were 
especially interested in what we call modal logic, which is the study of deductive inferences 
that involve notions of necessity, possibility, and ability. Aristotle himself had written on the 
subject. Aristotle had maintained the following logical principles (which he did not clearly 
distinguish): 
For any proposition P, “Necessarily P” is true if and only if “Not possibly not P” is true. 
“A is necessarily B” is true if and only if “A is not possibly not B” is true. 
Modal reasoning was of special concern to logicians of the Middle Ages because the 
motivation for their studies of logic was as much religious as it was scientific. They were 
concerned with features of God and with humanity’s relations with God. These subjects 
involved complicated uses of claims about necessity and possibility. For example, Saint 
Anselm’s proof of God’s existence seems to turn on the idea that God is an entity that could 
not possibly not exist, an entity that necessarily exists. Notions of possibility and necessity 
can easily lead to paradoxes, which require a logical theory to untangle. 
 These and other logical investigations amounted to some limited progress in 
understanding valid reasoning. But at the end of the fourteenth century, Western civilization 
was not substantially closer to understanding deductive inference than it had been in the 
fourth century B.C. It was still not possible, for example, to give a systematic theory of proof 
that would include the proofs of geometry and exclude fallacies. Although additional logical 
principles had been developed after Aristotle, they had not been formed into a powerful 
systematic theory. The three central questions posed in chapter 1 were not much closer to 
being answered. 
ARISTOTELIAN REASONING IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE* 
Although Aristotle’s theory of demonstrative reasoning is inadequate to represent most 
proofs in mathematics and the sciences, a lot of simple reasoning can be represented as 
syllogistic. 
Two puzzles 
Here are two very old puzzles about the properties of God 
and God’s relation to humans. Both involve modal 
reasoning. The first is concerns a claim about God that 
some Christians thinkers of the Middle Ages and 
Renaissance seem to have held: 
(1) God is necessarily omnipotent; that is, necessarily 
God can do anything. 
Consider now the question, Can God make a rock he 
cannot lift? Suppose God cannot make such a rock. Then 
(1) is false. Suppose, on the other hand, that God can make 
such a rock. Since God is able to make such a rock, the 
circumstance in which such a rock exists is possible. But in 
the possible circumstance in which God makes a rock he 
cannot lift, there is something God cannot do, namely to lift 
that rock. Hence there is a possible circumstance in which 
there is something God cannot do. So it is not the case that 
necessarily God can do anything. So (1) is false again. But 
either God can make a rock he cannot lift, or he cannot. 
Hence (1) is false. 
The second puzzle involves two other claims that were 
 Recently, Aristotelian modes of reasoning have been applied in the study of artificial 
intelligence. Research in artificial intelligence attempts to devise programs that will enable 
computers to solve problems that require intelligence in human problem solvers. Most AI 
work is not committed to making computers solve problems in exactly the same way in 
which humans solve them, but the way in which humans proceed sometimes gives the 
program designer useful hints about how to make a computer solve the same kind of problem. 
Humans reason in solving problems, even the most elementary kinds of problems. Computers 
should reason as well, or at least they should do something that looks like reasoning. 
 Human reasoning involves the use of an enormous amount of knowledge. If you are 
told that Dumbo is an elephant, you can immediately answer such questions as “Is Dumbo a 
mammal?” “Does Dumbo have a long nose?” “Does Dumbo have a tail?” “Is Dumbo a 
herbivore?” You can answer these questions because you know a great many things about 
elephants. If we want to design a computer program that will have the same capacities as you 
have, we will have to provide the computer with the same kind of knowledge. Equally 
important, we will have to find a way to organize the knowledge so that the computer can 
find relevant parts of it rapidly. 
 One of the earliest methods developed for organizing knowledge in a computer 
program is called an is-a hierarchy. An is-a hierarchy is a graph of just the kind I used to 
illustrate Aristotle’s conception of scientific knowledge. If the subject is elephants, a simple 
is-a hierarchy might look like this: 
 
Of course, the computer does not have this picture. What it has is a set of instructions that 
link terms such as “Dumbo” and “elephant” to one another, and the links are exactly as in the 
graph. Each connection in the graph represents a general statement. For example, 
Dumbo is an elephant. 
All elephants are mammals. 
All elephants are long-nosed. 
All mammals are animals. 
 Suppose the computer is asked, Is Dumbo an animal? To answer the question, the 
computer searches for a path from “Dumbo” to “animal.” It might, for example, go from 
“Dumbo” to “elephant,” to “mammal,” to “animal.” Upon reaching “animal,” it would 
answer that yes, Dumbo is an animal. In this sort of procedure the computer is carrying out 
the simplest sort of syllogistic inference. 
 One interesting thing about trying to simulate human reasoning using a computer is 
that we are forced to consider logical features that might otherwise be ignored. Suppose that 
instead of reasoning about elephants, the computer is to reason about birds. From the 
information that Tweety is a bird, the computer should he able to answer such questions as, 
“Does Tweety have feathers?” “Does Tweety have wings?” “Can Tweety fly?” “Is Tweety a 
mammal?” “Is Tweety an animal?” The relevant information about birds needed to answer 
these questions can be represented by a graph, just as the information about elephants is 
represented. The graph would encode such information as that birds have feathers, that birds 
have wings, that winged things can fly, and so on. The computer can then carry out simple 
syllogistic inferences to answer these questions. Given the information that Tweety is a bird, 
a person will generally answer the question, Can Tweety fly? with a yes. The computer will 
answer in the same way. But if you give a person a further piece of information about 
Tweety, you get a different answer. If a person is given the further information that Tweety is 
an ostrich, the person will not infer that Tweety can fly. People, in other words, make the 
following inference: 
Tweety is a bird. 
Birds can fly. 
Therefore, Tweety can fly. 
And they also make this inference: 
Tweety is a bird. 
Birds can fly. 
Tweety is an ostrich. 
Ostriches cannot fly. 
Therefore, Tweety cannot fly. 
“Tweety can fly” may look at first like the conclusion of a syllogistic inference, but actually 
something much more complicated is going on. Syllogistic inference, as Aristotle and his 
successors understood it, is monotonic, meaning that if a conclusion C can be validly inferred 
from a set of premises, then it can also he validly inferred from any set of premises that 
include the original premises. The Tweety example shows that the kind of reasoning humans 
do is sometimes (in fact quite often) nonmonotonic: adding information to the premises 
prevents us from drawing conclusions we would otherwise draw. One mark of the difference 
is that we are inclined to agree that birds can fly, but not that all birds can fly. In the same 
way, we are inclined to agree that whales give milk, but not that all whales give milk (male 
whales don’t). Sentences such as “Birds can fly” are sometimes said to be generalized, 
whereas sentences such as “All birds can fly” are said to be universal. While universal and 
generalized sentences are sometimes synonymous, they aren’t always. When they aren’t, 
reasoning that looks syllogistic may actually be nonmonotonic. To make a computer reason 
as humans do in contexts where knowledge consists of generalized but not universal 
sentences, the computer must make inferences according to principles of nonmonotonic logic. 
The principles of nonmonotonic logic and their efficient implementation in computer 
programs are major areas of contemporary research. 
Study Questions 
1. Write out a graph for reasoning about birds that is like the graph shown for elephants. 
2. Suppose that someone reconstructed a particular deduction as a syllogism and you 
wished to show that the inference principles used actually involved nonmonotonic reasoning. 
How could you argue for your view? Give an example. 
3. Knowledge of causes is often used to reason nonmonotonically. Give an example. 
4. What is the name of the syllogistic form used in the reasoning that Dumbo is an 
animal? 
5. Explain why the theory of the syllogism cannot fully account for everyday reasoning 
about properties of things. 
Review Questions 
1. What questions should a theory of deductive argument address? How well does 
Aristotle’s theory of deductive arguments succeed in answering these questions? 
2. What are three major difficulties with Aristotle’s theory of deductive argument? 
3. What are the four senses of “cause” in Aristotle’s philosophy? 
4. Do you think that syllogistic reasoning could be used to account for proofs in 
arithmetic or the theory of numbers? 
5. Explain Aristotle’s strategy for. justifying his theory of syllogisms. 
6. Which of Aristotle’s syllogistic forms of the second and third figures can be 
converted into a first-figure form without using Aristotle’s second rule of conversion? 
7. What role does the theory of syllogisms play in Aristotle’s understanding of scientific 
demonstration? 
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Figure 2.1 
Premise 1 of syllogism 1 
Figure 2.2 
Syllogism 1 
Figure 2.3 
Two possibilities for syllogism 2 
Figure 2.4 
A counterexample to syllogism 3 
Table 2.1 
The four figures of syllogistic arguments 
Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 
A are B 
B are C 
A are C 
A are B 
C are B 
A are C 
B are A 
B are C 
A are C 
B are A 
C are B 
A are C 
Table 2.2 
Valid Aristotelian syllogisms in the first three figures 
1st figure Barbara Celarent Darii Ferio 
A are B 
B are C 
A are C 
All A are B 
All B are C 
All A are C 
All A are B 
No B are C 
No A are C 
Some A are B 
All B are C 
Some A are C 
Some A are B 
No B are C 
Not all A are C 
2nd figure Cesare Camestres Festino Baroco 
A are B 
C are B 
A are C 
All A are B 
No C are B 
No A are C 
No A are B 
All C are B 
No A are C 
Some A are B 
No C are B 
Not all A are C 
Not all A are B 
All C are B 
Not all A are C 
3rd figure Darapti Felapton Disamis Datisi 
B are A 
B are C 
A are C 
All B are A 
All B are C 
Some A are C 
All B are A 
No B are C 
Not all A are C 
All B are A 
Some B are C 
Some A are C 
Some B are A 
All B are C 
Some A are C 
 Bocardo Ferison   
 All B are A 
Not all B are C 
Not all A are C 
Some B are A 
No B are C 
Not all A are C 
  
 
  
Chapter 3 
IDEAS, COMBINATIONS, AND THE MATHEMATICS OF THOUGHT 
INTRODUCTION 
From the fifteenth through the seventeenth centuries, literature, art, and science flourished in 
Europe, but logic did not prosper. The careful study of the problems of deductive inference 
and of the relations between words and things that make reliable inference possible came to 
be replaced by rhetoric, the study of persuasive speech. Aristotle had written on rhetoric, and 
logic texts in the Renaissance increasingly gave their attention to that subject rather than to 
studies of valid argument. But in the seventeenth century there occurred such a revolution in 
thought, and such an explosion in knowledge, that every subject, including logic, was 
affected. The seventeenth century brought into vivid contrast two different ideals of reason: 
on the one hand, the ideal of certainty best exemplified by Euclid’s geometry and Aristotelian 
syllogistics; on the other hand, the ideal of rational belief with uncertainty, exemplified in 
quantitative form by the laws of probability and the laws of nature, such as Boyle’s law of 
gases and Newton’s law of gravitation, newly discovered in the seventeenth century. One 
effect of this clash was to move intellectual interest away from a theory of demonstration 
toward theories of rational belief and rational inference. But the new mathematics of 
rationality also helped to unite the theory of deductive demonstration with the new 
quantitative theories of nature. The theory of deductive proof became the quantitative theory 
of ideas and of how they may be combined. 
 The seventeenth century saw the establishment of modern philosophy in the work of 
Galileo Galilei (1564–1642), Francis Bacon (1561–1626), René Descartes (1596–1650), 
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716), 
Isaac Newton (1642–1727), and John Locke (1632–1704). The creation of modern 
philosophy went hand in hand with the creation of modern science and modern mathematics. 
For the most original and powerful minds of the time, science, mathematics, and philosophy 
were simply different aspects of a common enterprise of knowledge. Indeed, they would have 
found our separation of the subjects somewhat artificial. Galileo provided some of the most 
powerful arguments for the heliocentric conception of the solar system, and he wrote 
systematic attacks on the adequacy of Aristotelian physics. At the same time, his writings 
contain the beginnings of new conceptions of how the mind works and how knowledge is 
acquired. Francis Bacon not only articulated a new, empirically based conception of how 
knowledge is acquired; he also developed the theory of heat and conducted a number of 
experiments to support that theory. Descartes, except for Newton perhaps the most eminent 
and influential intellect of the century, invented the study of the geometrical properties of 
solutions to algebraic equations, the subject we now call analytic geometry, and also 
developed an extensive (but largely erroneous) anti-Aristotelian physical theory. Hobbes, 
despite many attempts, left no mathematical or scientific achievements of value, but he left 
something else: the idea that the study of society can be part of natural science, and the idea 
that moral conceptions can be explained and justified by scientific considerations of human 
nature and of the conditions under which humans live. Pascal invented and sold a mechanical 
calculator, conducted a famous experiment to demonstrate the pressure of the atmosphere, 
and introduced many of the fundamental ideas in the theory of probability and the theory of 
rational decision making. Leibniz invented the differential and integral calculus and promoted 
a variety of social projects in the second half of the century. He too designed and built 
mechanical calculators. Newton we know as the source of modern physics; his Principia and 
Optics revolutionized that subject. His scientific writings, especially the Principia, also 
contain a new and sophisticated philosophy of science. Locke is known for his writings on 
the structure of the mind, for his theory of how knowledge is acquired, and for his account of 
just government. His writings were heavily influenced by the new sciences emerging all 
around him. 
 Except for Leibniz, seventeenth-century philosophers did not succeed in developing a 
better logical theory than Aristotle’s. Of Descartes, Hobbes, Pascal, Leibniz, Newton, and 
Locke, only Leibniz wrote extensively on logic, and most of what he wrote was not 
published. But the seventeenth century did establish two important ideas about deductive 
reasoning. 
 The theory of deductive reasoning and demonstration is part of psychology. It should 
provide part of the laws of thought, just as physics provides the laws of motion. 
 The laws of thought have an algebraic structure, just as do the laws of arithmetic or 
the laws of motion. 
The first of these ideas turned out to be fundamentally in error—only when it was abandoned 
did the modern understanding of deductive inference emerge—but its very falsity creates a 
puzzle that we will consider at several points in this book. The second idea turned out to be 
correct and profound, and two centuries later, in the middle of the nineteenth century, it 
formed the basis for the first fundamental advance in logic since Aristotle. In the rest of this 
chapter we will consider how these two ideas emerged from metaphysics, mathematics, and 
theology in the seventeenth century. 
 To understand how seventeenth-century thinkers brought these views of logic and 
demonstration to prominence and why they were widely thought to he true, we must consider 
a little of the tradition of thought about mathematics and knowledge that the century inherited 
and drew upon. 
COMBINATIONS 
According to both Plato and Aristotle, the objects of knowledge have a special formal 
structure. The sort of thing a person may know is that one thing or kind or property is a finite 
combination of other things or kinds or properties. Human is a combination of rational and 
animal. Triangle is a combination of closed, rectilinear, figure, and three-sided. Plato and 
Aristotle differed about the metaphysics, of course. For Plato, the elements of these 
combinations are ideal objects or forms; for Aristotle, they are essential attributes of concrete 
objects. For both philosophers, however, all knowledge consists of knowing such 
combinations of forms or essential attributes of a thing or kind. For example, according to 
Plato, knowledge of virtue is knowledge of which simple forms are combined in the form of 
virtue. 
 This simple conjunctive view of the objects of knowledge suggests questions about 
combinations of properties. Ultimately, on either the Platonic or Aristotelian view, any kind 
or property that can be the object of scientific knowledge can be analyzed into a combination 
of simple properties that cannot be further analyzed. The number of distinct kinds that can be 
the object of knowledge then consists of the number of distinct combinations of these simple 
properties, whatever they are. What is the number of pairs of distinct simple properties if 
there are n simple properties altogether? What is the number of triples of distinct simple 
properties if there are n simple properties altogether? What is the number of distinct 
combinations of any particular number m of simple properties drawn from n simple 
properties? How can these distinct combinations be enumerated and surveyed? If one has the 
Platonic and Aristotelian conception of the form of knowledge, these are fundamental 
questions. 
 In Europe just such questions gave rise to the mathematical subject of combinatorics, 
the study of the numbers of possible combinations satisfying given conditions. The first 
mathematical results of this kind in Europe seem to occur in a commentary en Aristotle by 
Porphyry (ca. 234–ca. 305) written in the third century. Porphyry wished to comment on all 
of the similarities and differences among five Aristotelian categories, and so he posed the 
problem of enumerating all the distinct pairs of things that can be obtained from a collection 
of five things. He observed that one might think that this number is 20, because one can 
choose the first thing of a pair in any of five ways and the remaining member of the pair in 
four distinct ways: 
 
But Porphyry correctly argued that the number of pairings is not 20: “Such is not the case; for 
though the first of the five can be paired with the remaining four, when we come to the 
second, one of the pairs will already have been counted; with the third, two; with the fourth, 
three, and with the fifth, four; thus there are in all only ten differences: 4 + 3 + 2 + 1.”1 
 Roughly 250 years later, Boethius (d. 524) wrote commentaries on Porphyry’s 
commentary on Aristotle, and in them he provided a more general, alternative proof. In 
modern terminology, his reasoning was as follows. Twenty is the number of ordered pairs, 
<x, y>, in which x is distinct from y, that can be formed from five distinct objects. With 
ordered pairs, a change in the order counts as a distinct pair, so <x, y> is not equal to <y, x>. 
Porphyry was interested in the number of pairs of distinct properties that could be formed 
from five properties, but he did not care about order. He was concerned with the number of 
unordered pairs, {x, y}. Clearly, for each ordered pair there will be another with the same 
objects but in the reverse order. If these two ordered pairs are thought of as together forming 
a single unordered pair, or if together they are counted as one object, then the number of 
unordered pairs will be half of the number of the ordered pairs. Ten is half of twenty, for 
example. The number of ways of choosing ordered pairs from n things is n(n  1), so the 
number of distinct unordered pairs that can be formed from n things is n(n  1)/2. 
 In the Middle Ages, the conception of the objects of knowledge as combinations of 
simple attributes that make up a kind or a complex property led to a conception of the method 
for acquiring knowledge. The method, in so far as it deserves the name, consisted of trying to 
“analyze” a thing into its simple properties (analysis), and then trying to put it back together 
by combining those properties (synthesis). Often the analysis and synthesis were purely 
mental and consisted of analyzing or synthesizing a thing only in imagination, but sometimes, 
in Renaissance chemistry, for example, analysis meant physically decomposing a substance 
into “simpler” substances, and synthesis meant physically reconstituting a substance of that 
kind. 
 One would expect that Christian intellectuals would apply the methods they had 
adapted from Aristotle and Plato to the study of God, and, of course, they did. God too had 
fundamental properties, and one could consider the combinations of God’s attributes. In the 
thirteenth century the question of how to enumerate, organize, and display God’s attributes 
led to a fundamental insight, one that we nowadays take for granted. It concerns the odd life 
of the great Spanish philosopher Ramon Lull (d. 1315), a thirteenth-century Franciscan 
monk. 
 Lull grew up in a wealthy family and passed his early adulthood in the court of James 
II of Spain. He spent his time with games and pleasantries and is reputed to have made great 
efforts to seduce the wives of other courtiers. Accounts have it that after considerable effort 
to seduce a particular lady, she finally let him into her chambers and revealed a withered 
breast. Taking this as a sign from God, Lull gave up the life of a courtier and joined the 
Franciscan order. He determined that he would dedicate his life to converting Moslem 
civilization to Christianity, and in a curious way, philosophy gained from that dedication. 
 Lull moved to Majorca, spent several years mastering the Arabic language, and 
studied and wrote tracts (of which he eventually authored hundreds) against Islam and for 
Christianity. About 1274 Lull had a vision of the means by which Moslems could be 
converted to Christianity. Stimulated by the idea, he wrote another book, his Ars Magna. 
While Lull’s fundamental style of thought is mystical and obscure, it contains one logical 
gem. 
 In effect, Lull’s idea was that Moslems (and others) may fail to convert to Christianity 
because of a cognitive defect. They simply were unable to appreciate the vast array of the 
combinations of God’s or Christ’s virtues. Lull believed that infidels could be converted if 
they could be brought to see the combinations of God’s attributes. Further, he thought that a 
representation of those combinations could be effectively presented by means of appropriate 
machines, and that was the key to his new method. Lull designed and built a series of 
machines meant to be used to present the combinations of God’s virtues. 
 A typical Lullian machine consisted of two or more disks having a common spindle. 
Each disk could be rotated independently of the others. The rim of each disk was divided into 
sections or camerae, and each section bore a letter. According to the application for which 
the machine was intended, the letters each had a special significance. They might denote, for 
example, an attribute of God. One Lullian machine, for example, has the letters B through R 
around the rims of an inner disk, and around the outer disk Latin words signifying attributes 
of God: “bonitas” (B), “magnitudo” (C), “eternitas” (D), and so on. A Lullian machine was 
operated by rotating the two disks independently, much as we would a star finder or (some 
years ago) a circular slide rule. At any setting of the disks, pairs of God’s attributes would be 
juxtaposed on the rims of the inner and outer disks. Rotating the disks would create different 
pairings. One would thus discover that God is good and great, good and eternal, great and 
eternal, and so forth. The heretic and the infidel were supposed to be brought to the true faith 
by these revelations. 
 Lull lectured on several occasions at the University of Paris. He traveled throughout 
Europe, attempting to raise money for missions to North Africa to convert Moslems to 
Christianity. He himself is reported to have made three such trips to Africa. Tradition has it 
that on his third trip, at the age of 83, he was stoned to death, but some biographers lacking in 
romantic sentiment dispute this account. 
 This may seem a bizarre and slightly amusing story of no particular philosophical 
significance. But buried within Lull’s mysticism and his machines is the seed of a collection 
of powerful ideas that only began to bear fruit three hundred and fifty years later. 
 One of the great ideas implicit in Lull’s work is that reasoning can be done by a 
mechanical process. Another equally profound idea in Lull’s thought is that reasoning does 
not proceed by syllogism but by combinatorics. Reasoning is the decomposition and 
recombination of representations. The decomposition and recombination of attributes can be 
represented by the decomposition and recombination of symbols, and that, as Lull’s devices 
illustrate, is a process that can be carried out by machines. 
 Lull’s work was known even in the seventeenth century, when these ideas were taken 
up by Leibniz, the most eminent mind on the continent of Europe in the second half of that 
century. Neither in Lull nor in Leibniz, however, do these ideas form a theory that competes 
with Aristotle’s or that offers solutions to the questions developed in the first chapter of this 
book. But Lull had at least taken the first step: he had an idea for a theory. 
Study Questions 
1. There are only two ways to order two distinct letters. How many ways are there to 
order three distinct letters? 
2. One of Lull’s machines had sixteen letters signifying attributes of God. How many 
ordered triples of three distinct letters can be formed from Lull’s sixteen letters? 
3. How many unordered triples of distinct letters can be formed from Lull’s sixteen 
letters? 
4. Let n! (said “n factorial”) denote the number n  (n  1)  (n  2)    1. The 
number n! is clearly the number of distinct ways that n things can be put in order, because we 
have n choices for the first thing, n  1 for the second, and so on, until there is only one thing 
left. The number of ways of choosing an ordered sequence of 3 distinct things from n things 
must be n  (n  1)  (n  2). The number of ways of choosing an ordered sequence of m 
distinct things from n things (where m  n) must be n  (n  1)    (n  (m  1)), or more 
simply, n!/(n  m)! Use these facts to find a formula for the number of ways of choosing m 
things from n things without regard to order. 
5. Suppose you of have a collection of n things. How many distinct collections with 2 or 
more members can be formed from the collection of n things? In the sixteenth century 
Cardano gave the correct answer: 2n  1  n. Can you give a proof of this answer? 
THE IDEA IDEA 
The method of analysis and synthesis might be thought of as a form of reasoning. So 
conceived, it is a kind of computation or calculation in which properties are added or taken 
away. But in most cases those who thought of themselves as applying this method did not 
really add or take away any properties of things. Instead, they added or subtracted thoughts or 
ideas of properties. So viewed, the method of analysis and synthesis had to do with the 
operations of the mind. 
Thomas Hobbes 
Thomas Hobbes was born at the end of the sixteenth century and lived almost until the 
eighteenth. Educated at Oxford, he made his living by attaching himself to rich and 
influential families, often serving as tutor to their children. The Civil War in England raged 
during his adult years, and Hobbes spent most of his intellectual efforts on political theory. 
The general view he had of the nature of politics and the foundations of government are still 
influential today. Although he criticized Aristotle’s system, in many respects Hobbes 
remained an Aristotelian thinker. Hobbes met on several occasions with one of the great 
intellectual revolutionaries of the first part of the seventeenth century, Francis Bacon, who 
along with many other figures of the period, was convinced that new empirical methods of 
discovery were required in science. Hobbes disagreed, and despised the experimental method 
that Bacon had championed and that by the middle of the seventeenth century was flourishing 
in England and in parts of continental Europe. Hobbes was self-taught in mathematics. He is 
said to have learned geometry by finding a book of Euclid’s Elements open to some advanced 
proposition, which, upon reading, Hobbes did not believe. Since he did not believe the 
proposition, Hobbes read the proof, which depended on still other propositions, whose proofs 
Hobbes proceeded to read. In this way he worked back to Euclid’s axioms and convinced 
himself of the truth of the proposition he had originally doubted. 
 That is just how seventeenth-century philosophers thought of it. Thomas Hobbes, for 
example, wrote as follows: 
By ratiocination, I mean computation. Now to compute is either to collect the sum of many 
things that are added together, or to know what remains when one thing is taken out of 
another. Ratiocination, therefore, is the same with addition and subtraction; and if any man 
add multiplication and division, I will not be against it, seeing multiplication is nothing but 
addition of equals one to another, and division nothing but a subtraction of equals one from 
another, as often as is possible. So that all ratiocination is comprehended in these two 
operations of the mind, addition and subtraction. 
 But how by the ratiocination of our mind, we add and subtract in our silent thoughts, 
without the use of words, it will be necessary for me to make intelligible by an example or 
two. If therefore a man see something afar off and obscurely, although no appellation had yet 
been given to anything, he will, notwithstanding, have the same idea of that thing for which 
now, by imposing a name on it, we call a body. Again, when by coming nearer, he sees the 
same thing thus and thus, now in one place and now in another, he will have a new idea 
thereof, namely that for which we now call such a thing animated. Thirdly, when standing 
near, he perceives the figure, hears the voice, and sees other things which are signs of a 
rational mind, he has a third idea, though it have yet no appellation, namely that for which we 
now call anything rational. Lastly, when, by looking fully and distinctly upon it, he conceives 
all that he has seen as one thing, the idea he has now is compounded of his former ideas, 
which are put together in the mind in the same order in which these three single names, body, 
animated, rational, are in speech compounded into this one name, body-animated-rational, or 
man. In like manner, of the several conceptions of four sides, equality of sides, and right 
angles, is compounded the conception of a square. For the mind may conceive a figure of 
four sides without any conception of their equality, and of that equality without conceiving a 
right angle; and may join together all these single conceptions in not one conception or one 
idea of a square. And thus we see how the conceptions of the mind are compounded. Again, 
whosoever sees a man standing near him, conceives the whole idea of that man; and if, as he 
goes away, he follow him with his eyes only, he will lose the idea of those things that were 
signs of his being rational, whilst, nevertheless, the idea of a body-animated remains still 
before his eyes, so that the idea of rational is subtracted from the whole idea of man, that is to 
say, of body-animated-rational, and there remains that of body-animated and a while after, at 
a greater distance, the idea of animated will be lost, and that of body only will remain; so that 
at last, when nothing at all can be seen, the whole idea will vanish out of sight. By which 
examples, I think, it is manifest enough what is the internal ratiocination of the mind without 
words. 
 We must not therefore think that computation, that is ratiocination, has place only in 
numbers, as if man were distinguished from other living creatures (which is said to have been 
the opinion of Pythagoras) by nothing but the faculty of numbering; for magnitude, body, 
motion, time, degree of quality, action, conception, proportion, speech and names (in which 
all the kinds of philosophy consist) are capable of addition and subtraction.2 
There are at least two important thoughts in this passage. One is that reasoning is a 
psychological process, so that a theory of logical inference should be a theory of the 
operations of the mind. The other is that the theory of reasoning is a theory of appropriate 
combinations. Just what the objects are that are combined is obscure in this passage, but other 
passages suggest that Hobbes thought of the mind as composed of particles, and some of 
these particles, or collections of them, serve as symbols (or as Hobbes would say, names) for 
things, and it is these physical symbols that are combined or decomposed in reasoning. As we 
will see later, the very same idea lies behind much of twentieth-century cognitive science. 
 The obvious question about the method of analysis and synthesis is why and how it 
should work. How are people supposed to be able to recognize which properties are simple 
and which are complex so that they can he decomposed into simpler combinations? Plato had 
an answer: recollection. The forms are “stamped on the soul,” and, prompted by experience, 
one has only to recollect them. Aristotle had another answer: we have a faculty of intuition 
that tells us which properties are fundamental. Neither of these answers seems very 
satisfactory. They don’t tell us, for example, why we should believe that intuition or 
recollection reliably gives us the truth. They don’t explain why people who try to apply the 
method come to very different conclusions, or how to come to agreement about who is in 
error. What could the method be? How could it work? How could we be certain that it works? 
René Descartes had an answer, sort of. 
 In Descartes’ view, as in Hobbes’s, we do not analyze and synthesize things in 
themselves. We take apart our conceptions of things, our ideas of them. What we do in 
thought, then, is to try to find the simple ideas of which complex thoughts are compounded. 
Ideas and thoughts are mental states, not physical states. An inquiry into the basis for 
knowledge must therefore be an inquiry into our psychology, into the operations of the mind, 
and it must show why those operations, if properly conducted, are reliable. Descartes held 
that such an inquiry should produce a method that could be shown to be perfectly reliable, 
and he claimed that he himself had found such a method: 
Science in its entirety is true and evident cognition. He is no more learned who has doubts on 
many matters than the man who has never thought of them; nay he appears to be less learned 
if he has formed wrong opinions on any particulars. Hence it were better not to study at all 
than to occupy one’s self with objects of such difficulty, that, owing to our inability to 
distinguish true from false, we are forced to regard the doubtful as certain; for in those 
matters any hope of augmenting our knowledge is exceeded by the risk of diminishing it. 
Thus in accordance with the above maxim we reject all such merely probable knowledge and 
make it a rule to trust only what is completely known and incapable of being doubted.3 
 Moreover by a method I mean certain and simple rules, such that, if a man observe 
them accurately, he shall never assume what is false as true, and will never spend his mental 
efforts to no purpose, but will always gradually increase his knowledge and so arrive at a true 
understanding of all that does not surpass his powers.4 
The fundamental operations of the mind involved in knowledge are intuition (by which we 
see directly that something is the case or that an immediate inference is necessary), deduction 
(in which we move through a sequence of intuitions to obtain a necessary conclusion), and 
induction (by which we infer general conclusions from particular examples). Induction does 
not provide certainty, but intuition and deduction do aim at certainty, which, according to 
Descartes, is the only proper goal of inquiry: 
By intuition I understand, not the fluctuating testimony of the senses, nor the misleading 
judgement that proceeds from the blundering constructions of imagination, but the conception 
which an unclouded and attentive mind gives us so readily and distinctly that we are wholly 
freed from doubt about that which we understand. Or, what comes to the same thing, intuition 
is the undoubting conception of an unclouded and attentive mind, and springs from the light 
of reason alone; it is more certain than deduction itself, in that it is simpler, though deduction, 
as we have noted above, cannot by us be erroneously conducted. Thus each individual can 
mentally have intuition of the fact that he exists, and that he thinks, that the triangle is 
bounded by three lines only, the sphere by a single superficies, and so on.5 
 Descartes seems to think that simple deduction, as in a syllogism, requires nothing but 
intuition. A chain of deductions, however, also requires memory: 
Many things are known with certainty, though not by themselves evident, but only deduced 
front true and known principles by the continuous and uninterrupted action of a mind that has 
a clear vision of each step in the process. It is in a similar way that we know that the last link 
in a long chain is connected with the first, even though we do not take in by means of one and 
the same act of vision all the intermediate links on which that connection depends, but only 
remember that we have taken them successively under review and that each single one is 
united to its neighbour, from the first even to the last. Hence we distinguish this mental 
intuition from deduction by the fact that into the conception of the latter there enters a certain 
movement or does not require an immediately presented evidence such as intuition possesses; 
its certitude is rather conferred upon it in some way by memory. The upshot of the matter is 
that it is possible to say that those propositions indeed which are immediately deduced from 
first principles are known now by intuition, now by deduction, i.e., in a way that differs 
according to our point of view. But the first principles themselves are given by intuition 
alone, while, on the contrary, the remote conclusions are furnished only by deduction.6 
 The questions for Descartes are how it is that intuition is to be used in producing 
knowledge, why we should believe that the deliverances of intuition are veridical, and why 
memory can be trusted. 
 Some thoughts, Descartes held, we perceive clearly, while others appear to us 
muddled or confused. Of clear ideas, some can be distinguished in imagination from all 
others, and some are indistinguishable from one another. The ideas of extension and of body, 
for example, are ideas that cannot be distinguished from one another in imagination: we 
cannot think of a body except by thinking of it as extended, and we cannot imagine extension 
without imagining some body that is extended. We have no separate idea of mind from that 
of substance that thinks. But we can form clear ideas of body and mind, and these ideas are 
distinct from one another. The idea of mind is the idea of a thinking substance, while the idea 
of body is the idea of an extended substance. 
 There is, according to Descartes, a special kind of mental state we have when we 
perceive a necessary truth clearly and distinctly. For example, when we see the connection 
between the premises of a valid syllogism and its conclusion, we see with a special clarity 
and distinctness that if the premises are true, then necessarily the conclusion must be true, 
and we do not confuse the necessary connection given by that syllogism with some other 
argument. Descartes sometimes writes of this clarity and distinctness as provided by the 
“natural light of reason.” What he says about it is an elaboration of Aristotle’s notion of the 
faculty of intuition. 
 Descartes’ method rests on three principles: 
 What is clearly and distinctly conceived to be true cannot be false. 
 The separation of thoughts of properties is a perfect indicator of the possible 
separation of the properties: properties that cannot be conceived of separately are necessarily 
coextensive, and properties that can be conceived of separately are not necessarily 
coextensive. 
 A genuine recollection of a sequence of clear and distinct ideas cannot be false. 
These are inner criteria; they do not tell you what to do to check someone else’s claim to 
know something by intuition or the natural light of reason other than to perform a thought 
experiment yourself. They do not even tell you very clearly what it is to clearly and distinctly 
conceive something or to genuinely recollect a sequence of clear and distinct thoughts. 
Descartes gives only a few examples, and his readers must try to learn from them what is a 
clear and distinct idea. Thus the idea that a triangle is a three-sided figure is, Descartes holds, 
a necessary truth that can be recognized by the natural light of reason. The quality, whatever 
it is, of the experience you have when you think of the question “Is a triangle three-sided?” is 
the mark of the natural light of reason and of a clear and distinct idea. 
 Why believe any of this? Supposing that we even understand what kinds of 
experiences Descartes means by the “natural light of reason” or “clear and distinct ideas” or 
genuine memory, why should we believe that his three principles are correct? We can ask a 
harder question, for Descartes claims that knowledge requires certainty: How can we be 
certain that the three principles are correct? Descartes’ attempt to answer these questions is 
given in his Meditations on the First Philosophy, in his answers to objections to that work, 
and in his Principles of Philosophy. 
 First, Descartes argues that some thoughts, some clear and distinct ideas, are 
indubitable. While we can doubt, at least momentarily, the existence of an external world and 
we can doubt, at least momentarily, the truths of mathematics, we cannot doubt, even for the 
moment, claims that are certain. Descartes’ example is the thought that I exist. I cannot doubt 
that I exist, for in the very attempt to doubt my existence, I show myself that I exist. 
To begin with, directly we think that we rightly perceive something, we spontaneously 
persuade ourselves that it is true. Further, if this conviction is so strong that we have no 
reasons to doubt concerning that of the truth of which we have persuaded ourselves, there is 
nothing more to enquire about; we have here all the certainty that can reasonably be desired. 
What is it to us, though perchance some one feigns that that, of the truth of which we are so 
firmly persuaded, appears false to God or to an Angel, and hence is, absolutely speaking 
false? What heed do we pay to that absolute falsity, when we by no means believe that it 
exists or even suspect its existence? We have assumed a conviction so strong that nothing can 
remove it, and this persuasion is clearly the same as perfect certitude. 
 But it may be doubted whether there is any such certitude, whether such firm and 
immutable conviction exists. 
 It is indeed clear that no one possesses such certainty in those cases where there is the 
very least confusion and obscurity in our perception; for this obscurity, of whatsoever sort it 
be, is sufficient to make us doubt here. In matters perceived by sense alone, however clearly, 
certainty does not exist, because we have often noted that error can occur in sensation, as in 
the instance of the thirst of the dropsical man, or when one who is jaundiced sees snow as 
yellow; for he sees it thus with no less clearness and distinctness than we see it as white. If, 
then, any certitude does exist, it remains that it must be found only in the clear perceptions of 
the intellect. 
 But of these there are some so evident and at the same time so simple, that in their 
case we never doubt about believing them true; e.g., that I, while I think, exist; that what is 
once done cannot be undone, and other similar truths, about which clearly we can possess this 
certainty. For we cannot doubt them unless we think of them; but we cannot think of them 
without at the same time believing them to be true, the position taken up. Hence we can never 
doubt them without at the same time believing them to be true, i.e., we can never doubt 
them.7 
(The argument Descartes gave was not original. In the fourth century Saint Augustine [354–
430] already observed that no one can doubt his own existence.) 
 Second, Descartes claims that we can know with complete certainty that a benevolent 
God exists. He gives two arguments. The first is that one has a clear and distinct idea of God 
as a perfectly benevolent, necessary being. One cannot think of God without thinking that 
God exists. The argument is essentially Saint Anselm’s, although Descartes gives him no 
credit for it. 
That the existence of God may be rightly demonstrated from the fact that the necessity of His 
existence is comprehended in the conception which we have of Him. 
 When mind afterwards considers the diverse conceptions which it has and when it 
there discovers the idea of a Being who is omniscient, omnipotent and absolutely perfect, 
which is far the most important of all; in it it recognizes not merely a possible and contingent 
existence, as in all the other ideas it has of things which it clearly perceives, but one which is 
absolutely necessary and eternal. And just as it perceives that it is necessarily involved in the 
idea of the triangle that it should have three angles which are equal to two right angles, it is 
absolutely persuaded that the triangle has three angles equal to two right angles. In the same 
way from the fact that it perceives that necessary and eternal existence is comprised in the 
idea which it has of an absolutely perfect Being, it has clearly to conclude that this absolutely 
perfect Being exists.8 
 The second argument is that the cause of our idea of God must be at least as great as 
our idea itself. Since our idea is of a perfect and necessarily existing being, it must be caused 
by something at least as perfect and necessarily existing, i.e., by God. The second argument 
seems simply to equivocate between the perfection of an idea and the idea of something 
perfect. Both arguments are obscure, but Descartes is quite firm that anyone who doubts them 
is defective, someone wanting in “the natural light of reason.” 
I really do not see what can he added to make it clearer that that idea [of God] could not be 
present in my consciousness unless a supreme being existed, except that the reader might, by 
attending more diligently to what I have written, free himself of the prejudices that perchance 
overwhelm his natural light, and might accustom his mind to put trust in ultimate principles 
than which nothing can be more true or more evident, rather than in the obscure and false 
opinions which, however, long usage has fixed in his mind. 
 That there is nothing in the effect, that has not existed in a similar or in some higher 
form in the cause, is a first principle than which none clearer can be entertained. The common 
truth, ‘from nothing, nothing comes’, is identical with it. For if we allow that there is 
something in the effect which did not exist in the cause, we must grant also that this 
something has been created by nothing; again the only reasons why nothing cannot be the 
cause of a thing, is that in such a cause there would not be the same thing as existed in the 
effect. 
 It is a first principle that the whole of the reality or perfection that exists only 
objectively in ideas must exist in them formally or in superior manner in their causes. It is on 
this alone we wholly rely, when believing that things situated outside the mind have real 
existence; for what should have led us to suspect their existence except the fact that the ideas 
of them were borne in on the mind by means of the senses? 
 But it will become clear to those who give sufficient attention to the matter and 
accompany me far in my reflections, that we possess the idea of a supreme and perfect being, 
and also that the objective reality of this idea exists in us neither formally nor eminently. A 
truth, however, which depends solely on being grasped by another’s thought, cannot be 
forced on a listless mind. 
 Now, for these arguments we derive it as a most evident conclusion that God exists. 
But for the sake of those whose natural light is so exceeding small that they do not see this 
first principle, viz. that every perfection existing objectively in an idea must exist actually in 
something that causes that idea, I have demonstrated in a way more easily grasped an 
identical conclusion, from the fact that the mind possessing the idea cannot be self derived; 
and I cannot in consequence see what more is wanted.9 
 The third step in Descartes’ argument should now be predictable. Since God is 
perfect, he cannot be a deceiver. Since we are inclined to believe whatever we clearly and 
distinctly perceive, whether through reflection or through experience, and since God created 
us, whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive must be true. For the same reason, what we 
genuinely recollect clearly and distinctly perceiving must be true, and so deduction can be 
relied upon. God is what guarantees the reliability of deductive inference. Of course, people 
can fail to apply the method reliably and, through acts of will, can confuse themselves. But 
that is not God’s fault, nor is it Descartes’. 
 Descartes’ philosophy had many critics, none more determined than Pierre Gassendi. 
Gassendi thought the whole thing a lot of balderdash, and he said so at length, first in 
objections that Descartes included in an appendix to his Meditations and then in a book. 
Gassendi revived the criticism made against Anselm: you can conceive of a perfect island, 
but that does not guarantee it exists. By parity of reasoning, that you can conceive of a perfect 
being, even one that necessarily exists, does not imply that such a being exists. Gassendi 
thought that many of Descartes’ claims about what he clearly and distinctly perceived were 
simply muddled terminology, about whose meaning Descartes had no clear conception at all: 
“He who says that anything is infinite attributes to a thing which he does not comprehend a 
name which he does not understand.”10 Gassendi thought that Descartes’ method was useless 
and in fact no method at all. We think of a method as a procedure that is more or less 
mechanical and will lead all users to the same conclusion. Descartes held that he had shown 
not only this but also that his method would lead users to the truth. Gassendi didn’t believe 
Descartes’ proof, and he thought that those who claimed to see things clearly and distinctly 
and to know things by the natural light of reason generally contradicted each other. Descartes 
replied that when they contradicted each other, it only showed that some of them had not 
applied the method correctly. 
 The content of Descartes’ books on method read a little like old-fashioned versions of 
popular books on mental improvement. Books of the latter sort are more common nowadays 
than they were in Descartes’ time, and they are generally held in contempt by people who do 
serious work on reasoning. Why were Descartes’ writings taken so seriously in their own 
day? In part because Descartes was so vociferous and skillful at arguing; in part because his 
writings addressed—even if unconvincingly to a modern mind—the essential questions about 
the reliability of the procedures that the Renaissance still held dear: syllogistic reasoning and 
the method of analysis and synthesis; and in part because Descartes had to his credit a 
number of important mathematical discoveries. He could and did claim that his method had 
led him to them. 
Study Questions 
1. In another passage from Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Descartes writes, “The 
working of conjecture is shown, for example in this: water which is at a greater distance from 
the centre of the globe than earth, is likewise less dense substance, and likewise the air which 
is above the water, is still rarer; hence we hazard the guess that above the air nothing exists 
but a very pure aether, which is much rarer than air itself. Moreover, nothing that we 
construct in this way really deceives us, if we merely judge it to be probable and never affirm 
it to be true; in fact it makes us better instructed.”11 Is this passage consistent with Descartes’ 
remarks about “probable knowledge”? 
2. How does the following remark of Descartes’ accord with the Aristotelian conception 
of scientific method? “The upshot of the matter is that it is possible to say that those 
propositions indeed which are immediately deduced from first principles are known now by 
intuition, now by deduction, i.e., in a way that differs according to our point of view. But the 
first principles themselves are given by intuition alone, while, on the contrary, the remote 
conclusions are furnished only by deduction. 
3. Rules are different from descriptions of facts. What are some of the differences? 
4. Suppose you tried to follow Descartes’ Rules for the Direction of the Mind. Could you 
know whether or not you had succeeded in following the rules? Could you know whether or 
not a conviction was an intuition guaranteed by the “natural light of reason”? If so, how, and 
if not, why not? 
5. Suppose someone else tried to follow Descartes’ Rules. Could you know whether or 
not she was doing so correctly? If so, how, and if not, again, why not? 
6. How do you know when you add two numbers together and carry that you have 
followed the addition algorithm correctly? How do you know when someone else does the 
addition under your observation that they have followed the algorithm correctly? 
7. Is Descartes’ argument that he cannot doubt his own existence a diagonal argument? 
(This is for those who did the second study question from chapter 1 in the section on infinity 
and cardinality.)* 
THE BINOMIAL THEOREM 
We have already seen that Aristotle’s and Plato’s conception of the structure of knowledge 
stimulated interest in the mathematical study of how things can be combined. By deepening 
the understanding of combinations, the seventeenth century took another important step 
toward fathoming the fundamental questions about deductive argument. One important 
contribution to this subject was Blaise Pascal’s Treatise on the Arithmetic Triangle. It 
indirectly furthered the understanding of logic and deductive reasoning, it contained one of 
the first important calculations in the the theory of probability, and it helped provide the 
foundations of modern decision theory. 
 In a later chapter I will briefly consider the importance of Pascal’s thought in creating 
the theory of probability and decision theory. For present purposes, the important aspect of 
his work on the arithmetic triangle is that it provided a systematic connection between the 
theory of combinations and ordinary algebra. Descartes had succeeded in connecting 
geometry with algebra by showing that geometrical figures such as the line and circle could 
be viewed as the collections of points that satisfy certain algebraic relations. Thus any three 
numbers, call them A, B, and C, determine a straight line if A and B are not both zero. The 
line is the set of all points (x, y) such that Ax + By + C = 0. Conversely, for every straight line 
there is some such equation. Now Pascal showed that the fundamental question of 
Aristotelian combinatorics, the number of ways of choosing r things from a collection of n 
things, concerned numbers that also have a purely algebraic significance. Pascal’s result is 
known as the binomial theorem. 
 Consider the expression (x + y)n. For different values of n we can expand this 
expression: 
n = 1: x + y 
n = 2: x2 + 2xy + y2 
n = 3: x3 + 3x2y + 3xy2 + y3 
n = 4: x4 + 4x3y + 6x2y2 + 4xy3 + y4 
We can rewrite each expansion this way (remember that x0 = 1): 
n = 1: xny(n  1) + x(n  1)yn 
n = 2: xny(n  2) + 2x(n  1)y(n  1) + yn 
n = 3: xny(n  3) + 3x(n  1)y(n  2) + 3x(n  2)y(n  1) + yn 
Each term in the sum is a binomial coefficient multiplied by a product consisting of a power 
of x and a power of y. The products of the powers of x and y are always either of the form 
xry(n  r) or of the form x(n  r)yr, where r is some number between 0 and n, inclusive. So for n = 
2, for example, the first term, x2, has the binomial coefficient 1 and has r = 0, while the 
second term, 2xy, has the binomial coefficient 2 and has r = 1. The binomial coefficients for n 
= 1 to n = 4 are therefore the following: 
n = 1: 1, 1 
n = 2: 1, 2, 1 
n = 3: 1, 3, 3, 1 
n = 4: 1, 4, 6, 4, 1 
Binomial theorem For a positive integral n, the binomial coefficient of x(n  r)yr (or of xry(n  
r) is exactly the number of ways of choosing r things from n things. In other words, the 
binomial coefficient is n!/(r!(n  r)!) Remember that 0! = 1. 
 Pascal’s Treatise helped to make it evident that the analysis of combinations arising 
from the Aristotelian and Platonic traditions was an aspect of algebraic relations among 
numbers. Descartes’ mathematical work had shown that geometry, the traditional 
mathematical language of the sciences, also has an algebraic side and that important 
geometrical properties could be characterized algebraically. By the middle and later parts of 
the seventeenth century, algebraic relations, usually presented as geometrical statements of 
ratios, had become the form in which natural science expressed the laws of nature. Kepler’s 
third law was essentially such a relation. So were Boyle’s and Mariotte’s law of gases and the 
inverse square law of gravitation. It was only natural to suppose that the actions of the mind, 
thought, must also have laws that can be described by such relations, and that the 
combinatorics of analysis and synthesis are a hint of them. Gottfried Leibniz came to that 
very conclusion. 
Study Questions 
1. Below are the first few rows of the arithmetic triangle listing the coefficients of the 
monomials in the expansion of (a + b)n: 
 
What is the next row of the triangle? 
2. The first row in the triangle gives the monomial coefficient for the expansion of (a + 
b)0, which equals 1. The second row gives the two coefficients, (1, 1), for the expansion of (a 
+ b), which is just a + b. The third row gives the usual quadratic coefficients, (1, 2, 1), for the 
expansion of (a + b)2 = a2 + 2ab + b2, and so on. Let (n, r) denote the coefficient of arb(n  r) in 
the expansion of (a + b)n. What is the formula for expressing (n, r) as a function of (n  1, r  
1) and (n  1, r)? 
3. Verify for n = 6 that (n, r) = n![r!(n  r)!]. 
LEIBNIZ AND THE MATHEMATICS OF REASON 
Pascal’s Treatise was published in 1665. The next year Leibniz, then 19 years of age, 
published his first work, a Latin treatise on logic and combinatorics, De Arte Combinatoria. 
He did not yet know of Pascal’s work, but he learned of it subsequently, and in later years 
when he journeyed to Paris, he tried unsuccessfully to meet with Pascal, who had retreated to 
religious quarters at Port Royal. Pascal had shown that the same combinatorial numbers or 
binomial coefficients also arise in relations between the terms of certain infinite series, and 
reflection on the properties of series eventually helped lead Leibniz to the discovery of the 
differential and integral calculus. 
 Leibniz’s first work was really a combinatorial study of logic in the Aristotelian 
tradition. It is the only work on logic that Leibniz ever published. Over the course of the rest 
of his life, Leibniz wrote a long series of unpublished and uncompleted papers on logic. They 
show the formation of some of the key modern ideas about deductive inference and proof, 
and they also show how very difficult the issues were for one of the greatest philosophers and 
mathematicians of the century. Leibniz’s logical theory is not consistent and thorough 
(Leibniz had a difficult time completing anything), but it contains many ideas that were 
successfully elaborated in later centuries, and it also shows clearly the limitations of the 
Aristotelian framework. 
 Leibniz’s viewpoint can be thought of as what you get if you do the following: 
 You take the Platonic and Aristotelian view of the formal structure of what is known. 
 You combine it with the method of analysis and synthesis. 
 You abolish the distinction between properties that a thing has accidentally and 
properties that a thing has essentially and assume instead that every property something has, 
it has necessarily. 
 Following tradition, Leibniz assumed that every proposition consists of a predicate 
applied to a subject, and that in this regard the structure of language reflects the structure of 
the world. In the world, substances have attributes. But Leibniz gave this a twist. Substances 
don’t, in his view, have attributes in the sense that one and the same substance could have an 
attribute or not have it. A substance just is a combination of attributes. You, for example, are 
nothing but the combination of all of the properties that you have. So there is no property that 
you in fact have that you could not have. An entity that didn’t have some property of yours 
wouldn’t be you. So every property you have, you have necessarily. The same holds of any 
other substance in the world. Whatever properties a substance has, it has necessarily. 
 In Leibniz’s view, the propositions that we assert and believe and perhaps know are 
about concepts. A proposition, “Socrates is snub-nosed,” for example, asserts a relation 
between the concept of the subject, Socrates, and the concept of the predicate, snub-nosed. It 
doesn’t assert anything about Socrates himself. The proposition is true if and only if the 
concept of Socrates, which is really a combination of primitive, unanalyzable concepts, 
contains the concept of snub-nosed, which is also a combination of primitive concepts. 
Suppose, for example, that the concept of Socrates contains the concept of a nose less than 2 
inches long, and the concept of snub-nosed just is the concept of a nose less than 2 inches 
long. Then the concept of Socrates contains the concept of snub-nosed, and so it is true that 
Socrates is snub-nosed. Similarly, the proposition “All perfect people are happy” is about the 
concept of perfect people and the concept of happiness, it is not about perfect people or about 
happy things. Leibniz had a reason for thinking that propositions are about concepts rather 
than about objects. The sentence “All perfect people are happy” may be true even though 
there are no perfect person. Unlike Aristotle, Leibniz did not think that a universal sentence 
such as “All perfect people are happy” entails that there exist perfect people. But if “All 
perfect people are happy” is true even though there exist no perfect person, the sentence 
cannot be about perfect people, for there are none. The sentence must be about something, 
however, and the proposal that it is about a mental entity, the concept of perfect men, seems 
to solve the problem. 
 In Leibniz’s theory, every concept just is a list or combination of primitive concepts. 
All true propositions are true because the list of primitive concepts of the subject term is 
appropriately related to the list of primitive concepts of the predicate term. Leibniz says that 
every true proposition is true because it is an instance of the identity A = A. He meant that if a 
proposition is true, the subject and predicate lists will be such that by eliminating irrelevant 
parts of one or the other, the same combination of concepts of attributes is found in the 
subject as is found in the predicate. So every true proposition can be given a proof. The proof 
of a proposition consists of the following: 
1. Producing the combinations of simple concepts denoted by the predicate of the 
proposition and the subject of the proposition. 
2. Showing that the concept of the predicate is included in the concept of the subject. 
Leibniz wrote extensively about these two steps. He never succeeded in making clear just 
how the analysis of concepts was to be obtained. Of course, neither had Aristotle nor the 
Scholastic tradition of analysis and synthesis. Leibniz envisioned the creation of an enormous 
dictionary or encyclopedia, and he attempted to get various people to actually assemble such 
dictionaries. 
 Once a universal dictionary has been assembled that expresses each concept in terms 
of the simplest concepts, Leibniz thought that the production of scientific knowledge would 
become mechanical. He thought an algorithm or mechanical procedure could be found to 
carry out the second part of the procedure for giving proofs. The way to formulate such a 
procedure is to treat the problem as a part of algebra. Each simple term and each complex 
term should be given a letter or other symbol (Leibniz sometimes suggested using numbers as 
symbols for concepts), and then one would use algebraic methods to search for algebraic 
identities. On other occasions he suggested representing concepts with geometrical figures, 
such as lines, and trying to carry out step 2 by geometrical procedures. The essential thing is 
that there is a mathematics of reason (in fact, that is the title of one of the logical papers 
Leibniz completed), and this mathematics can be carried out mechanically. 
 You can get the flavor of what Leibniz was up to from a fragment of one of many 
“Logical Calculi” he developed: 
(1) “A = B” is the same as “ ‘A = B’ is a true proposition.” 
(2) “A ≠ B” is the same as “ ‘A = B’ is a false proposition.” 
(3) A = AA; i.e., the multiplication of a letter by itself is here without effect. 
(4) AB = BA, i.e., transposition makes no difference. 
(5) “A = B” means that one can be substituted for the other, B for A or A for B, i.e., that 
they are equivalent. 
(6) “Not” immediately repeated destroys itself. 
(7) Therefore A = not-not-A. 
(8) Further, “A = B” and “A not ≠ B” are equivalent. 
(9) That in which there is “A not-A” is a “non-entity” or a “false term” e.g., if C = A B 
not-B, C would be a non-entity. 
(10) “A ≠ B” and “B ≠ A” are equivalent. This follows from 5. 
(11) “A = B” and “not-A = not-B” are equivalent. [Leibniz gives a proof of this claim.) 
(12) If A = B, AC = BC. This is proved from 5.12 
Leibniz goes on to state seven more claims of this kind. Clearly this looks like algebra, but it 
is an algebra for propositions rather than for numbers. 
 Leibniz was correct that the task of deciding whether all of the members of one list 
are members of another list can be done machanically. He was wrong in thinking that 
determinations of this kind are adequate for all (or even very much) of logic or of a theory of 
proof. He had difficulty, for example, giving an account in these terms of even the 
Aristotelian quantifiers. He could not give an account of reasoning that involves “or” or that 
involves “if ... then ___” (although in principle he could have expanded his framework to 
account for reasoning that depends on those connectives). Most important of all, Leibniz 
could not give any account of reasoning with relations. 
 We have already noted that Aristotle could not account for proofs in geometry 
because he could not incorporate reasoning about relations between individual objects. 
Leibniz had the same problem. From a logical point of view, he had no satisfactory solution. 
His papers contain some attempts to reduce reasoning involving relations to reasoning that 
involves no more than propositions of subject-predicate form. Leibniz seems instead to have 
adopted a metaphysical solution, and that may have led him to one of the strangest 
metaphysical positions in the history of philosophy. 
 The absence of a theory about how to reason with relations would be less bothersome 
if relations could not be the subject of knowledge. Real relations, according to the conception 
of the time, would have to be relations between two different substances. One way to avoid 
real relations, therefore, is to suppose that there is only one substance. That was Spinoza’s 
solution. According to Spinoza, there is only one substance, God, and what can be known are 
his attributes. Another way to solve the problem is to suppose that there are lots and lots of 
substances, but none of them stand in any relations to one another, or at least not in any 
relations that are the subject of scientific knowledge. That was Leibniz’s solution. 
 Leibniz claimed that the world is constituted of monads. Each monad is a little 
universe by itself. No monad has any causal relations with any other monad, so in the 
Aristotelian tradition the relations between monads are not subjects of scientific inquiry, 
since science is about causes. Some monads, such as we, have souls and so can be aware of 
themselves. Although each monad is separate from all others, each monad is a mirror of 
every other monad; some monads, those with souls, mirror one another more clearly and in 
more detail than do other monads. I am a monad, and so are you. We have no causal relations 
with one another, but Cod, who, being perfectly benign, has created the best of all possible 
worlds, has so created us that our perceptions are in perfect harmony. It appears to each of us 
that we live in a common world and have causal relations with one another. But appearance is 
not reality. 
 Leibniz’s logic was never adequate, which may explain why he published so little of 
it, and his metaphysics was not much comfort, although he intended it to be. He did, 
however, accomplish several things. 
 He formulated the notion of a decision procedure for logic: a mechanical or 
algorithmic procedure that will determine whether or not an inference is valid. He even 
attempted to give such a procedure for the theory of the syllogism. 
 He made clear the notion of an incomplete axiomatic theory. An axiomatic theory is 
incomplete provided there is some sentence in its language that can be neither proved nor 
disproved from its axioms. 
 He introduced the idea that pieces of language can be coded by abstract symbols, 
including numbers, and that logical relations among the propositions can be studied by 
considering relations among the symbols or numbers. 
 He introduced and furthered the idea that logical relations among propositions have an 
algebraic structure. 
 He developed the thought that universal subject-predicate propositions do not 
presuppose the existence of things satisfying their predicate or subject terms. 
CONCLUSION 
Although we look to the seventeenth century as the period when both modern science and 
modern philosophy began, it was also a time still captivated by the Aristotelian conceptions 
of reason and scientific knowledge. Many of the great works of seventeenth-century 
philosophy, especially on the continent, still assumed that the method for acquiring 
knowledge consists of analysis and synthesis and that real scientific knowledge requires some 
kind of proof analogous to the proofs of geometry. Almost all of the philosophical writers of 
the time assume, wrongly, that with one or another advance in these methods it will be easy 
to complete all of scientific knowledge. (In one of his last works’ Descartes chides the public 
for not providing him with the means to conduct a few experiments by which, he is sure, he 
could complete all of human knowledge.) 
 Even though seventeenth-century philosophers, except for Leibniz, made no 
fundamental advances in logic beyond the state in which Aristotle had left it, they did 
succeed in creating the intellectual framework for radical changes that began in the 
nineteenth century. Part of that framework consisted in treating logic as the theory of the 
operation of the faculty of reason, a faculty that acted to synthesize and analyze ideas. The 
mathematics of combinations became the formal basis for studying reasoning, which 
combined both logic and psychology, and it placed that study among the other new natural 
sciences. Geometry could be systematically connected with algebra, and the theory of 
combinations, which was the mathematical basis for whatever method there was to analysis 
and synthesis, could also be systematically connected with algebra. These connections were 
brought together in Leibniz’s notion that deductive inference could be studied and understood 
through the application of algebraic methods to abstract symbols representing propositions. 
One hundred and fifty years later, George Boole, a professor of mathematics at the University 
of Cork, turned this idea into a real theory of reasoning. 
Review Questions 
1. Describe the method of analysis and synthesis. 
2. How many ordered quadruples can be formed from seven distinct objects? How many 
unordered quadruples can be formed? 
3. In your own words, state two significant ideas implicit in the philosophy of Ramon 
Lull. Explain why these ideas should be considered significant. 
4. Discuss the validity of Descartes’ belief that “properties which cannot be conceived 
separately are necessarily coextensive; and properties which can be conceived separately are 
not necessarily coextensive.” 
5. Outline Descartes’ argument for the existence of God. 
6. Produce the binomial coefficients for n = 5. 
7. What is a monad? What role does it play in Leibniz’s philosophy? 
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Chapter 4 
THE LAWS OF THOUGHT 
INTRODUCTION 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, George Boole, a professor of mathematics at the 
University of Cork in Ireland, tried to realize Leibniz’s conception of an algebra of thought. 
Boole’s work was the most important advance in logic since Aristotle, and it prepared the 
foundations for the emergence of modern logic some thirty years later. Boole’s thought is 
interesting not only because of its advance in formal understanding, but also because it 
illuminates a fundamental difficulty in thinking of logic, the theory of perfect, deductive 
rationality, also as a theory of how the human mind, or some part of it, functions. 
 Boole’s conception of logic was similar to Leibniz’s: 
• Logic consists of a set of laws, like the laws of physics or the laws of geometry. 
• The laws have an algebraic form. 
• The laws have to do with the correct operation of the mind. 
One can well imagine that people think through visual images. Instead, Boole held that 
thinking is a way of talking to oneself in an unvoiced speech. According to Boole, rational 
thought is carried out in language. When we have a thought, we think a sentence. The laws of 
rational thought are therefore also the laws governing the use of language in reasoning. The 
rules of reasoning are at the same time both rules for the correct performance of various 
mental operations and also rules for the correct use of language. Boole’s theory, like 
Aristotle’s, therefore depends on an analysis of the structure of language. Boole’s own 
presentation of his views about the logical structure of language was not entirely clear, and 
perhaps not entirely coherent. We will study a somewhat simplified version of his theory 
while remaining as faithful as we can to his ideas. 
THE UNIVERSE OF DISCOURSE AND FIELDS OF SETS 
According to Boole, every discussion, every conversation, is about some domain, or universe 
of discourse. The domain may be real or imaginary, the subject may be real mountains or 
fairy-tale mountains, but for the purposes of any specific human conversation, objects not in 
the domain are ignored. 
In every discourse, whether of the mind conversing with its own thoughts, or of the 
individual in his intercourse with others, there is an assumed or expressed limit within which 
the subjects of its operation are confined. The most unfettered discourse is that in which the 
words we use are understood in the widest possible application, and for them the limits of 
discourse are co-extensive with those of the universe itself. But more usually we confine 
ourselves to a less spacious field. Sometimes, in discoursing of men we imply (without 
expressing the limitation) that it is of men only under certain circumstances and conditions 
that we speak, as of civilized men, or of men in the vigour of life, or of men under some 
condition or relation. Now, whatever may be the extent of the field within which all the 
objects of our discourse are found, that field may properly be termed the universe of 
discourse.1 
 Consider a particular domain of discourse. Suppose the topic is cats. The domain of 
discourse is the collection or set of all cats. For every conceivable property of cats, there is 
then a subset of the domain of discourse consisting of all of the cats that have that property. 
The property of being a Manx cat, for example, determines the subset of the domain of 
discourse that consists of Manx cats. The property of being a tailless cat determines the 
subset that consists of tailless cats. The property of being a black cat determines the subset 
that consists of black cats. I can make the idea clear with the same kinds of diagrams that I 
used in our study of the theory of the syllogism (Boole himself did not use such diagrams, but 
they were used by another nineteenth-century logician, John Venn). 
 If we conceive of two properties of cats, black and Manx for example, we can 
conceive of those properties holding of one and the same kind of thing, namely cats. We can 
conceive, for example, of cats that are black and Manx. That conception also corresponds to a 
subset of the domain of discourse: the set of all cats that are black and Manx, or to say the 
same thing, the intersection of the set of black cats and, the set of Manx cats. I will always 
write the intersection of two sets M and B (for the set of Manx cats and the set of Black cats, 
respectively) as M  B (figure 4.1). 
 We can also conceive of cats that are black or Manx. The corresponding set of all cats 
that are either black or Manx (or both) we call the union of the set of black cats and the set of 
Manx cats. I will always write the union of any two sets M and B as M  B. 
 If we can conceive of any property, we can conceive of its absence (what would Saint 
Anselm say about that claim?). Since a property such as being black corresponds to a subset 
of the domain of discourse, namely the set of all things in the domain that have the property 
black, the absence of black will correspond to the set of all things in the domain that are not 
black. If U is the domain of discourse, cats in this case, and B is the subset of black things in 
U, the subset of nonblack things in U will be written as B. B is said to be the complement of 
B in U, or the complement of B relative to U. When the context makes the universe of 
discourse clear, I will simply say that B and B are complements of one another. 
 Boole assumed that we can conceive of any number of compoundings of properties, 
and there are corresponding set operations that determine compound descriptions of sets. We 
can, for example, conceive of all of the cats that are not either black or Manx but are tailless. 
That corresponds to the subset of the domain of cats given by (B  M)  T, where B is the 
set of all black cats, M the set of all Manx cats, and T the set of all cats with tails. 
 Suppose that a piece of discourse or reasoning has to do with some definite universe 
of discourse U and some finite list of properties that things in that domain may or may not 
have. Suppose that the subsets of U corresponding to these properties are denoted by P1, 
P2, ... , Pn. The sets U and P1, P2, ... , Pn implicitly determine the collection of all subsets of U 
that can be obtained by forming the intersections, unions, and complements of U, P1, P2, ... , 
Pn forming the intersections, unions, and complements of those sets, forming the 
intersections, unions, and complements of those sets, and so on. If we consider the collection 
of all subsets of U that can be formed in this way, that collection is called a field of sets over 
U. A more formal formulation is the following: 
Definition A field of sets over a nonempty set U is any collection of subsets of U that 
contains U, contains the complement relative to U of any set it contains, contains the 
intersection of any two sets it contains, and contains the union of any two sets it contains. 
 It is easy to visualize simple finite fields of sets. Suppose, for example, that we are 
talking about cats, but (for whatever reason) we are only concerned with one property of cats, 
namely whether or not they have tails. Then the universe of cats divides into two kinds, those 
with tails and those without tails, and there are exactly four sets in the corresponding field of 
sets, namely the set of all cats (because U is always in a field of sets over U), the empty set 
(because the complement of U relative to U is the empty set), the set of cats with tails, and 
the set of cats without tails (figure 4.2). 
 It can be shown that there are no other distinct sets in this field of sets. For example, if 
we take the union of the set of all cats with tails and U, we get U again, which is a set we 
already have. If we take the intersection of U with the set of all cats with tails, we get the set 
of all cats with tails again, which is a set we already have. In the same way, any other 
intersection, union, or complement of these four sets generates one or another of the same 
four sets. 
 We can represent a field of sets, as in figure 4.2 on the right, by a graph with U at the 
top and the empty set  at the bottom. A line in the graph connecting two sets means that the 
lower set is included in the upper set.2 A set and its complement are never connected in such 
a graph, because neither set is contained in the other. 
 It is easy to construct other fields of sets. Simply let U be any nonempty finite set and 
list all of the subsets of U. The resulting collection, called the power set of U, is always a 
field of sets. If U has a single member, we get the simplest possible field of sets, consisting 
only of U and : 
•• 
The fields of sets obtained when U has three members and when U has four members are 
shown below: 
•• 
Study Questions 
1. Explain why the power set of any nonempty set U is a field of sets over U. Write your 
explanation as a proof of that fact. 
2. In the figures above, which elements of the field of sets are complements of other 
elements of the field? 
3. Give an example of a domain of discourse and two distinct properties such that all 
members of the domain that have one property also have the other and vice versa. 
4. Explain why there cannot exist a field of sets consisting of exactly three sets. 
LANGUAGE AND THE WORLD 
One of Boole’s central ideas was that we can regard the world, aspects of the world, or even 
imaginary worlds as structured like a field of sets. Although he did not explicitly introduce 
the notion of a field of sets as I have defined it, he held that for any discourse, there is a 
domain of objects with properties and combinations of properties. Together, the set of objects 
in the domain and the sets of objects with any particular property or combination of 
properties make up a field of sets. This proposal is really a metaphysical idea, just as 
Aristotle’s notion of objects with essential properties was a metaphysical idea. Like Aristotle, 
Boole proposed that language is structured to reflect metaphysics. 
 As a mathematical idealization of real language, Boole considered a language 
structured in the way in which the language of algebra is structured. Boole’s mathematical 
language contains variables, just as ordinary algebra does. In ordinary algebra the variables 
range over some system of numbers; we say that the variables take numbers as values. The 
variables in Boole’s language instead range over the sets that are in some field of sets. The 
context of the discourse or conversation determines the relevant field. Boole’s variables take 
sets in this field as values. So, to continue the example above, the domain might consist of the 
set of all cats, and possible values of Boole’s variables might include the set of all cats with 
tails, and the complement of that set would be the set of of all cats without tails. 
 In ordinary algebra we can write expressions that contain operation symbols and 
variables; we can write x + y, for example, and the result is a well-formed expression in the 
language of algebra. We understand that the plus sign signifies the operation of addition on 
numbers. Boole’s system also allows expressions to be formed by combining his variables 
with symbols for operations. He allows us to write x · y, x + y, and (1  x). In Boole’s 
formulas, the symbol “·” signifies set intersection, the symbol + signifies set union, and 
expression (1  x) signifies the relative complement of x in U. Just as we can build up 
arbitrarily complex expressions in ordinary algebra by combining operations and variables as 
often as we wish (with parentheses to make our meaning clear), so we can build complex 
expressions in the algebra of logic. 
 In ordinary algebra we can give explicit rules for how to evaluate expressions, 
although we don’t usually state them explicitly, because they are so obvious. For example, 
for any algebraic formulas x and y (where x, y stand not just for variables but for well-formed 
expressions of any complexity), the value of x + y is the sum of the value of x and the value 
of y, and the value of x · y is the product of the value of x and the value of y. Similarly, in 
Boole’s theory we can evaluate expressions in the algebra of logic by using explicit rules. For 
any formulas x, y, the value of x · y is the intersection of the value of x and the value of y, the 
value of x + y is the union of the value of x and the value of y, and the value of (1  x) is the 
relative complement of the value of x in U, the universe of discourse. 
 In ordinary algebra we use the identity or equals sign, =, to say that the value of one 
formula is the same as the value of another. Boole does the same thing, except that his values, 
as before, are not numbers but sets in a field of sets. In ordinary algebra we have names for 
some special numbers. In Boole’s mathematical model of language we always have a name 
for the universe of discourse and a name for the empty set. Boole uses the numeral 1 to 
denote the universe of discourse and the numeral 0 to denote the empty set, . 
 In ordinary algebra particular sentences about particular numbers can be obtained by 
replacing the variables in a formula with the names of numbers. For example, the true 
sentence 1 + 2 = 2 + 1 can be obtained by substituting 1 for x and 2 for y in the formula x + y 
= y + x. Similarly, in Boole’s system many ordinary sentences can be obtained by substituting 
terms for particular properties in place of variables and interpreting · as and, + as or, and (1  
x) as not x. For example, the sentence “Black and tailless cats are tailless and black cats” can 
be obtained by substituting “black” for x, and “tailed” for y in x · (1  y) = (1  y) · x, where 
the set of cats comprises the domain of discourse. 
 With some rearranging, many ordinary sentences can be represented by general 
expressions in Boole’s logic. Variables are substituted for names of particular properties, and 
operation symbols are substituted for English (or Chinese or Martian) connectives. Consider 
the sentence “Manx cats are tailless.” That is the same as saying, “No cats are Manx cats and 
cats with tails.” If we understand that the set of cats is the domain of discourse, and take “no 
cats” to designate the empty set, this sentence can be regarded as an instance of the formula 0 
= x · y, obtained by substituting “Manx cats” for x and “cats with tails” for y. 
THE LAWS OF BOOLEAN ALGEBRA 
In ordinary algebra we are interested in finding equalities among formulas that are true for all 
possible values of the variables in the formulas. For example, in the algebra of real numbers 
we know that 
x · y = y · x (commutative law of multiplication), 
x + y = y + x (commutative law of addition), 
x · (y + z) = (x · y) + (x · z) (distributive law), 
(x) = x. 
What distinguishes these equations from many other equations one might write down (e.g., x 
 1 = 0) is that these equations are true no matter what numbers the variables take as values. 
Equations with this property are important because they represent fundamental laws of the 
algebra of real numbers. 
 Similarly, Boole was interested in finding the laws of the algebra of thought. He 
posed the question, What equations in Boole’s algebra will be true for all values of their 
variables and in every field of sets for every (nonempty) domain of discourse? This is really 
the fundamental question about Boole’s logic. The following equations are true in every field 
of sets and for all values given to the variables. They form some of the laws of Boole’s 
system: 
x + y = y + x (1) 
x · y = y · x (2) 
x · (y + z) = (x · y) + (x · z) (3) 
x + (y · z) = (x + y) · (x + z) (4) 
x + 0 = x (5) 
x · 1 = x (6) 
x · (1  x) = 0 and x + (1  x) = 1 (7) 
x + (y + z) = (x + y) + z (8) 
x · (y · z) = (x · y) · z (9) 
0  1 (10) 
In modern mathematics any system of objects and operations in which all ten of these 
equations hold for all values of the variables is called a Boolean algebra. Every field of sets 
is a Boolean algebra. 
 It is easy enough to verify that these laws must hold in any field of sets. In most cases, 
verifying that these laws are true amounts to nothing more than saying what the operations 
involved mean. For example, the first of these equations says that for any set X (a value of the 
variable x) and any set Y (a value of the variable y), the union of X and Y is the union of Y and 
X. But the union of set X and set Y is the set whose members are in X or in Y, which is the 
same as the set whose members are in Y or in X. Again, the sixth equation says that for any 
set X in any field of sets over a set U, the intersection of X and U is X itself. Since by 
definition a set X is in a field of sets over U only if X is a subset of U, every member of X 
must be a member of U. The intersection of X and U, which is the set of all things that are 
members of X and also members of U, is therefore exactly the set of all members of X. 
Study Questions 
1. Show that x · x = x is a law in Boole’s algebra. You may derive it from equations (1) 
through (10) above or from the definition of a field of sets. 
2. Show that x + x = x is a law in Boole’s algebra. 
3. What characteristic distinguishes a law in Boole’s system from an equation that is not 
a law? Give an example of an equation that is not a law. 
TRUTH, PROPOSITIONS, AND BOOLEAN ALGEBRA 
One of Boole’s principal aims was to show that language has the same structure as do 
algebraic formulas; he aimed to provide a metaphysical but clear account of the structures of 
those formulas; he aimed to find the formulas that constitute the laws of such structures; and 
he aimed to show that reasoning in natural language could be evaluated in the same way that 
we evaluate reasoning in ordinary algebra. If the last of these aims could be achieved, we 
would be able to use the laws of Boole’s algebra to determine whether or not a particular 
sentence can be validly derived from other sentences, just as we can use our knowledge of the 
laws of ordinary algebra to determine whether or not one formula of ordinary algebra can be 
validly derived from a collection of other formulas. 
 To achieve his aims, Boole gave a second interpretation of his algebra. To understand 
this second interpretation, note that not every sentence that occurs in reasoning looks like an 
instance of one of Boole’s equations. This is because of a point that should be familiar by 
now: not all declarative sentences are compounded out of sentences of subject-predicate 
form. Boole’s first analysis of language works well enough for such sentences as “Tailless 
black cats are Manx cats” (which becomes an instance of x · y = z), but it doesn’t seem to 
apply at all to such a sentence as “Children love their parents, and parents love their 
children.” The problem in this case is that “loves” is not a property hut a relationship, and 
that in the context of the sentence, the term “parent” involves a relation between a child and 
the people that are the child’s parents. In previous chapters we learned, you will recall, that 
an important defect of traditional logic was its inability to represent reasoning with relations. 
 Boole had no theory about how to analyze sentences that involve relations, and except 
in simple cases (such as “no cats”), he had no theory of quantifiers either. But he nonetheless 
had a clever idea for analyzing some of the logical properties of such sentences within his 
algebra. The idea is this: Consider the sentence “Children love their parents.” That sentence is 
true if and only if the sentence “‘Children love their parents’ is true” is true. Trivial though 
this observation may sound, Boole made excellent use of it. 
 Consider again the simplest possible field of sets consisting of a non-empty set U and 
the empty set. Recall that Boole denotes U with 1 and the empty set with 0. Instead of 
thinking of 1 as a name for U and 0 as a name for the empty set, however, think of the 
numeral 1 as a name for the number 1, and think of the numeral 0 as a name for the number 
0. Now the ordinary numbers 1, 0 will satisfy the laws of Boole’s algebra if we give + and · a 
new interpretation. We let Boole’s symbol · denote the function of ordinary multiplication, 
but restricted to the numbers 0 and 1. In Boole’s algebra, 1 · 1 = 1, and 1 · 0 = 0, and 0 · 0 = 
0, just as in ordinary algebra. We let Boole’s expression (1  x) denote the very same 
function it denotes in ordinary algebra, but with x restricted to the numbers 0 and 1. So 1  1 
= 0, and 1  0 = 1. And we let x + y denote the ordinary sum of x and y restricted to 1 and 0, 
with one modification. The modification is that 1 + 1 is defined to be equal to 1 (not 2, as in 
ordinary arithmetic). So 1 + 0 = 1, and 0 + 0 = 0, and I + 1 = 1.3 
 In modern mathematics the described system consisting of the ordinary numbers 0 
and 1 related by the functions just defined is called the two-element Boolean algebra. Its 
structure is exactly like that of the field of sets consisting only of U and the empty set . We 
say the two structures are isomorphic, by means that if we adopt the following 
correspondence, each structure is transformed into the other. 
•• 
 In sciences besides logic, it is perfectly routine to code properties of things by 
numbers. Different numerical scales are used in different sciences for different purposes. 
Similarly, Boole proposed to use 0 and 1 as a simple numerical scale in logic. In Boole’s 
scale the numerical values register properties of sentences. Sentences are things that are true 
or false. We can think of truth and falsity as possible properties that sentences can have, and 
so we can think of the number 1 as the value a sentence has on a numerical scale when the 
sentence is true, and we can think of the number 0 as the value a sentence has on a numerical 
scale when the sentence is false. Just as we use a kilogram scale to assign particular numbers 
to objects according to a property, their weight, Boole proposes a scale that assigns numbers 
to sentences according to whether they are true or false. 
 Let us return now to Boole’s algebraic language. Previously the variables x and y 
ranged over subsets of the domain of discourse, and a sentence could be obtained from an 
algebraic formula by replacing variables with terms for properties. Now the variables receive 
a different interpretation, and accordingly, sentences are obtained from algebraic formulas in 
a different way. The variables range over the two-element Boolean algebra. Each variable can 
have 1 or 0 as its value, but no other values are allowed. Ordinary sentences receive an 
algebraic structure in the following way. Consider the sentence 
Children love their parents and parents love their children. 
Replace the original sentence by the sentence that says that the original sentence is true: 
“Children love their parents and parents love their children” is true. 
Since 1 is the value on Boole’s numerical scale for the property a sentence has when it is true, 
replace the phrase “is true” by “= 1”. 
“Children love their parents and parents love their children” = 1 
Replace “and” with ·, “or” with +, and “not” with (1  ···): 
“Children love their parents · parents love their children” = 1 
Finally, replace each distinct simple sentence (that is, each sentence not compounded out of 
others with “and,” “or,” and “not”) with a distinct variable. This gives us the following: 
x · y = 1 
The result is the Boolean algebraic form corresponding to the original sentence. 
 In this way any declarative sentence can be represented in Boole’s algebra. The 
generality is obtained at a cost, however. There is no longer any analysis of the structure of 
sentences except insofar as the structure involves sentential connectives, that is, words such 
as “and,” “or,” and “not,” which can be used to build compound sentences from simpler 
sentences. 
USE OF BOOLEAN LOGIC 
Boole meant for his logical algebra to be used in settings that are quite different from the 
contexts in which we use ordinary algebra. He meant his algebra to apply to all deductive 
reasoning. To show the applicability of his algebra, he attempted to use it to reconstruct 
several famous philosophical arguments and to determine whether or not they are valid. 
Boole considered arguments from Plato, Samuel Clarke (a contemporary of Isaac Newton), 
and Spinoza. However, only Boole’s analysis of the argument from Plato really works. 
 To understand Boole’s account of that argument, we need to make one more concept 
precise. One of Boole’s equations entails another equation if every assignment of the values 0 
or 1 to the variables of the first equation that makes it true also makes the second equation 
true. Similarly, a set of Boolean equations, the premises, entails another Boolean equation, 
the conclusion, if every assignment of values 0 or 1 to the variables that makes all equations 
in the premise set true simultaneously also makes the conclusion true. A mathematical fact, 
which we will not prove, is that if an inference from premises to a conclusion is valid when 
the variables take their values in any finite field of sets, it is also valid when the variables 
take their values in the 2-element Boolean algebra {0, 1}. Thus, to verify that an inference is 
valid (in any or all fields of sets) it is sufficient to check for validity in the 2-element algebra. 
 In The Republic, Plato gives the following argument (Socrates asks the questions and 
states the conclusions; others in the dialogue give answers to Socrates’ questions): 
Must not that which departs from its proper form be changed, either by itself or by another 
thing? 
 Necessarily so. 
 Are not things which are in the best state least changed and disturbed, as the body by 
meats and drinks and labours, and every species of plant by heats and winds, and such like 
affections? Is not the healthiest and strongest the least changed? 
 Assuredly. 
 And does not any trouble from without least disturb and change that soul which is 
strongest and wisest? And as to all made vessels, and furnitures, and garments, according to 
the same principle, are not those which are well wrought, and in a good condition, least 
changed by time and other accidents? 
 Even so. 
 And whatever is in a right state, either by nature or by art, or by both these, admits of 
the smallest change from any other thing. 
 So it seems. 
 But God and things divine are in every sense in the best state. 
 Assuredly. 
 In this way, then, God should least of all bear many forms? 
 Least, indeed, of all. 
 Again, should He transform and change Himself? 
 Manifestly, He must do so, if He is changed at all. 
 Changes He then Himself to that which is more good and fair, or to that which is 
worse and baser? 
 Necessarily to the worse, if he be changed. For never shall we say that God is indigent 
of beauty or of virtue. 
 You speak most rightly, said I, and the matter being so, seems it to you, O Adimantus, 
that God or man willingly makes himself in any sense worse? 
 Impossible. 
 Impossible, then, it is, that a god should wish to change himself; but ever being fairest 
and best, each of them ever remains absolutely in the same form.4 
 Boole took Plato’s argument to be the following: 
Premise 1: If the Deity suffers change, then the Deity is changed either by the Deity or by 
another. 
Premise 2: If the Deity is in the best state, then the Deity is not changed by another. 
Premise 3: The Deity is in the best state. 
Premise 4: If the Deity is changed by the Deity, then the Deity is changed to a worse state. 
Premise 5: If the Deity acts willingly, then the Deity is not changed to a worse state. 
Premise 6: The Deity acts willingly. 
Conclusion: The Deity does not suffer change. 
Using his algebra, Boole aimed to show that the conclusion is a necessary consequence of the 
premises, that is, if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true. To show that, he 
demonstrated that the algebraic form of the premises is such that whenever they are true, the 
conclusion is true. First he assigned variables to the simple sentences of which the premises 
are composed: 
x: The Deity suffers change. 
y: The Deity is changed by the Deity. 
z: The Deity is changed by another. 
s: The Deity is in the best state. 
t: The Deity is changed to a worse state. 
w: The Deity acts willingly. 
Boole represented sentences of the form “If A then B” as “not (A and not B),” or in other 
words, by equations of the form “A · (1  B) = 0.” 
 Boole’s formulas for the six premises and conclusion of Plato’s argument are as 
follows: 
x · (1  y) · (l  z) = 0 
s · z = 0 
s = 1 
y · (1  t) = 0 
w · t = 0 
w = 1 
x = 0 
 Now it is easy to show algebraically that the conclusion must follow from the 
premises. (Recall laws (4.1) to (4.10) of Boole’s algebra.) 
Since w = 1 and w · t = 0, t must equal 0. 
Since s = 1 and s · z = 0, z must equal 0. 
Since t = 0, 0 = y · (1  t) = y · (1  0) = y. So y = 0 
Since y = 0 and z = 0, 0 = x · (1  y) · (l  z) = x · (1  0) · (1  0) = x. Hence, x = 0. 
 In the twentieth century Boole’s algebra has found applications that he could not have 
imagined. His theory is used every day by electrical engineers who design microchips. Every 
computer you have ever used was designed using principles of Boole’s algebra. Electrical 
current (on or off) can be used to code the Boolean values of propositions, 1 and 0. The 
presence of a current stands for the value 1, and the absence of a current stands for the value 
0. In Boole’s formulas, if you put in values 0 or 1, you get a value of 0 or 1 for the entire 
formula. Bits of circuitry behave exactly as do Boolean formulas. For example, suppose an 
electrical device, a little bit of a microchip, has two input leads and one output lead, as in 
figure 4.3. If the device behaves so that the current arrives at z when and only when the 
device receives current from x and y at the same time, then the device is a physical realization 
of the Boolean formula z = x · y. Systems of such devices function together to do binary 
arithmetic in a pocket calculator or a computer. The central processing unit of such devices 
can thus be described a system of Boolean formulas, and knowledge of the properties of such 
formulas is important in designing the devices and in diagnosing their flaws. 
SOME LIMITATIONS OF BOOLE’S LOGICAL THEORY 
In the first chapter of this book I argued that a theory of deduction should answer at least 
three questions: 
• How can we determine whether or not a piece of reasoning from premises to a 
conclusion is a valid deductive argument? 
• How can we determine whether or not a conclusion is necessitated by a set of 
premises? If a conclusion is necessitated by a set of premises, how can we find a valid 
deductive argument that demonstrates that necessary connection? 
• What features of the structure of the world, the structure of language, and the relation 
between words and thoughts and things make deductive reasoning possible? 
Boole did not give us a theory that says whether a piece of reasoning is or is not a genuine 
proof. Instead, he relied on our understanding of an algebraic proof. He had no real answer to 
the first question, but his theory does tell us when a proof is possible and how to find one if it 
exists. He in effect offers an answer to the second question. There are algorithms that will 
determine, for any finite set of Boolean formulas (the premises) and any other Boolean 
formula (the conclusion), whether or not the premise set entails the conclusion. So once we 
have represented a set of premises and a conclusion as Boolean equations, there is a 
completely mechanical process to determine entailment. If the results of such a procedure say 
that the premises do entail the conclusion, then the application of the algorithm itself will 
constitute a proof of that fact. 
 Boole also gave an answer to the third question, but the answer does not seem 
satisfactory. Boole’s problem was that he had represented logic as a kind of physics of the 
mind. Logic, he assumed, describes the laws by which the mind moves, just as physics 
describes the laws by which bodies move. But we know that everyone makes errors in 
reasoning. So Boole’s theory cannot possibly describe how we reason, because in fact we 
don’t always reason that way. Instead, Boole’s theory seems to prescribe how we ought to 
reason. Theories that prescribe standards are normative. The laws of physics are not 
normative: they don’t say how bodies ought to move; they say how bodies do move in 
various circumstances. 
 Here is what Boole himself says on this and related issues: 
The truth that the ultimate laws of thought are mathematical in their form, viewed in 
connexion with the fact of the possibility of error, establishes a ground for some remarkable 
conclusions. If we directed our attention to the scientific truth alone, we might be led to infer 
an almost exact parallelism between the intellectual operations and the movements of 
external nature. Suppose any one conversant with physical science, but unaccustomed to 
reflect upon the nature of his own faculties, to have been informed, that it had been proved, 
that the laws of those faculties were mathematical; it is probable that after the first feelings of 
incredulity had subsided, the impression would arise, that the order of thought must, 
therefore, be as necessary as that of the material universe. We know that in the realm of 
natural science, the absolute connexion between the initial and final elements of a problem, 
exhibited in the mathematical form, fitly symbolizes that physical necessity which binds 
together effect and cause. The necessary sequence of states and conditions in the inorganic 
world, and the necessary connexion of premises and conclusion in the processes of exact 
demonstration thereto applied, seem to be coordinate. ... 
 Were, then, the laws of valid reasoning uniformly obeyed, a very close parallelism 
would exist between the operations of the intellect and those of external Nature. Subjection to 
laws mathematical in their form and expression, even the subjection of an absolute 
obedience, would stamp upon the two series one common character. The reign of necessity 
over the intellectual and the physical world would be alike complete and universal. 
 But while the observation of external Nature testifies with ever-strengthening 
evidence to the fact, that uniformity of operation and unvarying obedience to appointed laws 
prevail throughout her entire domain, the slightest attention to the processes of the intellectual 
world reveals to us another state of things. The mathematical laws of reasoning are, properly 
speaking, the laws of right reasoning only, and their actual transgression is a perpetually 
recurring phenomenon. Error, which has no place in the material system, occupies a large one 
here. We must accept this as one of those ultimate facts, the origin of which it lies beyond the 
province of science to determine. We must admit that there exist laws which even the rigour 
of their mathematical forms does not preserve from violation. We must ascribe to them an 
authority the essence of which does not consist in power, a supremacy which the analogy of 
the inviolable order of the natural world in no way assists us to comprehend.5 
In this passage Boole has reluctantly and halfheartedly come to the conclusion that the 
conception of logic as a kind of physics of thought, a conception inherited from the 
seventeenth century, is in error. Logic is a normative theory and a metaphysical theory. It is 
metaphysical in telling us which propositions are necessary consequences of others. It is 
normative in telling us that if we believe certain things (the premises), then we ought to 
believe other things (the necessary consequences of things we believe). But it doesn’t 
describe how our minds work. 
 There is another kind of difficulty with Boole’s theory. The first aim of a logical 
theory is to distinguish the arguments that are valid deductions from the arguments that are 
not valid deductions. Can Boole’s theory really do that? Clearly, his theory includes many 
arguments that we would regard as valid, but it does not include all of them. 
 As we have seen, Boole really had two theories. The first theory supposes that a 
sentence is of subject-predicate form or is compounded out of simple sentences of subject-
predicate form with “and,” “or,” and “not.” With this theory Boole can account for the 
validity of many syllogistic inferences. For example, we can represent the premises and the 
conclusion of the syllogistic form Camestres as Boolean equations, and the result is a valid 
argument in Boole’s system: 
No A are B A · B = 0 
All C are B C · (1  B) = 0 
No A are C A · C = 0 
It is easy to see that the Boolean argument is valid: Use the fact that an inference is valid in 
any finite algebra if it is valid in the 2-element Boolean algebra. Since it is assumed as a 
premise that A · B = 0, (i) either A = 0 or B = 0 or both. Since it is assumed that C · (1  B) = 
0, (ii) either C = 0 or B = 1 or both. Necessarily, either B = 1 or B = 0. If B = 1, then by (i), A 
= 0, so A · C = 0. If B = 0, then by (ii), C = 0, so A · C = 0. Hence, in either case A · C = 0. 
 Boole’s second theory does not assume that sentences have a subject-predicate form, 
but it only accounts for logical properties that depend on sentential connectives, such as 
“and,” “or,” and “not.” Neither of Boole’s theories can account for logical inferences that 
depend on quantifiers and relations. For example, Boole’s theories do not explain why the 
following simple inference is valid: 
Someone loves everyone. 
Therefore, everyone is loved by someone. 
Boole’s theories are not sufficient to reconstruct the arguments in Euclid’s Elements or in any 
other mathematically sophisticated work. Nonetheless, in several respects Boole’s work 
provided a real improvement on all preceding logical theories. Boole showed that logic really 
could be studied by modern mathematical methods, and he helped to distinguish logic from 
psychology. But he was not yet very close to an adequate theory of deductive reasoning. That 
achievement was begun thirty-five years later by Gottlob Frege. 
Study Questions 
1. Using an inequality, how could you represent “Not all A are B” in Boole’s theory? 
2. Consider the Aristotelian form Darapti and its Boolean representation: 
All B are A B · (1  A) = 0 
All B are C B · (1  C) = 0 
Some A are C A · C  0 
Darapti does not correspond to a valid Boolean argument: if B is the empty set (or 0 in a 2-
element Boolean algebra), the premises will be true no matter what values A and C may have, 
and in particular, A · C may be 0 or . For each of the Aristotelian syllogistic forms in the 
third figure, determine whether or not the corresponding arguments are valid in Boolean 
logic. 
3. For each of the valid Aristotelian forms in the first and second figures, construct a 
parallel argument using Boolean equations (or inequalities), and show that the Boolean 
argument is valid. 
Review Questions 
1. In what ways might Boole’s logical theory be considered a continuation of Leibniz’s 
ideas? 
2. Explain the differences between Boole’s two theories. Is it a good objection to 
Boole’s work that he does not provide a single, unified theory? 
3. What is a simple sentence in Boole’s logic? What is a compound sentence? 
4. How did Boole think that the truth or falsity of simple sentences determines the truth 
or falsity of compound sentences? 
5. What are the limitations in the answers Boole’s theory provides for the three principal 
questions at issue in a theory of proof? 
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Figure 4.1 
The intersection of the set of black cats and the set of Manx cats 
Figure 4.2 
A field of sets and a graph of their containment relations 
Figure 4.3 
An electrical device that is a physical realization of the Boolean formula z = x · y 
  
Chapter 5 
FREGE’S NEW LOGICAL WORLD 
INTRODUCTION 
Aristotle and Descartes each gave similar answers to the questions, How do we know what is 
true? How do we know the truths of geometry and arithmetic and physics, for example? Each 
of them held that we know the truths of these subjects because certain fundamental principles 
are known through intuition and other truths are validly deduced from these fundamental 
principles. By the eighteenth century this understanding of the structure of knowledge had 
almost dissolved. At the end of the nineteenth century, new developments gave birth to 
modern logic, to modern conceptions of proof and logical necessity, and to radical changes in 
metaphysics. In this chapter I will describe some of the developments that led to this new 
understanding. 
 The seventeenth century succeeded in throwing off most of Aristotle’s conception of 
knowledge and inquiry by establishing new and impressive sciences through other methods. 
The most striking example was Newton’s Principia, which established a science of motion 
that seemed at least as profound and powerful as Euclid’s geometry. But Newton did not 
argue for his new science from intuition or from the natural light of reason. He argued for it 
from observations that anyone (with appropriate instruments) could make, and he made his 
methods of argument a central point of the Principia. Francis Bacon did not succeed in 
constructing a science as impressive as Newton’s, but his Novum Organum did call for a new 
experimental method of discovery, and he illustrated that method by constructing an 
(essentially correct) theory of heat. William Harvey used simple observations and 
experiments to argue for the circulation of the blood, and William Gilbert described 
experiments to determine the properties of the lodestone, or magnet. In England, France, 
Germany, Italy, and Holland, those interested in physics, biology, and chemistry began to 
think that the way to knowledge was via the path of experimentation. Newtonian and 
Baconian science competed with Cartesian science in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries, and Newtonian and Baconian science won. 
 The new science and its methods brought new philosophical problems. One problem, 
which will concern us in later chapters, is this: Why are the experimental and observational 
methods of modern science reliable? How can we know, or why are we justified in believing, 
that these methods lead to truth? Another problem, which will concern us in this chapter, is 
this: If science depends on inferences made from observation and experiment, what is the 
basis for our knowledge of mathematics and for the special certainty that propositions in 
geometry and arithmetic seem to have? What is it that guarantees that arithmetic applies to 
everything and that geometry applies everywhere? 
 Reflection on such questions began to create new divisions among the sciences. In the 
eighteenth century, the new sciences of physics and chemistry seemed different from 
geometry and arithmetic. Unlike the new sciences, geometry and arithmetic did seem to 
depend on self-evident principles. How could anyone who understood the matter doubt 
Euclid’s axioms or that addition is commutative? For most thinkers, geometry and arithmetic 
did not seem (in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries anyway) altered by or elaborated 
through experimentation in the way theories in physics, chemistry, and biology are changed 
as the evidence from observation changes. There seemed to be two different kinds of 
sciences, one founded on experience and observation, the other founded on reason alone. A 
few philosophers disagreed with this division. For example, John Stuart Mill, perhaps the 
most influential English philosopher in the nineteenth century, held that geometry and 
arithmetic really are sciences exactly like physics, biology, or chemistry. Arithmetic, 
according to Mill, is an experimental subject; the fundamental principles of arithmetic seem 
certain to us only because they have so often been tested and confirmed by our experience. 
The same is true with geometry. 
 Prior to Mill’s work, another attempt to distinguish between various sciences emerged 
from the psychological perspective of the seventeenth century. Descartes and Leibniz, 
following Aristotelian tradition, had thought of physical objects as bundles of properties 
attached to a substance. Descartes thought of mental objects in the same way: bundles of 
properties attached to a mental substance. Ideas are collection of properties attached to a 
mental substance. So an idea may be simple or complex; it may consist of a single irreducible 
property or of a. bundle of properties together. Descartes’ way of thinking about ideas was 
shared by English philosophers who opposed him in other respects. John Locke, George 
Berkeley, and David Hume rejected Cartesian substances and Cartesian method, but they 
thought of ideas in roughly the way Descartes had. Flume, an eighteenth-century Scottish 
philosopher and historian, used the idea idea to give a rather traditional answer to questions 
about our knowledge of arithmetic and geometry. 
 Some propositions, Hume proposed, are about matters of fact. That the sky is blue, 
that the earth has but one moon, that Italy has a sea coast—these are matters of fact. Matters 
of fact can be discovered only from experience (if at all). The empirical sciences concern 
themselves with discovering matters of fact. Other propositions are about (or are true because 
of) relations among ideas. Since an idea is just a bundle of (mental) properties, some ideas 
may contain other ideas. Descartes insisted, for example, that the idea of body includes the 
idea of extended thing. Hume proposed that the propositions that we judge to be certain and 
to be known without observation or experimental testing are propositions about the relations 
of ideas. We can know theme without performing experimental tests, it seemed to Hume, 
because our mental life, our ideas, are immediately apparent to us and we can just see with 
the mind’s eye that some ideas contain other ideas. 
 Hume’s proposal really comes to this: True propositions that are about the relations 
among ideas can be known a priori, that is, in a way not founded on any experience, 
essentially by a combination of what Descartes would have called “natural light” and the 
method of analysis and synthesis. Propositions that are not about relations among our ideas 
but instead are about the external world cannot be known in this way. 
 Unfortunately, Hume’s proposal has an obvious flaw. Insofar as we understand what 
is meant by “idea,” it does not seem that mathematical truths can be obtained as relations 
among ideas. Consider simple arithmetic. It is a truth of arithmetic that 2 + 2 = 4, and this 
seems as certain as anything can be. But does the idea of the number 4 contain the idea of the 
sum of 2 with itself? If so and if this is why it is true that 2 + 2 = 4, then it would seem that 
the number 4 must contain an infinity of other ideas as well, for it is also true that 3 + 1 = 4 
and that 5  1 = 4 and that 8  4 = 4 and so on. No one (save possibly Leibniz) thought of 
ideas as entities that contain infinities of other ideas. Immanuel Kant, the greatest philosopher 
of the second half of the eighteenth century and one of the thinkers who most influenced 
science and philosophy in the nineteenth century, recognized this flaw in Hume’s proposal 
and built a system to try to account, nonetheless, for the a priori character of arithmetical and 
geometrical truths. 
 Kant distinguished between propositions (or judgments as he would have said) that 
are analytic and those that are synthetic. Kant thought that judgements always have a subject-
predicate form, and he wrote of concepts rather than ideas. He put the distinction between 
analytic and synthetic judgements thus: in analytic judgements, but not in synthetic 
judgements, the concept of the predicate contains the concept of the subject. Kant’s 
distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements is essentially the same as Hume’s 
distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact, and Kant took the distinction (with 
profuse acknowledgments) from Hume. Kant also distinguished between a priori and a 
posteriori judgments. A priori judgements can be known by reason alone; a posteriori 
judgements cannot be known by reason alone but require the evidence provided by 
experience. 
 Kant took the foremost question of epistemology and metaphysics to be this: How are 
synthetic a priori judgements possible? That was Kant’s technical way of asking how, for 
example, the truths of mathematics can be known with certainty by reason alone. The truths 
of mathematics are not, in his view, analytic, so their truth cannot be established merely by 
unpacking the relevant concepts; the method of analysis cannot succeed in establishing their 
truth. Nonetheless, it is true that 2 + 2 = 4, and we can know that truth without doing 
experiments, and our conclusion is not subject to any possible refutation by experience. 
Kant’s question was how this can be so. 
 We will consider Kant’s answer and its implications in some detail in a later chapter, 
but we first need to consider it very briefly here. Kant’s answer is this. The world we 
experience and come to know is partly a world of our own creation. Our sensory and our 
cognitive apparatuses act on whatever they receive to construct a world of colors, objects, 
spatial and temporal relations, and so on. The way in which we create the world and the 
world that we create are not subject to our will, but they are nonetheless partly our creation. 
We cannot make up a world of experience simply by imagining whatever we please. The 
world of experience is determined by our cognitive apparatuses, which is not subject to our 
will, and by how the world is in itself, which we will never know. The world in itself does 
not, or at least need not, have red things or extended things or even things. The world we 
experience depends on two factors: the world in itself and our cognitive apparatuses. We 
could say, as Kant sometimes suggests, that the world in itself provides the matter or raw 
input for experience, and we ourselves provide the form of experience. A picture may help 
(see figure 5.1). 
 Kant argued that judgements of arithmetic and geometry can be synthetic and yet 
known a priori because they constitute the form of experience. That is, our cognitive 
apparatus is so constructed that arithmetic will apply to every sequence of objects in 
experience and is so constructed that Euclidean geometry will apply to every system of 
objects in experience. We can imagine creatures who do not have cognitive apparatuses like 
ours and who might therefore have very different a priori sciences. For such creatures, 
arithmetic or Euclidean geometry might not even be true. But for us, the propositions of these 
mathematical theories are certain to be true of anything we experience. With Kant, the 
content and epistemology of mathematics became an essential part of psychology. 
Study Question 
Suppose that Kant was correct that the human cognitive apparatus imposes Euclidean 
geometric forms on experience. Could Kant know that to be true? If so, could he have a priori 
knowledge of it or only a posteriori knowledge? 
FREGE, LOGICISM, AND LOGIC 
In the late nineteenth century there seemed to be few alternative accounts of mathematical 
knowledge besides those of Mill and Kant. Gottlob Frege invented an entirely new approach. 
Frege was Professor of Mathematics at the University of Jena in Germany in the closing 
years of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century. He was as much a 
philosopher as a mathematician, and the two subjects were intimately combined in his work. 
Despite the obscurity of his writings during his lifetime, Frege’s efforts opened the way to 
much of modern mathematics, modern logic, modern approaches to topics in economics, and 
the modern theory of computation. Many people (including me) think that most work of 
value in twentieth-century philosophy is in some way indebted to Frege’s ideas. His work had 
enormous practical consequences as well: every time you use a computer you take advantage 
of a device that emerged in the twentieth century as a result of Frege’s work. Frege stands to 
logic roughly as Newton stands to physics. 
 Frege’s alternative to Kant and Mill was this: arithmetic and geometry are certain and 
can be known by reason alone because arithmetic and geometry are nothing but logic, and 
logic is certain and can be known by reason alone. According to the this idea, now called 
logicism, the notions of number, numerical order, sum, and product can all be defined in 
purely logical terms, and with those definitions, the basic laws of arithmetic should turn out 
to be purely logical propositions that are necessarily true. Similarly for geometry, the notions 
of congruence and betweenness might be reduced to purely logical terms, and the laws of 
geometry shown to reduce to logical truths. 
 In the late nineteenth century this proposal seemed to face insuperable obstacles. The 
best logical theory available was Boole’s, and as we have seen, Boole’s theory could not 
account for the simplest geometric proofs, and it was equally inadequate for proofs in 
arithmetic. Frege did not know of Boole’s work when he first began publishing on these 
questions, and the logical theories available to him were even less adequate. How could one 
reduce mathematics to logic when the available logical theories did not even permit one to 
derive the consequences of mathematical axioms? Frege offered an astonishing and ambitious 
solution: invent a better a logic. That is exactly what he did. 
 The logicist program begun by Frege was continued in the twentieth century by 
Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead, but it eventually failed. The program helped 
logic to flourish, but it did not succeed in convincing most scholars that mathematics is 
nothing but logic. For one thing, mathematical theories such as ordinary arithmetic require 
that there exist an infinity of objects—the infinite series of numbers—and no matter how 
ingenious the attempts at reducing mathematics to logic, the existence of an infinite collection 
of objects does not seem to be a matter of logic alone. For another thing, by the earlier years 
of the twentieth century, developments in mathematics and science made it appear that Mill 
was correct in claiming that geometry is an experimental science. In the nineteenth century 
several new geometrical theories were developed. They came to be known as non-Euclidean 
geometries. Karl Gauss, one of the discoverers of the first non-Euclidean geometry, viewed 
the theory exactly as Mill would have: as an alternative empirical theory about space. Gauss 
tried unsuccessfully to perform a test that would determine whether space is Euclidean or 
non-Euclidean. Furthermore, by 1915 Albert Einstein and David Hilbert had developed a new 
physical theory of gravitation, the general theory of relativity, which postulated that the 
geometry of space is a physical quantity that changes with the density of matter and radiation. 
 Frege first presented his new theory of logic in a work entitled (in English translation) 
Conceptual Notation: A Formula Language of Pure Thought Modeled on the Formula 
Language of Arithmetic. The book contained not only new logical ideas but a notation in 
which formulas were spread out in two dimensions on the page. Like logicism, Frege’s 
notation did not succeed, and it is never used today: So I will present Frege’s theory in 
conventional notation. 
 Let A, B, C, stand for any sentences. Then the formulas A, B, C stand for the 
sentences “A is not the case,” “B is not the case,” “C is not the case.” The formula A → B 
stands for the sentence “If A then B.” 
 All of the operations in Boole’s logic can be expressed with such formulas. For 
example, in Frege’s system the sentence “If A then B” is equivalent to “It is not the case that 
A and not B.” “If A then B” is also equivalent to “Either it is not the case that A, or it is the 
case that B, or both.” So Frege obtained the following equivalences. The sentence “A and B” 
is equivalent to the sentence “It is not the case that if A then not B,” and so the sentence “A 
and B” can be represented by the formula (A → B). The sentence “Either A or B or both” 
is equivalent to the sentence “If A is not the case, then B,” and so the sentence “Either A or B 
or both” can be represented by the formula A → B. “Equivalent” means that necessarily a 
sentence of one form is true if and only if the sentence of the equivalent form is true. 
 Notice that parentheses are used to make clear the intended scope of an operator. In 
the formula A → B, the symbol  has only A in its scope. In the formula (A → B) the 
symbol  has the entire formula A → B in its scope. 
 Since formulas representing “or” and “and” can be given for any sentences, we can 
make things more convenient by using A & B to abbreviate (A → B) and A ˅ B to 
abbreviate A → B. 
 Recall that Boole really had two logical theories. His second theory gave an account 
of how to reason with “and,” “or,” and “not” for sentences whose structure was not further 
analyzed. His first theory gave an account of reasoning that used the subject-predicate 
structure Boole assumed for sentences. Frege integrated the two theories into one, but he did 
not assume that sentences have a subject-predicate structure. Instead, Frege introduces names, 
variables, function symbols, and predicates, and he uses these logical categories to represent 
the structure of sentences. 
 For Frege a name is any term that denotes a particular object: “the Moon,” “Bertrand 
Russell,” “Plato,” “the number 3” are all names for different objects. 
 A variable is a letter, x, y, z used in place of a name. It does not name an object but 
ranges over objects, the way a numerical variable in algebra ranges over numbers. 
 A. function symbol is a term that denotes some object when applied to a name or 
sequence of names. “Father of,” “sum of,” “product of” are function terms. Applied to an 
appropriate name or sequence of names, each function term denotes an object: “father of 
Gottlob Frege” denotes Karl Alexander Frege, “sum of 2, 2” denotes 4, “product of 2, 3” 
denotes 6, and so on. Functions can be classified according to how many arguments they 
need in order to denote an object. “Father of” requires that one name be specified. We say 
that it is a unary function. “Sum of” requires that two arguments be specified (names of the 
two numbers to be added together). Two descriptions must be specified even if they describe 
the same number, as in the sum of 2, 2. We say that sum is a binary function. Similarly, we 
can consider function terms that require three arguments, four arguments, and so on. In 
logical notation, lower case letters such as f, g, h, are often used for function symbols. 
 A predicate symbol denotes a property of individual things or a relation among things. 
When applied to a name or a sequence of names, a predicate forms a sentence that asserts that 
the named objects in the sequence stand in the relation that the predicate denotes. “Loves,” 
for example, is a predicate, and so are “is red” and “is between.” “Sam loves Mary” is a 
sentence, and so are “Mars is red” and “Point b is between point a and point c.” In logical 
notation, predicate symbols are often given by capital letters, such as P, Q, R, and the names 
to which they attach are given in sequence after them. So if B is the predicate that denotes the 
property of betweenness, and a, b, and c are names for points, the formula Babe says that 
point b is between point a and point c. Frege introduced a special predicate for identity: for 
any names a and b, a = b always means that the object named by a is the very same object 
named by b. 
 Finally, a quantifier is a phrase such as “every,” “all,” “some,” “there exists,” “there 
is,” “there are.” In Frege’s theory the phrases “every” and “all” are represented by the symbol 
, called the universal quantifier. The universal quantifier is always immediately followed by 
a variable, x, y, z, etc. The universal quantifier followed by a variable can be attached to the 
beginning of any formula to form another formula. So, for example, to the formula Baxc we 
can attach x to make the formula x Baxc, which says that every point is between points a 
and c, or equivalently, for any point, call it x, x is between a and c. Quantifier phrases that 
assert existence (phrases such as “some,” “there exists,” and so forth) can be represented by 
using  and the universal quantifier together. So the sentence “There exists a point between 
points a and c” says the same thing as the sentence “It is not the case that every point is not 
between a and c.” With the universal quantifier, the latter sentence can be represented by 
x Baxc. We use x to abbreviate x . Every quantifier also has a scope, often 
indicated by parentheses. In the formula just written, the scope of the quantifier is the formula 
Baxc, but in the formula x(Baxc ˅ Bxxx) the scope of the quantifier is the entire formula 
Baxc ˅ Bxxx. In the formula x(Baxc) ˅ Bxxx the scope of the quantifier is again just the 
formula Baxc. 
 Frege’s logic allows us to put formulas together using any of these logical structures. 
If we form a formula with → and , we can put a universal quantifier in front of it. We can 
put a whole sequence of quantifiers together in front of a formula. With these logical 
categories we can easily represent important differences in sentences that Aristotle and Boole 
could not distinguish. For example, we can say say that someone loves everyone: xy(Lxy). 
We can say that everyone loves someone: xy(Lxy). We can say that everyone is loved by 
someone: xy(Lxy). We can say that someone loves himself: x(Lxx). Frege’s notation 
represents the differences among these English sentences clearly. 
 Frege introduced a series of formulas that he took to be logical truths. Every sentence 
having the form of one of these formulas is necessarily true, that is, true in every logically 
possible world. Frege’s list of logical truths is not intended to be complete. There are an 
infinity of other formulas that are also logically true and that can be derived from those that 
Frege gave. Here are some of Frege’s forms of logical truths: 
A → (B → A) 
(C → (B → A)) → ((C → B) → (C → A)) 
(D → (B → A)) → (B → (D → A)) 
(B → A) → (A → B) 
A → A 
A → A 
(c = d → K) → Kc/d (where Kc/d is the result of substituting d for c wherever c occurs in 
formula K) 
c = c 
 Besides his logical formalism, Frege introduced a series of rules of inference. The 
rules of inference permit one to infer one formula from others. Frege’s idea was that a proof 
consists of a sequence of sentences that can be represented as a sequence of logical formulas 
in which each formula is either an assumption of the proof (a premise) or else is derived from 
preceding formulas by means of one of the rules of inference. 
 I will not give all of Frege’s rules of inference, but here are a few rules that hold for 
his system of logic. 
Substitution From any set of premises at all, infer the result of substituting any formulas 
for A, B, C, and D, and of substituting any names for c and d in any of the forms of logical 
truths given above. 
Modus ponens From A → B and A, infer B, where A and B are any formulas. 
Quantifier deletion From x(Fx), infer Fx for any formula F. 
Conjunction introduction From any formulas A, B, infer A & B. 
Notice that these rules of inference are given entirely in terms of the structure of the formulas 
themselves. They do not depend on the meanings of the formulas. 
 A proof in Frege’s system is just a finite sequence of formulas such that every 
formula in the sequence either follows from preceding formulas by one of the rules of 
inference or else is an assumption of the proof. 
 Using nothing more than these rules of inference, Frege was able to account for 
deductive arguments that would have baffled Aristotle and Boole. The details of a system of 
proof derived from Frege’s are given in the next chapter. 
 The virtue of Frege’s system is not that the formal proofs it gives are short or simple. 
The virtues of Frege’s system are quite different: 
• The rules of proof are sufficient to reconstruct valid deductive arguments in 
mathematics and science. 
• The rules of formal proof are entirely explicit. 
• They are so explicit, in fact, that it is a completely mechanical matter to determine 
whether or not a sequence of formulas is a proof. All that is required to test whether a 
purported proof is indeed a proof is to check whether the rules of inference have been 
properly applied. 
Study Questions 
1. Explain what constitutes a proof in Frege’s logic. If we prove something about 
Frege’s logic are we giving a proof in his logic? 
2. Explain informally why the first six of Frege’s logical truths should be regarded as 
necessarily true. In other words, why should one think that sentences of these forms cannot 
possibly be false on the intended meanings of the symbols  and →. 
3. Use the list of Frege’s logical truths and the rules of substitution and modus ponens to 
give proofs of the following formulas: 
A → (A → A) 
(A → A) → (A → A) 
A → (A → A) 
A → A 
THE THEORY OF MEANING: LANGUAGE AND THE WORLD 
Frege’s logical theory was founded on an analysis of the logical structure of language, and his 
theory of proof uses nothing but grammatical features of formulas in a logical language. But 
what are formulas in such a language about? The “logical truths” Frege assumed are 
supposed to be forms of sentences that are necessarily true. But what is truth, and why are 
these sentences necessarily true? Do the proofs that can be constructed in Frege’s system 
necessarily preserve truth? Does a proof exist for every valid deductive inference? Answering 
these questions about Frege’s theory requires a theory of meaning. Frege himself thought a 
great deal about the question of meaning, and after the turn of the century, philosophers and 
logicians developed a mathematical theory of meaning to correspond to Frege’s logic. 
 Frege distinguished the reference of a phrase or a sentence from its sense. The phrases 
“morning star” and “evening star” refer to the same object, the planet Venus, but they have 
different senses. Frege held that each declarative sentence refers to its truth value. So true 
sentences refer to truth, and false sentences refer to falsehood. But, of course, not every true 
sentence means the same thing, so sense and reference must be distinguished. Reference does 
not determine sense, nor does sense determine reference, but according to Frege, two 
expressions that have the same sense must have the same reference. Frege’s picture suggests 
a linguistic transformation of metaphysics. Instead of searching for the essences of things, we 
should search for the senses, the meanings, of expressions. We will consider in later chapters 
some of the consequences of this way of thinking. 
 The mathematical theory of meaning that developed for Frege’s logic is really an 
elaboration of ideas implicit in George Boole’s work. Boole had emphasized that every 
conversation tacitly presupposes a universe of discourse. Suppose there is a set, called the 
domain, that contains all of the objects we wish to talk or reason about in a particular context. 
If we are reasoning about whole numbers, the domain will consist of the natural numbers. If 
we are doing anthropology, the domain will consist of people and the objects people possess 
or know about. In other contexts, other domains will be assumed. 
 In Boole’s conception, the objects in a domain have properties. For example, if the 
domain is the natural numbers, some of the numbers are even, some are odd, some are prime, 
some are perfect squares, and so forth. As with Boole’s first theory, consider for each 
property of interest the set of all objects in the domain having that property. The property of 
being even determines in the natural numbers the set of all even numbers, the property of 
being odd determines the set of all odd numbers, and so on for any property that we want to 
talk about. Like Boole, I will assume that a discourse is about a domain and a specific 
collection of properties of members of that domain, and that each property determines the set 
of all objects of the domain having that property. 
 Suppose E and O are one-place predicates in a formal language that we wish to use to 
represent arithmetic reasoning. We might specify that E denotes the set of all even numbers 
and O denotes the set of all odd numbers in a domain that consists of all the whole numbers. 
If the language has numerals as names, we might further specify that “0” denotes the number 
0, “1” the number 1, “2” the number 2, and so on. Then the formula E2 will say something 
true about numbers. What makes E2 true? The fact that “2” denotes an object (the number 2) 
that really is in the set denoted by E (the set of even numbers). A formula is true or false only 
in relation to a structure (a domain and subsets of that domain) and some rule that connects 
particular predicates with particular subsets of the domain and particular names with 
particular objects in the domain. 
 A formula such as Ex is neither true nor false, since x is a variable. However, if we let 
the variable x have a particular value, say the value 2, then the formula Ex will be true of that 
value. Ex is neither true nor false by itself, but in the domain we are considering, Ex is true of 
the number 2, false of the number 1, and so on. The formula Ex will be true of a value of x 
whenever that value of x is not in the set denoted by E. The formula  Ex is true of the 
number 3, for example. Now the formula x(Ex) says that Ex is true of everything in the 
domain. So x(Ex) is true if and only if Ex is true of every value of x. The formula x(Ex) 
says that some number is even. It is true if and only if the formula Ex is true of some number 
or other, in other words, if and only if Ex is true of some value of x. 
 When is a formula such as Ex ˅ Ox true of a value of x? When the value of x is in the 
set denoted by E or is in the set denoted by O. That is the same as saying that Ex ˅ Ox is true 
of a value of x if and only if that value of x is a member of the union of the set denoted by E 
and the set denoted by O. For example, in the interpretation of E and O we are considering, E 
denotes the set of even numbers, and 0 denotes the set of odd numbers, and since every 
number is even or odd, the union of E and O is the set of all numbers. So Ex ˅ Ox is true of 
every number in the domain. It follows from what was said in the preceding paragraph that 
x(Ex ˅ Ox) is true. In parallel fashion, the formula Ex ˅ Ox will be true of any object that is 
a member of both the set denoted by E and the set denoted by O. In other words, it will he 
true of any member of the intersection of those sets. Since no number is both even and odd, 
Ex & Ox is true of no number. Hence x(Ex & Ox) is false. 
 If the terms of a formal language are given their meanings according to the procedures 
just described, some formulas will come out true no matter what domain we choose, as long 
as it is not empty, and no matter what subsets of the domain individual predicates denote. For 
example, the formula x(Ex ˅ Ex) is true no matter what domain we consider and no matter 
what subset of that domain E denotes. x(Ex ˅ Ex) is a logically true formula. It is easy to 
see why: x(Ex ˅ Ex) is true in a domain under any particular specification of what E 
denotes if and only if Ex ˅ Ex is true of every element of the domain. Ex ˅ Ex is true of a 
member of the domain if that individual is a member of the set denoted by E or a member of 
the complement (in the domain) of the set denoted by E. But every member of every 
nonempty domain is a member of E or of the complement of E, no matter what set E is. So Ex 
˅ Ex is true of every value of x. So, finally, x(Ex ˅ Ex) is always true. 
Study Questions 
The mathematical theory of meaning for Frege’s logic can be extended to relations as 
follows. A two-place relation between members of a domain determines the set of pairs of 
objects in that domain that stand in the relation. In the natural numbers, the relation less than 
determines the set of all pairs of numbers where the first member of the pair is less than the 
second. So the pair <1, 2> is determined by this relation, but not the pair <2, 1> and not the 
pair <1, 1>. A two-place predicate in a formal language forms a sentence when followed by 
two names, but the names may also be replaced by variables. Such a predicate may be taken 
to denote the set of all pairs in a domain that stand in some relation. For example, let the 
domain be the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, ... , and let L be a two-place predicate that denotes 
the relation “less than.” Then L(1, 2) is true, but L(2, 1) and L(l, 1) are false. The formula Lxy 
is true of the pair <1, 2> but false of the pair <2, 1> and false of the the pair <1, 1>. The same 
thing may be done with three-place relations and three-place predicates, four-place relations 
and four-place predicates, and so on. 
1. Given the definitions in the paragraph above, what pairs of natural numbers is the 
formula Lxx true of? 
2. Is the formula xy Lxy true in the domain of natural numbers? Is the formula xy 
Lyx true? Explain what each of these formulas says. 
3. Explain what the following formula says, and determine whether or not it is true: 
xyz((Lxy) → (Lxz & Lzy)) 
4. Write a formula that says that for every two distinct points, there is a point between 
them. Use whatever symbols you need. 
IMPLICATIONS OF FREGE’S THEORY 
The proof of the logical truth of x(Ex ˅¬Ex) given in the preceding section is the basis for 
an explanation of why logical truths are necessarily true. Logical truths are true because of 
how we use our language. If we use “and,” “or,” “not,” “for every,” “some,” and other logical 
phrases in the way Frege describes, then the truth or falsity of complex sentences will depend 
on the truth or falsity of simpler sentences from which they are compounded, and the truth or 
falsity of sentences with quantifiers will depend on what the formulas without quantifiers are 
true of: These dependencies of complex sentences on simpler sentences will make some 
formulas come out true no matter whether their simpler sentences are true or false and no 
matter what the predicates they contain denote. The sentences or formulas that come out true 
in every possible world are the sentences or formulas that are true as a matter of logical 
necessity, true in every conceivable world. In Frege’s theory, there is no longer a great 
mystery as to how some sentences can have this kind of necessity. 
 The mathematical theory of meaning for the part of Frege’s logic I have described 
(sometimes called first-order logic) provides a formal notion of entailment. Recall that one 
sentence entails another if the truth of the first sentence logically necessitates the truth of the 
second sentence, in other words, if it is not logically possible for the first sentence to be true 
and at the same time for the second sentence to be false. Similarly, we say that a set of 
sentences entails another sentence if it is not logically possible for all of the sentences in the 
set to be simultaneously true and the entailed sentence to be false. We can analyze entailment 
as follows: 
Definition Let  be a collection of sentences, and let S be a sentence.  entails S if and only 
if for every nonempty domain D and every rule assigning subsets of D to predicates occurring 
in  or S, if all sentences in  are true, then S is also true. 
 With the theory of meaning and this definition of entailment, various fundamental 
questions about the adequacy of Frege’s logical theory become mathematical questions that 
can be answered by (often difficult) mathematical investigations. One such question is 
whether proofs in Frege’s logic necessarily preserve truth. This question becomes the more 
precise question, In every proof in Frege’s logic, do the assumptions of the proof entail the 
conclusions? Logicians succeeded in proving that the answer to this question is affirmative, 
and that is why proofs show that premises entail conclusions. Another question is whether for 
every entailment there is a corresponding proof. More precisely, if  entails S, is there a proof 
of S from assumptions in ? In 1931 Kurt Gödel, then a young Viennese logician, proved that 
the answer to this question is also affirmative. 
 I began our study of the idea of a deductive argument with three principal questions. 
1. How can we determine whether or not a piece of reasoning from premises to a 
conclusion is a valid deductive argument? 
2. How can we determine whether or not a conclusion is necessitated by a set of 
premises? If a conclusion is necessitated by a set of premises, how can we find a valid 
deductive argument that demonstrates that necessary connection? 
3. What features of the structure of the world, the structure of language, and the relations 
among words, thoughts, and things make deductive reasoning possible? 
 Frege’s theory provides an answer to the first question. Given a deductive argument, 
we can now determine whether or not it is a good deductive argument. We put the premises, 
the conclusion, and the intermediate steps of the argument into formal notation and then 
determine whether or not each step of the formal argument follows from preceding steps or 
from the premises by Frege’s rules of proof or by rules that can be derived from Frege’s 
rules. Moreover, this constitutes an adequate answer to the question. Using Frege’s theory, 
we can represent proofs in number theory, algebra, geometry, set theory, and those empirical 
sciences that use mathematical reasoning. In previous chapters I illustrated the limitations of 
theories of proof with the problem of reconstructing the very first proof in Euclid’s Elements. 
I emphasized that Aristotle’s theory of the syllogism could not account for Euclid’s proof and 
later noted that George Boole’s logical theory could not do much better. Frege’s theory can 
do better. Frege himself claimed that his system could be used to reconstruct proofs in 
geometry as well as other types of deductive arguments, such as Saint Anselm’s ontological 
proof of the existence of God. (Frege even wrote a paper on Anselm’s argument.) But it turns 
out to be a considerable task actually to develop a formal system in which Euclid’s 
geometrical assumptions can be stated and all of Euclid’s propositions can be proved. David 
Hilbert presented the first such system after the turn of the century, using some stronger 
logical principles than those I have discussed. 
 Frege’s theory also provides a kind of answer to the third question. The answer is 
given through the theory of meaning, which connects formulas in Frege’s logical notation 
with domains and their subsets, and specifies what it means for a formula to be true (or to be 
false) when its variables range over a domain and its predicates are assigned to subsets of that 
domain. The idea is that the names and predicates of a language denote objects, properties, 
and relations, and in the actual world some objects may happen to exemplify any particular 
property or relation, and some may not. The denotations and the facts of the world determine 
the truth values of sentences. What constitutes the relation of denotation between words on 
the one hand and things, properties, and relations on the other remains mysterious. This 
sketchy theory of meaning, together with the logicians’ mathematical demonstration that 
proofs in Frege’s system show that the premises of the proof entail the conclusion and 
Gödel’s proof that if a set of sentences entails a conclusion, then there exists some proof in 
Frege’s system that derives the conclusion from the premises, provide a partial answer to the 
third question. 
 Only the second question remains untouched, but it is a very important. Recall that 
Leibniz hoped that by formulating all of science in a formal language, an “alphabet of 
thought,” we would obtain an algorithm, a mechanical means, to derive all of the 
consequences of any proposition. If Leibniz’s vision were fulfilled, all of the tedious work of 
investigating the consequences of any set of assumptions could be done by machine. We 
would never need to be in ignorance of the implications of any theory: a computer could 
calculate them for us. On Frege’s logical theory, the second part of the second question 
amounts to the following: Is there an algorithm that, if run forever, will list every proof in 
Frege’s logic? The answer is that there is such an algorithm. If a finite set of sentences entails 
a conclusion, this algorithm will find a proof of that conclusion from premises in the set. But 
when we formulate the question in this way, we realize that the answer is a little 
disappointing, for what if we don’t know whether or not a set of premises entails a conclusion 
and want to find out? An algorithm that runs forever looking for a proof and doesn’t find one 
will never tell us at any finite time that there is no proof to be found. It seems that to fulfill 
Leibniz’s vision what we really want is a positive answer to the following question: Is there 
an algorithm, a mechanical, computable procedure, that will determine for every formula 
whether or not that formula is a logical truth in Frege’s system? If there were such an 
algorithm or computational procedure, we could use it to determine whether or not any 
particular set of premises logically necessitates any particular conclusion. For suppose that 
the premises are A, B, C, ... , D, and suppose that the conclusion is E. Then if the premises 
logically necessitate the conclusion, whenever the premises are true, the conclusion is also 
true; in other words, in no possible circumstance are the premises true and the conclusion 
false. Thus if the premises necessitate the conclusion, then the sentence (A & B & C & ... & 
D) → E must be true in every possible world, that is, it must be a logical truth. Conversely, if 
the formula (A & B & C & ... & D) → E is logically true, then in every world in which the 
formula A & B & C & ... & D is true, E is also true. So the premises necessitate the 
conclusion. Therefore, to determine whether or not the premises A & B & C & ... & D 
necessitate the conclusion E, we have only to determine whether the formula (A & B & C 
& ... & D) → E is logically true. So an algorithm that would determine whether or not a 
formula in Frege’s system is logically true would realize Leibniz’s dream. But is there such 
an algorithm? 
 There is not. No algorithm exists that will determine for every formula whether or not 
that formula is logically true. Hence no algorithm exists that will determine for every set of 
premises and every possible conclusion whether or not the premises entail the conclusion. 
Leibniz dreamed an impossible dream. 
 To obtain this answer, logicians in the 1930s had to formulate a precise theory of what 
is and what is not computable, and they had to formulate precise mathematical descriptions of 
idealized machines for carrying out computations. These logical studies created the 
mathematical subject now known as the theory of computation. That theory was developed 
by a number of people in the 1930s and 1940s, including Gödel, whom I have already 
mentioned; Alonzo Church, then a professor of mathematics at Princeton; and his students, 
including Alan Turing, then a young Englishman whom Church brought to Princeton. Their 
work led to the modern understanding of computation and provided the ground work for 
theoretical computer science. At the close of World War II, the new theory of computation 
and the emerging understanding of programming systems guided the construction of the first 
programmable electronic computers. 
MYSTERIES 
Frege’s theory leaves a number of problems unsolved. For example, Frege thought that his 
formula x(Ax → Bx) captured the logical properties of scientific laws about causality. But 
“Smoking causes cancer” cannot be represented very well by a logical formula of the form 
x(Sx → Cx). The sentence “Smoking causes cancer” does not imply that everyone who 
smokes gets cancer. Logicians have sought formal systems that better represent causal 
reasoning. Again, Frege’s logic does not succeed very well in capturing the logical properties 
of conditional senses whose antecedents are known to be false. For example, “If George Bush 
were not president, then Dan Quayle would be president” is true (at least in 1991), but “If 
George Bush were not President and he had emigrated to Chile in 1987, then Dan Quayle 
would be president” is false. But in Frege’s logic, if any sentence of the form. A → B is true, 
then so is (A & C) → B. Elegant formal systems have been developed to account for 
counterfactual reasoning. There are many other problems of this sort, but in each case modern 
solutions continue to use both Frege’s fundamental ideas and the basic principles of the 
theory of meaning that later logicians developed for Frege’s theory. 
 Frege’s theory also leaves or creates a number of other philosophical problems that 
we do not yet fully understand. Frege’s theory supposes that names denote objects, and 
predicates denote properties (or the sets that are the extensions of properties). One of the 
fundamental concerns of twentieth-century philosophy has surrounded the following 
questions: What is the relation of denoting? What makes it the case that a particular word or 
phrase on a particular occasion of utterance denotes a particular object or property? What are 
meanings or senses? 
 One answer to these questions is that people have a mysterious and irreducible 
capacity to make words mean things. On this view, the relation of denoting cannot be 
explained in any natural way. Most philosophers today regard such a view as unfounded, but 
finding a scientifically acceptable alternative is not easy, A plausible proposal is that denoting 
is some sort of causal relation between objects or properties on the one hand and utterances 
of words or phrases on the other. The idea is, for example, that when we say or write 
“Cicero,” we denote the Roman orator because our use of the word “Cicero” is connected by 
a millennium long causal chain of uses to the event in which Cicero was named “Cicero.” A 
use of the word “red” denotes the property red because somewhere in the prehistory of 
language, ancestral users picked a word for the property red, and that word evolved through 
history into the English word “red.” On this view, utterances of “red” and the presences of 
red things may be correlated, but the relation of denotation does not consist in that 
correlation. The correlation is what makes it useful to have a term for the property red and 
what makes it possible for us to learn what “red” denotes. Children are able to learn what 
“red” denotes because their teachers arrange circumstances in which the property denoted, 
red, is strongly correlated with utterances of “red.” 
 But what makes a particular action an act of naming? We need a natural account of 
naming quite as much as we need an account of denoting. The obvious explanation of naming 
appeals to what the namer intends for a word to denote. But to intend something seems to 
require having thoughts that have a linguistic structure and whose component simple thoughts 
stand in denoting relations to things and properties. Is the causal account therefore inevitably 
circular, and circular in a way that makes it unenlightening and unscientific? These questions 
have been the subject of considerable debate in philosophy in the last twenty years. 
 A third approach to the question of denoting denies that there is any such relation. In 
effect, it claims that the theory of meaning developed for Frege’s logic is a mistake. This 
approach is generally attributed to the American pragmatists Charles Sanders Peirce, William 
James, and John Dewey, who wrote during the first decades of this century, and also to 
various continental philosophers writing in the same period. It continues to be held today by 
some philosophers. The pragmatists denied that there are relations between language and a 
world (independent of language) in virtue of which sentences are true or false. Peirce, for 
example, claimed that truth is what will be believed in the Iong run. The radical reading of 
this slogan is that whatever people come to believe in the long run constitutes the truth. This 
idea is puzzling for several reasons, including the following: For an utterance or a writing to 
express a belief, and not be just ink marks or noise, requires that parts of the utterance or 
writing have a meaning, which seems to require that they denote properties or things (or at 
least possible properties and possible things). So the idea that beliefs could completely 
determine the world seems curiously incoherent, since the idea of something being a belief 
seems to require a world and meaning relations. Perhaps for reasons such as these, some 
contemporary pragmatists explicitly do not follow Peirce’s program. Instead, they emphasize 
that the fundamental property of sentences is not their truth or their falsity but their 
assertability. In some contexts it is appropriate to assert a sentence, and in other contexts it is 
not appropriate. The proper study of language and logic on this view is not the study of 
entailment but the study of assertability. A convincing development of this view of language 
faces formidable tasks, including explaining how linguistic competence is acquired, 
explaining how we can use assertions to reliably manipulate the world (“Jump! There’s a 
truck coming”), and explaining the basis for our intuitions about entailment and logical 
implication. I will return to some of these topics in a later chapter. 
 Meaning is not the only profound problem that has followed Frege’s logic. Another 
difficulty has to do with twentieth-century physics. We can give perfectly adequate formal-
logical reconstructions of many branches of physics. In essence, this has been done for 
classical particle mechanics, for the special theory of relativity, and for several other physical 
theories. There is one branch of twentieth-century physics, however, for which it seems that it 
cannot be done, and unfortunately, that part of physics, quantum theory, is the most 
fundamental. Quantum theory emerged in the first decades of this century from ideas due to 
Max Planck, Albert Einstein, and Niels Bohr. In the middle of the 1920s the theory was 
changed dramatically by Erwin Schrödinger, Werner Heisenberg, and others. The “new 
quantum theory” that emerged has a mathematical framework that can be perfectly well 
represented in a formal logical system. However, when we try to say what the entities of the 
theory are and what their properties are, things begin to come apart. 
 The fundamental problem can be thought of this way. Consider a box that has two 
sides, and suppose that there is an electron in the box. According to quantum theory, it can be 
true that an electron is in the left side of a box or in the right side of the box, while at the 
same time it is false that the electron is in the left side of the box and it is false that the 
electron is in the right side of the box. This phenomenon is known as superposition. Let Le 
mean the electron is in the left-hand side of the box, and let Re mean the electron is in the 
right-hand side of the box. Then it is true that Le ˅ Re and false that Le and false that Re. So 
we have that (Le ˅ Re) & Le & Re, which is a contradiction according to Frege’s logical 
theory (and according to Boole’s as well). 
 What do we do when a fundamental physical theory involves a contradiction? Well, 
ordinarily we might reject the physical theory and look for a better theory that does not 
involve a contradiction. Many physicists have attempted to do just that, but they have found 
no theory without superposition that is able to account for the statistical relations found 
among properties of subatomic particles. The same phenomenon is present even in more 
recent fundamental theories, such as the quantum theory of fields. Another response is to 
conclude that the physical theory is an excellent calculating device for predicting the 
outcomes of experiment but that the theory really says nothing about the constitution of 
matter. This view, often known as instrumentalism, avoids the problem of inconsistency by 
treating sentences that seem to be about individual particles as not about such things at all. 
Instrumentalism saves us from paradox, but only at the cost of enormous disappointment. 
After all, we thought that modern physics would tell us about the structure of the universe. 
On the instrumentalist view, modern physics does no such thing; it only tells us how to 
predict the outcomes of experiments. 
 There is another way to resolve the problem. If our fundamental physical theories 
seem to involve a contradiction, perhaps we should change our ideas about what is and what 
is not a contradiction. Perhaps the difficulty is not with physics but with Frege’s logic, and 
perhaps we should look for a logical theory in which the formula (Le ˅ Re) & Le & Re is 
consistent. Philosophers, physicists, and logicians have developed several logical systems of 
this kind, called quantum logics. Quantum logics avoid the logical paradox in modern 
physics, and some of them are still strong enough to permit the reconstruction of classical 
mathematical reasoning, but they have not yet been provided with a theory of meaning as 
clear as the system of domains and subsets that provides the theory of meaning for Frege’s 
logic. Perhaps the theory of meaning for quantum logic never will be so clear. Niels Bohr 
argued that quantum phenomena are essentially complementary, by which he meant that there 
is a coherent picture not of all properties of a quantum system taken together but only of one 
or another aspect of quantum systems considered independently. If he is right, then we should 
not expect to find an unequivocal theory of meaning that includes the foundations of modern 
physics. 
CONCLUSION 
Frege’s logical theory solves the problems I posed for a theory of deductive argument. It 
characterizes a notion of proof adequate to encompass mathematical proofs in a wide range of 
subjects. When elaborated with a theory of meaning, the theory of proof turns out to be 
complete in the sense that for every entailment, there exists a corresponding proof. Moreover, 
the theory of meaning explains why proofs reveal entailment, since the theory of meaning can 
be used to show that whenever there is a proof of a conclusion from a set of premises, the 
premises necessitate the conclusion. It is disappointing but certainly enlightening to learn that 
no possible algorithm can tell us, for every finite set of premises and every possible 
conclusion, whether there exists a proof of the conclusion from the premises. The work that 
led to understanding this limitation also created the modern theory of computation. 
 With all of its benefits and insights, Frege’s logical theory and the theory of meaning 
that was built upon it also left us with many puzzles. Some of the puzzles require extending 
the logical theory or introducing modifications while keeping the same general picture of 
how language relates to the world. Other puzzles, including explaining what constitutes 
meaning relations and reconciling Frege’s logic with modern physics, seem more 
fundamentally difficult. 
Review Questions 
1. What is logicism, and to what views of Mill and Kant is it opposed? 
2. Explain Frege’s logical categories and his conception of a formal proof. 
3. What does Frege’s theory say about the three fundamental questions concerning 
deductive argument? 
4. Explain the basic idea of the mathematical theory of meaning developed for Frege’s 
logic. 
5. Many previous theories were limited because they could not account for reasoning 
about relations. Explain how Frege’s theory can account for such reasoning. 
6. Describe some contemporary difficulties for Frege’s theory and some proposed 
solutions to them. 
7. Suppose that we could present Frege’s theory to Aristotle and to Leibniz. How do you 
suppose each of them would evaluate Frege’s theory? If they accepted Frege’s logical theory, 
what implications would that have for their own metaphysical theories? 
8. What roles did each of the following people have in the story of this chapter: Alfred 
North Whitehead (1861–1947), Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), 
David Hume (1711–1776), Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), Alan Turing (1912–1954), David 
Hilbert (1862–1943), Albert Einstein (1979–1955), Alonzo Church (1903–present), Niels 
Bohr (1995–1962), Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914). 
9. Briefly explain the views of Hume, Mill, and Kant about the nature of mathematical 
knowledge. 
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Kant’s picture of metaphysics 
  
Chapter 6 
MODERN LOGIC* 
In this chapter we will take a more careful look at logic as it has developed since Frege. We 
will consider many of the same ideas discussed in the previous chapter, but we will proceed 
more rigorously, and I give more details. 
RELATIONAL STRUCTURES 
One might be asked to find the roots of the polynomial x2  1. That is really just to ask for the 
values of x that satisfy the following formula: 
(1) x2  1 = 0 
The answer, of course, is {1, 1}. The formula states a condition satisfied only by special 
values of the variable x. We could say that the equation is true of the number 1 and true of the 
number 1. But it would not make sense to say that the equation is, all by itself, true, nor 
would it make any sense to say that the equation is false. The formula is true of some 
numbers, those that satisfy it, and false of other numbers, those that do not satisfy it. Compare 
these sentences: 
(2) For all x, x2  1 = 0. 
(3) For all x, if x2 = 1 then x2  1 = 0. 
(4) There exists an x such that x2  1 = 0. 
Sentence (2) is simply false if the domain over which the variables range is the real numbers. 
It is not true of some numbers and false of others. It is simply false. Sentence (3) is true; it is 
not true of some numbers but not others. Sentence (2) is false because it says that x2  1 is 
satisfied by every number, and that is false. Sentence (3) is true because it says that every 
number satisfying x2 = 1 satisfies x2  1 = 0, and that is true. Sentence (4) is true, not true of 
some numbers and false of others, but simply true. There are, however, particular numbers 
that make (4) true, specifically the numbers 1 and 1. They make (4) true because they satisfy 
(1), and what (4) says is that some numbers satisfy (1). 
 The difference between (1), which is true of some numbers but not others, and (2) 
through (4) is that (1) has a free variable, x, whereas in (2) through (4), the variable x is 
bound. In (2) and (3), every occurrence of the variable x is governed by the phrase “for all,” 
and we say that when a variable occurs in such a context, it is bound. Similarly, in (4) every 
occurrence of the variable x is governed by the phrase “there exists,” and we also say a 
variable occurring in such a context is bound. We say that formulas with free variables are 
open formulas and that formulas without free variables are closed formulas. Closed formulas 
will also be called sentences. 
 Other phrases can be used to bind variables. “Every” means the same as “for all.” 
“There exists” and “for some” are synonymous with one another, but they bind variables in a 
different way than does “for all.” 
 Why is the formula x2  1 = 0 satisfied by {1, 1}? Well, because if we take the 
number 1 and square it, we get the number 1 back, and if we take that number and subtract 
from it the number 1, we get 0. We get the same result if we take the value of x to be 1, but 
not if we take x to have any other value besides 1 or 1. So we are really thinking of the 
numbers in the real line as the possible values of x, and we are thinking of these numbers as 
things for which such functions as addition, subtraction, and multiplication are defined. 
Further, we think of the real numbers as each standing in a special relation to itself and to no 
other number, the relation of identity or equality. 
 So the picture we have when we do algebra is of a domain—perhaps the real line, 
perhaps the real plane, perhaps sometimes some other system of objects. When we write 
algebraic expressions using variables, the variables range over the objects of the domain. 
When we say “for all,” we mean for all members of the domain, and when we say “there 
exists,” we mean that there exists a member of the domain. The objects of the domain are 
related to each other by some definite collection of functions and by some definite collection 
of properties or relations. 
 Let us call a relational structure any nonempty set D, which we will call the domain 
of the structure, together with any finite collection of functions defined on all members of D, 
all ordered pairs of D, or all ordered triples of D, and so on, according to whether the 
functions require one argument or two arguments or whatever. The functions also have their 
values in D. We further allow that a relational structure may have any finite number of 
relations or properties. A property is just a subset of D, a two-place relation is just a subset of 
all of the ordered pairs of D, and so on. We write the set of all ordered pairs of D as D  D, 
sometimes called the Cartesian product of D with itself, or the second Cartesian power of D 
(after Descartes, of course). 
 The natural numbers form one relational structure. The domain consists of an infinite 
collection of objects. There are three functions—successor, addition, and multiplication—
defined on the domain. The successor function, s, maps each number to its immediate 
successor, that is s(x) = x + 1. There is one constant or distinguished individual, namely the 
number 0. There are two relations in the structure: one is the relation of identity that each 
number has to itself; the other is the relation of order (a < b), which holds of numbers a, b if 
and only if a is less than b. We write this structure as [N, 0, s, +, , =, <] and denote it by N. 
 We can consider the structure that has the same domain as the natural numbers but 
has no functions, no constant, and two relations: identity and the less-than relation. The 
structure is [N, <, =]. The structure just defined is sometimes described as discrete order with 
a first element because there is an object in the domain, namely the number zero, that is less 
than every number except itself. 
 The integers, denoted by Z, form a relational structure, [Z, 0, s, +, , =, <], that can be 
thought of as an extension of N. The integers include the positive numbers, zero, and the 
negative numbers. Successor, addition, and multiplication are all part of this relational 
structure, just as with the natural numbers. Whereas in the natural numbers there is a number, 
zero, that is not the successor of any number, in the integers every number is the successor of 
a number. In the integers we can define an operation, subtraction, that we cannot define on 
the natural numbers. (By our conventions a function can only be introduced if it is defined on 
all members of the domain of the structure, or on all ordered pairs if it is a two-place 
function. Subtraction does not have a value in the natural numbers for all pairs of natural 
numbers.) 
 If we ignore the functions in Z and consider just the identity and the ordering 
relations, we obtain a structure sometimes called discrete order without first or last elements, 
[Z, =, <]. 
 Another familiar number domain is the collection of rational numbers. The rational 
numbers can be described in various ways. They are, for example, the real numbers that have 
repeating decimal expansions. Another way to think of the rationals is as those numbers that 
can be represented by a ratio of integers. Of course, one and the same rational number can 
often be represented by more than one ratio of integers. Thus 1/2 is the same number as 2/4, 
as 3/6, as 4/8, and so on. Two ratios of integers a/b and c/d, represent the same number 
provided that ad = cb. So, starting with the integers, Z, we can consider the set Z  Z of all 
ordered pairs of integers, except for those ordered pairs whose second element is 0 (because 
we cannot divide by 0). We can then define an equivalence relation, call it E, between such 
ordered pairs by the condition that E(a, b, c, d) if and only if ad = cb. For each ordered 
pair of integers a, b in Z  Z (except ordered pairs whose second element is 0), we can 
consider the set of all ordered pairs x, y such that E(a, b, x, y). We can call this set the 
equivalence class of a, b and denote it by [a, b]. So if E(a, b, c, d) holds, that is, if a, 
b and c, d are equivalent ratios of integers, then they determine one and the same 
equivalence class, that is to say, [a, b] = [c, d]. 
 Now take the domain of the rational numbers to be the set of all equivalence classes 
just constructed. In other words, treat the equivalence classes as themselves the fundamental 
objects. We can define operations + and on these equivalence classes in terms of the 
operations of addition and multiplication on the integers. To understand the point of the 
definitions, recall that a fraction, say 1/2, is simply one way of representing the ordered pair 
1, 2, and recall that in adding fractions, say 1/2 + 2/4, we multiply the numerator of each 
fraction by the denominator of the other, add the results, and divide by the product of the 
denominators. The definitions are as follows: 
Definition of sum [a, b] + [c, d] = [ad + bc, bd] 
Definition of product [a, b]  [c, d] = [ac, bd] 
The first of these equations says that the operation + operating on the two equivalence classes 
[a, b] and [c, d] is defined to be the equivalence class of the ordered pair of numbers ad + 
bc, bd, where the + between ad and bc means ordinary addition of integers. The second 
equation is to be read in an analogous way. 
 We can also define an ordering relation, denoted by <, on the rational numbers from 
properties of the integers. Thus we have the following definition of order: 
Definition of order [a, b] < [c, d] if and only if there exists a rational [u, v] such that u > 
0 and v > 0 and [a, b] + [u, v] = [c, d]. 
Using the integers, we have constructed the rational numbers, which we denote by Q. 
Actually, we had to use a good bit more than just the integers; we also had to use principles 
of set theory. 
 The rational numbers form a relational structure that has an infinite domain with the 
operations of addition and multiplication (but not the successor operation). Informally, we 
think of the rational numbers as including the integers, so that each integer x is identified with 
a particular rational number, [x, s(0)]. Just as with the natural numbers and the integers, we 
can use addition to define the relation of less than on the rational numbers, and we can think 
of the structure obtained from Q by deleting all relations and functions except for identity and 
less than. This ordering differs from the ordering on the integers in the following way: 
between any two rational numbers, there is another rational number. So the sentence “For 
every object x and for every object y, if x is less than y, then there is an object z such that x is 
less than z and z is less than y” is true in the rationals but false in the integers. An ordering for 
which this sentence is true is said to be dense. 
 Number systems are not the only relational structures. Euclidean geometry is 
concerned with such structures. Consider a structure whose domain consists of all ordered 
pairs of real numbers. Intuitively, each object in the domain is a point of two-dimensional 
Euclidean space. The points can be taken to stand in two relations (besides identity): 
betweenness and congruence. Betweenness is a three-place relation. Informally, a point z is 
between two points x and y just in case there is a Euclidean (straight) line segment from x to y 
containing z. Congruence is a four-place relation. Again informally, a pair of points x, y is 
congruent to a pair of points u, w just in case the line segment with endpoints x and y has the 
same length as the line segment with endpoints u and w. 
 In fact, any set of objects, together with functions and relations defined on the objects, 
can form a relational structure. The domain can be the set of streets in Pittsburgh. Properties 
might be the set of paved streets, and the set of cobblestoned streets. One relation might be 
the set of pairs of streets such that the first intersects the second. 
Study Questions 
1. For each of the following formulas, describe the set of natural numbers (i.e., nonnegative 
whole numbers) satisfying it: 
x  2 = 0 
x2 < 5 
x + (x  3) = 4 
x  x = 0 
2. Which of the following are true in the structure of a discrete order with a first element? (a) 
There is an object such that every object is less than it. (b) For any two distinct objects, there 
is a third such that the third object is less than one of the first two and the other object of the 
first two is less than the third object. (c) No object is less than itself. (d) If one object is less 
than a second and the second object is less than a third, then the third object is less than the 
first. (e) If one object is less than another, then the latter is also less than the former. 
3. Specify the set of natural numbers that satisfy the following (note that what follow are not 
sentences; they are formulas): (a) x is less than all other numbers; (b) x is less than all 
numbers; (c) x is less than 3, and 1 is less than x; (d) x is less than 3, and 2 is less than x; (e) x 
is less than 3, or 2 is less than x. 
4. Can you give a formula that cannot be satisfied in the domain of the integers but can be 
satisfied in the domain of natural numbers? 
5. Let E be the relation defined in the construction of the rational numbers from the integers. 
Prove that for all ordered pairs u = x, y, w = k, z, v = m, n, the following hold: E(u, u); if 
E(u, w), then E(w, u); and if E(u, w) and E(w, v), then E(u, v). Any two-place relation that has 
these three properties (called, respectively, reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity) is an 
equivalence relation. 
6. Show that the following open formula (open because x and y are free variables) can be 
satisfied by some pairs of numbers in the integers: if x is less than y, there is an object z such 
that x is less than z and z is less than y. 
7. Prove that the ordering of the rational numbers is dense. 
FORMAL LANGUAGES 
Consider the sentence “For any two objects, there is a third such that the third object is less 
than one of the first two and the other object of the first two is less than the third object.” 
What makes this sentence clumsy is the need for coreference. Different parts of the sentence 
must refer to one and the same unnamed object and not to other objects. In this case we can 
introduce the device of variables in such sentences in lieu of names. So we might say, “For 
any two distinct objects x, y, there is a third object z such that z is less than x or z is less than 
y, and if z is less than x then y is less than z, and if z is less than y then x is less than z.” This 
restatement ought to be clearer, even though it is still complicated. One reason logicians work 
with formalized languages is to remove such ambiguities. Another reason is that logicians 
want to prove things about properties of languages, and doing so requires that a language be 
a definite mathematical object. 
 In a formalized language there is a basic vocabulary consisting of expressions that 
serve as names for particular objects in the domain (analogous to the names “zero” and “0,” 
which we use for the number zero), expressions that serve as variables, expressions that 
denote properties and relations, expressions that denote functions, expressions that serve as 
quantifiers (analogous to “for all” and “there exists”), expressions that serve as sentential 
connectives (analogous to the & and  and  of chapter 5), and items, such as parentheses, 
that serve a role analogous to that of punctuation marks in English. 
 For example, we can take the vocabulary for the basic language of arithmetic to 
consist of the following: 
Names: 0 
Variables: xi for any i in N 
Two-place predicate symbols: L, = 
One-place function symbol: s 
Two-place function symbols: +,  
Quantifiers: ,  
Sentential connectives: &, , ,  
Parentheses: (,) 
This basic vocabulary is infinite, but only because we allow an infinity of distinct variables. 
 Clearly there are an infinite number of finite strings of elements from this vocabulary, 
for example, the following are all strings from this vocabulary: 
(L  =)( 
(x)Lx30 
((((((((((((((((((((((()))))))))))) 
In a natural language such as English, not every string from the vocabulary makes sense. 
“English, up goes the, to tree. not; ;;? who” is a string of English words and punctuation 
marks, but it is not a sentence; it has no meaning in the English language. We say it is not 
well formed. 
 In the same way, we want only special strings from our formal vocabulary to count as 
being well formed, but we want it to be perfectly definite which strings are, and which are 
not, well formed. In English and in other natural languages there is no bound on the length or 
number of well-formed strings, or sentences, and so the collection of sentences in English is 
infinite. We want the same to be true of the well-formed strings in formalized languages. 
After all, the number of truths is infinite, and we hope to be able in principle to state any of 
them. 
 How can we characterize this infinite class exactly? We do so by giving an inductive 
definition. The inductive definition will begin by saying that a certain perspicuous collection 
of strings is well formed. Then it will specify rules or operations from which a new well-
formed string can be made from previous well-formed strings. Finally, it will say that the set 
of all well-formed strings is exactly the set of all strings that can be generated by applying 
these rules to the initial finite set of well-formed strings any finite number of times. In this 
way the set of well-formed strings will be “built up.” 
 For the vocabulary I have just given, the characterization of the set of well-formed 
strings is as follows: 
Definition of a term (1) The symbol 0 is a term. (2) Every variable is a term. (3) If t1, … , 
tn are terms and f is an n-place function symbol, f(t1, ... , tn) is a term. (4) Nothing else is a 
term. 
Definition of an atomic formula An atomic formula is a string of the form Ltitk or of the 
form ti = tk, where ti and tk are any terms. 
Definition of a well-formed formula (1) Every atomic formula is well formed. (2) If M is 
well formed, so is (M). (3) If M is well formed, so is M. (4) If M and N are well formed, so 
are (M & N) and (M  N) and (M  N). (5) If M is well formed, so are xiM and xiM, where 
xi is any variable. (6) Nothing else is well formed. 
The inductive definition of a well-formed string implicitly provides a procedure for 
determining whether or not an arbitrary string is well formed. If there is a means of 
determining whether a symbol is a variable, the procedure can be made completely 
mechanical. 
 When we first considered examples from algebra, I noted the difference between 
variables that occur free and variables that are governed by a quantifier expression such as 
“there exists” or “for all.” We can make the notion of a free occurrence of a variable precise 
for any formalized language of the kind we are considering. Recall first of all that one and the 
same variable can occur in several places in one and the same well-formed formula, so that 
what must be defined is the notion of a free occurrence of a variable in a well-formed 
formula: 
Definition of a free occurrence of a variable in a well-formed formula (1) Every 
occurrence of a variable in an atomic formula is a free occurrence. (2) An occurrence of a 
variable in S is free if and only if that occurrence is free in S. (3) An occurrence of a 
variable is free in (M  N) if and only if that occurrence is free in M, if it occurs in M, or free 
in N, if it occurs in N. (4) An occurrence of a variable is free in (M & N) if and only if that 
occurrence is free in M, if it occurs in M, or free in N, if it occurs in N. (5) An occurrence of a 
variable is free in (M  N) if and only if that occurrence is free in M, if it occurs in M, or free 
in N, if it occurs in N. (6) An occurrence of a variable xi is free in xkS or in xkS if and only 
if that occurrence is free in S and i does not equal k. 
An occurrence of a variable that is not free is said to be bound. 
 We say that a well-formed formula is closed or is a sentence if it contains no free 
occurrences of variables. Otherwise, the formula is said to be open. 
 One great advantage of formal languages is that the language itself becomes a 
perfectly definite mathematical object, so that one may proceed to prove things about it, just 
as one proves things about numerical or geometrical objects. The importance of formal 
languages is not so much in their actual use but rather in showing that everything can in 
principle be made precise. In practice, completely formal languages are much too clumsy to 
use, and I will abbreviate formulas in obvious ways, for example, by ignoring extraneous 
parentheses required by the formation rules but unnecessary for seeing what is meant. 
 The formulation and study of formalized languages was concurrent with the 
development of logic early in this century. In the 1950s this aspect of logic served as a model 
and stimulus for the science of linguistics. Since then a principle aim of many linguists, 
following the work of Noam Chomsky, has been to characterize natural languages as systems 
with explicit rules of formation, or parsing rules. Like the rules of our simple formalized 
language, these linguists search for a formulation of grammatical principles that will make it 
possible to determine mechanically whether or not a string of symbols from a language is 
grammatical. 
Study Question 
Which of the following are terms if f is a two-place function symbol and g is a one-place 
function symbol and x and y are variables: 
f(x, f(x)) 
f(g(x), y) 
g(f(x, g(y)) 
g(g(g(g(x)))) 
TRUTH AND SATISFACTION 
We know the basic idea for connecting formulas in a formal language to relational structures. 
The aim is to connect symbols with objects, properties, and relations in such a way that 
formulas in the language will be true or false of objects or sequences of objects in the domain 
and sentences in the language will be true or false. The basic idea is that each predicate of 
each type (that is, one-place, two-place, etc.) is mapped to a subset of members of the domain 
(or subset of ordered sequences of members of the domain) satisfying a property or relation. 
One-place predicates are mapped to subsets of the domain, two-place predicates are mapped 
to sets of ordered pairs of members of the domain, and so on. In the same way, unary-
function symbols in a formal language are mapped to unary functions in the relational 
structure, binary-function symbols to binary functions, etc. I will call an interpretation any 
mapping that connects the names, predicates, and function symbols of a language with the 
relations and functions of a relational structure. 
 We also know from chapter 5 what it is that makes an atomic formula with a free 
variable true of an object in the domain of a relational structure on an interpretation 
connecting the language of the formula with the relational structure. A formula, such as Mx is 
true of an object d in the domain of a relational structure under an interpretation, call it J, 
provided that d is in the subset of the domain that J connects with the predicate M. Logicians 
tend to say that d satisfies Mx, keeping the terminology familiar from algebraic formulas. 
More formally, if we let J(M) be the subset of the domain D to which J maps M, then d 
satisfies Mx with respect to J if and only if d  J(M). If the predicate is two-place, then a 
formula such as Bxy is true of, or satisfied by, an ordered pair of objects from the domain, say 
c, d, provided that c, d is in the set of ordered pairs connected to B by J. That is, c, d 
satisfies Bxy with respect to J if and only if c, d  J(B). We also know that a formula of the 
form x Mx will be true with respect to an interpretation if and only if some object in the 
domain is in the set to which J maps M, in other words, if and only if some object in the 
domain satisfies Mx. x Mx will be true with respect to interpretation J if and only if every 
object in the domain is in the set to which J maps M, in other words, if and only if every 
object in the domain satisfies Mx. A general definition of truth of sentences and satisfaction 
of formulas can be given inductively. 
Study Question* 
Think of an assignment function K as a rule that specifies, for each variable in a formal 
language, an object in a domain D. Then we say that K satisfies M(x) if K(x) is in J(M), where 
the interpretation J is assumed. Try to give an inductive definition of “Mapping K of variables 
in language L to domain D of relational structure R satisfies formula S.” Assume a fixed 
interpretation J of the predicate and function symbols and the names in the language. Start 
with clauses for atomic formulas in the language. For each sentential connective (&, , ), 
add a clause saying when K satisfies a compound formula with the connective (for example, 
P & Q) in terms of when K satisfies the components (P and Q in the example). For existential 
quantifiers, take K to satisfy x S(x, y, z), for example, if some assignment function J that has 
the same value as K for all variables except possibly for the variable x satisfies S(x, y, z). For 
universal quantifiers, take K to satisfy “x S(x, y, z) if every assignment function L that has 
the same values as K for all variables except possibly for variable x satisfies S(x, y, z).” 
PROOFS 
There are many different ways to formulate a theory of proof for the kinds of formal 
languages I have discussed. Different formulations may start from different sets of logical 
truths and use different rules of inference. All of the many formulations turn out to be 
equivalent in the sense that if a formula is provable from a set of assumptions in one 
formulation, it is also provable from the same set of assumptions in other formulations. I will 
give a system of proof that is based loosely on Frege’s treatment.1 
 To obtain a consistent and adequate system of proof, we must be careful about the 
substitution of variables. The problem is that we cannot permit the substitution of an arbitrary 
term in an arbitrary universally quantified formula. Where t is an arbitrary term, we cannot 
without restriction infer a formula of the form x St or the formula St from a formula of the 
form x Sx. For example, suppose that the formula we are considering is xy(x = y). This 
sentence says there are at least two things in the domain. If we substitute the term y for the 
variable x in this sentence, we would get the sentence xy(y = y), which, by quantifier 
deletion, entails y(y = y). This sentence is a contradiction asserting there exists something 
that is not identical with itself. 
Definition of substitutable (1) For atomic S, any term is substitutable for x in S. (2) Term t 
is substitutable for x in S if and only if t is substitutable for x in S. (3) Term t is substitutable 
for x in M  N if and only if t is substitutable for x in both M and N. (4) Term t is 
substitutable for x in x S if and only if either x does not occur free in S or x does not occur in 
t and t is substitutable for x in S. 
 Our formal characterization of proof is given by a system of axioms and inference 
rules. There are an infinity of different axioms, but they may all be obtained from a finite 
number of axiom schemata either by substituting any well-formed formulas in an axiom 
scheme or by substituting and then placing universal quantifiers in front of the formula. 
Definition Formula S is a generalization of formula S if and only if S is obtained from S 
by prefixing S with any finite number of universal quantifiers in any variables. 
 Every generalization of any formula obtained by substituting any well-formed 
formulas for A, B, and C and any names or variables for x, c, and d and any term for t in the 
following axiom schemata is an axiom. 
A  (B  A) 
(C  (B  A))  ((C  B)  (C  A)) 
(D  (B  A))  (B  (D  A)) 
(B  A)  (A  B) 
A  A 
A  A 
c = d  K  (Kc/d) (where K is an atomic formula and Kc/d is the result of substituting d for 
c in zero or more occurrences of c in formula K) 
c = c 
x Sx  St (where t is substitutable for x in Sx) 
x(M  N)  (x M  x N) 
S  x S (where x does not occur free in S) 
 There is a single rule of inference: 
From S  T and S, infer T. 
 Finally, I define a proof of formula S from a set of assumptions  to be a finite 
sequence of formulas such that the last formula in the sequence is S and each formula in the 
sequence is in , is an axiom, or follows from two preceding formulas in the sequence by the 
rule of inference. 
 Actual proofs in this system may be quite lengthy and very difficult to construct. The 
important thing, once more, is not that this characterization of proof provides a convenient 
system in which actually to construct proofs. It does not. Rather, the important thing is that 
the notion of a proof in a formal language becomes perfectly definite, so that we can 
informally prove things about formal proofs, just as we give informal proofs about other 
definite mathematical objects, such as numbers or sets. 
SOUNDNESS AND COMPLETENESS 
I have developed the logic of quantifiers from several points of view. First I described 
relational structures, which I took to be the abstract structure of the possible worlds or 
circumstances that are of concern in mathematics and the sciences. Then I described 
formalized languages, which differ from natural languages in their simplicity and in having 
explicit rules that make it possible to determine in a mechanical way whether or not a string 
of symbols is well formed. Third, I developed a semantics for formalized languages. The 
semantics specifies precisely the conditions under which a set of values for variables in the 
language satisfies a formula in the language. Using these notions, one can say precisely what 
is meant by the claim that a collection of formulas in the language entails another formula. 
Recall that a set of sentences  entails a sentence S if and only if S is true in every relational 
structure for which all sentences in  are true. Fourth, I sketched a theory of proof. Although 
the intent of the theory of proof is that proofs will preserve truth, the theory of proof given 
made no use of any of the semantic notions; it did not use the notion of a relational structure 
or the notion of a set of values satisfying a formula. Nonetheless, it is possible (informally) to 
prove that the theory of proof and the semantic account of entailment coincide perfectly: a 
collection of formulas entails a formula if and only if the latter is provable from a finite 
subset of the former. More exactly, we have the following theorems for formalized languages 
of the kind considered in this chapter. 
Soundness theorem If  is any finite set of formulas and there is a proof of a formula S 
from , then  entails S. 
A much more difficult result is the converse, first proved by Kurt Gödel in his doctoral 
dissertation in 1930: 
Completeness theorem If  is any collection of formulas and  entails S, then there is a 
proof of S from formulas in . 
Since a proof must be a finite sequence of formulas and therefore only a finite number of 
assumptions can occur in any proof, an immediate corollary is the following: 
Compactness theorem If S is entailed by , then S is entailed by some finite subset of . 
These results, which will not be proved here, tend to show that the semantics and the proof 
theory are in accord. It remains to be shown, however, that the logical theory I have described 
is really adequate to reconstruct deductive reasoning in the mathematical sciences. 
THEORIES AND MODELS 
The logical theory I have developed in this chapter is usually referred to as first-order logic 
because it permits quantifiers to bind variables that range over individuals but it does not 
contain variables that range over properties nor does it have quantifiers that bind such 
variables. One of the best ways to consider the richness of first-order logic is to consider 
some collections of sentences and formulas in formalized languages, and the collections of 
relational structures in which those sentences or formulas are true. First we need some 
convenient terminology. 
 Relational structures are often called models. In particular, a relational structure in 
which sentence S is true is called a model of S. Any collection  of formulas in a formalized 
language has a set of logical consequences, denoted Cn(). Cn() is the set of all well-
formed formulas that can be deduced from  or, in other words, that are entailed by . For 
any set , Cn() is deductively closed; that is to say, every logical consequence of Cn() is 
already in Cn(). A deductively closed collection of formulas is called a theory. A theory is 
consistent if and only if it has a model. Two sentences in a language are said to be consistent 
if and only if their conjunction has a model. 
 Given a theory T, if there exists a collection  of formulas for which (1) there is an 
algorithm that determines for any formula in the language whether or not it is in , and (2) 
Cn() = T, then T is said to be axiomatizable. If there exists a finite set of formulas  such 
that Cn() = T, then T is said to be finitely axiomatizable. 
 A theory is said to be complete if for every sentence S in the language of the theory, 
either S is in the theory or S is in the theory. If a relational structure is for a formal 
language, then every sentence in that language is either true or false in that relational 
structure. Hence for any relational structure, the set of all sentences true in that structure is a 
complete theory. 
The Theory of Identity 
Consider the following sequence of sentences: 
x1x2(x1 = x2) 
x1x2x3(x1 = x2 & x1 = x3 & x2 = x3) 
. 
. 
. 
The first sentence says that there are at least two things. The second sentence says that there 
are at least three things. The next sentence in the sequence will say that there are at least four 
things, and so on. 
 All models of the first sentence have two or more elements in their respective 
domains. Every relational structure [D, =] in which D has at least two members is a model for 
the first sentence. Every model of the second sentence has three or more elements in its 
domain, and every structure with identity that has a domain of three of more members is a 
model of the second sentence. 
 Notice that every model of the second sentence above is also a model of the first 
sentence. Every model having a domain with at least three members is a model with a domain 
having at least two members. So the second sentence entails the first sentence. Since the 
second sentence has a model, the two sentences are consistent. We can form the set of 
sentences consisting of both of these sentences. Call that set 3 to indicate that it is a set of 
sentences that says there are at least three things. By including more and more sentences in 
the sequence of sentences indicated above, we can form a sequence of sets of sentences, 4, 
5, ... , n, ... The set n is a collection of sentences that are true in all and only structures 
having at least n members in their respective domains. 
 Now suppose we form the set that is the union of all sets n for all n > 1, and call the 
set of sentences that results . We use the symbol n(…) to denote the operation of taking 
the union of an arbitrary collection of sets indexed by n. Accordingly,  = n(n). 
 The set  contains each sentence that occurs in any of the n. Cn() is a theory. In 
what structures is the theory true? For every n > 1, there is a sentence in  that says there are 
at least n things. That sentence is false in any domain having fewer than n members. So for 
every number n > 0,  is not satisfied in any domain having exactly n elements and no more. 
So the only structures in which all sentences in  are true are structures having infinite 
domains. In fact, one can prove that all structures for the language having infinite domains 
are models of . 
 There is an obvious algorithm for determining, for any given sentence, whether or not 
that sentence is in . So Cn() is an axiomatizable theory. It is easy to prove that it is not a 
finitely axiomatizable theory. One can also prove that the theory is complete. 
How Can It Be Proved That Cn() Is Not Finitely Axiomatizable? 
First I prove a lemma needed for the proof of the theorem: 
Lemma If  is any set of sentences and Cn() is finitely axiomatizable, then there is a 
finite subset of  that axiomatizes Cn(). 
Proof Suppose that A is a finite set of sentences such that Cn(A) = Cn(). Then certainly  
entails A. Hence by the completeness and compactness theorems, there is a finite subset of , 
call it , such that  entails A. So  is a finite subset of  that axiomatizes Cn(). Q.E.D. 
Theorem Cn() is not finitely axiomatizable. 
Proof Now suppose, contrary to what is to be proved, that  is finitely axiomatizable. 
Then by the lemma just proved, there is a finite subset of  that axiomatizes . Any such 
finite subset must be the same as n for some n. So n entails . But all the sentences in n 
are true in any domain that has at least n members. So they are all true in a domain that has 
exactly n members and is therefore finite. But  has no finite models. So there are models of 
n that are not models of . So n does not entail , which is a contradiction. Since the 
supposition that  is finitely axiomatizablc implies a contradiction,  is not finitely 
axiotnatizable. Q.E.D. 
Study Questions 
1. Write a sentence that says there are at least four things. 
2. Write a sentence that says there are exactly four things. 
3. Give an argument to show that Cn(n) is not a complete theory for any n. (Hint: Show 
how, for any given n, to find a sentence true in one model of Cn(n) and false in another 
model.) 
The Theory of Successor 
Consider the structure [N, 0, s, =], obtained from the natural numbers by ignoring the 
functions of addition and multiplication. Since this structure has an infinite domain,  is true 
in it. So, of course, are other sentences and formulas. Consider the following: 
x(s(x) = 0) (Zero is not the successor of any number.) 
yx s(y) = x (Every number has a successor.) 
xy(s(x) = s(y)  x = y) (No two distinct numbers have the same successor.) 
xs(x) = x (No number succeeds itself.) 
These four sentences are true in [N, 0, s, =] but do not entail all that is true in that structure. In 
fact, the complete theory of [N, 0, s, =] can be axiomatized but it cannot be finitely 
axiomatized. But the four sentences just given do entail all of the sentences in . So while 
the theory Cn () is not finitely axiomatizable, we can extend that theory with extra 
vocabulary (in this case, the constant symbol 0 and the symbol for the successor function) to 
a finitely axiomatizable theory. Moreover, the extension is conservative: the extended theory 
entails Cn() but no other sentences that can be stated with identity alone. 
Study Questions 
1. Finish the proof of the following theorem: 
Theorem If theory T is any extension of Cn() that is not conservative, then T is 
inconsistent. 
Proof Since a sentence and its denial cannot both be true in a relational structure, it suffices 
to show that if T is a nonconservative extension of Cn(), then Cn(T) includes some 
sentence and its denial, and hence T has no model. T is an extension of Cn() means that 
Cn(T)  Cn(); that is, every consequence of  is a consequence of T. That T is not a 
conservative extension of Cn() means that there exists a sentence in the language of  
(the language with only identity as a predicate) that is a consequence of T but is not a 
consequence of . Let S be such a sentence. Since , is complete, either S is in Cn() or 
S is. But since S is by assumption a sentence that is not a consequence of , S is in 
Cn(). Etc. 
2. Explain why the set consisting of the four sentences for the theory of successor given 
above has no finite model. 
The Theory of Successor and Discrete Order 
If we add the order relation on the natural numbers to the identity and successor relations, we 
are considering the structure [N, 0, s, <, =]. The theory of this structure is rather different 
from the theory of identity or of successor for the natural numbers. The complete theory of 
[N, 0, s, <, =] is finitely axiomatizable. Here is a set of axioms: 
y((y = 0)  x(y = s(x))) 
xy(Lxs(y)  (Lxy  x = y)) 
xy((Lxy  x = y)  Lxs(y)) 
x  Lx0 
xy(Lxy  (x = y  Lyx)) 
xy(Lxy  Lyx) 
xyz(Lxy  (Lyz  Lxz)) 
By adding structure to a structure that can only be described with an infinite set of axioms, 
we get a structure that can be completely described by a finite set of axioms. 
The Theory of Dense Order 
The ordering on the rational numbers gives the structure [Q, <, =]. The complete theory of 
this structure is also finitely axiomatizable, and it too has no finite models. The theory can be 
axiomatized by the following axioms: 
xy(Lxy  z(Lxz & Lzy)) 
yx Lxy 
yx Lyx 
x  Lxx 
xyz(Lxy  (Lyz  Lxz)) 
xy(Lxy  (x = y  Lyx)) 
Study Questions 
1. Give English paraphrases for each of the axioms in the two axiom systems just given. 
2. Suppose that you are allowed to look only at a finite number of elements and their order 
relations. Imagine that either all of the objects are selected from a domain that is either 
densely ordered or discretely ordered, but you are not told which. Could you determine from 
the finite sample whether the objects came from a discretely ordered domain or from a 
densely ordered one? 
TWO PARADOXES 
Many familiar theories can be formalized in first-order logic. The postulates of arithmetic 
developed by Guiseppe Peano (1858–l932) in the nineteenth century can be formalized. In 
fact, I have formalized parts of that theory in the examples of previous sections. The theory of 
sets has been given a first-order formalization, and Euclidean geometry, hyperbolic geometry, 
and the geometry of spherical surfaces have also been given nice formalizations. Algebraic 
theories, such as the theory of real algebra, have been formalized and extensively studied. 
Moreover, theories that are not purely mathematical have also been given first-order 
formalizations. These include the classical mechanics of particles, classical rigid-body 
mechanics, parts of genetics, the special theory of relativity, parts of cosmology, and many 
other theories. There are, however, some fundamental notions that escape representation in 
first-order theories. Various conceptions of cardinality cannot be represented, even though 
they seem to be fundamentally important ideas. The notion of truth cannot be adequately 
represented, even though the notion is essential to the semantics of first-order logic. 
The Finite and the Infinite 
I have already described a formal theory, , that expresses the concept of infinity. Every 
model of the theory has an infinite domain, and every infinite domain serves as a model of 
the theory. But consider the concept of finiteness. Every domain that is not infinite is finite. 
So it might seem reasonable to expect that if the idea of infinity can be represented in a first-
order theory, so can the idea of finiteness. Such a representation would consist in a theory 
that has every finite domain as a model and has no models with infinite domains. We cannot 
form such a theory by asserting the denial of , because  is not a sentence but rather an 
infinite set of sentences. Sets do not have denials; sentences do. Intuitively, to express the 
idea of finiteness, we would need to find a way to assert within the language of  that some 
sentence in that set is false. It turns out that there is no way to do that. In fact, the following 
can be proved: 
Theorem In any first-order language, every theory that has models of every finite 
cardinality has an infinite model. 
Traditional metaphysics held that the notion of infinity is obscure, but the notion of finiteness 
is not troublesome. In modern logic things seem to get reversed. Infinity is easy, finitude is 
obscure. 
 But infinity is not that easy. Recall that in chapter 1 we considered theorems of 
Cantor’s that show that for any set , the set of all subsets of  (the power set of ) has a 
larger cardinality than . So the set of all subsets of the set of natural numbers is larger than 
the set of natural numbers, and the set of all subsets of the set of all subsets of the natural 
numbers is larger still, and so on. There are infinities, bigger infinities, still bigger infinities, 
and so on forever. But the differences among infinite sets with different cardinalities cannot 
be represented by any first-order theory. One of the remarkable results proved early in this 
century is the following: 
Löwenheim-Skolem theorem In any first-order language, every theory that has an infinite 
model has an infinite model of every cardinality. 
The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem is sometimes described as a paradox. It states a fact about 
first-order theories, but since that fact presupposes that we can distinguish between infinite 
sets with different cardinalities, the fact itself cannot be faithfully represented as a claim 
within any first-order theory. 
 The moral seems to be that not everything that it makes sense to say can be said in a 
first-order language. Many philosophers and logicians have drawn that conclusion. More 
powerful logical systems (systems that in fact originated in Frege’s work) permit one to 
distinguish between different infinities. The essential thing is that while sentences in first-
order languages have only variables that range over individuals in a domain, more powerful 
logical systems have variables that also range over arbitrary subsets of a domain. In first-
order logic we can say that all individuals in the domain have some property or that there 
exists an individual with some property, but in more powerful logical systems we can also 
say that there exist properties and relations with some second-order property. 
 Some philosophers and logicians resist the conclusion that first-order logic is 
inadequate and hold that everything can be said in a first-order language. They may do so, for 
example, because they doubt that such abstract objects as sets, properties, and relations really 
exist, and they do not want to use a formal language that logically commits them to the 
existence of such entities. Those with such a view seem to be stuck with the position that 
there are no absolute notions of finitude or of infinite cardinalities. Or more radically and 
skeptically, they may recall Gassendi’s riposte to Descartes: he who says that anything is 
infinite attributes to a thing that he does not comprehend a name that he does not understand. 
Perhaps the same is true for he who says that anything is finite. 
The Liar 
In the the Old Testament, the Cretan says that all Cretans are liars. Suppose he had said that 
all Cretans lie whenever they speak. Then what he said could not have been true, since if it 
were true, everything said by a Cretan is false, and since what he said was said by a Cretan, if 
it were true it would be false. 
 The biblical paradox leads to a modern logical paradox. This time the paradox is not 
peculiar to first-order logic but intrinsic to the very idea of giving a theory of truth for a 
language. Let us make one assumption about truth and falsity: 
Assumption No sentence in a language is both true in that language and false in that 
language. 
 It is easy to show that if a language is strong enough to say certain things about the 
truth or falsity of sentences in that language, then the assumption must be contradicted. 
Consider the following sentence: 
(1) Sentence (1) is false. 
There are only three possibilities: (1) is true in English, (1) is false in English, or (1) is neither 
true nor false in English. Suppose that (1) is true. Then since (1) says that (1) is false, what it 
says is false. So if (1) is true, it is also false, which contradicts the assumption. Suppose that 
(1) is false. Then since (1) says that (1) is false, what it says is true. Hence (1) is true. So if 
(1) is false, then it is true, which contradicts the assumption. Finally, suppose that (1) is 
neither true nor false. Then since (1) says that it is false and it is neither true nor false, what it 
says of itself is false. Hence if (1) is neither true nor false, it is false, which is a logical 
contradiction. 
 There are several responses to this argument. One response is to try to find some 
logical flaw in the proof. One might think that there is something unclear about  the idea of 
English as a definite object about which one can produce proofs. One of the great logicians of 
this century, Alfred Tarski, showed that essentially the same result can be obtained for certain 
formalized first-order languages. So the paradox does not result from the vagueness of the 
English language. Some think that the argument contains some subtle equivocation in the 
notion of truth, but there is little agreement about what the equivocation might be. Another 
response is to accept the conclusion. If one accepts the conclusion, then any of several lines 
of thought suggest themselves. One is to try to introduce a new technical notion that is like 
the notion of truth but does not have the unwelcome property that for some sentences it both 
applies and does not apply. Another is to attempt to isolate all discourses that, like sentence 
(1), produce paradox, and to avoid applying semantic notions to them. There is no single 
widely accepted solution. 
 In a way, the liar paradox is refreshing. We started with a pre-Christian problem, to 
characterize valid deductive arguments, and that quest led 2,500 years later to a modern, 
mathematical theory of proof, meaning, and deductive argument. It is amusing and ironic to 
find the resulting theory perplexed by a simple remark recorded more than 2,000 years ago. 
Study Questions 
1. Sentence (1) refers to itself, but not all forms of the liar paradox require self-reference. 
What can be inferred about the truth or falsity (or lack thereof) of sentences (2) and (3) 
below? 
(2) Sentence (3) is true. 
(3) Sentence (2) is false. 
2. What can be inferred about the truth or falsity (or lack thereof) of sentences (4) and (5) 
below? 
(4) Sentence (5) is neither true nor false. 
(5) Sentence (4) is neither true nor false. 
Review Questions 
1. In this chapter I have given a theory of proof and proofs of theorems about the theory of 
proof. What is the relation between the two? 
2. What is meant by an inductive definition? 
3. Give examples of each of the following: (a) two complete, finitely axiomatizable theories 
that each has no finite model but that are inconsistent with one another, (b) a theory that is 
not finitely axiomatizable, (c) a theory that is finitely axiomatizable and has no finite models 
but is not complete. 
4. Explain the difference between discrete order and dense order. 
5. Explain why the compactness theorem follows from the completeness theorem. 
6. Suppose that you are given a finite sample of objects and the facts about their relations 
with one another, either all drawn from a relational structure that has discrete order with first 
endpoint or all drawn from a relational structure that has discrete order without endpoints. 
Could you tell from the sample which structure it came from? Why or why not? 
7. Explain how to construct the rational numbers from the integers. 
8. Suppose that someone devised a theory of proof for which no completeness theorem is 
true. What would you conclude about the adequacy of the theory of proof, and why? Suppose 
that someone devised a theory of proof for which no soundness theorem is true. What would 
you conclude about the adequacy of the theory of proof, and why? 
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Part II 
EXPERIENCE, KNOWLEDGE, AND BELIEF 
Chapter 7 
SKEPTICISM 
INTRODUCTION 
Euclid’s geometry was the paradigm of science shared by Aristotle, Descartes, and many 
people in between. At roughly the same time that Descartes was reaffirming this conception 
of knowledge and attempting to give arguments for a “method” adapted to it, revolutionary 
developments in science were replacing the Cartesian view of how knowledge is acquired 
with a quite different conception. Andreas Vesalius had examined human cadavers to 
produce new revelations about human anatomy; Galileo had discovered sunspots, found the 
satellites of Jupiter, and observed their rotation about that planet; William Gilbert had 
investigated the properties of the magnet; and William Harvey had done experiments to argue 
for the circulation of the blood. 
 These and other discoveries did not seem to have the form expected by either 
Aristotelian or Cartesian science. There were no intuitions of general principles about 
lodestones or human physiology from which everything else in these subjects was deduced. 
Instead, examples of particular phenomena were observed, found to be repeatedly and 
regularly produced, and thus taken to hold generally. Inferences from particular instances to 
general conclusions were called inductive, and they were contrasted both with the direct 
intuition of general principles and with deductive inferences. 
 Induction might lead to general conclusions from observed regularities, but the goal 
of the new science was to go beyond simple generalizations of observed regularities to find 
their causes and the laws governing those causes. Scientists of the time searched for the 
hidden powers, causes, and structures that produce appearances, and they searched for the 
laws that govern such powers, causes, and structures. In the sky the sun and the stars appear 
to move, but according to Copernicus, that is only appearance, and in fact, it is the earth that 
moves. Harvey observed that living humans invariably have a pulse, but he explained the 
pulse by postulating a hidden mechanism not available to the eye: the heart acts as a pump 
and sends the blood through tubes in the body. Copernicus and Harvey and Galileo seemed to 
be penetrating the “hidden springs” of nature, but how could they do so? What could the 
method be? Different answers to these questions were offered by two great English scientists 
and philosophers: Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton. 
BACON’S INDUCTIVE METHOD 
Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum, published in 1620, was an influential statement of the 
goals and methods of the new science. Bacon saw clearly that the aims of science are not just 
to generalize observed regularities but more fundamentally to find the causes of those 
regularities. In keeping with the scholastic terminology of the day, Bacon usually wrote not 
of causes but instead of “forms”; even so, by that term he meant those properties of things 
that together are responsible for phenomena of scientific interest. Rather like Aristotle, he 
thought of the content of scientific 
Francis Bacon 
Francis Bacon was born in 1561 to a politically prominent English family. He studied at 
Cambridge University, where he learned and came to dislike Aristotelian philosophy. After a 
period on the Continent, he returned to England and studied law, thereafter making his living 
through law, the patronage of various nobles, and a small inheritance. When James I 
succeeded Elizabeth I to the throne of England, Bacon prospered and eventually became 
Chancellor. In 1621 he was accused of taking bribes; he was found guilty of the accusations 
by a Parliamentary court and sentenced to an enormous fine, imprisonment, and disbarment. 
Most of the sentence was not carried out, but Bacon never again held public office, and he 
died five years later. He wrote systematically on scientific method between 1605 and the end 
of his life, but he missed many of the scientific developments of his day. He did not know 
William Gilbert, although Gilbert was a contemporary and was the physician of both 
Elizabeth I and James I. William Harvey was Bacon’s own physician, but Bacon seems not to 
have known of Harvey’s work on the circulation of the blood. But others knew of Bacon. 
Harvey said that he “writes philosophy like a lord chancellor.” 
laws as conjunctions of conditions necessary and sufficient for observed effects. 
Bacon thought that scientific laws are to be discovered by applying the appropriate kind of 
reasoning to observations of particular cases. If one is studying the cause of heat, for 
example, then instances of hot things and cold things must be observed, and from those 
instances Reason must draw a conclusion as to the general cause of heat. The important 
questions for scientific method concern what observations to make and how to reason from 
the observations to conclusions about causes. 
 Bacon’s answer was clear but not fully precise. To discover the cause of a 
phenomenon such as heat or light or gravity, one should collect three different kinds of 
instances. Bacon thought of the instances of each kind as formed into “tables” or lists. One 
should first collect a list of positive instances of the phenomenon in question. A list of 
positive instances of heat should include many instances of distinct kinds, incorporating as 
much variety as possible. Second, one should collect a list of negative instances. The 
negative instances should be chosen to be as similar to the positive instances as is possible 
while still failing to exhibit the phenomenon to be explained. Third, one should form a list of 
degrees. The list of degrees is like the list of positive instances but the instances in it are 
ordered by the intensity of the effect. A list of degrees of heat contains positive instances of 
heat, ordered from instances in which heat is least apparent and least intense to those in 
which heat is most apparent and most intense. 
 Bacon’s primary example was the investigation of the cause of heat. He provided 
lengthy lists, of which the following arc only a selection of the instances: 
Positive instances of heat 
• The rays of the sun, especially in summer and at noon 
• The rays of the sun reflected and condensed, as between mountains or on walls, and 
most of all in burning glasses and mirrors. 
• Fiery meteors 
• Burning thunderbolts 
• Eruptions of flame from the cavities of mountains 
• All flames 
• Ignited solids 
• Natural warm baths 
• Liquids boiling or heated 
Negative instances of heat 
• Rays of the moon, stars, and comets 
• The rays of the sun on the tops of mountains where the air is thin 
• The rays of the sun in the polar regions 
• The rays that emerge from a reverse burning glass 
• Rotten wood that shines by night but is not hot 
• The scales of fish and the body of the glowworm, which give light but are not warm 
Degrees of heat 
• Everyday inanimate substances, such as rocks and metals 
• Substances formerly hot, such as horse dung, lime, and ashes from fires 
• The heat of animals 
• Animal heat is increased by motion and exercise, wine, feasting, sex, fevers, and pains 
• The heat of the sun in warm climates 
• The heat of a flame, which depends on the body ignited 
Bacon supposed not only that the investigator has such lists of positive and negative instances 
as well as instances of various degrees but also that the investigator knows the properties of 
each instance. Sometimes his own lists include commentaries that indicate properties he takes 
to be relevant. Thus he tells us that on mountaintops the air is thin and that the body of the 
glowworm gives light. 
 From the lists, Bacon proposed that the cause or “form” be found by seeking a 
conjunction of properties such that 
• each property in the conjunction occurs in every positive instance, 
• in every negative instance, some property in the conjunction is absent, 
• the combination of properties increases in intensity as the phenomenon increases in 
intensity. 
Bacon did not explain how the intensity of a combination of distinct properties is to he 
measured, nor did he explain how a combination of the kind required is to be found. But he 
did give an example, the cause of heat, which he concluded is the chaotic motion of the very 
small parts of a thing, but the procedure by which he found this explanation is not fully clear. 
 Bacon’s method became a standard for the new science in the late seventeenth century 
and after, and it has been subsequently redescribed in many different ways, sometimes in 
more detail than Bacon himself provided. In the nineteenth century John Stuart Mill wrote an 
influential logic text, A System of Logic, that treats induction almost exactly as Bacon did (but 
without giving Bacon any credit). Mill proposed three “methods” for inferring causes: the 
method of agreement, the method of difference, and the method of concomitant variation. 
The method of agreement is simply the rule, Infer that the properties common to all instances 
of an effect are its causes. The method of difference is the rule, Infer that the properties 
common to all instances of an effect and absent from all noninstances of the effect are the 
causes. The method of concomitant variation is the rule, Infer that the combination of 
properties that increases in intensity as the effect increases in intensity, and decreases in 
intensity as the effect decreases in intensity is the cause of the effect to be explained. Mill’s 
methods are simply a decomposition of Bacon’s procedure. In the 1950s a number of 
psychologists became interested in how children learn new concepts from old concepts. One 
of the very first proposals is that they do so by a procedure that is essentially Bacon’s. Today 
elaborations of Bacon’s procedures find little application in studies of human psychology, but 
they are widely used in artificial intelligence procedures that simulate learning. 
THE NEWTONIAN REVOLUTION 
In 1686 Isaac Newton published the first Latin edition of his Philosophiae Naturalis 
Principia Mathematica (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy). If ever a work of 
ideas shook civilization, Newton’s Principia did. Not only did it establish the content and 
methods of much of physics as we still understand that subject, it also provided the example 
for the next century of how scientific knowledge is to be acquired. 
 Newton’s masterpiece is divided into four parts. The first part is a statement of the 
purpose of the work, together with a system of definitions and axioms. The second part, book 
1, is a series of theorems on the motions of bodies subject to forces of various mathematical 
forms. Together with the definitions and axioms of the first part, book 1 forms an axiomatic 
system much like Euclid’s Elements (and in fact Newton assumes without comment all of 
Euclidean geometry), but the subject is motion rather than the relations of figures. Book 2 
concerns hydrostatics (the motions of bodies in fluids, such as air and water) and wave 
motion. It too proceeds axiomatically, investigating the laws of motion that follow from the 
axioms under various assumptions about forces of resistance. Newton’s theorems are 
illustrated by applications to various hydraulic experiments. In book 3, Newton uses the 
theorems deduced in book 1, together with observed laws of planetary motion, to argue for 
the law of universal gravitation and then to deduce consequences of that law and the laws of 
motion. 
 Newton was not concerned with providing a theory that merely generalizes observed 
regularities. His goals were deeper. In Newton’s conception, what we see and observe are 
apparent motions—the motions of bodies relative to one another and relative to the position 
we inhabit. The effects we see in nature—the motions of the planets, the tides, falling 
bodies—are effects compounded of several different causes or forces. But in Newton’s 
conception, besides apparent motions there are real motions, that is, motions with respect to 
absolute space. And there are real causes as well, those fundamental forces that apparent 
causes are composed of. 
 Newton thought simple experiments could demonstrate that there is real motion with 
respect to absolute space and that real motion is different from the relative motion of one 
body with respect to another. If a bucket of water is rotated, at first the bucket moves relative 
to the water within it, and initially the surface of the water is flat. But shortly the rotation of 
the bucket is communicated to the water and the water begins to rotate as well, until 
eventually the water is rotating as fast as the bucket, and the two, water and bucket, are no 
longer rotating relative to one another. But as the water in the bucket begins to rotate, the 
surface of the water ceases to be flat and becomes more and more concave, so that when the 
water is rotating with the rotating bucket and the two are no longer rotating with respect to 
one another, the water has crept up the sides of the bucket (figure 7.1). Thus there are two 
states in which the bucket and the water are at rest with respect to one another. In one of 
them, the initial state before rotation, the surface of the water is flat. In the other state, when 
both water and bucket are rotating, the surface of the water is concave. The difference must 
he caused by something, and it cannot be caused by the relative motion of the water and the 
bucket, since there is none in either case. Newton concluded that the difference is caused by 
different states of motion with respect to absolute space: rotation with respect to absolute 
space causes the water to recede from the axis of motion and makes the surface of the water 
concave. 
 The point of the Principia is to show how to infer true motions and causes from 
apparent motions and causes. 
It is indeed a matter of great difficulty to discover, and effectually to distinguish, the true 
motions of particular bodies from the apparent; because the parts of that immovable space, in 
which those motions are performed, do by no means come under the observation of our 
senses. Yet the thing is not altogether desperate; for we have some arguments to guide us, 
partly from the apparent motions, which are the differences of the true motions partly from 
the forces which are the causes and effects of the true motions. ... But how we are to obtain 
the true motions from their causes, effects, and apparent differences, and the converse, shall 
be explained more at large in the following treatise. For to this end it was that I composed it.1 
 Aside from the assumptions of Euclidean geometry, Newton’s axioms consist of his 
three laws of motion: 
• Every body continues in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line unless 
it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it. 
• The change of motion is proportional to the motive force impressed and is made in the 
direction of the straight line in which that force is impressed. 
• To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction; that is, the mutual actions 
of two bodies upon each other are always equal and directed to contrary parts. 
Newton’s evidence for these three laws consisted of a variety of simple experiments with 
pendulums conducted by Newton’s contemporaries—Christopher Wren, John Wallis, and 
Christian Huygens (“the greatest geometers of our times”)—and by Newton himself. Other 
evidence included Galileo’s law (that bodies falling freely toward earth cover a distance 
proportional to the square of the time of fall), the motions of projectiles, the motions of 
magnets floating on water, and simple mechanical experiments. Experiments of these kinds 
exhibit either the composition of forces required by the first two laws or the conservation of 
momentum required by the third law. 
 In these experimental arguments for the laws of motion, Newton assumed that 
something about the forces is known. For example, he assumes that in Galileo’s experiments 
with falling bodies, it is known that the force of gravity acting on each body is constant and 
the “quantity of matter” or mass of the falling body does not change. “When a body is falling, 
the uniform force of its gravity acting equally, impresses, in equal intervals of time, equal 
forces upon that body, and therefore generates equal velocities; and in the whole time 
impresses a whole force, and generates a whole velocity proportional to the time. And the 
spaces described in proportional times are as the product of the velocities and the times; that 
is, as the squares of the times.”2 In other words, given that the force of gravity is constant in a 
falling body, the second law requires that the acceleration of each body be constant, and 
hence that the distance a body falls is proportional to the square of the time elapsed. 
 Galileo’s law also provides the basis for a more detailed argument for the second law 
of motion, an argument that does not assume that the force of gravity is constant. For finding 
that for one class of bodies the distance traveled in free fall is proportional to the square of 
the elapsed time, you might use Newton’s second law to infer that for this class of bodies the 
force of gravity is constant for each body. Then by induction you might conclude that for any 
body in free fall near the surface of the earth, the force of gravity is constant. And finally, by 
applying this conclusion to a new class of bodies in free fall and measuring the time elapsed 
to cover a fixed distance of fall, you might conclude that the second law of motion is 
satisfied. This argument pulls the second law of motion up by its own bootstraps by assuming 
that the law is true of one system of bodies in order to obtain a generalization about the force 
of gravity, which it then applies to another system of bodies in order to test the second law. 
Later, in book 3 of the Principia, Newton gives a much more complex argument with a 
similar structure. 
 While book 1 of the Principia is a work of great mathematical power, it is book 3 that 
shows Newton’s new method in its most dramatic application. Here Newton gave an 
argument for the law of universal gravitation. The argument has an intricate structure, but the 
general idea is quite simple. Newton started with observed regularities about the motions of 
the sun, moon, and planets and the properties of pendula here on earth. Using these 
regularities and logical consequences of his three laws as premises, he then deduced that 
there exists a force attracting the planets to the sun, a force attracting the satellites of Jupiter 
to the planet Jupiter, and a force attracting the moon to the earth. He further proved from 
these premises that the force in question varies inversely as the square of the distance 
between the bodies and that the force is proportional to the products of the masses of the 
bodies. Accordingly, from generalizations induced from observed regularities and from his 
three laws of motion, Newton deduced that there exist bodies in which one body attracts the 
other with a force given by the equation F = GMM'/r2, where G is a constant, M is the mass 
of one of the bodies, M' is the mass of the other body. and r is the distance between them. 
 Newton then inferred inductively that for every pair of particles in the universe, there 
is such a force between them. Using the law of gravitational force, he was able to compute 
the relative masses of many of the planets and the sun and hence to estimate the center of 
mass of the solar system, which he hypothesized to be at rest with respect to absolute space. 
 Newton placed his argument, which he called a “general induction from the 
phenomena,” within a general method for the conduct of science. He prefaced the argument 
with a system of “Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy” and then applied the rules to justify 
particular steps in his general induction of the law of gravitation. The rules of reasoning have 
to do with the circumstances in which one may legitimately induce general conclusions about 
causes: 
Rule I We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and 
sufficient to explain their appearances. 
Rule II Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same 
causes. 
Rule III The qualities of bodies, which admit neither intensification nor remission of 
degrees, and which are found to belong to all bodies within the reach of our experiments, are 
to he esteemed the universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever. 
Rule IV In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions inferred by general 
induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary 
hypotheses that may be imagined, till such time as other phenomena occur, by which they 
may either be made more accurate, or liable to exceptions.3 
 Rule I sounds circular: How are we to know which are the “true” causes? But Newton 
used the rule in a way that was not circular. When he argued for the existence of a force in 
nature, such as the force of gravitation, and found that force sufficient to explain some 
phenomenon, such as the tides, he took rule I to justify the conclusion that no other 
explanation need be sought. Rules I and II together amount to a complex (and rather vague) 
claim that in science we should proceed as though the world is causally simple. Rule III is the 
basic inductive rule, applied to properties things either have or don’t have, but not to values 
of variable quantities. Rule IV was meant to exclude alternative explanations of phenomena. 
In Newton’s argument for the law of universal gravitation, instances of the law were obtained 
by applying independently confirmed laws of motion to phenomena. The law of gravitation 
and the laws of motion in turn explain the motions of the planets and pendula used to derive 
instances of the law of gravitation. Alternative explanations of the motions of the planets and 
the motions of pendula might be concocted, but if these alternative explanations postulate 
regularities for which instances cannot be obtained from the phenomena (by independently 
confirmed laws, such as the laws of motion), then rule IV says that these alternative 
explanations are to be rejected. 
 Newton’s argument for universal gravitation and the general achievement of the 
Prineipia formed the framework for much of science in the eighteenth and even the 
nineteenth centuries. Later physicists sought to establish the existence of other forces and 
their laws through arguments that paralleled Newton’s, while philosophers of science 
believed that they saw in Newton’s arguments the most penetrating insights into the structure 
of nature. 
ANCIENT INDUCTIVE SKEPTICISM 
Whether in Newton’s “general induction” or in Bacon’s simpler framework, inductive 
inference is subject to an important objection. The objection was apparent to the ancient 
Greeks, and it is one of the reasons why Plato, for one, sought other grounds for claims to 
knowledge. 
 In one passage in The Meno, Plato pointed out the difficulty with inference from 
particular facts to general conclusions. In the dialogue, Socrates and his acquaintance, Meno, 
are applying the Socratic method to attempt to answer the question, What is virtue? The 
method is to consider various hypotheses about what constitutes virtue and to confront each 
hypothesis with various cases to see whether the cases accord with the hypothesis or provide 
a counterexample to it. (Socrates and Meno agree as to whether or not something is virtuous.) 
When a counterexample is found to the current hypothesis, a new hypothesis is tried. 
Eventually Meno tires of the enterprise and asks Socrates a pointed question about how, by 
this method, one could ever know the correct characterization of virtue: 
Meno: How will you look for it, Socrates, when you do not know at all what it is? how will 
you aim to search for something you do not know at all? If you should meet with it, how will 
you know that this is the thing that you did not know?4 
 Many commentators, including Aristotle in his Posterior Analvtics, understand this 
passage to pose a problem about recognizing an object of which only a description is known, 
or about referring to an object that is unknown in one or another respect. But Plato has hit on 
a point that is at once simpler, deeper, and more precise. Consider any universal hypothesis, 
such as “All ravens are black” or “All virtuous people are just” or “All pure water boils at 
100 degrees centigrade at 1 atmosphere of pressure.” Suppose that we collect particular cases 
of things that are ravens and things that are not or, as the case may be, of people that are 
virtuous and people that are not or of the boiling points of samples of pure water. Suppose 
that after looking at a sufficiently large sample, we conclude that all ravens are indeed black, 
that virtuous people are just, or that all pure water boils at 100 degrees centigrade at I 
atmosphere pressure. And suppose that when we draw these conclusions, we are right, the 
conclusions are in fact true. Plato has Meno ask how we will know the conclusions are true. 
For even if we are in fact right about the boiling point of water, it is still logically possible 
that some as yet unexamined sample of pure water will boil at a different temperature at 1 
atmosphere of pressure. Even if we are really in a world in which no such sample exists and 
we believe we are in such a world, how, after examining only a finite sample, can we know 
that we are in such a world? 
 The answer depends on what is meant by knowledge. For Plato, someone can know a 
proposition only if the proposition is true, the person believes it, and the person also knows 
why the proposition is true. Plato had a detailed theory of what is required to know why a 
proposition is true, but for our purposes, the important point is that Plato held that knowledge 
of a proposition requires that one believe it through a process that guarantees or necessitates 
the truth of the belief. Thus, according to Plato, for someone to know that all ravens are black 
after having examined a finite sample of ravens, the person must have formed a belief in such 
a way that the occurrence of the belief guarantees the truth of “All ravens are black.” The 
belief must be brought about by a mark or, as the ancients would have said, a criterion of its 
truth. A belief occasioned by a criterion of truth will be certainly true, and no further 
evidence need be examined. Meno’s objection is that from a logical point of view the 
evidence of a finite sample contains no such criterion for a universal claim. 
 Plato’s solution to Meno’s problem is to claim that there is an internal criterion within 
the inquirer. By some method, one considers hypothesis after hypothesis, confronting each 
with the evidence, according to the Socratic procedure. When eventually one hits upon the 
true hypothesis, some inner recognition guarantees its truth. The criterion is not in the 
evidence that the inquirer has used to reject other hypotheses before arriving at the true one; 
the criterion is in the inquirer. All that the evidence does is to prompt the inquirer to 
recognize a conclusion that the inquirer already implicitly knew. Discovery is recollection. 
The latter part of the dialogue attempts to illustrate this claim by having Socrates prompt a 
slave boy, supposed ignorant of all geometry, to produce the Pythagorean theorem by 
considering a sequence of examples and counterexamples. 
 The skepticism of Meno’s question was endorsed by a number of Hellenistic writers. 
Several schools of thought developed in the fourth century B.C., and many of them continued 
to be developed into the second century A.D. One of these schools of thought, Pyrrhonism, 
took its name from Pyrrho of Elis (circa 360–275 B.C.). The main source of the views of this 
school of thought is the writings of Sextus Empiricus (circa A.D. 200). He argues for a great 
variety of skeptical doubts. One of his doubts is that there is any such thing as a criterion, 
whether internal or in the evidence itself, and hence Sextus doubts that induction can provide 
knowledge: 
It is also easy, I consider, to set aside the method of induction. For, when they propose to 
establish the universal from the particulars by means of induction, they will effect this by a 
review either of all or of some of the particular instances. But if they review some, the 
induction will be insecure, since some of the particulars omitted in the induction may 
contravene the universal; while if they are to review all, they will be toiling at the impossible, 
since the particulars are infinite and indefinite. Thus on both grounds, as I think, the 
consequence is that induction is invalidated.5 
 The arguments given by Plato and Sextus depend on a purely mathematical point: no 
procedure is mathematically possible that, in every logically possible world or circumstance, 
will correctly decide the truth or falsity of a universal hypothesis from a finite sample of 
singular facts. It is not simply that we haven’t chanced to think of such a procedure. None is 
possible, any more than it is possible that 2 + 2 = 5. Although Plato and Sextus don’t give 
rigorous proofs, they make it plain that they see the idea for a proof: Suppose there were a 
procedure that reliably decides the truth or falsity of a universal hypothesis H in every 
logically possible world. Then in any logically possible world W in which H is true, there 
must exist finite evidence E true in W such that when the procedure is given E, it decides that 
H is true. But for any finite evidence E consistent with a universal hypothesis H, there is, 
besides the logically possible world W in which E is true and H is true, another logically 
possible world V in which E is true and H is false. So the procedure will give the wrong 
output on evidence E in world V. Hence, no reliable procedure of the kind desired is logically 
possible. 
Study Questions 
1. Imagine a procedure that is given a series of particular facts about a domain and after 
each new fact outputs one of the following: *, T, F. The asterisk indicates that the procedure 
makes no conjecture, “T” indicates that the procedure claims some hypothesis H is true, and 
“F” indicates that the procedure claims H is false. Once T or F are output, the procedure 
continues to output the same value ever after. Assume that every singular fact in the domain 
will eventually be presented to the procedure, but the facts may be presented in any order, 
and any fact may be repeated any number of times. Say that H can be verified if there exists a 
procedure that will output T in all and only those possible domains in which H is true; say 
that H can he falsified if there exists a procedure that will output F in all and only those 
possible domains in which H is false; say that H can be decided if there exists a procedure 
that will output T in every possible domain in which H is true and will output F in every 
possible domain in which H is false. Which of the following kinds of hypotheses can be 
verified, falsified, or decided: (a) a singular claim about a particular fact, e.g., “Sarn is a black 
raven,” (b) a universal hypothesis, e.g., “All ravens are black,” (c) an existential hypothesis, 
e.g., “There exists a black raven.” 
2. Give an example of a sentence that cannot be verified or falsified by any collection of 
singular sentences or facts. 
3. Prove that if hypothesis H can be verified and also falsified, then H can be decided. 
4. Suppose that we change the requirements of the procedure. Once the procedure 
outputs T or F, it is no longer required to keep outputting the same conjecture. The procedure 
is allowed to change its conjecture: if T or F is output on some evidence E, the reverse (F or 
T, respectively) may be output on some larger finite set of evidence E′ including E. Say that 
H can be verified in the limit if there exists a procedure that outputs only T in all and only 
possible domains in which H is true, after some finite number of conjectures. Say that H can 
be falsified in the limit if there exists a procedure that outputs only F in all and only possible 
domains in which H is false, after some finite number of conjectures. Say that H can be 
decided in the limit if there exists a procedure that output only T in every possible domain in 
which H is true, after some finite number of conjectures and that outputs only F in every 
possible domain in which H is true, after some finite number of conjectures. Which of the 
following kinds of hypotheses can be verified, falsified, or decided in the limit: (a) a singular 
claim about a particular fact, e.g., “Sam is a black raven,” (b) a universal hypothesis, e.g., 
“All ravens are black,” (c) an existential hypothesis, e.g., “There exists a black raven.” 
5. Can the example you gave in answer to question 2 be verified or falsified in the limit? 
Can you think of a sentence that cannot he verified or falsified in the limit? 
HUME’S INDUCTIVE SKEPTICISM 
The difficulty with inductive inference is that it can he unreliable. If every observed object 
has a certain feature, it is logically possible that some (or even all) objects that have not yet 
been observed will not have that property, or that objects that have the property at all 
observed times will not have it at subsequent times. Many of the ancient Greeks thought the 
heavens were perfect and unalterable, for they exhibited perfectly regular motions that 
seemed never to change. But then in the sixteenth century there appeared a new star (now 
thought to be a supernova): the heavens did change. Until the eighteenth century, no means 
had ever been found to synthesize a biological chemical from inorganic chemicals, but then 
Friedrich Wöhler found a way to synthesize urea. Whenever we draw conclusions about the 
unobserved based on samples in our experience, we risk the possibility that our conclusions 
will he false. If our conclusions may be false, we cannot be justified in being certain of them. 
If we cannot be justified in being certain of our conclusions, then, according to the 
conception of knowledge that endured from Plato to Descartes, we cannot have knowledge. 
 The new science of the seventeenth century prospered by ignoring the traditional 
objections to induction, but those objections were not altogether forgotten. The writings of 
the ancient skeptics were known in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the problem 
was obvious enough in any case. Thomas Hobbes complained that inductive inference was no 
more than guessing, and Cartesian scientists resisted the empirical arguments of Newton and 
Boyle and others. But in the writings of David Hume, an eighteenth-century philosopher and 
historian, the old skeptical concerns about induction were revived and elaborated most 
forcefully in a new philosophical idiom. 
 Hume’s skeptical arguments were formulated within a psychological theory that he 
adopted from other English philosophers, notably John Locke and George Berkeley. Among 
the contents of mental life, Hume distinguished between ideas and impressions. Impressions 
are the contents of sensation, of experience, whether of the external world or of our own 
feelings and thoughts. In Hume’s way of talking, ideas are either memories of impressions or 
thoughts formed by combining such memories. Hume writes of ideas and impressions as 
though they are so many pieces that can he combined together or taken apart. An impression 
is not the entire gestalt of experience at any moment; instead, it is some aspect of experience. 
If you see a red ball at rest on the green grass in a yard on a day when the sky is blue, you 
have separate impressions of red, green, and blue, as well as an impression of a round thing 
and so on. Any of these separate impressions may be copied in memory to form ideas and 
may be combined with other ideas to form new complex ideas. There is nothing novel in this 
part of his psychological theory: we see much the same view in the writing of Descartes and 
Hobbes. But Hume goes further. 
 Ideas combine and separate in thought according to natural law. The principles that 
determine whether or not ideas are associated with one another have to do with the contents 
of those ideas, with what they are ideas about. One idea tends to lead to another if the two 
ideas have a similarity in their content (resemblance, Hume called it), if they are ideas of 
events that are close to one another in time or space (contiguity, Hume called it), or if one of 
the ideas is of a cause and the other idea is of the effect of that cause. 
 Ideas can be obtained as copies in memory of impressions or by combining copies of 
impressions stored in memory, but with minor exceptions, ideas can he obtained in no other 
way. There are no innate ideas: “When we think of a golden mountain, we only join two 
consistent ideas, gold and mountain, with which we were formerly acquainted. A virtuous 
horse we can conceive; because, from our own feeling, we can conceive virtue; and this we 
may unite to the figure and shape of a horse, which is an animal familiar to us. In short, all 
the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment. The 
mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will.”6 
 Finally, in Hume’s psychology the mind has traditional faculties or capacities. The 
capacities of the mind are composed of the faculties of will, imagination, understanding, and 
so on. Reason is the operation of the understanding, and Hume thought of reasoning as 
deduction, analysis, and synthesis. Hume sometimes gave a peculiar psychological 
formulation to the question of the reliability of inductive inference as a means to produce 
knowledge. The issue, as he formulated it, is whether it is the understanding that acts in 
inductive inference, or something else. 
 If, as Bacon and Newton seem to suggest, inductive inference is the inference to 
causes from effects (and effects from causes) and to general principles about causes and 
effects, then the question, as Hume saw it, is how such relations may be discovered and what 
it would be to discover them. By “discover” Hume meant cone to know, and he regarded 
knowledge as something more than an inner state of complete conviction. To know 
something must not only you have come to believe it, but it must also be true, and you must 
have come to believe it by a reliable means. How, then, can we acquire knowledge of causes 
and effects? Not by reason alone, for any attempt to predict causes from effects without 
experience would be arbitrary and unreliable. From the point of view of reason, the actual 
effect of any given cause is an arbitrary selection from a myriad of possibilities: 
I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of no exception, that the 
knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori, but arises 
entirely from experience, when we find, that any particular objects are constantly conjoined 
with each other. Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and 
abilities; if that object be entirely new to him, he will not be able, by the most accurate 
examination of its sensible qualities, to discovery any of its cause or effects. Adam, though 
his rational faculties be supposed at the very first, entirely perfect, could not have inferred 
from the fluidity, and transparency of water, that it would suffocate him, or from the light and 
warmth of fire, that it would consume him. No object ever discovers, by the qualities which 
appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from 
it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real 
existence and matter of fact.7 
In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It could not, therefore, be 
discovered in the cause, and the first invention or conception of it, a priori, must be entirely 
arbitrary. And even after it is suggested, the conjunction of it with the cause must appear 
equally arbitrary; since there are always many other effects which, to reason, must seem fully 
as consistent and natural. In vain, therefore, should we pretend to determine any single event, 
or infer any cause or effect, without the assistance of observation and experience.8 
Hume’s point could be put this way: from premises that consist of a description of how an 
object or collection of objects appear to us, there is no reliable course of reasoning that leads 
to conclusions about how the object or objects will behave. 
 Even after we have experience with an object or kind of object or circumstance, any 
conclusions we may draw cannot be founded on reason “or any process of the 
understanding.” 
These two propositions are far from being the same, I have found that such an object has 
always been attended with such an effect, and I foresee, that other objects, which are, in 
appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects. I shall allow, if you please, that the 
one proposition may justly be inferred from the other; I know in fact, that it always is 
inferred. But if you insist, that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to 
produce that reasoning. The connexion between these propositions is not intuitive. There is 
required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be 
drawn by reasoning and argument. What that medium is, I must confess, passes my 
comprehension; and it is incumbent on those to produce it, who assert, that it really exists, 
and is the origin of all our conclusions concerning matter of fact.9 
 Hume did not leave the matter as a challenge; he went on to give an argument that 
there can be no reasoning that leads from experience to general conclusions about causes and 
effects. The argument is that all reasoning is either deductive (or “demonstrative,” as Hume 
called it) or else inductive (or “moral reasoning,” as Hume called the latter). In the cases at 
issue, nothing in the premises about the experience of causes, or the experience of the 
succession of causes and effects, permits one to deduce a general proposition that says that a 
certain cause will always and everywhere have a certain effect. If we analyze the concept of 
causality, we find no impression corresponding to the notion of a necessary connection 
between cause and effect; we cannot see a connection that would warrant us in always 
inferring the effect from the cause. But, Hume claimed, reasoning from experience to 
universal claims about causes and effects cannot be a kind of inductive or moral reasoning 
either, on pain of circularity. His argument is a little compressed: 
If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put trust in past experience, and make it the 
standard of our future judgement, these arguments must be probable only, or such as regard 
matter of fact and real existence, according to the division above mentioned. But that there is 
no argument of this kind, must appear, if our explications of that species of reasoning be 
admitted as solid and satisfactory. We have said, that all arguments concerning existence are 
founded on the relation of cause and effect, that our knowledge of that relation is derived 
entirely from experience, and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the 
supposition, that the future will be conformable to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the 
proof of this last supposition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must 
be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted which is the very point in 
question.10 
The thought behind this passage seems to be something like this: The question is why the 
inference is reliable from the premise “I have found that such an object has always been 
attended with such an effect” to the conclusion “Other objects in all appearance similar will 
be attended with similar effects.” In other words, what guarantees that whenever the premise 
is true, the conclusion is true, or even that in most cases in which the premise is true the 
conclusion is true? The answer cannot be that the inference is reliable because in most cases 
(or always) in our experience it has been reliable, and therefore it will be reliable in every (or 
almost every) instance, for that reasoning is a particular case of the inference whose 
reliability is in question. 
 Hume’s conclusion is that inductive inference is not founded on reason. We have no 
rational grounds for believing such inferences to be reliable, and so when we do empirical 
science, we are not engaged in a rational activity. Inductive inferences, Hume concluded, are 
founded on custom and habit rather than reason. We are so constructed psychologically that 
from observed instances of regularities we come naturally to expect the same regularity in 
future instances. We cannot in many circumstances help but form such expectations. But the 
fact that we are driven by nature to hold certain convictions does not mean that we have any 
reason for holding them; it does not mean that we can give a sound argument for such 
convictions. 
 Hume’s skepticism was based on the fact that there are many alternative logically 
possible continuations of the world we have so far experienced, as diagramed in figure 7.2. 
Bread has always nourished humans, but it is logically possible that after tomorrow it no 
longer will. Hydrogen has always had less mass than oxygen, but it is logically possible that 
after tomorrow it no longer will. Any conclusion we draw now about the future is potentially 
false. Whether or not a conclusion is true depends on which of the many logically possible 
alternative futures turns out to be the actual future. In some possible futures the claim that 
bread will nourish will be false, and in others it will be true. Whichever is actually the case, 
flume’s view is that now we don’t have knowledge that bread will always nourish, because 
even if we happen to be correct, our conclusion was not obtained by a procedure we can 
know to he reliable. Lucky guesses are not knowledge. 
METAPHYSICAL SKEPTICISM 
Suppose somehow that we had before us all possible facts of a certain kind; suppose that by 
magic we could survey an infinity of possible experiences. Then Hume’s or Sextus’ 
skepticism would not apply. But one can imagine that skeptical doubt would remain even 
then. In his Meditations, Descartes offers the following consideration: 
I will suppose not a supremely good God, the source of truth, but rather an evil genius, as 
clever and deceitful as he is powerful, who has directed his entire effort to misleading me. I 
will regard the heavens, the air, the earth, colors, shapes, sounds and all external things as 
nothing but the deceptive games of my dreams, with which he lays snares for my credulity. I 
will regard myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, no senses, but as 
nevertheless falsely believing that I possess all these things.11 
 A modern version of Descartes’ thought is this: Imagine that you are a brain in a vat, 
with your sensory nerves stimulated according to a schedule controlled by a powerful 
computer so as to create in you the illusion of a coherent life. In the illusion created by the 
stimulations of your nerves, you move about through the world, talk to other people, and so 
on, none of which you really do. Having imagined such a circumstance, now ask yourself 
how you know that it isn’t true. It seems that nothing in experience, not even in an infinity of 
experiences, will distinguish between the case in which you are a brain in a vat and the case 
in which you are not. 
 Descartes’ demon is the basis for a whole class of skeptical problems distinct from the 
problems of inductive inference. Consider the following claims, which every reader of this 
hook believes: 
(1) Ordinary objects and persons continue to exist when I do not perceive them. 
(2) Other persons have minds. 
(3) Some past events really took place. 
(4) The world I perceive really exists. 
The skeptical arguments that we don’t know any of these things almost always follow the 
same strategy. They try to show that there is a logically possible world in which my 
experience will be exactly the same as in the real world, but in the logically possible 
alternative world, one or another of these four claims will be false. For me to know that (1) is 
true, for example, I should be able to form my conviction that (1) is true by a procedure that 
can reliably discriminate between worlds in which (1) is true and worlds in which (1) is false. 
But if there is a logically possible world in which (1) is false and in which I have the very 
same experiences as I actually do, then no evidence provided by experience can tell me 
whether or not I am in that world rather than in a world in which (1) is true. And since I 
cannot know that (1) is true by reason alone, I cannot know that (1) is true. The idea is that if 
God were to place me a number of times into worlds in some of which (1) is true and in some 
of which (1) is false but in all of which my experience is like what I have in this world, then I 
would never be able to tell into which kind of world I had been placed. Because I cannot 
discriminate, I cannot know that (1) is true, even though I believe that (1) is true and even if, 
as it turns out, I am correct in my belief. 
 We can certainly imagine a world in which objects vanish from existence when they 
are not perceived. George Berkeley, an English philosopher of a generation before Hume, 
claimed that such is actually the case. Things exist, Berkeley held, when and only when they 
are perceived. Berkeley maintained, however, that things do not vanish from existence when 
you or I are not perceiving them because God is always perceiving them. But if God should 
blink while we are sleeping, the world would disappear and reappear like some flashing neon 
sign. 
 The relation between mind and body is mysterious. Nothing about the physical 
appearance of an object shows directly that it feels or thinks. Your experience would be the 
same if, contrary to Newton’s rules of reasoning, you and you alone had feelings and 
thoughts, while all other animals and persons do no more than act as if they sometimes have 
feelings and thoughts. That seems to be a logically possible world, and one that you cannot 
reliably discriminate from the world in which the second claim is true. 
 In the nineteenth century the growing evidence of evolution provided by geology and 
fossils discomforted many members of the clergy (as it does even now). Calculations based 
on the Old Testament led to the conclusion that according to Holy Writ the world was created 
less than 5,000 years ago. Rocks and fossils suggested that creatures lived and became extinct 
thousands and even millions of years before that. The Reverend Phillip Gosse found a way of 
reconciling scripture and science. Gosse proposed that when God created the world some 
5,000 years ago, he created it complete with geological strata and fossils. The geological 
strata and the fossils within them are thus not the traces of a real past but only evidences 
created to make things look as if there were a real past. Gosse’s strategy can be carried out 
more generally, as Descartes realized. There is nothing inconsistent in your assuming that all 
of your memories are illusory and that in fact the world was created yesterday along with 
your memories and the physical circumstances that corroborate your memories. For all you 
could experience, the two worlds, one in which memories are true or veridical, the other in 
which they are illusory, would be indistinguishable. 
 Each of these skeptical arguments uses the same strategy; in each case the object is to 
show that some simple and fundamental belief is underdetermined by any possible 
experience. It cannot even he said that the beliefs in question are inconsequential or that it 
would make no difference whether we believed them or not. There are any number of things 
in my life that I regret and wish I had done otherwise. The same is true of most people. But if 
I believed that the past is a fiction, I would have no regrets. Each of us judges others by their 
character and their history, and we probably put more weight on individual history than is 
useful in predicting future behavior. But if we believed the past to be an illusion, we would 
let go our grudges against others and take account of their fictive past only insofar as it 
proves useful in predicting their future behavior. If I believed that others besides myself had 
neither feelings nor thoughts, my moral inhibitions would vanish. Prudence tells me to avoid 
actions for which I might be punished, but given the chance to make use of another person 
without retribution, there would be no reasons to inhibit me. Metaphysics matters. 
CONCLUSION 
Both inductive skepticism and metaphysical skepticism challenge the thought that there is a 
reliable method for getting from evidence or experience to the conclusions of everyday life 
and science. Knowledge requires that belief be formulated in a reliable way, and therefore, 
skepticism argues, we have and can have no knowledge of the claims of everyday life and 
science. There seem to be only two ways of avoiding the skeptical conclusion: 
• We can deny the skeptical description of our situation. We can maintain, for example, 
that we do have available all facts at once, or we can maintain that we directly experience 
other minds, bodies, the past, and so on, so that no inference is required to know them. 
• We can deny that knowledge or rational belief requires a process of belief formation 
that is reliable in all logically possible worlds. 
 Plato took the first solution, and so have a number of English philosophers, including 
G. E. Moore early in this century and others even to the present. 
 In one way or another, attempts to develop the second response to skepticism have 
generated a large part of the theory of knowledge and metaphysics from the eighteenth 
century up to the present. These efforts have had enormous consequences outside of 
philosophy. They are at least in part responsible for the foundations of much of contemporary 
economic theory, statistics, cognitive science, and computer science. We will see some of 
these implications in later chapters of this hook. In the next three chapters I will consider two 
major versions of the second response. Each variant forms a rich tradition of work that has 
occupied philosophers and many others besides. 
Review Questions 
1. Describe Bacon’s method for inductively reasoning. 
2. How did Newton use the rotating bucket as an argument for motion with respect to 
absolute space? Reproduce his reasoning in sufficient detail. 
3. State Newton’s rules of reasoning in your own words. 
4. What constitutes knowledge for Plato? For Hume? 
5. What is meant by the term “criterion of truth”? 
6. Discuss the distinction between ideas and impressions for Hume. 
7. Explain why there can be no innate ideas in Hume’s philosophy. 
7. Characterize Hume’s skepticism concerning inductive inference. 
8. How does the relationship between the external world and your perception of this 
world lead to metaphysical skepticism? How is metaphysical skepticism different from 
inductive skepticism? 
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Chapter 8 
BAYESIAN SOLUTIONS* 
NATURAL RELIGION 
Sophisticated Enlightenment intellectuals may have been annoyed by the difficulties about 
the rationality of science presented in David Hume’s arguments, but others were at least as 
troubled by the difficulties that Hume presented for religion. At the time an influential 
conception of Christianity in the British Isles (and nowhere more so than in Hume’s own 
Scotland) held that religion is an extension of science. The same rational sense that produced 
arguments that revealed a universe obeying Newton’s laws could also produce, it was firmly 
believed, arguments to show the existence of God and the truth of Christianity. Hume set out 
the principal arguments in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and then refuted 
them. 
 The argument from design was a favorite of advocates of natural religion. Hume 
stated the argument through the voice of his conversationalist Cleanthes: 
Look round the world: Contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it to 
be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser 
machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what human senses 
and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most 
minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into 
admiration all men who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means 
to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the 
productions of human contrivance—of human design, thought, wisdom, and 
intelligence. Since therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all 
the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble, and that the Author of Nature is 
somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, 
proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this argument a 
posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity 
and his similarity to human mind and intelligence.1 
Hume’s skeptic, Philo, objects that in science inferences from effect to cause are founded on 
many examples, and when applied to a new case require that the case be as similar as possible 
to those already known. But the inference from little parts of the universe and their design by 
humans to the universe as a whole and its creation according to a design of God’s is an 
extraordinary change of context, circumstances, and scale quite unlike the careful, detailed 
similarities that natural science requires. 
 Hume had even more disconcerting objections to the argument from design. The 
argument supposes that like effects have like causes, and that since the universe shows 
pattern and structure as do human artifacts, the universe must have been designed, just as 
watches and ships are designed. But the designs of watches and ships are caused by the ideas 
of such designs in men’s minds, and these ideas are themselves the effects of various 
complicated causes operating to produce them. So by the same principle that like effects are 
due to like causes, we must conclude that the idea of the design of the universe in the mind of 
the designer, God, has causes. So God’s thoughts, like ours, are caused by something else. 
 There are worse problems, Hume argued: 
 The argument from design cannot establish the infinity of any of God’s attributes, for the 
part of the universe that falls within the compass of our observations is, however large, 
necessarily finite, and “the cause ought always to he proportioned to the effect.” 
 God cannot be perfect, because nature is not, or at least seems not to be on the basis of the 
evidence available to us. We live in a world in which children die horrible deaths from 
disease and in which evil sometimes triumphs over good. If the cause must be like the effect 
and the world is imperfect, then so must be the creator or creators of the world. To judge 
from the design that nature shows to us, either God is not all powerful, or else God is 
malicious. In either case, God is imperfect. 
 Even the perfections of the world do not, according to the analogy, give evidence that God 
is correspondingly perfect. A workman may produce an excellent piece of work only after 
many failed and bungled attempts. For all we know, God has tried to make many worlds and 
bungled most attempts. 
 The analogy provides no grounds for believing that there is a single God. To the contrary, 
when large complex projects are executed by humans, many designers and builders are 
required. The argument from design therefore seems to require us to conclude that there are 
many creators acting in consort, not one. 
 Hume’s philosophy raised two kinds of difficulties for natural religion: First, the 
kinds of arguments applied in the sciences did not lead to Christian doctrine when applied 
more broadly, as in the argument from design. Second, according to Hume’s general skeptical 
arguments, natural science itself is a matter of habit rather than reason. The second difficulty 
was the most fundamental, and in the eighteenth century the theory of probability offered a 
solution. 
THE THEORY OF PROBABILITY 
The modern mathematical theory of probability emerged from the Renaissance through the 
work of many people, including some, such as Pascal and Leibniz, whom I have already 
discussed. Games of chance and astronomical observations were two main sources of 
problems that led to the development of the theory, but theoretical arguments also provided a 
motive for developing the theory of probability as an account of the weight and bearing of 
evidence. By the eighteenth century probability theory was sufficiently developed that people 
attempted to apply it in more general settings, and an important use of the theory was to reply 
to skepticism and atheism. Before we turn to some of the applications of the theory of 
probability, let us consider some basic features of the theory itself. 
 One standard model of circumstances in which probabilities arise consists of drawing 
balls from an urn (figure 8.1). Suppose that all the balls are the same shape, but some are 
black and some are white. The probability of drawing a black ball is taken to be equal to the 
proportion of black balls in the urn. Suppose a number b of the balls are black, and a number 
w are white. Then the probability p of drawing a black ball is p = b/(b + w), and the 
probability of drawing a white ball is (1  p) = w/(b + w). 
 Drawing a black ball from the urn is an event. Drawing a white ball from the urn is a 
different event. These two events are incompatible (as outcomes of one and the same 
drawing): if one of them occurs, the other does not. They are also complementary: if one of 
them does not occur, the other one must, on the assumption that some ball or other is drawn. 
We can describe other relevant events, for example, the event that either a white ball or a 
black ball is drawn. If a ball is drawn, this event is certain to occur. We can consider the 
event that neither a black ball nor a white ball is drawn. If a ball is drawn and the urn contains 
only black balls and white balls, this event is impossible. 
 The events described can be viewed as forming a field of sets or a Boolean algebra. 
Consider the set D = {B, W} that has two members: B, representing the drawing of a black 
ball, and W, representing the drawing of a white ball. Consider the subsets of D: {B, W}, {B}, 
{w}, . They form a field of sets over D and represent the events of drawing either a black 
ball or a white ball, drawing a black ball, drawing a white ball, and drawing neither a black 
ball nor a white ball. 
 
I have already noted that event of drawing a black ball has probability b/(b + w). Drawing a 
white ball from the urn is a different event, with probability w/(b + w). Whatever numerical 
values b and w have, so long as they are not both zero, these ratios must have values between 
0 and 1. 
 The sum of the probability of drawing a white ball and the probability of drawing a 
black ball is b/(b + w) + w/(b + w) = 1. In other words, if a ball is drawn from the urn, it is 
certainly either black or white. Drawing a white ball or a black ball is also an event, but one 
that is certain to happen if any ball is drawn at all. Thus if we assume that a ball is drawn, it is 
certain that the ball drawn is black or white. Events that are certain have a probability of 1. 
 The event of drawing a white ball on a specific draw is incompatible with the event of 
drawing a black ball on that turn. These two events are therefore systematically related: if one 
happens, necessarily the other does not happen. The probability of {B, W}, the event of 
drawing a black ball or a white ball, is the probability of a disjunction (or union) of two 
incompatible events. It is thus the sum of b/(b + w) and w/(b + w), or 1. The probability of 
two incompatible events is the sum of their probabilities. 
 These features characterize the mathematical properties of probabilities whenever the 
collection of alternative events is finite. From a formal point of view, probabilities do not 
have to be associated with drawings from urns. They can be associated with any system of 
events that form a Boolean algebra or field of sets. All that are required for a mathematical 
function to be a probability measure or probability distribution in the formal sense are that it 
be defined on a collection of events that form a field of sets and that the numerical 
assignments given to the events satisfy the principles in italics in the previous paragraphs. In 
other words, the following: 
Definition A (finitely additive) probability measure on a field F of sets over a nonempty set 
D is any function p defined on all sets in F and assigning each set a real number between 0 
and 1 such that (1) p(D) = 1 and (2) for any two sets R and S in F that have an empty 
intersection, p(R  S) = p(R) + p(S). 
Study Questions 
1. Show that for any probability measure over any field of sets, the probability of the 
empty set is 0. 
2. Show that for any probability measure p over any field of sets F, if R and S are sets in 
F and if R is a subset of S, then p(R)  p(S). 
BERNOULLI TRIALS 
Late in the seventeenth century Jacob Bernoulli studied the properties of sequences of draws 
from an urn with balls of two kinds, say black and white. Whatever ball is drawn, it is 
returned to the urn (and the urn mixed up again) before the next draw. (Bernoulli sometimes 
wrote of drawing “tiles” and rather than drawing black or white balls. He assumed each tile 
either had or lacked some property that made it “fertile,” i.e., desired or useful. Of course, for 
philosophical and mathematical purposes, it makes no difference whether the examples we 
consider are about black and white balls or fertile tiles.) 
 Bernoulli was motivated by considerations of the following sort. Suppose that you 
don’t know the proportion of black balls in an urn but you can draw a ball at random, see 
whether or not it is black, and return it to the urn. You can repeat this procedure as many 
times as you like, mixing the balls in the urn thoroughly after each trial. After you have 
carried out a number of trials, there will be a proportion of the trials in which a black ball was 
drawn and a remaining proportion in which a white ball was obtained. The proportion of 
trials in which a black ball is obtained ought to be a rough estimate of the proportion of black 
balls in the urn. We would expect that the larger the number of trials made, the better this 
estimate would be. Bernoulli aimed to do two things: first, to prove that as the number of 
trials increases, the proportion of trials in which a black ball is drawn will converge to the 
proportion of black balls in the urn, and second, to determine how the accuracy of this 
estimate depends on the number of trials made. Apparently because Bernoulli did not think 
he had satisfactorily answered the second problem, he did not publish his work. Fortunately, 
in 1713, eight years after Jacob Bernoulli’s death, his nephew published the work as the book 
Ars Conjectandi. 
Newton’s problem 
Late in the seventeenth century Isaac Newton, who was then rightly regarded as the greatest 
living natural philosopher and mathematician, was asked a simple problem about repeated 
trials. Newton’s problem was the following: A man who is condemned to death is given a 
chance to save his life and regain his liberty. He has a choice of three different options: (1) 
throw 6 dice and be freed if and only if exactly I die comes up 6, (2) throw 12 dice and be 
liberated if and only if exactly 2 dice show a 6, (3) throw 18 dice and be liberated if and only 
if exactly 3 dice show a 6. Which should he choose? Newton’s (correct) answer was that the 
prisoner should choose the first alternative. Why? 
 The events associated with repeated trials of draws from an urn can also be viewed as 
a field of sets or a Boolean algebra, and probabilities can be assigned to those events subject 
to the rules I have just given. The algebras become very large very fast. So let us consider 
only the algebra of events associated with two trials in which a ball is drawn from an urn of 
black and white balls, with the understanding that after the first trial, the ball drawn is 
returned to the urn and the contents are mixed up. 
 If we let Bl denote drawing a black ball on the first trial and W2 denote drawing a 
white ball on the second trial, then the list of possible outcomes of the two trials is this: 
{B1B2}, {B1W2), {W1B2), {W1W2} 
Each outcome of two trials in this list is an event. In one sense, these events are the most 
fundamental in the problem. All other events having to do with the outcomes of the trials are 
unions of these simple events. For example, the event of drawing a black ball on the first trial 
is {B1B2, B1W2} = {B1B2}  B1W2}. If the Boolean algebra or field of sets for this problem is 
drawn, the events in the list each are immediately above the impossible event, . In another 
sense, however, the events in this list are not fundamental, since each is a composite of an 
outcome on the first trial, which is an event in the simpler Boolean algebra we drew earlier, 
and an outcome on the second trial, which is an event in an isomorphic simpler Boolean 
algebra. The algebra for the two trial problem can be thought of as a product of two simpler 
algebras: one for the first trial and one for the second trial. 
 The fundamental events (called atoms of the algebra) just about  in the large algebra 
are composites of the fundamental events (also called atoms) just about  in the simpler 
algebras. The larger product algebra is then constructed simply by taking unions of the 
composite atomic events. 
 A probability measure for the two trials will assign a number between 0 and 1 to each 
event in the product algebra. What relation should there be between the probabilities assigned 
to events in the product algebra and the probabilities of events in the separate trials? 
Bernoulli’s claim is this: 
Bernoulli’s rule If the trials are conducted independently of one another, so that the 
outcome of one trial has no effect on the outcome of the other trial, then the probability of a 
composite event should be the ordinary product of the probability of the separate events that 
compose it. 
 Suppose 1/3 of the balls in an urn are black. Then on any trial the probability of 
drawing a black ball is 1/3, and the probability of drawing a white ball is 2/3. According to 
Bernoulli, the probability of drawing a black ball on the first trial and a black ball on the 
second trial, p({B1B2}), is therefore 1/3  1/3 = 1/9. The probability of drawing a white ball 
on the first trial and a black ball on the second trial, p({W1B2}), is 2/3  1/3 = 2/9. In the same 
way Bernoulli’s rule for assigning probabilities to atomic events determines values for 
p({B1W2}) and p({W1W2}). 
 The probabilities of the atoms in an algebra determine unique probability values for 
all other events in the algebra. For example, consider p({B1W2, B1B2}). The set {B1W2, BlB2} 
is the union of the sets {BlW1} and {B1B2}. These sets have  as their intersection. Hence by 
the rules for probability measures, p({B1W2, B1B2}) = p({B1W2}) + p({B1B2}) = (1/3  2/3) + 
(1/3  1/3) = 2/9 + 1/9 = 1/3. 
 The example is perfectly general. The probabilities of atomic events in the product 
algebra for a number of independent trials are the products of the probabilities of atomic 
events in the algebras for the individual trials. Any two atoms are disjoint sets having an 
empty intersection. In the product algebra, every event is a union of atoms. So the probability 
of any event in the product algebra is obtained simply by adding up the probabilities of the 
atoms contained in that event. For the simple example of two independent trials, if p(B) = 1/3, 
we get the following values: 
 
 What is the probability of getting no black balls in two independent draws from an 
urn? There are two ways to compute this probability, each, of course, yielding the same 
value. One way is to apply Bernoulli’s principle about composite events directly. The event 
of getting no black balls in two draws is composed of the events of getting a white ball on the 
first draw (p = 2/3) and a white ball on the second draw (p = 2/3). Since the events have no 
effect on one another, the probability of the composite event is obtained by multiplying and is 
4/9. The other way is simply to look at the event in the product algebra that represents getting 
no black balls, {W1W2}, and see that its probability is 4/9. 
 What is the probability of getting exactly one black ball in two trials? This event is the 
union of two disjoint events, namely the event {B1W2} and the event {W1B2}. By Bernoulli’s 
rule, the probability of {B1W2} is 2/9, and the probability of {W1B2} is also 2/9. Since these 
events have an empty union, the probability of their union is the sum of their probabilities, or 
4/9, which is the answer. 
 What is the probability of getting exactly two black balls in two trials? This event is a 
composite event consisting of drawing a black ball on the first trial (p = 1/3) and drawing a 
black ball on the second trial (p = 1/3). So by Bernoulli’s rule, the probability is 1/9. 
Study Question 
Suppose that the probability of drawing a black ball is 1/6. Calculate the probabilities of all 
events in the algebra representing two trials with this probability. 
THE BINOMIAL DISTRIBUTION 
Bernoulli, like Newton and other students of probability in the seventeenth century, was 
interested in the general formula for obtaining any number, say k, of successes (or “fertile” 
cases) in n independent trials when the probability of success in each trial is p (and so the 
probability of an outcome other than a success is 1  p). For example, we could call drawing 
a black ball a success and ask such questions as, What is the probability of drawing a black 
ball 5 times in 10 trials when the probability of drawing a black ball on any one trial is 1/3? 
 One way to obtain the answer to such questions is as follows. Suppose a sequence of 
n = 10 trials yields 5 draws of black balls. Suppose, in particular, that the first 5 draws yield 
black balls and the next 5 draws yield white balls. Each draw of a black ball is an event with 
probability p = 1/3, and each draw of a white ball is an event with probability q =1  p = 2/3. 
The trials are all independent, so the probability of a composite atomic event consisting of 5 
draws of black balls on the first 5 trials and 5 draws of white balls on the next 5 trials will be 
the product of the probabilities of the outcomes of the individual trials that compose it. In 
other words, the probability of the composite event consisting of 5 draws of black balls 
followed by 5 draws of white balls will be 1/3  1/3  1/3  1/3  1/3  2/3  2/3  2/3  2/3 
 2/3 = (1/3)5  (2/3)5 = (1/3)5  (2/3)n5 = p5qn5. Now drawing black balls on the first 5 
draws and drawing white balls on the next 5 draws is only one member of the event of 
drawing exactly 5 black balls in 10 trials. For we could draw the 5 black balls on any 5 of the 
10 trials; it is not necessary that we draw the 5 black balls on the first 5 trials. For example, 
the event of drawing exactly 5 black balls in 10 trials also includes the case in which we draw 
a white ball on the first trial, then draw 5 black balls, then draw 4 white balls; it also include 
the case in which we draw a white ball, then a black ball, then a white ball, then a black ball, 
and so on. Each different way of drawing 5 black balls in 10 trials will have the same 
probability, namely p5qn5. No two distinct ways of drawing 5 black balls can both occur; 
considered as events, their intersection is empty. So, to answer the question with which we 
began—What is the probability of drawing a black ball 5 times in 10 trials when the 
probability of drawing a black ball on any one trial is 1/3?—we must calculate how many 
different ways there are of selecting, from 10 trials, 5 trials that result in black balls and we 
multiply that number by p5qn5. 
 The number of different members of the event of drawing exactly 5 black balls in 10 
trials is given by the number of different ways in which we can select 5 things (the 5 trials on 
which a black ball occurs) from 10 things. From chapter 3 we know that number is C(5, 10) = 
10!/(5!(10  5)!) So finally we obtain the conclusion that the probability of drawing 5 black 
balls in n = 10 independent trials, on each of which the probability of drawing a black ball is 
p = 1/3 and the probability of drawing a white ball is q = (1  p) = 2/3, is given by 
5 5
10! 1 2
.
5!(10 5)! 3 3
   
   
    
 
 The reasoning used is perfectly general: 
Theorem The probability of k successes in n independent trials each having a probability p 
of success and a probability q = (1  p) of failure is C(k, n)pkg(nk). 
 You may recall that Pascal proved that C(k, n), the number of ways of choosing k 
things from n things, is also the value of the kth binomial coefficient in the expansion of an 
nth power binomial such as (x + y)n. In fact, the formula for the probability of k successes in n 
independent trials each with probability p of success is the very same as the formula for the 
kth monomial in the expansion of the binomial (p + q)n. For this reason the probability 
measure that assigns the probability C(k, n)pkqnk to the event of k successes in n trials is 
called the binomial distribution. For n = 8 and p = q = 1/2, the binomial distribution is as 
shown in figure 8.2. 
 Recall that Bernoulli wanted to determine how good an estimate of the proportion of 
black balls in an urn is provided by the proportion of black balls actually drawn in a sequence 
of trials. The first question, however, is whether it can be shown that as the number of trials 
gets larger, the proportion of black balls drawn comes closer and closer to the proportion of 
black balls in the urn. In the probability distribution shown in figure 8.2, where 8 draws are 
made from an urn that is half filled with black balls, the probability is a little over .27 that 
half the balls drawn will be black, and the probability that either 3, 4, or 5 of the balls drawn 
will be black is roughly .71. In other words, the probability is .71 that the proportion of black 
balls drawn will be within 1/8 of the proportion of black balls actually in the urn. Let us 
consider the binomial distribution for 16 trials rather than just 8, again with p = 1/2. Then we 
would find that the probability of getting black balls on exactly half of the draws is just 
under .20, and the probability is about .79 that the proportion of black balls drawn is within 
1/8 of the proportion of the black balls in the urn (1/2). 
 As the number of trials increases, the probability goes down that the proportion of 
successes will be exactly equal to the probability of a success on a single trial, but as the 
number of trials increases, the probability of obtaining a proportion of successes within a 
fixed interval of the probability of success on a single trial increases. Bernoulli himself made 
the point this way: 
I suppose that without your knowledge there are concealed in an urn 3000 white pebbles and 
2000 black pebbles, and in trying to determine the numbers of these pebbles you take out one 
pebble after another (each time replacing the pebble you have drawn before choosing the 
next, in order not to decrease the number of pebbles in the urn), and that you observe how 
often a white and how often a black pebble is withdrawn. The question is, can you do this so 
often that it becomes ten times, one hundred times, one thousand times, etc., more probable 
(that is, it be morally certain) that the numbers of whites and blacks chosen are in the same 
3:2 ratio as the pebbles in the urn, rather than in any other different ratio? 
 To avoid misunderstanding, we must note that the ratio between the number of cases, 
which we are trying to determine by experiment, should not be taken as precise and 
indivisible (for then just the contrary would happen, and it would become less probable that 
the true ratio would be found the more numerous were the observations). Rather, it is a ratio 
taken with some latitude, that is, included within two limits which can be made as narrow as 
one might wish. For instance, if in the example of the pebbles alluded to above we take two 
ratios 301/200 and 299/200 or 3001/2000 and 2999/2000, etc., of which one is immediately 
greater and the other immediately less than the ratio 3: 2, it will be shown that it can be made 
more probable, that the ratio found by often repeated experiments will fall within these limits 
of the 3:2 ratio rather than outside them.2 
 In fact, Bernoulli succeeded in proving essentially the following theorem, which is 
now sometimes known as the weak law of large numbers. 
Bernoulli’s theorem For any small positive number  and any large positive number c and 
any value of p (0  p,  1), there is an n such that for the binomial distribution with n trials, 
each with probability p of success, if x is the number of successes in n trials, then 
Prob(x/n  p > ) < 1/(c + 1). 
 Bernoulli and his successors, such as Abraham De Moivre, took this result to form the 
basis for a rebuttal to skepticism, or at least to Hume’s kind of skepticism. If some quantity 
(analogous to the true proportion of black balls) is constrained by nature to have a particular 
value and we can make repeated experiments to measure the quantity (which is analogous to 
making repeated trials and using the frequency of black balls in the trials to estimate the 
proportion of black balls in the urn), then the probability that our estimate is within a given 
small interval of the truth gets larger and larger. We are justified, as the number of 
experiments or trials we make increases, in having more and more confidence that our 
estimate of the quantity is within any given interval of the true value. The argument depends, 
however, on our granting the analogy between urn problems and scientific problems, and the 
appropriateness of urn problems as a general model for empirical inquiry might be doubted. 
 In the middle of the eighteenth century, the Reverend Thomas Bayes provided the 
basis for a more powerful argument against Hume. 
Study Questions 
1. How does the binomial distribution (for any n > 0) look when p = 1? 
2. Compute the values and graph the results for the binomial distribution with n = 8 and 
p = 3/4 (as in figure 8.2). 
WHAT IS PROBABILITY? 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries philosophers and mathematicians were 
uncertain about the metaphysics of probability. Much of that uncertainty remains today. On 
the one hand, probability was thought of as a measure of a feature of events, their chance. 
Games of chance, such as dice games, are so called because they determine specific chances 
for various outcomes. It is the physical properties of dice that determines the chance that they 
will show one side or another when thrown. So chance is a kind of complex physical 
property. On the other hand, probability was thought of as a treasure of opinion, a measure of 
degree of belief or credence. 
 The view of probability as a measure of opinion or degree of belief was strengthened 
by the effects of Newtonian philosophy. In problems in dynamics, an initial description of the 
state of a physical system is given, positions and momenta at one time, for example, and 
Newtonian laws then entail unique values for the state of the system at subsequent times. The 
Newtonian laws provide a function between possible states of a system at one time and 
possible states of the system at certain subsequent times. Each initial state determines unique 
subsequent states. Pierre Simon de Laplace, the greatest mathematical physicist and 
prohahilist of the eighteenth century, drew a bold conclusion from this feature of Newtonian 
dynamics: 
Laplacian determinism From a complete description of the mechanical state of the 
universe at one moment of time, the Newtonian laws of dynamics determine a unique state of 
the universe at any subsequent moment of time. The latter state can in principle be computed 
from the initial description and the laws. 
 We now know that, even if we assume Newtonian laws, Laplace’s view is false and 
requires considerable qualification, but from the eighteenth century until the twentieth 
century Laplacian determinism was accepted not only by physicists but by many other 
scientists as well. Laplace provided a picture of the universe in which there is no such thing 
as a real physical property of chance except for the extreme cases (chances of 0 or of 1), and 
the appearance of chance variation in events is simply the result of our ignorance. 
 This was, in fact, the view that Hume endorsed in his section on probability in the 
Enquiry: “Though there be no such thing as Chance in the world; our ignorance of the real 
cause of any event has the same influence on the understanding, and begets a like species of 
belief or opinion.”3 If one took Hume’s view quite literally, then the study of probability 
would become the study of belief, its degrees, and its variations. But that was something no 
one in the eighteenth century knew how to attempt. Probabilists knew how to count and 
observe frequencies, and they knew how to compute some of the mathematical consequences 
of mathematical probabilities, but they did not know (or really care) about variations of belief 
in actual people. Perhaps one result of this tension was that astute writers were carefully 
equivocal about the meaning of probability. 
 Thomas Bayes, who wrote one of the most important studies of probability in the 
eighteenth century, defined the notion this way: “The probability of any event is the ratio 
between the value at which an expectation depending on the happening of the event ought to 
be computed, and the value of the thing expected upon its happening. By chance I mean the 
same as probability.”4 
 The idea behind Bayes’ definition can be seen by thinking what a promise would be 
worth to you if you knew that it would be kept. A lottery ticket is a kind of promise, and 
lottery tickets can generally be sold or exchanged. Suppose you are offered a lottery ticket 
that will pay $2 if a 6 comes up on a roll of a die. To compute what the ticket is worth to you 
(“the value at which an expectation depending on the happening of the event ought to be 
computed”) multiply $2 (“the value of the thing expected upon its happening”) by the 
probability of the event: 
Value of an expectation depending on the happening of the event = (probability of the event) 
 (value of the thing received if the event happens) 
So the value at which an expectation depending on the happening of the event ought to be 
computed, divided by the value of the thing expected upon its happening, is just the 
probability of the event: 
Probability of the event
 (probability of the event)  (value received if the event occurs)
value received if the event occurs


 
 The ambiguity in Bayes’ definition arises because of his use of the phrase “ought to 
be.” What probability ought to be given to a possible outcome of a lottery? One that is the 
measure of some physical property? One that is somehow logically correct? Bayes does not 
say. If Bayes had instead used the phrase “is,” then his account would amount simply to a 
reformulation of Hume’s, in which the degree of belief in an outcome is measured indirectly 
through assessments of the value of bets or lotteries on the outcome of the event. 
BAYES, PRICE, AND HUME 
Bayes was a Scottish minister and a contemporary of David Hume. He was known for his 
mathematical skills, but published almost nothing during his lifetime. After his death a 
remarkable manuscript was found among his papers, a manuscript that eventually came to 
revolutionize the theory of probability. Bayes’ “Essay towards Solving a Problem in the 
Doctrine of Chances” was read, with an introduction and postscript by Richard Price, to the 
Royal Society of London in 1763, and it was subsequently published in the Proceedings of 
the Society. While the essay itself was entirely mathematical, Price presented it as a response 
to Hume’s skepticism. 
 Consider one of Hume’s examples: How can reason together with experience justify 
our belief that the sun will rise tomorrow? Hume, of course, argued that they could not, and 
that our belief is founded on experience and habit rather than on experience and reason. Price 
thought of the issue in terms of Bernoulli trials and the binomial distribution. The days and 
nights we experience can be thought of as so many draws from Nature’s urn: periods of night 
followed by periods of day are successes; a period of night that lasts a long while and is not 
followed (in central latitudes) by a day (after roughly twelve hours) would count as a failure. 
In Hume’s terminology, Nature’s “hidden springs” determine the probability that a day will 
follow a night. So as Price conceived the issue, our experience of nights and days constitute 
so many trials from a binomial distribution, in which the probability of observing k successes 
in n trials is C(k, n)pkqnk, where q is by definition equal to 1  p. If we knew the value of p, 
the chance that the sun will rise tomorrow would be represented by the value of the parameter 
p. If p = 1, the sun will certainly rise tomorrow (and the day after that, and the day after that, 
forever). If p = 0, then the sun will certainly not rise tomorrow, or ever. If we are uncertain of 
the value of p, we are uncertain whether the sun will rise tomorrow. 
 In Bayes’ theory, the value of p itself has a probability. In formal terms, for example, 
that p is between 1/2 and 2/3 is an event to be assigned a probability. The idea may be a little 
confusing, since p itself is a number that determines a probability. In draws from urns, for 
example, p is a proportion that determines the probability of k successes in n draws from the 
urn. But quite aside from that, Bayes supposed that the event that p lies within an interval of 
values is measured by a probability. In general, to follow Bayes’ reasoning you must keep in 
mind that several different probability measures will be talked about at once. 
 The probability distribution on p determines, for any n and k, a probability that there 
will be k successes on n trials. To obtain that probability, for each value of p, compute the 
probability of k successes in n trials, then multiply that probability by the probability of the 
value of p used, and then sum over all of the values of p. Since the values of p form a 
continuum, we must actually integrate rather than sum. If we let Prob(x) signify the function 
representing the initial probability that parameter p has the value x or less and let Prob(k, n) 
signify the probability of obtaining k successes in n trials, then the formula for Prob(k, n) 
becomes 
1
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Changing the function Prob(x), which measures the probability of values of p, will generally 
result in changes in Prob(k, n), the probability of k successes in n trials. 
 In Price’s view, the central question about induction, therefore, is to determine how 
much probability should be assigned to any interval of values of p in light of evidence about a 
number of successes and failures in Bernoulli trials. Once that is known, it will be understood 
how we can rationally learn from experience: “the number of times in which an unknown 
event has happened and failed being given, to find the chance that the probability of its 
happening [in a single trial] should lie somewhere between any two named degrees of 
probability.”5 
 Bayes supposed that before any trials are made, the probability that p lies in the 
interval between a and b is b  a (0  b < a  1). We now call the initial probability 
distribution for p that Bayes assumed a uniform distribution. Accordingly, the mathematical 
and conceptual problem that Bayes addressed concerns how the initial uniform probability 
distribution for p should be changed as Bernoulli trials are conducted and their outcomes 
noted. 
 For a uniform distribution, x = Prob(x), and so 1 = d Prob(x)/dx, and therefore, the 
expression for Prob(k, n) simplifies to 
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If we regard n as fixed, this is Bayes’ expression for the probability that k successes will be 
obtained. 
 What is the probability that k successes will be obtained and that the value of p lies 
between two numbers a and b? Bayes argued that it is just the sum (or integral) of the 
probability of k successes taken over each value of p from a to b. In other words, 
Prob(k successes in n trials & a  p  b) = ( ) ( , ) (1  ) d .
b
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 Finally, Bayes argued that the probability of event A given event B is the probability 
of A and B jointly occurring, divided by the probability that B occurs. (We now call the 
notion that event A occurs given that B occurs the probability of A conditional on B, and write 
it Prob(A  B)). Applying this principle to his problem, Bayes concluded that the probability 
that p is between a and b, given that k successes have been observed in n trials, is 
Prob(a  p  bk successes in n trials) = 
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 The most difficult problem for Bayes was to evaluate these integrals. He showed that 
the denominator is always equal to 1/(n + 1), no matter what value of k is considered, but the 
numerator is more difficult, and Bayes was not able to give a general solution. He was able to 
give an analysis for the numerator only when either k or (n  k) is small. 
 It is easy to see what happens to the probability of values for p as one gathers trials in 
which only successes occur. Starting with a uniform probability distribution over p, suppose 
that there are k successes in k trials, i.e., that n = k. C(k, k) = 1, and (n  k) = 0, so we have 
that 
Prob(a  p  bk successes in k trials) = 1 1
d
1/( 1)
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As the number of trials k becomes large, this quantity approaches 0 for any interval that does 
not include the value p = 1, and it approaches 1 for any interval that does include the value p 
= 1. In other words, if we start from an initial uniform distribution over values of p, as the 
number of trials without failure increases, the probability distribution becomes concentrated 
around p = 1. Moreover, we do not have to wait for a large number of trials before the 
probability of values of p in intervals of interest that do not include 1 becomes very small. 
After 10 successes in 10 trials, for example, the probability that p lies between 0 and 1/2 is 
less than .001, and the probability that the value of p lies between 3/4 and 1 is greater 
than .94. 
Price thought such results as these to be a decisive reply to Hume: 
Let us imagine to ourselves the case of a person just brought forth into this world and 
left to collect from his observation of the order and course of events what powers and 
causes take place in it. ‘The Sun would, probably, be the first object that would 
engage his attention; but after losing it the first night he would be entirely ignorant 
whether he should ever see it again. He would therefore be in the condition of a 
person making a first experiment about an event entirely unknown to him. But let him 
see a second appearance or one return of the Sun, and an expectation would be raised 
in him of a second return, and he might know that there was an odds of 3 to 1 for 
some probability of this. This odds would increase, as before represented, with the 
number of returns to which he was witness. But no finite number of returns would be 
sufficient to produce absolute or physical certainty. For let it be supposed that he has 
seen it return at regular and stated intervals a million of times. The conclusions it 
would warrant would be such as follow—There would be the odds of the millionth 
power of 2 to one, that it was likely that it would return again at the end of the usual 
interval. ... 
 It should be carefully remembered that these deductions suppose a previous total 
ignorance of nature. After having observed for some time the course of events it would be 
found that the operations of nature are in general regular, and that the powers and laws which 
prevail in it are stable and permanent. The consideration of this will cause one or a few 
experiments often to produce a much stronger expectation of success in further experiments 
than would otherwise have been reasonable; just as the frequent observation that things of a 
sort are disposed to gather in any place would lead us to conclude, upon discovering there 
any object of a particular sort, that there are laid up with it many others of the same sort. It is 
obvious that this, so far from contradicting the foregoing deductions, is only one particular 
case to which they are to be applied.6 
Study Question 
For the binomial distribution with n = 8 and p = 1/2, calculate the conditional probability that 
exactly 5 successes are obtained, given that more than 4 successes are obtained. 
THE MODERN REVIVAL 
Bayes’ ideas did not have much influence in the eighteenth or even the nineteenth centuries. 
Laplace used similar but less explicitly developed methods. There was a small school of 
Bayesians at the University of Cambridge in the nineteenth century, but they seem to have 
published very little. In the twentieth century, in the hands of the philosopher Frank Ramsey 
and the statistician Bruno De Finnetti, Bayes ideas were rekindled and developed into a major 
branch of modern statistics, as well as an influential approach to philosophical issues about 
knowledge. 
 Three distinct problems beset the Bayes and Price response to Hume’s inductive 
skepticism: 
1. What is probability? Bayes, De Moivre, Leibniz, and others suggested that it is the 
degree of belief or confidence that ought to be given to an event or state of affairs, but they 
gave no clear account of what this means. 
2. Bayes showed how to compute simple cases of a conditional probability for a 
parameter of a binomial distribution, and we have seen that the conditional-probability 
distribution may quickly come to be localized around a particular value for the parameter. 
But does the process of changing probabilities by forming conditional probabilities as new 
evidence arises always converge to the truth? 
3. Price’s response to ‘Hume assumes that our inquiries into nature are accurately 
represented as attempts to infer a parameter in a binomial distribution from a sequence of 
Bernoulli trials. But he gave no argument for the accuracy of this representation, and it is not 
obviously correct in general. Perhaps in nature the value of p varies from trial to trial; perhaps 
our sample is not randomly selected from any binomial distribution. 
 Ramsey’s solution to the first question was to argue that probability is a measure of 
rational degree of belief. In Ramsey’s conception, different rational agents may assign 
different degrees of belief, and hence different probability measures, to the same system of 
events. Thus you may judge that a coin is fair and have confidence equal to 1/2 that it will 
land heads if flipped, while I may judge that the coin is biased and have confidence equal to 
1/3 that it will land heads if flipped. Moreover, Ramsey allowed that different rational agents 
may assign different degrees of belief to the same system of events even though the rational 
agents have available to them exactly the same body of evidence. You and I may each have 
observed the same fifty flips of the coin in question and have no other specific information 
about it, but we may still differ in the probability we assign to heads on a given flip. 
According to Ramsey, the rationality of a system of degrees of belief requires only two 
things: 
 The measure of degrees of belief must satisfy the axioms for probability measures. 
 As new evidence is acquired, the measure of degrees of belief in a system of events must 
change to their conditional probabilities (under that same measure) on the evidence. 
 If probability is a measure of degree of belief, how can degree of belief be measured? 
Ramsey proposed a method that assumes one further principle about rational agents. To 
explain it requires that we be clear about the notion of expected value, which Bayes himself 
used. 
Definition For an action with a finite set of possible outcomes, each outcome having a 
definite value, the expected value of the action is the sum over all possible outcomes of the 
measure of degree of belief that the outcome will occur multiplied by the value of the 
outcome. 
Ramsey assumed the following principle: 
Ramsey’s assumption Given a set of alternative actions one of which must be chosen, a 
rational agent will choose the action with the largest expected value. 
Ramsey was then able to show that under quite general conditions the degrees of belief of an 
agent that satisfies this assumption can be inferred from the agent’s choices among gambles. 
In appropriate circumstances, degrees of belief are measurable features of ideally rational 
agents (see boxed illustration). 
An illustration 
The problem is to find dollar values A, B, and C such that the rational agent is indifferent 
between the following prospects: 
1. Getting $A for sure 
2. Getting $B if proposition q is true and getting $C if q is not true 
Suppose further that we have determined that the agent’s degree of belief in q, DOB(q), is 
one minus the agent’s degree of belief in q, 1  DOB(q). Since the agent is indifferent 
between choice 1 and choice 2, they must have the same expected value. Hence, A = B  
DOB(q) + C(1  DOB(q)). Therefore, by simple algebra, DOB(q) = (A  C)/(B  C). 
 The second question concerning Price’s response to Hume has to do with whether or 
not one will converge to truth if one follows the strategy of adopting an initial (or prior) 
probability distribution and then changing it by forming conditional probabilities as new 
evidence is acquired. In the context of Ramsey’s account of probability as rational degree of 
belief, the question about convergence is quite general. There is no reason, on Ramsey’s 
account, why we should start with a uniform distribution. 
 Modern studies of probability have shown that in very general circumstances, 
changing probability by conditionalizing does result in convergence to the truth. There are, 
however, some important restrictions on this claim. 
1. If the initial distribution gives 0 prior probability to a set of values that contains the 
true value of a parameter, that set will continue to receive 0 probability no matter how much 
evidence is obtained. 
2. If the evidence has the same probability on alternative hypotheses, then the ratios of 
the probabilities of those hypotheses will be unchanged by conditionalizing on the evidence. 
The first of these limitations means that a dogmatic Bayesian agent who happens to be wrong 
cannot recover from that error. The second means that if two (or more) hypotheses give the 
same likelihood to every possible body of evidence, then conditioning on evidence will never 
change the initial ratio of their probabilities. And this means, of course, that if exactly one of 
them is true, then we will not converge toward giving probability 1 to the true hypothesis by 
conditioning on ever larger bodies of evidence. 
 The third problem for Price’s argument against Hume has to do with the 
appropriateness of the binomial model as a representation of inquiry into nature. Instead of 
relying on the binomial representation, using modern logic, we can state the essential points 
of Price’s argument much more generally. Imagine a Fregean formal language that has an 
infinite number of predicate and function symbols. That is, suppose that the language is large 
enough that every hypothesis can be expressed in it (up to the limits of expressibility of 
formalized languages). Say that two sentences in the language are equivalent if they are 
logically equivalent, if each of them can be deduced from the other. Then numbers 
representing degrees of belief can be assigned to sentences in such a way that equivalent 
sentences receive the same degrees of belief. The degrees of belief can then satisfy the 
axioms of probability, and it can be shown under general conditions (provided restrictions 
numbered 1 and 2 above are not violated) that a Bayesian agent who changes degrees of 
belief by conditionalizing on the evidence will converge to the truth. 
 The Bayesian picture does not refute metaphysical skepticism. Rather, it tries to 
render it harmless. Metaphysical skepticism imagines alternative hypotheses that generate 
exactly the same experiences, so the ratio of the initial probabilities of the alternatives will 
always be the same as their ratio after conditioning on any evidence. This means that we 
cannot learn, even in the long run, that the skeptic’s hypothesis that we are brains in vats is 
false. But so what? How will our ignorance harm us in either deliberation or action? 
 The modern Bayesian picture of rational action and deliberation derives as much from 
Pascal and Ramsey as from Bayes, and this very picture forms the foundation of much of 
contemporary economic theory and of an influential branch of contemporary statistics. The 
individual is considered to be someone who must decide what to do. Alternative courses of 
action are available, and each alternative course of action may produce outcomes of interest 
to the individual, depending on how the world really is. The individual has preferences 
regarding the possible outcomes: some may be valuable, some may be disastrous, and so on. 
The value of the alternatives is assumed to be measurable on some scale, and these measured 
values of outcomes are traditionally called utilities. The individual also has views about the 
likelihood or probability of the various alternative states of the world; in the modern 
subjective Bayesian tradition, following Ramsey, these probabilities are nothing more than 
the individual’s degrees of belief in the various alternative states of the world. If the 
individual can frame her preferences, measure the utility to her of the various possible 
outcomes, formulate the probabilities of the alternative states of the world, and determine 
which outcomes will result from which actions in which states of the world, then she can 
calculate her expected utility for each alternative action. The expected utility of action A is 
just the sum, over each possible state W of the world, of the utility of the outcome of action A 
in world state W multiplied by the subjective probability of state W of the world. 
 On the modern Bayesian view, to act rationally, the individual must choose an action 
that has as large an expected utility as possible. Nothing more is required for rationality than 
degrees of belief that satisfy the axioms of probability, preferences that are coherent, and 
actions taken to maximize expected utility. It is perfectly rational, therefore, for an individual 
to recognize the logical possibility that she is a brain in a vat, or that other minds don’t exist, 
and to give such claims 0 probability or infinitesimal probability so that they make no 
difference to expected utility calculations. It is also possible to give such hypotheses some 
substantial probability but to judge that they will make no difference whatsoever to outcomes 
of value. The modern Bayesian may even be a metaphysical skeptic, bit that skepticism 
makes no difference to rational deliberation or rational action. 
Study Question 
Pascal provided a famous argument for the rationality of causing oneself to believe in God. 
He realized that one cannot simply choose to believe in God, but by going to church, 
avoiding temptation, and pious behavior, one can so act that one comes to believe in God. 
Pascal’s argument that this is the rational course of action contains the central ideas of the 
probabilistic study of rational decision making, or decision theory, as the subject is now 
called. It also uses an interpretation of probability according to which all alternative 
circumstances are equally probable. Pascal assumes that it is rational to act so that your 
expected utility is maximized. 
 One of Pascal’s arguments is this: If God exists and you act so as not to believe in 
him, you will be condemned to hell for eternity and suffer an infinite loss in utility; if God 
exists and you do believe in him, you will spend eternity in Heaven and have an infinite gain 
in utility; if God does not exist and you do believe in him, you will suffer a small finite loss 
in utility in having given up sinful pleasures; if God does not exist and you do not believe in 
him, you will gain a small, finite utility from sinful pleasures. Either God exists, or he does 
not. So the probability is 1/2 for either case. Thus the expected utility of acting so as to 
believe in God is 1/2   = . A rational person will therefore choose to act so as to 
believe in God. 
 What is wrong with Pascal’s argument? 
BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND BAYESIAN PROBLEMS 
Altogether, the results obtained by modern Bayesians provide a powerful response to Hume’s 
inductive skepticism and an interesting response to metaphysical skepticism. But as so far 
developed, it is a response for an ideally rational agent, that is, an agent who 
1. never makes logical mistakes, 
2. never needs to consider novel hypotheses not previously thought of, 
3. can compute anything, 
4. never accepts anything false as data. 
And that’s not us. Some of the reasons we do not satisfy these four conditions have to do with 
human perception. Let’s consider point 4. The Bayesian account of belief and learning as 
presented assumes that the data the rational agent uses in forming conditional probabilities is 
free of error. But there is no reason to believe this to be the case with us humans. We often 
describe data, or aspects of data, in ways that subsequently come to be thought of as 
erroneous. Richard Jeffrey, a distinguished Bayesian philosopher, offers the example of 
observing the colors of objects by candlelight. What you see may alter your degree of belief 
that an object is blue (or green or red, as the case may be), but it is unlikely to make you 
certain that the object is blue. 
 Various responses to this problem have been proposed by those who are sympathetic 
with Bayesian approaches to the theory of knowledge. One is to claim that the uncertain 
descriptions of our data are themselves inferences made from simpler descriptions that are 
certain. It might be argued, for example, that there are “sense data” events, from which any 
ordinary report of things seen are tacitly inferred. From a mathematical point of view, the 
algebra of events in which we describe possible outcomes of experiments can always be 
enlarged to include such hypothetical events, and measures of our degree of belief can be 
extended to such events to give some of them the value 1. A second response is to suggest 
that we should not change our degrees of belief by forming conditional probabilities on the 
data, because that process results in giving the data a degree of belief of 1. Instead, we could 
suppose that, as with observation by candlelight, experience causes us to change our degrees 
of belief in some propositions (e.g., that the object is blue) but does not cause us to change 
them to 1. We then must readjust our degrees of belief in the propositions so that the total 
system of degrees of belief will again satisfy the axioms of probability. Jeffrey proposed a 
rule for doing so. One difficulty with this approach is that we lose the general guarantee of 
convergence to the truth. 
 Another reason we don’t satisfy the four conditions has to do with the limitations of 
human logical powers. It is obvious that we humans are not able, at any moment in our 
history, to consider all possible hypotheses about the world. The history of science is filled 
with episodes in which novel theories were introduced, theories that had never before been 
articulated. If at a given moment we have a set of alternative hypotheses about which we 
have degrees of belief, and a novel hypothesis not previously thought of is introduced, we 
must decide what degree of belief to give to this novel hypothesis. We cannot do this by 
conditioning on empirical data, since no new empirical data have been obtained (other than 
the existence of the novel hypothesis). What happens when a new hypothesis is introduced is 
that the relevant algebra of events is changed. But unfortunately, nothing in the Bayesian 
story tells us how to alter our degrees of belief when this happens. 
 Perhaps the most profound difficulty for the Bayesian conception arises from a 
combination of philosophy of mind, psychology, and the theory of computation. One of the 
most powerful ideas of the twentieth century---and an idea that we will consider in detail in 
subsequent chapters—is that the human brain is a biological computer and the cognitive 
activities of humans are produced by computational procedures within this biological 
computer. If we assume for the moment that this is so, then we humans cannot determine the 
answers to mathematical problems that are in principle beyond the capacity of any possible 
computer to decide. 
 A perfectly nondogmatic Bayesian must be able to determine a degree of belief for 
each of an infinity of sentences. For any declarative sentence, the perfect, ideally rational 
nondogmatic Bayesian agent has a degree of belief in that sentence. Moreover, initially the 
only sentences given a degree of belief of 0 are logical contradictions, for what it means to be 
perfectly nondogmatic is that no sentence whose truth is logically possible is given a 0 degree 
of belief. That, recall, is one condition required to show that an ideal Bayesian agent can 
converge to the truth, whatever it is. For brevity, let me call such a probability measure 
nondogmatic. One of the results of modern logic and the modern theory of computation that 
developed from it in this century is that no possible computer can compute a nondogmatic 
probability function defined on all sentences in a formalized first-order language that 
contains even one two-place predicate. If no possible computer can do it, and if no human 
can do it unless some possible computer can do it, then no human can do it. 
 In fact, it turns out that only very dogmatic probability functions are feasible to 
compute. But if such probability measures are used, then of course reliability must be 
sacrificed, and the claim to have a general answer to Hume’s skepticism is lost. 
CONCLUSION 
Although in many ways religious belief was one of the great motivations for the study of 
probability, probability has not, on the whole, been kind to religious belief. How much 
comfort, if any, Bayes’ ideas provide to natural religion is not clear. When asked what place 
God has in his system of the universe, Laplace is said to have replied, “I have no need of that 
hypothesis,” and insofar as he was correct about what he needed to explain the motions of the 
planets, his remark illustrates that Bayesian doctrine does not provide much support for 
natural religion. Insofar as natural phenomena can be explained by theories that do not invoke 
God (or at any rate, do not invoke a nice God), Bayesian approaches provide no special case 
for religious belief. On the other hand, Bayesian doctrine is extremely tolerant, and nothing in 
it argues that religious belief is in any way irrational. 
 Historically, another “natural” argument for religious belief is founded on miracles: a 
God who can intervene in the course of nature is said to be the best explanation for miracles. 
Hume ridiculed such arguments on the grounds that natural laws are confirmed by billions of 
instances known to mankind, and in the case of any miracle it is more probable that the 
testimony of witnesses is false than that the laws of nature have failed. In the late nineteenth 
century, Francis Galion, one of the chief inventors of modern social statistics, gave a 
probabilistic argument against the efficacy of prayer. He compared the longevity of clerics 
and kings, whose health was presumably prayed for a great deal, with that of more ordinary 
folk, who presumably got less prayer on their behalf. He found that on the average there were 
no differences in the lifespans of the two groups. 
 Nonetheless, religion aside, the study of probability is one of the great successes of 
skepticism. Although serious skeptics would not welcome the gratitude, contemporary 
economic and statistical theorists owe an intellectual debt to the skeptical tradition. 
Review Questions 
1. State the argument from design, and explain Hume’s objections to it. 
2. What response could be given to Hume’s objection to arguments for the existence of 
God founded on miracles? 
3. Give the definition of a probability measure. 
4. What is a field of sets? 
5 What is meant by a “Bernoulli trial”? 
6. State Bernoulli’s theorem. 
7. Describe the binomial distribution, and explain in detail why it is called the binomial 
distribution. 
8. What is Laplacian determinism? 
9. Explain Hume’s conception of probability. 
10. What is a uniform probability distribution? 
11. Using any appropriate mathematical examples, explain how Bayes proposed that 
probabilities should be changed as evidence is acquired. 
12. Explain how Price used Bayes’ results as a response to Hume’s skepticism. How 
might Hume reply? 
13. Describe Frank Ramsey’s contributions to Bayesian conceptions of probability and 
inference. 
14. Discuss some difficulties with the Bayesian conception of rationality. 
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Chapter 9 
KANTIAN SOLUTIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
At the beginning of this century the great American physicist Josiah Willard Gibbs 
introduced his revolutionary book on statistical mechanics and thermodynamics with the 
remark that its aim was to reduce the study of heat to an a priori science. Gibbs’s purpose 
shows the extraordinary influence of an eighteenth-century philosopher, Immanuel Kant. 
Kant claimed to have demonstrated that the fundamental principles of physics, ranging from 
the conservation of matter to Newton’s three laws of motion, are founded on reason alone, 
are not induced from experience, and could not be falsified by any possible experience. More 
than a century later, Gibbs, along with many others, still believed him. 
 Kant spent all of his life in or near Königsburg, in the eastern part of Prussia. He is the 
first philosopher we have considered who was so by profession: in 1770, after fifteen years as 
a lecturer, he became professor of logic and metaphysics at the University of Königsburg. 
Until 1770 Kant wrote on scientific topics, particularly questions of geophysics. From 1781 
he produced in rapid succession a sequence of books on epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. 
One of his principal philosophical works, The Prolegomena, is explicitly directed to an 
audience of teachers of philosophy, something quite uncommon before the eighteenth 
century. 
 Kant’s theory of knowledge was developed in response to Hume’s skeptical 
arguments. In The Critique of Pure Reason, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, and 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant claimed to explain why arithmetic and 
geometry can be known a priori with certainty and to provide a demonstration of the a priori 
certainty of the most fundamental laws of physics, a demonstration that every event must 
have a cause, a demonstration that every sequence of causes and effects must follow some 
rule, and a refutation of Hume’s skepticism about induction. 
 All of these works are written in a very obscure and forbidding style. Kant introduced 
an enormous variety of technical terms, which he seldom defined clearly and did not use in 
an obviously consistent way. He was fond of classifications and subclassifications, and so 
each part of his work received a separate special name or title, always in technical terms that 
sometimes mystify even those who are immersed in his system. Kant’s combination of 
obscurity and influence have naturally produced a great many commentaries intended to 
clarify and evaluate his views and arguments, and several excellent secondary works have 
been published in the last twenty years. 
 In Chapter 2 we saw that Aristotle’s logic cannot account for the proofs in Euclid’s 
geometry, not even for the proof of the very first proposition in The Elements. Euclid’s 
conclusions seem to follow from his assumptions, but the derivations cannot be reconstructed 
as syllogisms. Euclid’s first proposition, like many others in The Elements, involves a 
relation with mixed quantifiers, both universal and existential: for every line segment there 
exists an equilateral triangle having that segment as one side. The proof uses the axiom of 
circles, which again is of mixed formed: for all radii and all points, there exists a circle with 
that radius having that point as center. Euclid’s argument uses the axiom of circles to move 
from any particular given line segment to the existence of circles having the line segment as 
radius and the end points of the segment as centers. While the inference is perfectly 
legitimate, it is not syllogistic. 
 Kant seems to have recognized this fundamental defect in the foundations of the 
mathematics of his time—and the two millennia before his time. Since he regarded 
Aristotle’s logic, with minor modifications, as complete, he did not seek to found 
mathematics on a better logic. But if the consequences of Euclidean geometry (and the 
axioms, for that matter) are necessarily true and certain and this certainty does not come from 
logic, what can be its basis? The very same issues arise about proofs in arithmetic. According 
to Kant, the propositions of geometry and arithmetic are not logically necessary, or even 
conditionally logically necessary given Euclid’s assumptions, and yet we know them with 
certainty and without generalizing inductively from experience. How is this possible, or as 
Kant put it, how are propositions that are synthetic (i.e., not logically necessary) and a priori 
(i.e., knowable without reliance on the content of our experience) possible? Kant’s ingenious 
answer is that we are so constituted that no experience can violate the laws of geometry or 
arithmetic. For example, in each instance in which we think of or see a line segment, our 
constitution provides (in imagination or in sensation) the circles and points that Euclidean 
geometry says exist. Kant’s epistemology is an elaboration of this response to the puzzle 
about the foundations of mathematics. 
 But not just mathematics. If the strategy Kant proposed worked for geometry and 
arithmetic, might some version of it work as well for other principles that we think are 
beyond doubt but that we doubt could be learned from experience? For example, one might 
think that all changes (or changes of certain kinds) have causes and at the same time doubt, 
with Hume, that any such principle could be learned (let alone learned with certainty) from 
experience. Kant hit upon the idea that the principle that changes require causes is not 
something we learn from experience but something we ourselves use to form experience. 
THE KANTIAN PICTURE 
The world we experience is a world of enduring things arranged in space and of events 
involving those things. Some events occur simultaneously with one another, and others occur 
in succession. If we look out upon a scene, we do not see separate patches of color and 
luminosity on a two-dimensional surface. Instead, we see things, objects. We see trees and 
houses and clouds and fences and other objects arranged in three-dimensional space. And yet 
it would seem that it is just such patches and their boundaries that are presented to each of our 
eyes. Somehow our mind puts together the inputs to each eye, transforming them into 
something quite different. If we follow a scene, we do not see a succession of patches of 
color and luminosity, but again it seems that just such a succession is presented to each of our 
eyes. We see causal processes involving changes in things and in their relations with one 
another. A bird flies through the sky, the clouds move with the wind, a leaf falls from a tree 
and drops to the ground. Somehow our mind transforms the inputs into intelligible causal 
changes in objects. If we move about in the world, or close our eyes and reopen them, we do 
not just see two or more different systems of patches of color and luminosity, although that is 
what is presented to our eyes. Instead, we may see the same objects once more. We recognize 
that we are home again, back in places we have been before, looking at the faces of our 
neighbors or friends. Our mind somehow reidentifies objects of experience. 
 These examples indicate the radical difference between what is presented to the eye 
and what we see. Patches of light and color are not presented to the retina with such tags as 
“house”; sequences of patches are not presented to us with such tags as “causal process”; two 
arrangements of patches are not presented to us linked with such identifiers as “patches of the 
same thing you saw this morning.” We see things identified, objectified, and causally 
ordered, but that is our doing. Kant saw in reflections such as these a fundamental point: the 
world we experience is a world constructed by our minds. Kant called this process synthesis. 
We have seen the Kantian picture before, but it is worth seeing again (figure 9.1). 
 For the most part, the construction of the empirical world from sensory inputs is 
automatic; it is done by our minds but not by our wills. We do not have to deliberately and 
consciously assemble things out of patches of color and illumination. But sometimes higher-
order versions of these processes are deliberate, as when scientists introduce atoms and other 
unseen particles to explain experimental results or when Newton introduced the universal 
gravitational force. These inferred objects and processes also belong to the world of 
experience in a broad sense. Atoms and gravitational forces are not patches of color and 
illumination; they are objects, properties, and processes in three-dimensional space and in 
time. Such theoretical objects and processes are postulated to explain other objects and 
processes more apparent in experience. Kant’s interests included the deliberate, scientific 
construction of the unseen features of the world, but his primary concern was with the 
construction of the prescientific world of experience by our minds. 
 In view of these conclusions, we might expect to learn about general features of our 
experience by investigating how our minds construct the world from sensory inputs. That is 
exactly what cognitive scientists attempt to do in our own time, but in the eighteenth century 
no one had suggested such an inquiry, nor, exactly, did Kant. For one thing, neither Kant nor 
anyone else in the eighteenth century had any idea of how such an experimental inquiry into 
the operations of the mind could be conducted. But in any case, Kant would not have thought 
that such experimental inquiries could be important in responding to Hume’s skeptical 
arguments. For any conclusions obtained from experiments about how the mind works, and 
thus about general features of any possible experience, would be subject to Hume’s doubts 
about induction. If from experiments we learned that mental operations always produce 
experiences with a certain feature, that information would not provide any response to 
Hume’s skepticism about induction. Indeed, conclusions about the operations of the mind 
founded on experiment would themselves be subject to the general doubts that Hume 
advanced about the conclusions of inductive inference. 
 Kant never suggested an experimental inquiry into the operations of the mind. Instead, 
he claimed to deduce conditions necessary for any possible experience. The premises of such 
an argument are to be nothing more than that the mind produces experience of reidentifiable 
objects undergoing regular changes in time and in three-dimensional space. The conclusions 
of such arguments are that Euclidean geometry is true of the space we experience, that every 
event has a cause, that every sequence of causes and effects follows a general rule, and that 
the most general fundamental laws of natural science necessarily hold in the world we 
experience. Kant called such arguments transcendental. Kant took Hume’s skepticism to be 
refuted by the principles that every event has a cause and that a sequence of causes and 
effects must satisfy general laws. Moreover, the demonstration of these claims is supposed to 
be immune to Hume’s doubts about inductive inference, because the argument that leads to 
the reliability of induction is not an inductive inference or a deductive argument but a 
transcendental argument premised only on the possibility of experience. Kant thought he had 
shown, in other words, that inductive inference can he reliable for any possible course of 
experience. 
 Kant emphasized repeatedly that he retained a certain form of skepticism. What Kant 
doubted was that we could have any knowledge of how the world is in itself, as distinct from 
our knowledge of things in the world of experience constructed by our minds. Of course, 
through experimental investigations we can acquire knowledge about how external 
circumstances produce radiation on our retinas and about the correlation between our 
perceptions and those external things. But all knowledge of that kind is knowledge of things 
within the world of experience, not knowledge of things in themselves. In distinguishing 
external causes of our internal perceptions, we already presuppose that there are things, that 
they are located in three-dimensional space, and that they are subject to a causal order. All of 
these suppositions are products of the application of our minds to the data of sensation. They 
are true of the world of experience—indeed, necessarily true, according to Kant—but we 
have no reason whatsoever to believe that they are true of the world in itself. 
 Unfortunately, none of Kant’s transcendental arguments are sound. Kant in fact gives 
no direct argument that Euclidean geometry is true or is imposed by the mind on the data of 
sensation. Instead, he assumed that Euclidean geometry is true of the space of experience, 
and he further assumed that it is necessarily true (no possible experience could contradict it), 
and that we can know a priori that it is true. His argument is that his theory explains how this 
could be so: if Euclidean geometrical relations are an artifact of how we synthesize the 
manifold of experience, then all possible experience must satisfy Euclidean geometry, and we 
can be certain (Kant says “apodeictically certain”) of its truth, so we do not have to resort to 
inductive inference. Despite Kant’s claim, this is not even an adequate explanation. The 
hypothesis that in creating experience from the data of sensation the operations of the mind 
guarantee that spatial representations satisfy Euclidean geometry would explain why space is 
Euclidean (if that were true, which it is not), but it would not of itself explain the certainty 
that Euclidean geometry is true. In fact, it seems that if the mind constructs experience so that 
Euclidean geometry is true, we still have no means other than induction from experience to 
learn that Euclidean geometry is true. There are at least two senses of a priori, and it seems 
that Kant sometimes does not clearly distinguish them. In one sense, a feature of the world is 
a priori if it is due to our minds; in another sense, a feature is a priori if without induction we 
can come to know the proposition that says that the feature obtains. Even in Kant’s own 
story, Euclidean geometry is a priori in the first sense but not in the second sense. 
 Kant’s arguments for an a priori physics are given in the Metaphysical Foundations of 
Natural Science. One example will show the flavor of his demonstrations: 
Proposition 3: second law of mechanics Every change of matter has an external cause. 
(Every body remains in its state of rest or motion in the same direction and with the same 
velocity unless it is compelled by an external cause to forsake this state.) 
Proof (In universal metaphysics there is laid down the proposition that every change has a 
cause; here [in mechanics] there is only to be proved of matter that its change must always 
have an external cause.) Matter as mere object of the external senses has no other 
determinations than those of external relations in space and hence undergoes no changes 
except by motion. With regard to such change, insofar as it is an exchange of one motion 
with another, or of motion with rest, and vice-versa, a cause of such change must be found 
(according to the principle of metaphysics). But this cause cannot be internal, for matter has 
no absolutely internal determinations and grounds of determination. Hence all change of a 
matter is based upon an external cause.1 
 The physical argument just considered is at least succinct. In contrast, Kant’s 
argument for the reliability of inductive inference is very elaborate and very obscure. The 
general picture is quite simple, but how it works is neither clear nor simple. The general 
picture is roughly as follows: In synthesizing the manifold of experience, the understanding 
makes judgements. Judgments all have a logical structure. There are only a few possible 
logical structures for judgements, and they can be completely described (according to Kant) 
in a simple table (table 9.1). There are 81 distinct logical forms. Each logical form is 
determined by a value for quantity, quality, relation, and modality, and each of these four has 
three possible values. 
 Kant, I think, would have classified the judgement that necessarily, all Manx cats are 
tailless, as universal (“all”), infinite (it neither affirms nor denies a property of a particular 
thing), categorical (it is not a conditional or disjunctive claim), and apodeictic 
(“necessarily”). The classification is a version of the logical theories current late in the 
eighteenth century, of which Kant had his own. The important thing is that Kant claimed that 
with each value of quantity, quality, relation, and modality there is a corresponding concept 
of the understanding. For example, the concept of the understanding that corresponds to 
hypothetical judgements (expressed by conditional sentences) is cause. 
 When we form the manifold of experience from the matter of experience, we apply 
the concepts of the understanding to make judgements, and some of these judgements are 
hypothetical. Hypothetical judgements incorporate the concept of causality, and so we form 
the world of experience so that sequences of events (in the world of experience) make 
appropriate sentences of the form “If A then B” always true. Thus we have an a priori concept 
of causality and of necessary connection, which we do not need to form from experience but 
rather use to form experience. And the construction of the world of experience guarantees 
that the causal relations that experience presents to us in particular sequences of events can be 
generalized and will always be true. 
 What we have is a sequence of claims that together form a general picture of how the 
world of experience is constituted, why geometry and parts of physics are irrefutable by any 
possible experience, and why induction is reliable. 
 There are really two different themes in Kant’s philosophy. One is idealism: the world 
of experience is constructed by the mind, and aspects of the world of experience may 
therefore be artifacts of that construction. The other theme is transcendental argument: 
necessary conditions of any possible experience can be established by deductive arguments 
from general features of experience. Variations on Kant’s form of idealism captivated a great 
many philosophers and philosophically inclined scientists in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Despite the failure of Kant’s own attempts at transcendental arguments, many 
others have since been given. Indeed, the idea of a transcendental argument has been 
broadened to include, for example, arguments for necessary conditions of any possible belief 
from general features of belief. In one way or another, Kant’s picture posed the issues for 
much of modern philosophical thought about knowledge. In the remainder of this chapter I 
will consider some of those developments. 
CONSTRUCTIONAL SYSTEMS 
Kant held that the objects of experience are constructed or “synthesized,” but he was not at 
all clear about what they are constructed from, or how the details of such a construction could 
work. After Frege’s work, a few philosophers began to have novel ideas about what a 
“construction” or “synthesis” might be. The three most important philosophers first 
influenced by Frege were Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Rudolf Carnap. 
Russell had an important correspondence with Frege, and Carnap went to Jena to study with 
him. 
 Russell and Carnap each proposed (at about the same time) that extensions of Frege’s 
logical theory, or Frege’s logic in combination with set theory, could be used to describe the 
construction of physical objects from the data of sensation. Russell and Whitehead developed 
techniques to carry on Frege’s logicist program to reduce mathematics to logic; Russell and 
Carnap independently thought that the same techniques could be used to give an account of 
our knowledge of the external world. 
 Russell’s idea was that with variables ranging over basic entities (the sense data) and 
with predicates denoting properties of sense data (such as red) one could define terms that 
would denote sets of sense data. Physical objects would literally be sets of sense data, or sets 
of sets of sense data, or sets of sets of sets of sense data, and so on. Similarly, higher-order 
properties of physical objects (such as the property of being a tree) would also be appropriate 
sets of sense data (or sets of sets of sense data, etc.). Russell sketched these ideas in a popular 
book, Our Knowledge of the External World, but he made no attempt to describe any logical 
details. Meanwhile, Carnap actually produced an outline of such a system. 
 Carnap’s book, The Logical Construction of the World, was published in 1929. 
Carnap assumed that the fundamental entities over which the variables of his system range 
are what he called elementary experiences. An elementary experience is all that appears to 
someone at a particular moment. In addition, he assumed one relation between elementary 
experiences is given in experience, namely the relation that obtains when one recollects that 
two experiences are similar in some respect or other. (For example, they might both be 
experiences that contain a red patch somewhere.) The construction of the world begins with a 
finite list of pairs of elementary experiences; for each pair in the list, the person whose 
experiences they are recollects that the first element in the pair is in some respect similar to 
the second element in the pair. Qualities such as color and tone are then defined as certain 
sets (or sets of sets, etc.) formed from this list. Objects are to be constructed in the same way. 
 One of the most remarkable things about Carnap’s logical construction of the world is 
that it is presented not only as a collection of logical formulas to be applied to terms denoting 
elementary experiences and the relation of recollection. Carnap also described the 
construction as a computational procedure. That is, along with each logical construction he 
gave what he called a “fictitious procedure” that shows how to calculate a representation of 
the object constructed from any list of pairs of elementary experiences. The procedures are 
perfectly explicit, and they could be represented in any modern computer language, such as 
Pascal or LISP. Carnap was the first philosopher (indeed, the first person) to present a theory 
of the mind as a computational program. The use of logical representations immediately 
suggested (to Carnap, anyway) that computation can be done not just on numbers but on 
symbols that represent nonnumerical objects. This was really Ramon Lull’s idea, and 
Hobbes’s idea after that, but in Carnap’s work it begins to look much more serious. 
 Contemporary work in artificial intelligence (AI) aims to produce computer programs 
that describe procedures that, when implemented on a computer, will produce intelligent 
behavior. Many AI workers build programs that are in the general spirit of Carnap’s 
procedures. There is even a popular AI programming language, PROLOG, that represents 
procedures as logical formulas. Such programs operate on inputs to create data structures that 
play the role of beliefs, desires, or interests and that describe objects and properties, which 
the programs infer from the data given to them. Of course, when Carnap wrote his book, 
there were no electronic digital computers, no computer programs, and no programming 
languages. Those did not begin to appear until fifteen years later. Even so, a great deal of 
contemporary work in artificial intelligence has descended from Carnap’s ideas. 
CONVENTIONALISM AND ANALYTIC TRUTH 
Kant’s goals were to put geometry and the laws of motion on an a priori foundation and in 
addition to solve the problem of inductive skepticism that Hume had posed. His strategy was 
to see the world as a system of objects, properties, and relations constructed by the mind in 
such a way that Euclidean geometry and Newton’s laws of motion are always satisfied and 
inductive inference is reliable. The problem was that Kant could not really demonstrate these 
claims. Carnap’s Logical Construction of the World gave a more detailed and clearer 
description of procedures by which features of the world could be constructed by the mind 
from simpler data. But Carnap’s work did not show (nor did Carnap claim) that our minds 
actually construct the world of experience in the way Carnap described. That would be an 
empirical claim for which Carnap had no evidence. In addition, Carnap’s construction did not 
guarantee that induction will be reliable or that the laws of motion are satisfied. So Carnap’s 
construction formed a kind of logical bridge between Kant’s project and modern cognitive 
science, but Carnap’s work did not help to fulfill Kant’s epistemological goals. For that, we 
must consider another modern line of thought, conventionalism. 
 Henri Poincaré (1854–1912) was one of the great mathematicians, mathematical 
physicists, and philosophers of the late nineteenth century. Poincaré held that Euclidean 
geometry is true a priori, and that, as Kant maintained, it is we who make Euclidean geometry 
true. But Poincaré’s account of how we make Euclidean geometry true is quite different from 
Kant’s. 
 Poincaré thought that nothing in experience could contradict geometry by itself, 
because pure geometry makes no predictions about the world. Only geometry in combination 
with physics makes predictions that can be tested by experience. Suppose, for example, that 
you wish to test the Pythagorean theorem. You might measure the two sides and the 
hypotenuse of a right triangle and see if the sum of the squares of the lengths of the sides 
equals the square of the length of the hypotenuse. But how would you measure the lengths? 
Perhaps you would use a measuring stick of some kind, laying it off against the sides and 
against the hypotenuse of the triangle. Suppose now that you do the measurements and that to 
your surprise you discover that the sum of the squares of the lengths of the sides does not 
equal the square of the length of the hypotenuse of the triangle. Must you conclude that the 
Pythagorean theorem is false? Poincaré thought not. 
 Rather than reject the Pythagorean theorem, you are free to conclude that as the 
measuring stick was moved from one position to another when measuring the sides and 
hypotenuse of the triangle, it was subject to forces that changed its length; you are also free to 
conclude instead that the triangle was not really a right triangle. If you get the imagined 
results, you are free to change physics rather than geometry. Poincaré thought that if we made 
observations inconsistent with the combination of geometry and physics, we would always 
prefer to change physics and keep Euclidean geometry unaltered. The truth of Euclidean 
geometry is therefore, in Poincaré’s view, a matter of decision, of human convention. We 
always have a choice about how to interpret observations, and we always choose to interpret 
them so that geometry is true. The reason, according to Poincaré, is that maintaining 
Euclidean geometry and altering physics as needed will keep our total system of beliefs 
simpler than would adopting a non-Euclidean geometry. We happen to prefer simpler 
systems of belief. 
 Poincaré’s account of geometrical truth reminds one of the account of logical truth 
developed from Frege’s theory. In that view, logical truths are true in virtue of our use of 
such simple parts of language as quantifier phrases (“every,” “no,” “all”) and sentential 
connectives (“and,” “or,” “not”). It is our linguistic practice that makes certain sentences 
logical truths, just as, according to Poincaré, it is our linguistic and inductive practice that 
makes geometrical claims immune to refutation. Poincaré’s explanation of geometrical truth 
could readily be extended to other kinds of mathematical truths. Philosophers influenced by 
his views offered a parallel explanation for truth in arithmetic. On this view, arithmetic is true 
because we do not allow anything in experience to contradict it. When we use a scientific 
theory and arithmetic to make a prediction that turns out false, we blame the scientific theory, 
not arithmetic. 
 Poincaré’s conventionalism provided an alternative to Kant’s account of mathematical 
truth, and it saved an important Kantian theme. For both Kant and Poincaré, mathematics is 
not founded on inductive inference and is not subject to refutation by any possible 
experience. 
 Conventionalist explanations might be extended to parts of physics as well. Might it 
not be that, like geometry, certain parts of physics cannot be tested separately but only in 
conjunction with other parts of physics? And might the parts of physics that cannot be tested 
in isolation be made true by convention, that is, by our decision not to let any unexpected 
observations count against them but rather to always put the blame for failed predictions 
elsewhere? Influenced by Poincaré, Albert Einstein argued that some determinations of 
simultaneity relations between physical events arc conventional. 
 Imagine that you are trying to determine whether two events A and B that occur in 
regions of space some distance from one another are simultaneous (figure 9.2). Light travels 
with a finite velocity. Imagine that the two events occur close enough together in time so that 
no light pulse could be sent from the place where A occurs, when A occurs, to arrive at the 
place where B occurs before or at the moment B occurs, and symmetrically, that no light 
pulse could be sent from the place where B occurs, when B occurs, to arrive at the place 
where A occurs before or at the moment A occurs. 
 One of the fundamental principles of Einstein’s special theory of relativity is that no 
causal process can move faster than light. If a light ray cannot be sent from A to B or to an 
event in the same place prior to B, then no signal of any kind can be sent from event A to 
event B. The same is true for signals from B to A. Einstein maintained that whether or not 
events A and B are simultaneous is a matter of convention. One could just as well decide to 
take any of the events between B* and B** as simultaneous with A. But certain choices about 
which distant events are simultaneous lead to a simpler system of physics than do other 
choices, and that is why, Einstein claimed, we should adopt appropriate conventions about 
simultaneity. 
 Hans Reichenback (1881–1953), Einstein’s student, developed the conventionalist 
idea still further. According to Reichenbach, the fundamental laws of motion, whether 
Newton’s or Einstein’s, are true by convention if they are true at all. The first law of 
Newtonian mechanics says that a body subject to no force will move through space in a 
straight Euclidean line with a constant speed (when viewed from an unaccelerated frame of 
reference). The first law picks out certain motions through space and time and says that they 
are the motions possible for a body subject to no force. But no experiment could contradict 
such a law of motion, Reichenbach argued. For suppose we found that when we eliminate all 
known forces, bodies do not move in straight Euclidean lines. Then instead of abandoning 
Newton’s first law of motion, we could postulate a new “universal” force that acts on all 
bodies all the time, keeping them from moving in straight Euclidean lines with constant 
speed. In fact, Reichenbach claimed, gravity is such a “universal force.” It affects everything 
and keeps bodies that are otherwise isolated from more specific forces from moving in 
straight Euclidean lines at constant speed. When Newton and Newtonians treated gravity as a 
force that disturbs bodies from their natural, unforced motion, they were exercising a 
convention, not drawing an experimentally founded generalization. Whether we use 
Newton’s laws of motion, Einstein’s laws of motion, or some other system, according to 
Reichenbach it is our decision or convention that makes the laws of motion we choose true 
and irrefutable. 
 For Kant, as for Leibniz, Hobbes, and others, analytic truths are judgements that are 
true because one concept is contained in another concept. Philosophers in the twentieth 
century influenced by the conventionalist approach gave the term “analytic truth” quite a 
different interpretation. It came to mean any sentence that is true because of the conventions 
implicit in our use of language or because of our general inductive practice about which parts 
of our theories we blame when the unexpected occurs. Logical truths thus count as analytic 
truths, according to conventionalists, and so do geometry, arithmetic, parts of physics, and 
even such everyday truths as “All bachelors are unmarried men.” 
DOUBTS 
Several of the accounts of knowledge that emerged in the first half of this century share a 
similar structure. They postulate some kind of fundamental level of appearances—whether 
Russell’s “sense data,” Carnap’s “elementary experiences,” or whatever—that can be 
described and reported. The claims of other minds, of an external world, of physical objects, 
of the objects and laws of science are connected with claims about fundamental appearances 
by means of conventions (or stipulations or analytic truths). The connections aren’t 
deductive, they are part of the very meanings of our terms for describing the world and its 
contents. Versions of this picture were developed by Russell, by Carnap, and by such 
American philosophers as Roy Wood Sellars and Clarence Irving Lewis. Elements of this 
picture are still advocated by a number of philosophers, but its central tenets were critically 
attacked in the middle of this century. 
 One challenge was to the very idea of a category of statements that provide a 
“foundation” for knowledge. The idea of a foundational class of statements is that statements 
not in this class are justified by their logical or conceptual connections to claims in the 
foundational class and, of course, by the truth of the appropriate claims in the foundational 
class. For example, Russell’s sort of foundationalism seemed to say that our claims about 
physical objects are ultimately justified by claims about sense data. The claims that we assert 
from the foundational class need no justification whatsoever: no justification is or can be 
given for my claim about how something appears to me. A number of philosophers denied 
that any such foundational class of statements exists. They acknowledged that for the 
purposes of some inquiry or for resolving some question, we might very well distinguish the 
hypothesis at issue from a class of possible sentences that could be evidence for or against the 
hypothesis. But, they argued, other considerations could always induce us to broaden or 
narrow the evidence class, or to reject some purported piece of evidence. For reports of 
appearances to be beyond the requirement of justification, there must be no way of calling 
such judgements into doubt, and the critics argued that every judgement in public language 
can he called into doubt. If you say “The cat looks black to me,” one can ask how you know 
you are using “black” correctly, how you know there is a cat before you, how you know that 
it’s you who are the subject of this experience. 
 Willard Van Orman Quine was one of the most influential critics of the 
conventionalist solutions. Quine argued that there is no mark that distinguishes claims that 
philosophers such as Reichenbach and Carnap called conventional from any other claims of 
science. There is nothing special about geometry or simultaneity or the laws of motion. 
 Quine’s argument really has two sides. First, it cannot be said that geometry or 
theories about simultaneity or the laws of motion are immune from revision. These claims 
have changed a great deal in the course of the history of science. In the general theory of 
relativity, Euclidean geometry has been replaced by dynamic non-Euclidean geometries. The 
laws of motion of the theory of relativity and of quantum theory are not the laws of motion 
that Newton postulated. Simultaneity relations according to the theory of relativity are 
different from such relations according to Newtonian theory. Just like the rest of science, the 
parts that neo-Kantians called “conventional” have been altered over time. 
 Second, Quine argued that there is no logical distinction between claims that are 
called conventional and other parts of science. The change that takes place when we alter the 
laws of motion is not a change of a different logical kind from the change that takes place 
when we alter the laws of electrodynamics. It is not true, according to Quine, that some parts 
of science are subject to refutation from experience and other parts of science are immune 
from any such refutation. If we are determined enough and ingenious enough, Quine argued, 
no matter what unexpected observations we make, we can revise science so as to keep 
unchanged any particular claim we wish. We simply have to be willing to make enough 
alterations in other parts of our scientific theories. As Quine put it, anything can he held true, 
come what may. It is true that our science is in some measure conventional, if that means our 
scientific theories are a human creation that serve a purpose, which alternative creations 
might serve as well. But it is not true, according to Quine, that the conventionality is located 
in particular parts of our system of beliefs. On the contrary, a hit of arbitrariness is diffused 
over the whole system. 
 Quine realized that we can start with conventions or analytic truths. We can introduce 
a new term as an abbreviation for a combination of old terms. But as soon as we begin to 
form generalizations and to conjecture laws that involve the new term, we create an option 
for ourselves. If a 
Quantum logic? 
Does the diffused conventionalism extend even to logic? Could we, to save our physical 
theories, literally change our principles of inference in the face of unexpected experiences? 
Quine himself was equivocal on the question, but subsequent philosophers were not. Many 
philosophers proposed that the phenomena of quantum mechanics call for a change in logical 
principles. Recall that there are physical phenomena of the following kind: An electron is in a 
box divided into two sides, the left side (L) and the right side (R). According to common 
interpretations of the quantum theory, it can happen that  Le is true and  Re is also true, 
but at the same time it is true that Le  Re. These circumstances are impossible according to 
classical, or Fregean, logic. One might think, therefore, that the remedy is to change the 
physical theory, but for many reasons, physicists are not willing to do that. A number of 
philosophers, physicists, and mathematicians have proposed that what has happened in 
quantum theory is a change in logic itself. One philosopher, Hilary Putnam, has compared the 
change in logic implicit in quantum theory with the change in geometry implicit in the 
adoption of the general theory of relativity. But a change of logic is in a sense more radical 
than any change in a particular theory. A change in logic is not simply a change in beliefs but 
a change in the consequences that one draws from any proposition whatsoever. 
counterexample to the new conjectures is produced that involves the connection between the 
original term and the new term, then rather than giving up the conjectures, we have the option 
of abandoning the definition while keeping the new term and the new conjectures. We can 
make conventions for the moment, but if they are useful in empirical science, they soon cease 
to be any different from other scientific claims. 
 Arguments such as these undermined the conventionalist road to Kant’s goals, and in 
particular to the special status of geometry and the laws of motion. 
IDEALISM, SKEPTICISM, AND RELATIVISM 
One of the unexpected effects of Kant’s philosophy was to produce a concern with the 
historical development of belief and culture. The initial source of the connection between 
idealism and history was Hegel, who thought of all of human history as a kind of Kantian 
synthesis in the mind of God, or (as Hegel called the deity) the Absolute. The synthesis Hegel 
imagined was not carried out by the categories of the understanding but by what Hegel called 
dialectic; history produces a condition and an opposing condition that works against the first, 
a thesis and an antithesis as Hegel called them, and the two opposing forces produce a 
synthesis, which then faces another antithesis, and so on. Hegel’s views have been one 
important source for the development of historicist conceptions of knowledge and truth. 
 In its boldest form, historicism is the view that the world changes as human culture 
and belief about the world change, or equivalently, that the contradictory beliefs of human 
cultures at different epoches are all equally true. For example, in Aristotle’s time there were 
final causes because Aristotle and the Greeks believed in them, but now there are no final 
causes. There were witches in Salem in the days of Cotton Mather, but now there are none. 
There are few contemporary thinkers who explicitly endorse such bold historicist claims, but 
many writers implicitly use the historicist perspective. 
 In any period there are bound to be groups with conflicting beliefs. A view closely 
related to but distinct from historicism is cultural relativism, which asserts that the beliefs of 
all human communities are equally well founded and that none are more or less true than 
others. While cultural relativism is liberal and tolerant, it also offends almost every moral 
sensibility. It entails, for example, that we should not censure those who organize their 
families differently than we, who have different religious views, or who have different 
medical practices. But it also entails that if a physician in rural Oklahoma believes that 
women of a local religious community are dying because of infection produced by 
incompetent midwives but the male elders of the religious community believe that the women 
are dying only because it is God’s will, there is no truth to the matter, and no one, neither 
physician nor religious authority, can have the better reasons. It also means that if Hitler 
caused many to believe that Jews form an inferior race, he and his followers were not less 
right or less warranted in their beliefs than were those who opposed such opinions. 
 Historicism was associated with idealism through Hegel’s influence, and the 
association of these themes continues today even among those who have never read a word of 
Hegel. Cultural relativism has many of the same sources, but it was also supported by 
twentieth-century movements in cultural anthropology. Cultural relativism seems little 
different from radical skepticism of the kind that Descartes imagined but never seriously 
entertained and that Hume thought philosophically warranted but absurd and impossible in 
practice. Recently, however, neo-Kantian replies to skeptical arguments have come to be 
widely replaced by views that are quite close to cultural relativism. Many of the arguments 
for these views have to do with psychology and the history of science. 
The History of Knowledge 
One of the striking facts about the history of science is that, judged from our present 
perspective, almost every scientific theory ever proposed has been false in some respect. 
Moreover, there are sometimes radical breaks in scientific tradition. When these breaks or 
scientific revolutions occur, new theories emerge that may postulate a different fundamental 
structure for the world or for some aspect of the world. New scientific theories do not simply 
propose novel laws for the same quantities that occur in the theories that proceed them. 
Instead, when a scientific revolution occurs, old quantities and old entities may be 
disregarded altogether—even their existence may be denied—while new laws are proposed 
that govern novel properties and entities. 
 Newton’s dynamics was about motion with respect to absolute space. In the theory 
that succeeded Newtonian dynamics, the theory of relativity, there is no such thing as 
absolute space. In relativity, a property of bodies, relativistic mass, varies with the velocity of 
the moving body. There is no such quantity in Newtonian dynamics. In the theory of heat that 
dominated the nineteenth century, heat was regarded as a fluid called caloric, and the study 
of heat was the study of the properties and motions of that fluid. There is no such fluid 
according to modern theories of heat. In eighteenth-century chemistry, combustion involved 
the loss of a chemical species, phlogiston. Much of eighteenth-century chemistry concerned 
the properties of various gases from which some measure of phlogiston had been removed. 
Phlogiston chemists called samples of light, colorless gas dephlogisticated air. In the 
chemistry of the nineteenth century and afterwards, there is no such thing as phlogiston, and 
so there is no such process as removing the phlogiston from a gas. There is hydrogen gas, and 
oxygen gas, but there is no such thing as dephlogisticated air. 
 Thomas Kuhn, a contemporary historian and philosopher whose influential book The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions emphasized these aspects of scientific development, 
argued that changes in scientific theory constitute changes in how the world is seen. Kuhn’s 
thought was that scientists before and after a scientific revolution may literally perceive 
different entities in circumstances that might otherwise seem similar. Faced with the same 
light, colorless gas, an eighteenth-century chemist would see dephlogisticated air, while a 
nineteenth-century chemist would see hydrogen. Examining the water in a spinning bucket, a 
Newtonian scientist sees rotation with respect to absolute space, whereas an Einsteinian 
scientist sees only absolute acceleration but no motion with respect to absolute space. 
 Furthermore, Kuhn argued, revolutionary changes in scientific theory change the very 
meanings of words. There are no fixed senses to claims made in different scientific 
paradigms. When the Newtonian talks of “mass,” something different is meant than when the 
relativist talks of “mass.” Because there are no fixed meanings, scientists in different 
paradigms cannot describe their observations in neutral terms, which means that there is no 
possible empirical procedure by which advocates of different paradigms can resolve their 
differences. Phlogiston chemists and oxygen chemists could not even agree on how to 
describe experimental results, nor could classical ether theorists and relativity theorists. Kuhn 
says that the language in one scientific paradigm is incommensurable with language in a 
competing paradigm. 
 Finally, scientific revolutions change scientific method. In practice, scientific method 
in any subject consists of elaborate and often tacit criteria for good observational studies, 
criteria for experimental designs, particular statistical methods for analyzing data, and 
restrictions on the form and content of scientific explanations. Alternative paradigms differ in 
some or all of these aspects of scientific method. So even if advocates of different paradigms 
could agree on empirical premises, they would make very different inferences. 
 The radical conclusion that some philosophers have drawn from Kuhn’s picture of the 
history of science is that the world of experience depends upon variable features of human 
beings or communities of human beings. Different worlds of experience arise because of 
different conceptual schemes, and any empirical knowledge must he relative to such a 
scheme. An even stronger conclusion is that there are absolutely no normative principles that 
can or should regulate the transition from one conceptual scheme to another. Nothing can be 
said about whether one conceptual scheme was better than another or whether evidence 
warranted any historical transition from one paradigm to another over the course of human 
intellectual history. 
 In one respect, conceptual relativism can he viewed as a philosophical position that 
frees a parameter fixed in Kant’s framework. According to Kant, the world of experience is a 
function of the world in itself, which is unknown and unknowable, and what we might call 
the human conceptual scheme. The two together determine the world of experience of each 
person and guarantee their correlation. Our notions of possibility involve counterfactual 
worlds of experience, presumably those that might occur if things in themselves were 
different. The relativist framework retains the Kantian view that the world of experience is 
determined by the individual’s conceptual scheme and the world in itself, but allows the 
conceptual scheme to vary from person to person and for each person from time to time. 
Within each conceptual scheme, the counterfactual worlds of experience are those that might 
occur if things in themselves were different. Viewed in this formal way, conceptual 
relativism looks like a natural extension of the Kantian framework, but in substance, it 
represents a collapse of the Kantian solution into skepticism, in which there is and can be no 
rational basis for agreement between people committed to different paradigms or conceptual 
schemes. We will see in the next chapter, however, that even this apparently radical view of 
the human condition leaves room for normative principles about how best to conduct inquiry. 
Study Questions 
1. Does conceptual relativism entail that whatever one believes is true? 
2. What do you think that Quine would say about the doctrine of incommensurability 
across paradigms? 
3. Do you think that there is a level of description of the outcomes of experiments at 
which phlogiston and oxygen chemists would agree as to what happened? If so, what 
becomes of Kuhn’s thesis? 
AFTER KANT 
Language Games 
If the Kantian and neo-Kantian replies to skepticism fail, what reply can be given to 
metaphysical and inductive skepticism? What answer can we give to questions about how it 
can be known that we are not brains in vats, or how any one of us can know that others have 
minds, or why the results of scientific inquiry should be trusted? More fundamentally, if the 
project of giving a priori foundations for knowledge is impossible, what is there for 
philosophical inquiry about knowledge to do? 
 One line of thought in the twentieth century tries to answer these questions by 
outlawing them. They can be outlawed in either of two ways. One way is to argue that the 
questions themselves are incoherent, self-contradictory, or meaningless. This response to the 
collapse of Kantian theory was taken by the logical positivists of the 1920s, who proposed the 
verification principle, which held that the meaning of a claim is exhausted by whatever 
would verify it. The principle still has advocates, principally among philosophers associated 
with Oxford University. More elaborate attempts to dismiss metaphysical and inductive 
skepticism are based on claims that the questions violate standard linguistic practice. In the 
middle of this century John Austin argued that skeptical doubts and claims about the evidence 
of the senses involve linguistic improprieties. Peter Strawson argued that reliance on 
inductive inference is just part of the meaning of “rational,” so that no one can coherently ask 
why it is rational to believe in the results of inductive inference. More recently, Donald 
Davidson has argued that the very idea that most of our beliefs could be wrong is incoherent. 
Other arguments claim that we don’t infer the existence of an external world or of others 
minds; we simply recognize them immediately and without inference. 
 None of these responses provide very satisfactory responses to skepticism, although 
the detailed analyses of the informal logical properties of parts of language given by Austin 
are fascinating in their own right. Even if our inductive practices are part of what we mean by 
“rational,” it still makes sense to ask why we should think that these practices are reliable, 
and it still makes sense to ask why, if we are interested in coming to believe the truth, we 
should be “rational.” It certainly seems to make sense to ask how I know I’m not a brain in a 
vat. Whether or not I go through a process of inference when recognizing objects or other 
persons seems irrelevant to the skeptical challenge, which is to show that my practice or habit 
or capacity for recognizing persons and things would reliably discriminate the real thing from 
particular conceivable illusions. 
 Descartes’ question as to how he can know that he is not dreaming, or parallel 
questions about how anyone can know she is not a brain in a vat, or how anyone with a mind 
can know other people have minds, and so on, are fundamentally questions about how to 
reliably distinguish whether our beliefs are correct or illusory. Remarks about language and 
practice are attempts to show a priori in each case that one of the alternatives is impossible. 
They are near relatives to Kant’s transcendental arguments, and about as convincing. 
Primitivism 
A second contemporary approach to skepticism and the problems of knowledge, an approach 
that can best be called primitivism, rejects the concern for rational, true belief that such 
problems presuppose. The primitivist response claims that intellectuals ought not to bother 
with such questions or with trying to answer them, sometimes hinting darkly that the 
questions are not really profound or that they have hidden confusions that need not be 
detailed (e.g., there is no such thing as true belief) or even that the skeptical questions and 
responses to them indicate a kind of cultural decay. Primitivism rejects the scientific 
description of the world as a place of things, events, and processes that are in themselves 
indifferent to human concerns, and in which the emergence of human consciousness and 
intentionality constitute phenomena to be explained. Primitivism instead insists on the sort of 
anthropomorphic conception of the world that we use in our everyday lives, a conception in 
which we think of things in terms of their utility to us and others and their significance as 
symbols. In the writing of the most influential primitivist of the twentieth century, Martin 
Heidegger, primitivism tends to be associated both with a holism that denies that any 
particular sort of object can be characterized and defined, or its essence given, in any way 
that separates that kind from the whole system of Being. Heidegger’s primitivism emphasizes 
the authority of the community over the individual. Indeed, Wilhelm Dilthey, a German 
philosopher who is the source of much of contemporary primitivism and who influenced both 
Heidegger and such American pragmatists as John Dewey, suggested that individuals do not 
really exist; all that really exists is the social role an individual plays. After World War II, 
versions of these views were taken up by a number of French philosophers, notably Jean-Paul 
Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and (less clearly) Albert Camus, whose doctrines came to be 
popularly known as existentialism. In recent years primitivism has been championed by a 
number of American philosophers, and in one version or another it has become the standard 
philosophical opinion of many scholars in the humanities other than professional 
philosophers. 
 Primitivism doesn’t have much to offer those interested in the possibilities and limits 
of knowledge, in how we must be constituted and how the world must be constituted for us to 
know the world, in the nature of reason, demonstration, or meaning, in how the phenomena 
of mind can arise in a mindless world. Indeed, primitivists do not want to offer any results 
about these topics, nor, often enough, do they want others to. 
Naturalized Epistemology 
A third response to the collapse of attempts to give an a priori foundation for human belief is 
quite different. That response is to start with whatever we think we know about the world and 
ourselves and to work backward and sideways, asking what we mean by knowledge; what the 
limits of knowledge are and are not for creatures such as ourselves; how to make a coherent 
metaphysical picture of the world, ourselves, and our interactions with the world that fits with 
our scientific understanding; and how creatures such as ourselves living in worlds such as 
ours can best achieve the goals of knowing and understanding. These projects are often called 
naturalized epistemology. Naturalized epistemology is not psychology, although it may very 
well use psychological results. Naturalized epistemology is not an empirical inquiry into how 
people learn. Instead, naturalized epistemology is partly a matter of analyzing the very goals 
and presuppositions of inquiry, partly a matter of trying to put together what we believe about 
the physical and the psychological realms into a coherent story of the human condition, and 
partly a matter of discovering how creatures such as ourselves can best conduct inquiry to 
achieve our goals. Some aspects of naturalized epistemology aren’t even particularly about 
people but instead are about norms for any possible agents that share certain features of the 
human condition, agents that might be androids or computers, for example. 
 The questions of naturalized epistemology are a mixture of vivid contemporary issues 
and traditional philosophical concerns: How does mind relate to body? Could people be 
computers? How do the phenomena of meaning work? How can and should a 
computationally bounded agent reason? How can and should such an agent conduct inquiry? 
What can it learn, and what can it not learn? Given what we think we know about the world 
and ourselves, what questions can and cannot be answered in principle? Some of these 
questions have a vaguely Kantian ring, even though no attempt is made in naturalized 
epistemology to give a priori foundations for knowledge. A hypothesis about the substantive 
assumptions concerning causal structure, space, and time that a human must make to get 
around in the physical world is not any sort of a priori proof that those assumptions are 
correct, but it has an aspect of the transcendental about it. A mathematical proof 
characterizing the class of questions that a computationally bounded agent can and cannot 
reliably discover sounds a bit like a Kantian transcendental deduction. One difference is that 
the proofs of naturalized epistemology, unlike Kant’s, are valid. Another difference is that the 
natural epistemologist doesn’t claim to have shown a priori that the world we experience 
must be such that procedures of inquiry succeed. 
 Bertrand Russell’s intellectual career illustrates the transition from neo-Kantianism to 
naturalized epistemology. Russell began his philosophical career as a neo-Kantian; his 
doctoral work was, in fact, a defence of the a priori claims of geometry in response to the 
development, in the nineteenth century, of consistent non-Euclidean geometries. Early in the 
twentieth century he focused on the problem of how, a logically powerful individual could 
“construct” the external world from sense data, that is, how he could define set-theoretic 
structures, based on possible sense data, that would play the roles of things in space and time 
and their properties and relations. Russell derided the idea of doing philosophy while simply 
assuming that there is an external world; that procedure, he wrote, has the advantage of theft 
over honest toil. By the time he wrote his last major philosophical work, Human Knowledge: 
Its Scope and Limits, Russell had decided that this kind of honest toil was work for Sisyphus. 
In this book Russell tried to characterize the assumptions about causal structure that humans 
must somehow have wired into them if they are to succeed in learning about the world as we 
believe it to be. 
 Naturalized epistemology does not provide a reply to skepticism, any more than does 
primitivist philosophy. But unlike primitivism, naturalized epistemology abandons neither 
reason nor clarity and offers a rich structure of problems, solutions, and results. In the 
remaining chapters of this book we will consider some of each. 
Review Questions 
1. Discuss in your own words the claim that the world we experience is a world 
constructed by our minds. 
2. For Kant, why must Euclidean geometry and the fundamental laws of natural science 
necessarily hold for all human experiences of the world? 
3. What is a transcendental argument? 
4. Kant rejected Hume’s skepticism but retained another form of skepticism. Explain the 
distinction between these two, and discuss why Hume’s skepticism is denied by Kant. 
5. Outline Kant’s logical structure for judgements of the understanding. 
6. Discuss the role of the concept of causality in the formation of the manifold of 
experience from the matter of experience. 
7. What is meant by the term “idealism” as used in Kant’s philosophy? 
8. Outline Carnap’s idea of a constructional system based on elementary experiences. 
9. Discuss Poincaré’s argument for the necessary truth of Euclidean geometry (now 
called conventionalism). 
10. How did Quine argue against conventionalism? 
11. Define “historicism.” Define “cultural relativism.” How are they different? 
12. Describe what you think Kuhn means by a scientific paradigm. 
13. What does Kuhn mean when he says that languages of distinct paradigms are 
incommensurable? 
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Chapter 10 
KNOWLEDGE AND RELIABILITY 
INTRODUCTION 
The challenges of metaphysical and inductive skepticism can be met in at least two different 
ways. One way is to change the conception of reliability used by Plato and Sextus. The 
Platonic conception of reliability requires that, whatever the truth may be, after a finite 
amount of evidence is obtained, we will believe the truth and know that we believe the truth. 
Another way is to loosen the connection between reliability and knowledge. The arguments 
of Meno, Sextus, Descartes, and even Hume demand that for knowledge in the actual world, 
we be able to reliably determine the truth in arbitrary imaginable worlds. But perhaps 
knowledge requires only reliability in some possible worlds, not in all imaginable 
circumstances. These are two of the most serious contemporary responses to skepticism. 
 We have already considered the Bayesian response to skepticism. Modern Bayesians 
abandon the notion of knowledge altogether, focusing instead on the notion of rational 
degrees of belief and rational changes of degrees of belief. Rather than obtaining the truth 
after a finite amount of evidence has appeared and knowing when one has obtained the truth, 
Bayesians conceive reliability as at most convergence to the truth in the limit, so that as 
evidence increases without bound, one’s probability distribution becomes concentrated more 
and more tightly around the true hypothesis. Rather than requiring that inquiry lead to the 
truth in all logically possible worlds, Bayesians allow many logically possible worlds to have 
a zero initial probability; if the truth lies in such a world, it will not be found. And finally, 
Bayesians maintains that for deliberation, decision, and action, only expected utilities matter, 
and these may be defined and computable even in the presence of skeptical hypotheses. 
 In this chapter we will consider two additional contemporary responses to skepticism. 
One involves analyzing the notion of knowledge in a novel way; the other involves analyzing 
the notion of reliability in a novel way. The novel analyses of knowledge have been 
developed almost entirely by philosophers; the novel analyses of reliability were first 
introduced by the contemporary philosopher Hilary Putnam, but they have been further 
investigated by linguists, psychologists, computer scientists, and economists. How we 
respond to skepticism turns out to have many implications for disciplines besides philosophy. 
KNOWLEDGE 
The skeptic claims that we don’t know things we ordinarily think we know very well. One 
response to the skeptic is to define “knowledge” so that it follows from the definition that the 
skeptic’s claims are false. This is a dicey strategy, because we will not be very satisfied if the 
definition also has the consequence that lots of things we think aren’t really knowledge turn 
out to be knowledge according to the definition. Nothing much is gained if we refute know-
nothingism by embracing know-everythingism. 
 Here is a nice account of knowledge, proposed by the great American philosopher 
Clarence Irving Lewis: 
Lewis’s account of knowledge Someone, s, knows proposition p if and only if (1) s 
believes that p, (2) p is true, (3) s is justified in believing that p. 
The key terms used in the analysis—“believes,” “true,” and “justified”—are all vague in one 
way or another, but the notion of justification is especially vague. If we understand 
justification in a sufficiently broad way, this kind of analysis of knowledge offers a reply to 
skepticism. We might say, for example, that we are justified in a belief if we have formed it 
in the ordinary ways through seeing, touching, hearing, or other senses. To the skeptical 
claim that we do not know that there is an external world, we can reply that we do indeed. 
For we believe there is an external world, there truly is an external world, and we are justified 
in our belief because we formed it in the ordinary ways in which people form beliefs. 
 There is something unsatisfactory about this answer. If we came to recognize for 
some reason that many of our ordinary ways of justifying beliefs were in fact wildly 
unreliable, so that false beliefs were as likely to be justified as true beliefs, we might think 
that someone whose true belief was justified only by such unreliable methods really did not 
have knowledge. Traditional skeptical arguments depend on the fact that our standard 
methods of acquiring beliefs, such as perception, are not infallible. Indeed, sometimes our 
standard methods of forming beliefs are not even close to infallible. Psychological 
investigations in the last fifty years have shown that in many contexts people’s ordinary ways 
of forming beliefs and making judgements are in fact quite unreliable. People are unreliable, 
for example, in forming probability judgements when they are given information sufficient to 
determine the right judgement according to the probability calculus. In many cases, even 
people with a good deal of experience in using statistics make predictable errors in judging 
probabilities. People are also known to be unreliable in judging certain forms of risk. Few 
people are afraid of driving in cars, while many people are afraid of flying, but driving in a 
car is much more risky. Moreover, human unreliability isn’t limited to probability 
judgements. There is a great deal of evidence that most medical experts are unreliable at 
many forms of diagnosis, that psychiatric experts are unreliable at predicting future behavior, 
and that textbook methods standardly used in the social sciences to determine causal facts are 
unreliable. In any of these cases a person using an unreliable method could claim to be 
justified in belief, but if the method used was unreliable we might question whether she really 
had knowledge, even if by chance her belief was true and even if the method was widely 
accepted and used. 
 In a short paper famous among philosophers, Edmund Gettier gave a refutation of the 
account of knowledge as justified, true belief.1 Some of his examples go like this: Suppose 
you believe that Barishnikov is in town because you have seen an advertisement for a dance 
performance; seeing the advertisement justifies your belief. But suppose Barishnikov’s 
performance was canceled because, unknown to you, the orchestra went on strike. 
Nonetheless, Barishnikov is in your town because he has a chronic health problem and your 
town is where the specialist he sees maintains a practice. According to Gettier, your belief 
that Barishnikov is in town is true, and you are justified in having the belief, but in fact you 
have no knowledge that Barishnikov is in town. 
 It is easy to produce further examples in which someone has a true belief and has 
acquired that belief by a means that we ordinarily think justifies the belief, and yet the reason 
why the person holds the belief is not the reason why the belief is true. Many people think 
that in such a state, belief is not knowledge; something is missing. Gettier’s examples 
produced a number of attempts to say what that something is. Here are a few possibilities: 
Defeasibility. Say that a true belief p that someone holds is defeasible for that person if there 
is some other true proposition such that if the person believed that proposition, she would not 
believe p. The proposal is that true beliefs that are knowledge must not be defeasible. 
Truth of reasons. For knowledge, the reasons one would give to justify a belief must 
themselves all be true. 
Causal relations. For knowledge, the circumstances justifying the belief that p must stand in 
appropriate causal relations to the truth that p and to the belief that p. 
Reliability. The belief that p must have been acquired by a process that reliably yields the 
truth. 
 There are objections to all of these remedies. The appeal to reliability, for example, 
seems to offer little aid in avoiding Gettier’s objection, since in the sorts of examples Gettier 
gives, a true belief is acquired by a method that generally is reliable and yet knowledge does 
not seem to result. 
 One of the most appealing answers to Gettier’s problem was developed in recent 
years by Robert Nozick. It also forms a response to the skeptical claim that nothing is known. 
Nozick’s idea is that one knows a proposition p if the proposition is true and if one’s belief in 
it was acquired by a method such that if the proposition p were not true, the method would 
lead one to believe p, and if p were true, one would believe p. 
 The force of the idea is that in saying that method m would lead one to believe p if p 
were false, Nozick is not claiming that the method must be reliable in every imaginable or 
logically possible circumstance. When we consider the conditions for the truth of sentences 
using subjunctives, such as “if the dancer were not in town,” we do not consider arbitrary 
logically possible worlds. Instead, we consider only those possible circumstances that we 
would expect if things were very much as they are except that the indicated circumstance of 
the subjunctive phrase (the dancer is in town) were true. Consider Gettier’s sort of example 
again. A person truly believes that Barishnikov is in town from reading an advertisement. 
Barishnikov is indeed in town, not because of the concert, which has been canceled, but for 
reasons of heath. If Barishnikov were not in town, it would be because he did not have an 
appointment with the physician. From reading the advertisement, the person in question 
would nonetheless believe that Barishnikov is in town. So the person does not have 
knowledge, and Gettier’s objection is nicely sidestepped. 
 Many objections have been offered against Nozick’s analysis of knowledge. I will 
consider just a few of them. One objection is this. On Nozick’s analysis, one can know that p, 
and also know that p logically entails q, but fail to know that q. Nozick himself welcomed 
this feature of his account. I can, for example, know very well that I am typing, since if I 
were not typing, I would not believe that I am. But that I am typing entails that I am not a 
brain in a vat, and I know that the entailment holds. Nonetheless, on Nozick’s analysis of 
knowledge, I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat, since if I were a brain in a vat, I 
would not then believe that I am a brain in a vat. Many commentators find it absurd that we 
should not be credited with knowing the known logical consequences of what we know. One 
way of fixing the analysis to meet this objection is suggested in the next set of study 
questions. 
 Another problem with Nozick’s analysis concerns reliability. Sometimes a very 
reliable method will give the truth whenever some condition is met but will give no output or 
a random output in cases where the condition is not met. There are familiar examples from 
logic and mathematics. There is a method, for example, that, when given any logical formula, 
will return “yes” if the formula is a logical truth but is not guaranteed to return anything if the 
formula is not a logical truth. The same sort of one-sidedness can happen with methods or 
strategies for forming empirical beliefs. Nozick’s analysis, however, requires something 
much stronger, something apparently too strong. It requires that the method m for resolving 
the question of whether p he a sort of decision procedure for p: it must return p if p is true and 
return the denial of p if p is not true. But if p is in fact true and we believe p and the method 
by which we formed the belief that p is reliable for positive assertions but not for denials, it 
would seem that we still know p.2 
Study Questions 
1. The problem of logical closure in Nozick’s analysis might be removed by modifying 
the analysis to say that subject s knows that p if there exists a proposition q such that s knows 
that p entails q and if s acquired the belief that q by a method m that would have led s to 
believe the denial of q if q were not true. Is it a good objection to this revised analysis that the 
notion of knowledge of logical consequence is used to analyze the notion of knowledge? 
2. The proposed analyses of knowledge in the text are more or less Socratic: knowing 
that p is analyzed in terms of a conjunction of other conditions not involving the notion of 
knowledge. Could knowing that p instead be usefully analyzed in terms of knowledge 
that___, where the blank is filled in by something other than p? Could knowing that p at time 
t be usefully analyzed in terms of knowledge of other propositions at times prior to t? 
3. In mathematical logic, definitions are often recursive. The addition of natural 
numbers, +, for example, is often defined recursively in terms of 0 and the successor function 
s on the natural numbers. (By definition, s(x) equals the number immediately following x.) 
The definition of addition is that x + 0 = x and x + s(y) = s(x + y). A recursive definition 
determines the value of a predicate or function for each object in a series in terms of some 
base case (the addition of 0 in the example just given) and in terms of the values of the 
predicate or function for succeeding members of the series. Can you use a time ordering to 
give a recursive analysis of knowledge? 
4. Nozick proposes his account as an analysis of empirical knowledge, not of 
mathematical knowledge. What difficulties would his analysis meet if it were applied to 
mathematical knowledge? 
RELIABILITY AND JUSTIFICATION 
It may be a waste of time to spend a great deal of effort on attempting an analysis of 
knowledge. Perhaps, as Bayesians maintain, knowledge isn’t really the central concept of 
human inquiry. For what ends should one want knowledge rather than merely true belief? For 
purposes of prediction or deciding action, it seems sufficient to believe truly and unnecessary 
to meet the further conditions, whatever they are, for knowing. Plato put this issue plainly in 
The Meno and answered it with the suggestion that knowledge has the further virtue of 
stability: we are less likely to forget or to change beliefs we know; we are more likely to 
change opinions concerning what we truly believe but do not know. 
Socrates: If someone knows the way to Larissa, or anywhere else you like, then when he goes 
there and takes others with him he will be a good and capable guide, you would agree? 
Meno: Of course. 
Socrates: But if a man judges correctly which is the road though he has never been there and 
doesn’t know it, will he not also guide others aright? 
Meno: Yes he will. 
Socrates: And as long as he has a correct opinion on the points about which the other has a 
knowledge, he will be just as good a guide, believing the truth but not knowing it. 
Meno: Just as good. 
Socrates: Therefore true opinion is as good a guide as knowledge for the purpose of acting 
rightly. That is what we left out just now in our discussion of the nature of virtue, when we 
said that knowledge is the only guide to right action. There was also, it seems, true opinion. 
Meno: It seems so. 
Socrates: So right opinion is something no less useful than knowledge. 
Meno: Except that the man with knowledge will always be successful, and the man with right 
opinion only sometimes. 
Socrates: What? Will he not always be successful so long as he has the right opinion? 
Meno: That must be so, I suppose. In that case, I wonder why knowledge should be so much 
more prized than right opinion, and indeed how there is any difference between them. 
Socrates: Shall I tell you the reason for your surprise, or do you know it? 
Meno: No, tell me. 
Socrates: It is because you have not observed the statues of Daedalus. Perhaps you don’t 
have them in your country. 
Meno: What makes you say that? 
Socrates: They too, if no one ties them down, run away and escape. If tied, they stay where 
they are put. 
Meno: What of it? 
Socrates: If you have one of his works untethered, it is not worth much: it gives you the slip 
like a runaway slave. But a tethered specimen is very valuable, for they are magnificent 
creations. And that, I may say, has a bearing on the matter of true opinions. True opinions are 
a fine thing and do all sorts of good so long as they stay in their place, but they will not stay 
long. They run away from a man’s mind; so they are not worth much until you tether them by 
working out the reason. That process, my dear Meno, is recollection, as we agreed earlier. 
Once they are tied down, they become knowledge and are stable. That is why knowledge is 
something more valuable than right opinion. What distinguishes one from the other is the 
tether.3 
 Modern views of the tether are different from Plato’s. The contemporary answer is 
that knowledge is necessarily associated with having a justification for belief, and with 
justification comes stability. A justification is a kind of argument. Besides promoting stability 
of true beliefs, arguments can also be used to excuse one’s beliefs to others and to persuade 
others of their truth. 
 These reasons for wanting something more than true belief are met by having 
arguments sufficient to persuade oneself if one should fall into doubt, sufficient to excuse one 
from complaints about actions based on what one believes, and sufficient to persuade others 
of what one believes. Arguments that serve such purposes may be of many sorts, depending 
on the beliefs and dispositions of whomever they are arguments for. For some people and 
some communities citing a holy book may always suffice to remind, excuse, or persuade. 
What more than truth should members of such a community want of beliefs that they know 
can be thus justified? Holy writ suffices for the devout because the devout believe it to be 
reliable. The same sort of argument is available to the rest of us: Anyone can remind himself 
of a belief temporarily called into doubt by recalling that it was acquired by a procedure he 
believes to be reliable. If recollection of one’s own history is in doubt, one may sometimes be 
able to reacquire the belief by applying such a method again. Similarly, one may excuse a 
belief to others by showing that it was acquired by a method believed to be reliable. One may 
try to persuade others of the truth of something one believes by showing them that it reliable 
method produces the same conclusion. 
 Such arguments have a common structure. They appeal to a background of beliefs that 
limit the possible alternative circumstances or hypotheses that need to he considered as 
possible truths; they appeal to a method believed to reliably yield the truth in any of those 
possible circumstances; they appeal to beliefs about evidence; and they show or claim that the 
method yields a particular result. For example, those who appeal to a holy book to decide 
some question imagine at least two alternatives: either a proposition at issue is true or its 
denial is true. They believe that a reliable method to determine the truth, whatever it may be, 
is to consult the holy hook, and they cite evidence as to what the book says. If there is 
something wrong in their procedure, it is that the testimony of the book may not he reliable. 
But not every justification involves a direct appeal to reliability. 
 Lots of justifications don’t seem to involve claims of reliability directly but do rest on 
them indirectly. A woman can justify a claim that there are giraffes in Pittsburgh by saying 
that she saw a giraffe in Pittsburgh. But on reflection it seems that justifying beliefs by 
appeals to perception has a great deal to do with showing that the belief was acquired by a 
reliable method. One need not he a grand skeptic here, or worry about the existence of an 
external world: if tests reveal the woman can’t distinguish a giraffe from a plum tree and 
there are lots of plum trees in Pittsburgh, we may conclude that her appeal to perception fails 
to establish her knowledge that there are giraffes in Pittsburgh, and, depending on subtleties 
of context, we may even deny that her claim to have seen giraffes, or the corresponding 
perceptual events, justify her belief that there are giraffes in Pittsburgh. 
 Many justifications have no immediate connection to truth or reliability. For example, 
your belief in a proposition p can be justified by showing that you learned it from someone 
else who ought to know, someone who is an accepted authority. If you formed your belief on 
good authority, whether or not the authority really did know that p is irrelevant to whether 
you are justified in your belief. Again, in court testimony and elsewhere, when professional 
engineers or professional statisticians serve as expert witnesses, they often justify their 
opinions by claiming that the opinions were obtained in accordance with accepted 
professional standards. Of course, in some cases accepted professional standards might prove 
to he quite unreliable guides to the truth, but for the purpose of the legal context, the expert 
witness need offer no guarantee of reliability to claim to he justified in her opinion. However, 
even in these cases there is a second level of justification that has to do with reliability. You 
may he justified in a belief obtained from an accepted authority, in the sense that you are 
excused from any charge that your belief was wanton, formed carelessly, or without 
foundation. But if we are interested in believing the truth, the question of the reliability of 
your authority, or of accepted professional standards, still remains and should not be avoided. 
 Philosophers of science have proposed any number of confirmation relations between 
evidence and theory, and they claim that belief in, or acceptance of, a hypothesis is justified if 
the hypothesis is confirmed by known evidence. But few of these confirmation relations have 
any connection with truth or reliability. The confirmation theories either evade a 
straightforward question or deny its presupposition: If we are interested in believing the truth, 
predicting the future, or predicting the effects of alternative actions, why should we give 
credence to hypotheses that are “confirmed” by the evidence? One idea is to try to avoid this 
question by reanalyzing the notion of truth so that the questions just posed become 
meaningless. One analysis of truth, for example, sometimes called the redundancy or 
prosentential theory of truth, holds that to claim something to be true is merely an indirect 
method of referring to and endorsing some definite proposition or system of propositions. On 
this view, “It is true that snow is white” is an emphatic way of saying snow is white. 
“Whatever John thinks is true” is merely an indirect way of endorsing whatever propositions 
John thinks (even if the person making the endorsement does not know exactly what John 
thinks). Various standard usages of the notion of truth might be thought to he unintelligible 
on this account of truth, especially the very usages that have to do with inquiry. If truth is 
simply a device for referring to and endorsing sentences otherwise described and not any 
property of sentences, then it might seem that we can make no sense of such sentences as 
“Find out the truth about the greenhouse effect,” “Find out the truth about torture and murder 
around the world.” These injunctions seem to make no sense on the redundancy account of 
truth because they do not refer to any definite propositions that are independently 
characterized by some other description; on the redundancy theory of truth, no propositions 
can be characterized simply as the truth about some issue or domain. Likewise, it seems to 
make no sense to say, “We are interested in believing the truth.” So it might seem that no 
challenge about reliability can be posed about confirmation relations. 
 Using a simple logical device, however, we can easily formulate questions about 
inquiry and reliability consistent with the redundancy or prosentential theory of truth. We 
need to use variables that range over propositions. Then we can say, “Find the propositions p 
about the greenhouse effect such that p.” “Find out the propositions p about torture and 
murder around the world such that p.” “We are interested in believing those propositions p 
such that p.” Using propositional variables and subjunctives (“if it were the case that p”), we 
can ask whatever we wish to about the reliability of a proposal for forming or changing 
beliefs, and to do so, we do not need to explicitly use the notion of truth. 
THE MATHEMATICS OF RELIABILITY 
These considerations suggest that emphasis on the analysis of knowledge and of justification 
may be unprofitable. Perhaps instead we should directly consider the notion of reliable 
methods of forming opinion. What can we discover about reliable inference? I begin with the 
twentieth-century philosopher Hans Reichenbach. Reichenbach claimed that the goal of 
science is to determine the probabilities with which events of various kinds will occur, or the 
probabilities with which certain events will occur, given that others have occurred. 
 Suppose that you flip a coin four times and it comes up heads three of the four times. 
Then the relative frequency of heads in the sequence of four flips is the number of times the 
coin landed heads, divided by the total number of flips. In this case the relative frequency is 
3/4. Suppose that you flip a coin 12 times and it comes up heads 7 of those times. In that case 
the relative frequency of heads in the sequence is 7/12. Suppose that we flip a fair, evenly 
balanced coin a number of times, and suppose that the flipping has no effect on the balance of 
the coin. The relative frequency of heads will change as we flip the coin more and more 
often. But as the number of flips grows ever larger, the change in the relative frequency of 
heads will tend to become smaller and smaller. If we flip the coin 1,000 times, we cannot 
expect that it will land heads exactly 500 times, but the relative frequency of heads should he 
very close to 1/2, and it should remain close to 1/2 if we flip the coin 10,000 times. 
 Imagine flipping the coin forever, so that there is an infinite sequence of flips. Then 
there is a corresponding sequence of relative frequencies of heads. 
H T T H H H T H T T H ... 
1 1/2 1/3 1/2 3/5 2/3 4/7 5/8 5/9 1/2 6/11 ... 
Assuming that the coin is fair and perfectly balanced and remains that way through all flips, 
the infinite sequence of relative frequencies of heads should converge to 1/2. Or in other 
terms, 1/2 should be the limit of the infinite sequence of numbers giving the relative 
frequencies. According to Reichenbach, probabilities are limits of relative frequencies. So, 
according to Rcichenbach, the aim of science is to determine limits of relative frequencies. 
 Now some infinite sequences of numbers have limits and some do not. The sequence 
1/2, 2/3, 3/4, 4/5, 5/6, 6/7, 7/8, 8/9, ... , if continued forever, converges to 1. But the sequence 
1/2, 1, 1/2, 1, 1/2, 1, 1/2, 1, ... does not converge at all. It oscillates forever between 1/2 and 
1. So, in Reichenbach’s view, probabilities do not always exist, and therefore sometimes the 
goal of scientific knowledge cannot be achieved. But when probabilities do exist and there 
are limits of relative frequencies for events of kinds that interest us, then there is a method of 
conjecturing hypotheses that will always lead to the truth. Reichenbach called this method the 
straight rule. 
Straight rule of induction Always conjecture that the limit of the relative frequency of 
events of kind a in a sequence of events of kind b is the relative frequency so far observed of 
events of kind a among events of kind b. 
 Reichenhach’s argument that the straight rule of induction is reliable is very simple. 
Consider (1) an infinite sequence of flips of a coin, (2) the corresponding infinite sequence of 
relative frequencies of heads, and (3) the corresponding infinite sequence of conjectures 
about the limit of the relative frequency of heads by the straight rule: 
H T T H H H T H T T H ... 
1 1/2 1/3 1/2 3/5 2/3 4/7 5/8 5/9 1/2 6/11 ... 
1 1/2 1/3 1/2 3/5 2/3 4/7 5/8 5/9 1/2 6/11 ... 
The sequence (3) of conjectures according to the straight rule is the same as the sequence (2) 
of relative frequencies. If the sequence of relative frequencies converges to a limiting value, 
then so does the sequence of conjectures about that limiting value, made in accordance with 
the straight rule. Any method of conjecturing the limit of relative frequencies can converge to 
the truth only if the sequence has a limit. If an infinite sequence of relative frequencies has a 
limit, the straight rule will converge to it. Thus if any method will succeed in converging to 
the probability of an event in a sequence, the straight rule will. 
 Reichenbach called his argument a pragmatic vindication of induction. He meant 
something like the following: We can imagine that some procedures for making inductive 
inferences will work, will converge to the truth, in certain circumstances, and other 
procedures will work in other circumstances. One problem about induction is how to know 
which procedures are reliable in which circumstances, since different rules for conjecturing 
might lead to different conjectures on the same evidence. Since the straight rule is maximally 
reliable, in practice the only sensible thing to do is to form conjectures according to the 
method of the straight rule. 
 Many objections to Reichenbach’s vindication of induction concern his understanding 
of the goals of science. No real coin will ever be flipped an infinity of times, let alone an 
infinity of times without having its center of gravity altered. Why should scientists be 
concerned with the limit of an imaginary infinite sequence? 
 There are other objections as well. Suppose that we flip a coin a number of times and 
after each new flip apply the straight rule to estimate the probability of heads on a flip. Then 
we obtain, as before, a sequence of outcomes (1), a sequence of relative frequencies (2), and a 
sequences of conjectures about the limit of the relative frequency of heads in flips of the coin 
(3). If we form conjectures according to the straight rule, we are guaranteed to converge to 
the true limit of the sequence of there is such a limit. But the same is true if we form our 
conjectures according to any of an infinity of different rules. 
 For example, consider the following rule: 
Alternative rule If the observed relative frequency of events of kind a in a sequence of n 
events of kind b is r, conjecture that the limit of the relative frequency of events of kind a in 
the sequence of events of kind b is (1/n) + (n  2)r/n. 
As n becomes large, the first term in this sum approaches 0, and the second term in the sum 
(equal to r  2r/n) approaches r. So in the limit, the conjectures produced according to this 
rule converge to r, the relative frequency. If the straight rule converges to a limiting value 
when applied to a given sequence, the alternative rule also converges to the same value. The 
conjectures of the straight rule and the alternative rule will differ, but they will converge to 
the same value. Let its call any alternative rule that converges to the same limit as the straight 
rule a convergent rule. 
 For any sequence of events of kind b and any relative frequency of events of kind a in 
the first n members of this sequence, and for any number 1 between 0 and 1, there is a 
convergent rule that conjectures 1 from the first n members of the sequence. In other words, a 
pragmatic justification can he given for any conjecture one pleases on any evidence. This is a 
rather mathematical way of pointing out that Reichenbach’s pragmatic vindication of 
induction helps only in the long run but does not help at all in the short run. But, as the great 
economist John Maynard Keynes objected, in the long run, we’re all dead. 
PUTNAM’S FRAMEWORK 
About 1960 Hilary Putnam transformed Reichenbach’s frequency analysis of reliability to 
create a general framework for analyzing the reliability of methods for deciding the truth or 
falsity of any sort of hypothesis. We have already seen the basic idea in a study question from 
an earlier chapter. Imagine, for example, that we want to determine the truth or falsity of “All 
ravens are black.” To make things simple, let’s suppose that there are no difficulties in 
determining the color of any individual object we meet, and no difficulties in determining 
whether or not any object we come across is a raven. Further, let’s suppose that we can 
continue searching for ravens forever; I assume that every raven that ever exists will 
eventually be seen, even though the same raven may be seen repeatedly and even though 
there may be no time at which all ravens have been seen. After each new piece of evidence is 
collected, the scientist conducting this inquiry for us can make a conjecture about the truth or 
falsity of the hypothesis that all ravens are black. Finally let’s suppose that the scientist uses 
some rule R for forming conjectures. We can picture the setup as in figure 10.1. 
 Mathematically, rule R is simply a function from finite sequences of evidence to the 
two-member set {True, False}. What does it mean for such a rule to be reliable? Putnam’s 
criterion for the reliability of any such rule R is this: 
Putnam’s criterion In every logically possible world W in which the conditions above are 
met and for every possible order of presentation to the investigator of the individual facts in 
W, there exists some finite number of facts after which R outputs only T if the hypothesis is 
true and outputs only F if the hypothesis is false. 
In other words, the investigator eventually gets it right and sticks with the right answer. The 
difference between Putnam’s conception of reliability and Plato’s conception is that Plato 
requires that a reliable method never output T unless the hypothesis is true or output F unless 
the hypothesis is false. Putnam’s reliable learner is allowed to vacillate and change the 
conjecture an arbitrary but finite number of times. In general, we cannot say how large or 
how small finite will be. A method that is reliable in Putnam’s sense is guaranteed to arrive at 
the correct hypothesis at some time, but usually no guarantee can be given as to when that 
time will be. 
 It is easy to apply Putnam’s criterion to methods for investigating whether or not all 
ravens are black. Carl Hempel, a twentieth-century philosopher of science, proposed that a 
body of evidence E that consists of singular sentences describing the color and ravenhood of 
a finite number of objects confirms “All ravens are black” if and only if E, together with the 
assumption that nothing exists that is not named in the evidence, logically entails “All ravens 
are black.” Hempel’s analysis of confirmation can he transformed into a rule for forming 
conjectures: conjecture T if the evidence confirms the hypothesis, and F otherwise. It is easy 
to see that, in Putnam’s sense, this rule is not a reliable method for determining the truth 
value of any universal hypothesis such as “All ravens are black.” Let the hypothesis be true in 
a world with an infinity of black ravens, but let the evidence he ordered so that the 
investigator always discovers a new raven at a stage prior to discovering its color. The body 
of evidence consisting of sentences asserting for n things that they are ravens and black and 
for one other thing that it is a raven doesn’t entail (even with the assumption that nothing else 
exists) that all ravens are black. The status of the (n + 1)th raven is not settled by the evidence 
at that stage. So a scientist using Hempel’s rule could he made to change her mind infinitely 
often about the hypothesis. In contrast, Karl Popper, another influential twentieth-century 
philosopher of science, proposed that inquiry should proceed by conjecturing the most easily 
refutable hypothesis and sticking with it until efforts to refute it succeed. By Popper’s 
method, we would conjecture the truth of “All ravens are black” until (and if) the evidence 
contains a description of a raven that is not black. It is also easy to see that Popper’s method 
is reliable in Putnam’s sense for the question of whether ravens are black: If we follow the 
rule and are in a world in which all ravens are black, we will always be right in our 
conjecture. If we follow the rule and are in a world in which there is a raven that is not black, 
then eventually that raven will be put in evidence, and we will change our conjecture to F and 
be right ever after. Either way, we will always get to the correct conjecture and stick with it 
after a finite body of evidence is collected. 
 Popper’s rule is more reliable than the one derived from Hernpel’s confirmation 
theory, but Popper’s rule is defective in other respects. It can be shown that Popper’s rule is 
not the most reliable procedure that can be constructed. There is, in fact, a maximally reliable 
rule of inference, and there are problems for which Popper’s rule fails but the maximally 
reliable rule succeeds. 
 Other common methodological recommendations also turn out to reduce reliability. 
For example, some philosophers of science recommend that scientific change be 
conservative: a theory or hypothesis should not be given tip until it is contradicted by the 
evidence. Popper’s rule is conservative, but so are many others. It can be shown that, any 
conservative rule is less than maximally reliable. Another common recommendation is that 
theories should be simple, but it can he shown that various precise versions of a preference 
for simple hypotheses sacrifice reliability. 
 Putnam’s framework was discovered independently by a computer scientist, E. Mark 
Gold, and it has since been developed by computer scientists, linguists, psychologists, and 
philosophers. It forms one standard used to evaluate procedures to make computers learn, and 
it is the basis for a technique for studying language learning in children. 
 My presentation may make it seem that Putnam’s framework is rather artificial: the 
imaginary investigator gets to receive data, but he never gets to conduct experiments, the way 
real investigators do; the data the imaginary investigator receives are never erroneous, but 
real data sometimes are; every fact about the world eventually occurs among the evidence the 
imaginary investigator receives, but that may very well not be true of us; the imaginary 
investigator inquires about hypotheses in a formal first-order language, but real investigators 
usually have other formulations of their hypotheses; the imaginary investigator is given the 
hypothesis to investigate, but real human investigators often have to generate their 
hypotheses themselves; our imaginary investigator knows little or nothing about the world, 
but real investigators know a great deal. But in the last thirty years Putnam’s framework has 
been generalized so that each of these aspects of real inquiry are represented, and 
mathematical results about reliable procedures are still obtained. The framework does not 
have to be limited to hypotheses that can be expressed in a formal first-order language; it has 
been adapted so that it applies to a great variety of ways of representing hypotheses. 
Reliability can be studied over any arbitrary set of possible infinite sequences of data (the 
exclusion of some sequences amounts to background knowledge brought to the inquiry). The 
data need not be free of error, nor need the investigator be merely a passive recipient of the 
data. The hypothesis does not have to be specified in advance; instead, we can study the 
reliability of procedures that try to discover true hypotheses about a domain. Reliability can 
he studied when various restrictions are put on the learning rule. One of the most interesting 
restrictions is that the rule be computable. When that restriction is imposed, many of the 
theoretical results obtained are reinterpretations of mathematical results in the theory of 
recursion, a subject we will briefly consider in a later chapter. 
 What is the relation between the analysis of knowledge and Putnam’s sense of 
reliability? If we settle for Putnam’s sense of reliability rather than Plato’s stronger 
requirement, the force of inductive skepticism is weakened a little. From data consisting of 
particular facts, no universal claim can reliably be established in Plato’s sense, as Sextus 
pointed out. We know that universal claims can he reliably established in Putnam’s sense. 
From a logical point of view, a formal sentence can be reliably verified (that is, we will 
converge after finite evidence to saying the hypothesis is true if and only if it is true) 
provided the sentence is logically equivalent to a sentence with a string of existential 
quantifiers, followed by a string of universal quantifiers, followed by a formula without 
quantifiers. So, for example, “There exists a smallest particle” is verifiable in this sense. A 
sentence can reliably be falsified provided it is logically equivalent to a sentence with a string 
of universal quantifiers, followed by a string of existential quantifiers, followed by a formula 
without quantifiers. So a sentence is reliably verifiable and falsifiable if it is logically 
equivalent to both sorts of quantified sentences. What this means is that it is easy to think up 
claims—even perhaps claims we believe—that cannot be reliably verified or falsified in 
Putnam’s sense unless some possible worlds and data sequences are ruled out by prior 
knowledge. An example is “For every compound there exists a temperature at which the 
compound is a liquid for all pressures greater than 1 atmosphere.” But although the truth or 
falsity of such a sentence cannot he reliably decided, it may he a logical consequence of some 
sentence that can be reliably decided, or it may simply be that we are committed to prior 
beliefs relative to which the sentence is decidable. 
Study Questions 
1. Suppose that for a particular set of infinite sequences of possible data and a particular 
proposition that is true in the worlds described by some possible sequence of evidence but not 
in the worlds described by other possible sequences of evidence, there is an inference rule 
that is reliable in Putnam’s sense and that, when the inference procedure has finally settled on 
a value, it will not change. That is, suppose that the inference rule can announce that it has 
settled down. Show that there is then an inference rule that is reliable in Plato’s sense. 
2. Consider an arbitrary set S of infinite sequences of possible data and a set of mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses. Suppose that there is a prior probability distribution on 
the evidence and data that in every infinite data sequence in S converges by Bayesian 
conditionalization to probability 1 for the true hypothesis. Show that there is a conjecturing 
rule (a function from finite data sequences to hypotheses) that is reliable in Putnam’s sense. 
3. Does Keynes’s objection to the Reichenbach’s “vindication of induction” also apply 
to results about the existence of inference methods that are reliable in Putnam’s sense? 
4. If the truth or falsity of p can he reliably determined in Putnam’s sense and p logically 
entails q, does it follow that q can be reliably determined in Putnam’s sense? 
RELIABILITY WHEN TRUTH IS RELATIVE 
There are many familiar ways in which what we say or believe changes the very truth value 
of what we are talking about. The predictions of Wall Street “gurus” may help to make their 
own predictions come true. If everyone in a community believes everyone else is going to act 
selfishly, they may all reason that it is in their interest to act selfishly as well, and so the 
beliefs come true. Some philosophers have suggested much more radical ways in which truth 
may depend on belief, so radical that people with different beliefs or different conceptual 
schemes may literally live in different worlds of experience. In that case, if two such people 
meet and dispute, there is no fact of the matter as to who is correct. 
 Philosophers who think that truth is in this way relative to something about the 
speaker—her conceptual scheme, her social role, or whatever—sometimes hold a modified 
Kantian picture of the human condition. According to Kant, there is an unknown world in 
itself that, together with the conceptual scheme fixed in all of us, determines our common 
world. According to the relativist, there are many possible conceptual schemes, and the world 
of any individual’s experience is a function of the world in itself and her conceptual scheme. 
If, through a scientific revolution, a leap of faith, or immigration, the person were to change 
her conceptual scheme, then, according to the relativist, what is true of her world of 
experience would also change. The picture is something like figure 10.2. A picture like figure 
10.2 does not imply that whatever the investigator thinks is true therefore is true. Just because 
the truth varies with her conceptual scheme or beliefs doesn’t mean that the truth varies in 
such it way as always to agree with her beliefs. 
 The picture of inquiry when truth is not relative allows us to try to satisfy two 
requirements at once: to reach agreement with one another and to reach the truth. If truth is 
relative in this way, however, we cannot ensure reaching agreement, but we can still ask 
when it is that someone can reliably get to the truth, although what the truth is will depend on 
features of the person herself. Most philosophers who have thought about relative truth have 
thought that the very idea is inconsistent with any normative standards of inquiry, but in fact 
that is not so. Indeed, the issue of reliable methods of inquiry becomes more interesting when 
truth depends on the conceptual scheme of the inquirer. It turns out that if you want to get to 
the truth of the matter about some question when the truth of the matter depends on you, and 
even depends on what you think is the truth of the natter, there are still more reliable and less 
reliable ways to proceed. 
 Let us suppose that an investigator can alter his conceptual scheme as he chooses and 
that the data he gets will depend on how the world is in itself and on the conceptual scheme 
he adopts. To make things more interesting still, let us suppose that there are alternative 
possible worlds in themselves about which nothing substantive can be known but that may 
combine differently with conceptual schemes to produce a world of inquiry from which data 
is obtained. If the investigator changes from conceptual scheme 1, say, to other conceptual 
schemes and then returns to conceptual scheme 1, he receives data that continue where he left 
off. If, therefore, he adopts a given conceptual scheme infinitely often, he will receive a 
complete set of data for that conceptual scheme. The picture of inquiry now looks something 
like figure 10.3. 
 Changing conceptual schemes may change proposition s from true to false or from 
false to true, or even make the proposition meaningless. Suppose that the investigator wants 
to have his conjectures about s converge to a truth value, true or false, that is correct. Already 
the relativist picture shows itself to be more complicated and more interesting than the realist 
picture, because there are at least three different senses that might be given to this 
convergence (see figures 10.4 to 10.6). 
 We can think of a relativistic inquiry problem as given by a set of possible worlds in 
themselves, a set of conceptual schemes, and a function that determines a world of inquiry for 
each pair consisting of a world in itself and a conceptual scheme. The worlds of inquiry are 
just like ordinary worlds from which ordinary data are presented (until the investigator 
changes the conceptual scheme). In some of them the matter under investigation, s, is true, 
and in some of them it is false (and in some of them s is neither true nor false). In addition, to 
make a relativistic discovery probIem definite, we need to specify a sense of convergence. 
Once all of these components are specified, it is a mathematical fact whether or not there 
exists a method that will reliably converge to the right truth value for s. It turns out that the 
different requirements on convergence really make a difference as to whether a question can 
he reliably answered. There are relativistic problems of inquiry that cannot be reliably solved 
if schemestable convergence is required but that can be solved if only truth-stable 
convergence is required, and there are problems that cannot he solved if truth-stable 
convergence is required but that can be solved with unrestricted convergence. 
 The difficulty of obtaining a reliable method is basically this: Any fixed conceptual 
scheme determines a discovery problem in which there are a number of alternative possible 
worlds of inquiry. That discovery problem might be unsolvable, so if the method stays with 
the conceptual scheme, it will fail to converge to the correct truth value in that conceptual 
scheme. But if the discovery problem posed by that conceptual scheme is reliably solvable, 
the investigator must return to that scheme often enough to obtain sufficient data to converge 
to the correct truth value for the hypothesis. In more vivid terms, deciding when to go along 
with a scientific revolution is a delicate matter. Given that the goal is to converge to a truth 
value for some proposition, there are better and worse methods of inquiry. When the number 
of alternative possible conceptual schemes is finite, there is a universal method, that is, a 
relativistic discovery procedure that is reliable if any method is reliable. The method is too 
intricate to consider here, but the philosophical moral is not difficult at all. Even when truth is 
relative, there are interesting and intricate epistemological norms concerning reliable 
inference. 
CONCLUSION 
In the last twenty years there have been an enormous number of careful attempts to give 
necessary and sufficient conditions for someone to know something. The analyses have 
almost all been Boolean; that is, a Boolean combination of conditions are offered as 
necessary and sufficient for knowledge. The inquiry produced no consensus and no firm 
result, although it did produce several analyses, such as Nozick’s, that seem to capture 
something important about the concept of knowledge, even if they do not provide necessary 
and sufficient conditions. 
 An alternative enterprise that received less attention from philosophers has proved 
more fruitful. That enterprise, the analysis of conditions for reliable inference, was 
inaugurated by a philosopher, but like many fruitful philosophical ideas, it spread beyond the 
confines of professional philosophy. Moreover, the investigation of conditions for reliable 
inference followed a fundamentally different course than the investigation of conditions for 
knowledge. Rather than insisting that there is one unique correct set of conditions for 
reliability, researchers entertained a variety of different notions of reliability and investigated 
the relations among them. And rather than stopping with a statement of one or another 
conception of reliability, researchers investigated mathematically the properties of methods 
that are (or are not) reliable in any particular sense. 
Review Questions 
1. State C. I. Lewis’s account of knowledge. What are some problems with the idea of 
justified belief? 
2. Give an example of the type of prototypical situation that Gettier uses to refute 
Lewis’s account of knowledge. 
3. State Nozick’s account of knowledge, and discuss how it circumvents Gettier’s 
objection. 
4. Give a definition of “convergence.” 
5. What is Reichenbach’s straight rule of induction? Cite the flaw in Reichenbach’s view 
discussed in the text. 
6. Characterize the contrasting rules for conjecture formation proposed by Hempel and 
Popper. Discuss each with respect to Putnam’s criterion for reliability. 
7. Explain why any sentence that is logically equivalent to a sentence with a string of 
universal quantifiers followed by a string of existential quantifiers followed by a formula 
without quantifiers can be reliably falsified. 
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Figure 10.1 
A scientist conjectures about the hypothesis that all ravens are black, using rule R. 
Figure 10.2 
One’s world of experience is determined by the world in itself and one’s conceptual scheme. 
Figure 10.3 
One’s conceptual scheme and the world in itself determine the data stream and hence the 
truth values of sentences under that conceptual scheme. 
Figure 10.4 
The conceptual scheme is stable. Converge to a conceptual scheme, stabilize the truth value 
of s (that is, converge to a world of inquiry), and then converge to the truth value of s for that 
conceptual scheme. 
Figure 10.5 
The truth value is stable. Stabilize the truth value of s, and then converge to its truth value. 
Figure 10.6 
Unrestricted. Permit the truth value of s to fluctuate forever, so long as you are eventually 
always right about it. 
  
Chapter 11 
MIND AND MEANING 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the fundamental mysteries of philosophy is the place we humans have in 
nature. Are we completely natural objects subject to the same laws of nature as air and 
water and apples, or are we special systems whose features—consciousness, 
deliberation, choice, feeling—are outside of the system of laws that constrain other 
objects? The sciences of biology and psychology in our time have assumed that we 
are completely natural objects whose structure and properties can be reduced to 
physics, chemistry, and computation. Philosophers and logicians helped to create the 
computational part of this scientific enterprise, while other philosophers have 
developed a variety of arguments against the very possibility of reducing humans to 
physical, chemical, and computational systems. In this chapter we will consider the 
connection of mind and body, focusing on arguments against the possibility of 
unifying humans with the rest of nature. 
 Suppose we make a list of some of the kinds of events there are in our 
everyday world: 
• Birthdays 
• Elections 
• Shopping trips 
• Being thirsty 
• Seeing chairs 
• Seeing autos 
• Believing that it is George Washington’s birthday 
• Collisions 
• Eclipses 
Birthdays, elections, shopping trips, collisions, and eclipses seem to be public 
occurrences, while events such as seeing chairs or autos or believing that it is 
someone’s birthday seem to be private. Private events have to do with a particular 
person, whoever is doing the seeing or believing. We think of such private events as 
mental. We could also make a list of the kinds of entities there are in the world. 
Again, some of them—cars, chairs, and bathtubs—arc public entities, while others—
thoughts and desires, hopes and fears—are private entities that we usually think of as 
mental. The nonmental is not a homogeneous collection. Nonmental events include 
birthdays, elections, and shopping trips, all of which are social events that could not 
occur unless appropriate mental events also occurred. Nonmental events also include 
the decay of uranium atoms, eclipses of the sun, aortic ruptures, and other events that 
we think of as physical rather than social. Nonmental entities include such physical 
objects as electrons and refrigerators, but social entities such as nations and political 
parties are also nonmental. 
 The division of our world into the mental and the nonmental raises a number 
of curious questions: What is the basis for the division? That is, what characteristics 
differentiate the mental from the nonmental? What are the relations between the 
events, states, entities, and processes of these two different sorts? Are they 
fundamentally identical in some way, so that when we understand things properly, the 
distinction disappears? Or if the distinction is genuine, are there causal relations 
between mental events and processes and nonmental events and processes? Are 
events of one sort entirely determined by events of the other sort? 
 Every answer we might give to such questions produces a great many more 
questions. If, for example, we suppose, as did Bishop Berkeley in the eighteenth 
century, that nonmental events, entities, and processes do not really exist, then we 
must ask why, if that is so, it nonetheless appears as though there are physical entities 
whose existence does not depend on thought and whose appearances seem subject to 
general laws. And, given any answer to that question, another arises: How is the 
answer, whatever it is, known to be true? Other theories in the philosophy of mind 
take roughly the same form. An answer to the fundamental questions about the 
relation between the mental and the nonmental raises further questions about the 
details of the connection and how, if at all, the fundamental view can explain features 
of our experience. Other epistemological questions arise concerning the justification 
for the claims of any theory of the mental and the physical. 
 In this chapter we will consider some of the general viewpoints about the 
relations of the mental and the nonmental, and we will focus on special problems 
about the source of meaning. Then in the two succeeding chapters we will consider 
the details of some contemporary theories of mind that hold mental states to be 
intimately connected with computational states. 
SOME METAPHYSICAL VIEWS 
One view of any entity, whether mental or physical, is provided by the image of a 
clothesline: any object consists of a substance (the clothesline) to which various 
properties have been pinned. Although the picture ignores many complexities and 
qualifications in any philosopher’s conception of things, the clothesline view of 
objects is contained in much of metaphysics from Aristotle to Descartes, and even 
after. Aristotle considered matter of different kinds as built up by applying different 
forms to other materials. The bare clothesline in Aristotle’s metaphysics is elemental 
matter. When elemental matter acquires forms (Aristotle sometimes suggests this 
occurs by mixing the four elements in various proportions), a new substance emerges 
to which other forms may be attached, and so on. (So if we want to pursue the 
clothesline metaphor, in Aristotelian metaphysics the clothes on a line may be rolled 
up and new clothes pinned over them.) Although Aristotle would perfectly well have 
recognized the distinction between mental events, processes, and entities on the one 
hand and nonmental events, processes, and entities on the other hand, he did not 
separate minds and bodies into two different kinds of fundamental substances. 
 According to Aristotle, the body and the mind (or soul, to use Aristotle’s term) 
are not two different substances. The features of ourselves and others that we call 
mental are special properties of bodies and could not exist without bodies. Aristotle 
uses an analogy from geometry: souls and mental features are not like lines and 
planes, which we think of as kinds of geometrical objects. Souls and mental features 
are like the geometrical property of being straight, which we think of as a feature of 
certain lines: “The affections of the soul are inseparable from the material substratum 
of animal life to which we have seen that such affections, e.g., passion and fear, 
attach, and have not the same mode of being as a line or a plane.”1 
 René Descartes is often credited with introducing into philosophy a 
metaphysical conception in which there are two distinct kinds of substance, one 
mental and one physical. It is as though there were two clotheslines and two different 
sorts of clothes. Clothes of one kind and only that kind, the physical properties, can be 
pinned on one of the clotheslines, while clothes of the other kind and only that kind, 
the mental properties, can be pinned on the other clothesline. In the Cartesian view, 
mental properties of mental substances can have causal relations with physical 
properties of physical substances, and vice versa. Your intention to move your arm, 
for example, causes your arm to move, and the alcohol in wine may cause the feeling 
of dizziness. Both the mental and the physical realms are subject to various 
regularities or laws. The functioning of the mental has a structure, just as does the 
functioning of the physical. (Gilbert Ryle, a twentieth-century philosopher who 
rejected almost all of Descartes’ metaphysics, described it this way: the physical 
world works like clockwork, the mental like “not-clockwork.”) 
 Descartes held that a substance can be characterized as that which can exist 
independently of other entities. Bodies can exist without minds, and, according to 
Descartes, minds can exist without bodies. In Descartes’ terminology, a mode of a 
substance is that which cannot exist unless the substance exists. Descartes held that 
there are three kinds of substance: God, mental substance, and physical substance, the 
latter two of which are combined in humans. Unfortunately for the consistency of his 
views, Descartes also held that the existence of all other things depends on the 
existence of God: if God did not exist, neither would minds or bodies. Spinoza, 
applying the Cartesian definitions consistently, concluded that there is but one 
substance, God, and that the mental and the physical are only different modes of God. 
 This picture of entities as substances with attached properties was eroded in 
the eighteenth century, especially by English philosophers. In the seventeenth century 
John Locke, a friend of Newton and Boyle, found the notion of substance puzzling 
because substances seem not to be objects of experience: one may see a chair, its 
color, its shape, feel its weight, and so on, but one has no perception of its substance. 
Locke nonetheless retained the idea of physical substance, once referring to it as “the 
something, I know not what, underlying the evident.” Early in the eighteenth century 
George Berkeley, an Anglican bishop, argued that there is no such thing as material or 
physical substance. There is a mental substance, he maintained, of which each of us is 
directly aware, and there are mental properties, ideas, of which we are also directly 
aware. But none of us are ever directly aware of anything but ideas and mental 
substance. We are locked behind a veil of ideas, but there is nothing on the other side 
of the veil. The notion of material or physical substance is only a confusion of words. 
 David Hume rejected even the hypothesis of mental substance. Recall that 
Hume held that all ideas, all thoughts, are compounded from the impressions of 
sensation, whether “inner” sensation or “outer.” Hume argued that we have no 
impression at all of anything corresponding to mental substance. We have current 
sensations, we have memories, but we have no idea corresponding to a bare entity that 
is the self. 
 What does it matter whether there is only one substance, some properties of 
which may be physical and some mental, or whether there are two substances, one 
mental and one physical, the first taking only physical properties and the second 
taking only mental properties, or whether there are no substances at all? Among other 
topics, it matters for the identity of persons. 
PERSONAL IDENTITY 
Just who you are is a matter of great personal and practical importance. You can mull 
over the senses in which you are and in which you are not the same person you were 
five years ago. Legal issues present a context in which the concept of identity is of 
central importance. Legal proceedings must establish who is now the person who did 
a crime at some earlier time, or who entered into a contract at some earlier time, or 
who was the person designated at some earlier time to receive an inheritance. In most 
cases the establishment of identity in legal contexts may present little of conceptual 
interest, but sometimes legal issues may push our conception of identity to its limits. 
Is an amnesiac who forgets everything about her past, and must relearn it all, the same 
person she was before losing her memory? Ought she to be responsible now for harms 
she did then? If someone suffers a disorder of multiple personalities and one 
personality is permanently replaced by another, does the person remain identical? It is 
a lot easier to ask such questions than to see what facts about the world could settle 
them, but they raise a fundamental philosophical question: What determines the 
identity of persons through time? 
 The traditional Western religious answer to the question is that the soul 
determines personal identity. The soul isn’t the same as the mind, or consciousness. 
Rather, it is a kind of marker, an invisible tag, attached to human beings. Captured 
wild animals are sometimes tagged so that if they are captured again, their identities 
can be established. The soul serves the same purpose, except that traditionally the soul 
is more than a marker. One can imagine that two wild bears somehow exchange 
identification tags, but that wouldn’t change the identity of the bears. It is impossible 
that two people could exchange souls, because the soul necessarily determines the 
identity of the person. 
 Evidently, the notion of a soul has some logical resemblance to the notion of a 
substance: souls, like substances, are what endures through change; souls, like 
substances, are essential to the thing they constitute. For that very reason, the 
philosophers who rejected the notion of mental substance would not be satisfied with 
the notion of soul. The reasons for dissatisfaction are much the same: No one has ever 
seen or measured a soul, just as no one has ever seen or measured a substance. 
Instruments that enhance the powers of our senses—telescopes and microscopes—
don’t reveal souls or substances. There is no scientific phenomenon that requires such 
things for its explanation. 
 If the idea of mental substance is given up, the question of personal identity 
becomes more interesting and more difficult. Consider persons at a given moment as 
collections of properties located in space-time. I am here now with all of the physical 
properties and mental properties I have at the moment I am writing this page. I was in 
Butte, Montana, in 1959, with all of the physical properties and mental properties I 
had then. What is it about those two collections of properties, one here and now and 
the other in Butte in 1959, that makes them moments of one and the same person? If 
there is no such thing as substance that establishes identity and that remains the same 
through change, what is it that makes for the identity of persons through time? The 
same kind of question could be posed about objects. If there is no such thing as 
substance, what makes an object at a moment the same object as that at some other 
moment? 
 Two kinds of criteria have arisen for identifying stages of persons as stages of 
the same person. One emphasizes physical connections between person stages, while 
the other emphasizes psychological connections between person stages. On one view, 
what determines that persons at two moments are stages of one and the same person is 
a physical continuity between the stages: one stage leads to the other by the motion 
and slow change of matter. On the other view, what determines that persons at two 
moments are stages of one and the same person is some kind of psychological 
continuity, as when, for example, the later person stage remembers being the earlier 
person stage. Each of these views must be qualified in various ways to meet obvious 
difficulties. 
 Consider first physical continuity. Starting with a wooden boat at a certain 
moment, we could replace one hoard of the boat at a time with a new board. After a 
while a boat stage would be obtained that had none of the original boards, and yet we 
would naturally think of it as a later stage of the very same boat. Suppose, however, 
that as the old boards were removed from the boat one by one, they were reassembled 
into another boat exactly like the first. Then at some moment we would have two boat 
stages, one made up entirely of new boards and another made up entirely of the old 
boards in the original boat arranged in the same way. Which of these boats is identical 
with the original boat? If the criterion is identity of constituents and similarity of 
arrangements, then it seems the second boat, the one made from the same boards as 
the original boat, is identical with the original boat. If, however, the criterion for 
identifying boat stages is the existence of a physically continuous transition from one 
stage to another, then the conclusion changes. With this criterion we would conclude 
that the original boat is identical with the boat stage consisting of new boards. Some 
philosophers suggest that neither boat is identical with the first boat: the existence of 
the two competitors for the status of being identical with the original boat somehow 
keeps either of them from being so. 
 Next consider psychological continuity. We cannot simply say that a later 
person stage is identical with an earlier person stage if and only if the later stage 
remembers being the first stage. For one thing, there are earlier stages of me that I do 
not remember. For another, people can have false memories, as when someone 
remembers being Napoleon. The first problem is solved readily enough by requiring 
that between two identical stages there be a sequence of interposed stages such that 
there is a chain of memories from the first stage to the last. The second problem is 
more difficult. We might say that it is not enough for one stage to remember being an 
earlier stage; in addition, the memory must be correct. But that requirement seems 
circular and therefore uninformative: What does it mean to say that a later person 
stage correctly remembers being an earlier person stage, other than that the later 
person stage is identical with the earlier person stage and remembers having been that 
stage? 
 One way to test how these different criteria fit our fundamental conception of 
what determines identity is to imagine some rather unpleasant experiments. Imagine 
that there is a machine that can scan and copy every molecule in your body, forming a 
perfect duplicate of you. Suppose that in the year 2000 you step into the machine and 
are duplicated. You and your duplicate are rather like the two boats. To make the 
analogy more complete, you need only imagine that the machine stays with you for a 
number of years and creates a duplicate of you from the very atoms that you shed over 
the years. So all of the various views about the identity of boat stages apply equally 
well to you and your duplicate. Your duplicate has the same memories you have, and 
so the criteria of psychological continuity does not distinguish between the the 
identity of younow and you2000 on the one hand and the identity of younow and your 
duplicate in 2000 on the other. So we have, at least in imagination, the kind of case 
about which there seem to be so many conflicting criteria of identity. 
Study Question 
If some consideration not yet entertained shows that in our usual judgement, younow 
really are identical with one of the alternatives—you2000 or your duplicate—and not 
the other, that consideration would tell us something about our concept of identity. 
Suppose that one and only one of you2000 and your duplicate made in the year 2000 
will thereafter be tortured. You get to choose now which of them it will be. What is 
your preference, and why? 
REDUCTION 
After making lists of physical properties and mental properties, one might think that 
there is some connection between the two. One might guess, for example, that mental 
properties are simply certain combinations of physical properties and that any entity 
that has a brain in a certain physical state at a certain moment will therefore also be an 
entity that has a certain thought or mental state at that moment. Or instead one might 
guess that physical properties are simply certain combinations of mental properties, as 
in idealist metaphysics of the kind we found in Kant, Russell, and Carnap. If, 
however, there are two kinds of substances, one mental and one physical, and the 
mental kind can have no physical properties and the physical kind can have no mental 
properties, then any reduction of the mental to the physical or of the physical to the 
mental seems clearly impossible. Without distinct substances, new possibilities 
emerge, and many of the most fundamental controversies in Western thought since 
the seventeenth century have turned on which of these possibilities is correct. 
 Thomas Hobbes presented a quite different view of mind from other English 
writers of the seventeenth century. Hobbes held that reasoning and judgement are 
forms of computation. The corpuscles of the body may serve as special counters, like 
the counters of an abacus. The states of these counters have a symbolic role: they refer 
to or represent something in the external world. Mind is matter that functions in a 
special way. This view was given a direct endorsement in the eighteenth century by 
Julien La Mettrie, who claimed that humans should properly be understood as 
machines. It would follow that mental states, processes, and events are physical 
aspects of physical systems. Everything mental could be reduced to something 
physical. The reductive relations would not simply be causal; it wouldn’t be, for 
example, that physical events in the brain cause thoughts. Rather, on the reductionist 
view, special physical events in the brain just are thoughts. 
 The reductionist idea, sometimes called materialism or physicalism, gained 
enormous ground with scientific developments in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries: The chemicals of life were found to obey the very same laws as inorganic 
chemicals. Some animal behavior that seemed purposeful was found to be produced 
by simple chemical mechanisms. Phototropism in moths, for example, was found to 
be due to a chemical reaction in the nerve cells, so that when one eye of a moth was 
blinded, rather than moving toward a light, it would pivot in a circle. Many people 
supposed that as science progresses, we will find that we are like very complex moths, 
and that our purposeful, apparently rational, goal-directed behavior is the result of 
intricate but purposeless mechanisms inside us. Even so, a large philosophical 
literature has developed arguing that no reduction of the mental to the physical is 
possible. Let’s consider some of the arguments against the possibility. 
The Intensional and the Extensional 
Franz Brentano, a nineteenth-century philosopher, insisted that a distinguishing mark 
of mental events is that they have a special sort of content. They are directed at an 
object or circumstance from a particular aspect, and the aspect is crucial. Brentano’s 
thought was forceful but not especially precise, and some twentieth-century 
philosophers have offered logical revisions of his claim. They depend on some 
features of logic that are thought to be true of the language of physics but not true of 
the language of mind. 
 Let F(i) be a formula in a logical system such as Frege’s, where i is the name 
of an individual. Then from F(i) and i = k, it follows deductively that F(k), for any 
name k. Formal languages with this property are sometimes said to be extensional. In 
an extensional language the truth or falsity of a claim about an object doesn’t depend 
on how the object is named or described. Some parts of ordinary language don’t seem 
to be extensional. Consider, for example, sentences about what someone desires or 
fears or hopes or believes. It might be true that Sam likes seeing the morning star and 
false that Sam likes seeing the evening star. But the morning star and the evening star 
are the very same object, the planet Venus. Phrases such as “likes,” “believes,” 
“fears,” and so forth are said to create itensional contexts. Substitution of names or 
descriptions for identical objects in intensional contexts can change truth values. 
 An argument to the conclusion that the mental cannot be reduced to the 
physical goes like this: 
Premise 1: The language of physics is extensional. 
Premise 2: The language of mind is intensional. 
Premise 3: For the mental to reduce to the physical, all true claims in the language of 
mind must be entailed by true claims in the language of physics plus definitions. 
Premise 4: No addition of definitions to an extensional language can create a 
language with intensional contexts. 
Conclusion: Therefore, the mental cannot be reduced to the physical. 
The argument is valid, and the only questions concern the truth of its premises. I will 
focus on premise 4, although premises 1 and 3 might also be challenged. Assume that 
we have an extensional language L for stating physics. Let’s consider the problem of 
giving a physical account of the sentence “Sam likes the morning star.” If we add to L 
the predicate “likes,” a reduction must find some formula in physical language, call it 
(x, y), that holds whenever object x likes object y. But the argument shows that no 
such equivalence is possible. 
“likes(Sam, morning star)” 
is true, and 
“likes(Sam, evening star)” 
is false, even though “morning star = evening star” is true. So whatever  is, it would 
have to satisfy 
(Sam, morning star), (Sam, evening star), 
and “morning star = evening star.” These conditions violate the assumption that the 
physical language L is extensional. 
But suppose that the reduction took a slightly different form. Instead of a two-place 
predicate “likes,” consider a three-place predicate Likes(x, y, z), where z represents a 
particular description or physical aspect of an object. In the example, 
Likes(Sam, Venus, “morning star”). 
Notice that the third position is taken not by a name of Venus but instead by a name 
of a name of Venus. So it is true that 
Likes(Sam, Venus, “morning star”) 
and false that 
Likes(Sam, Venus, “evening star”) 
and irrelevant that evening star = morning star. Extensionality is satisfied. (In this 
example, instead of using a linguistic object in the third position of “Likes,” we could 
use an angle, or range of angles, between Sam, Venus, and the Sun.) 
 Perhaps we can always reduce an intensional language to some extensional 
language by introducing extra places in predicates. Until there is a proof that this 
cannot be done, the logical argument against reduction is incomplete. 
Functionalism, Physicalism, and the Cartesian Fallacy 
Another influential argument against physicalism can be given informally. The 
argument is that a creature could be in a mental state such as believing or hoping or 
fearing even if the creature had a very different physical constitution from us. The 
creature’s biology might be based on a silicon chemistry rather than a carbon 
chemistry, it might use deuterium oxide instead of water, and so forth. But we can at 
least imagine that such a creature has the same sorts of inner experience we do and the 
same dispositions to act that we do when we believe or fear or desire something. In 
such imaginary cases we ought to say that the creature has the corresponding mental 
states. But since a creature could have the same mental states we do without having 
the same physical structure we do, mental facts cannot be reduced to physical facts. 
 In the last thirty years, versions of this argument persuaded some philosophers 
to think that mental states should be viewed as functional states and that functional 
states are necessarily something quite different from physical states. Functional states 
are supposed to be causal features or dispositions of a system to produce a certain 
output from a certain input and to have nothing to do with the material composition of 
the system. So the imaginary silicon creature could be in the same functional state as a 
human, even though the two have quite different physical compositions. 
 The argument has two flaws. One of them is an overly narrow conception of 
physics, and the other is a common equivocation over the notion of possibility. The 
first flaw is very simple. Many of the fundamental notions of physics are functional. 
Consider the fundamental objects of simple mechanics: the lever, the pulley, the 
inclined plane. What makes something a lever or an inclined plane is a certain 
function the thing can perform. not its chemical constitution. An inclined plane can be 
made of ice, of steel, or of wood. The same is true of many other physical notions. 
Chemical composition is not what makes something a planet. So the opposition 
between physicalism and functionalism is spurious. 
 The second flaw in the argument is more interesting and more important, 
because it uses ideas that occur quite frequently in philosophical disputes. It may in 
fact be among the most common fallacies in philosophical writings about the mind. 
The first idea is this: 
(1) Imagination is the test of possibility. Whatever can be consistently imagined is 
possible. 
The argument against physicalism combines this idea with another: 
(2) If two properties are identical, they are necessarily identical. In other words, 
the properties are identical in all possible circumstances. 
Principles 1 and 2 provide a spurious strategy for proving that property f cannot be 
identical with property g: just imagine a circumstance in which something has f but 
not g or a circumstance in which something has g but not f. We have already met 
principle 1 in Descartes’ arguments. The principle is correct if we are talking of 
logical possibility, the sort of possibility we consider when we ask whether a 
purported proof is valid. But scientific claims (as distinct from proofs) usually involve 
a narrower conception of possibility, in which principle 1 is false. For example, 
modern science holds that it is not possible for a massive body to be accelerated from 
a velocity less than that of light to a velocity greater than that of light, but such an 
acceleration is certainly thinkable. Again, modern science holds that water is the 
compound of one atom of oxygen and two atoms of hydrogen, but it is certainly 
imaginable that water is, say, the compound of one atom of oxygen and one atom of 
hydrogen. Early in the nineteenth century the father of the modern atomic theory, 
John Dalton, believed that very thing. (The scientific conception of impossibility is 
undoubtedly vague. It means roughly the following: try as you will with whatever 
resources, such a thing will never come about; it is a law of nature that it will not 
come about.) When we consider the question of the identity of the mental and the 
physical or the reduction of mental properties to physical properties, this second 
scientific sense of possibility is involved, not the wider sense of logical possibility. To 
show in this sense that it is possible for creatures with different chemical 
compositions to be in mental states such as ours, it is not enough to imagine creatures 
who experience as we do but have a different chemical composition. For all we know, 
it may be a law of nature that no object can have the sort of experience we have unless 
it has the sort of chemical composition we have. 
 The moral is that we should not argue about scientific identifications through 
imaginary cases unless there is good reason to think that the cases imagined could be 
realized consistently with physical law. Of course, in many cases good reasons will be 
available, and then there is nothing wrong with arguing by imagination. 
Study Questions 
1. Find some other examples of scientific properties that are identical to one 
another. 
2. Is principle 2 correct? 
WHAT ARE MEANINGS? 
Issues about minds are closely connected with issues about meaning. The 
phenomenon of meaning is of special philosophical interest because meanings seem 
so central to what it is to be a sentient, rational creature, and yet at the same time the 
nature of meaning is elusive. Meanings are supposed to be whatever it is one has a 
hold on when one understands a concept, statement, or rule. One of the things that 
distinguishes humans from rocks and even from computers is that humans understand 
concepts, statements, and rules. We grasp meanings. Things without minds don’t 
grasp meanings. Things without minds may behave in ways that can be described by 
rules, but they don’t apply rules. A rock doesn’t apply the law of gravity when it falls, 
but a person applies a rule for addition when figuring out the sum of ten numbers. 
What is it that we grasp when we get the meaning of a rule, a claim, or a word, and 
what is it to mean something or to understand what something means? We will 
consider several influential and interesting ways of approaching these questions. 
Truth Conditions 
Frege’s philosophy of language distinguished between the sense and reference of a 
thought, or as we might say, between the meaning and the truth value of a proposition. 
Twentieth-century elaborations of Frege’s view place the speaker in a system of 
relations with other speakers and the world and focus on a relation of reference or 
denotation between thoughts or utterances and objects or features of the world. The 
views I describe in the next few paragraphs were developed by several philosophers, 
but most forcefully by Alfred Tarski in the first half of the twentieth century and by 
others subsequently. 
 Here is the picture: Names denote particular objects, as “George Bush” 
denotes George Bush. Predicate terms such as “red,” “male,” “leader of a nation” 
denote properties or relationships. So “male” denotes a property that George Bush 
exemplifies. The relation of denotation determines the conditions for the truth or 
falsity of claims. The facts determine whether these conditions are met. So, for 
example, the sentence “George Bush is a male” is true if and only if the object 
denoted by this use of the term “George Bush” has the property denoted by this use of 
“male.” That is, “George Bush is a male” is true if and only if George Bush is a male. 
This sort of statement of a condition for the truth of a sentence sounds rather trivial, 
but if we understand the words in quotes as arbitrary symbols and if we also 
understand the unquoted words as we ordinarily do, then the statement says 
something. It gives the condition (in English) for the truth of the quoted sentence. The 
truth condition only appears trivial because the quoted sentence is already in English. 
But if it were in French, the truth condition would more clearly provide some 
information: “George Bush est un male” is true if and only if George Bush is a male. 
 What makes words or phrases denote the particular individuals or properties 
they do? One standard answer is that thoughts, words, and phrases get their 
denotations from the causal relations in which speakers find themselves. Our uses of 
“George Bush” denote George Bush because George Bush’s mother named him 
“George Bush” and because she told him that his name is “George Bush” and so, 
through newspapers and television and through talking with other people, we who 
have never laid eyes on George Bush come to know and use his name. This account is 
very sensible, but it leaves at least one mystery: What did George Bush’s mother do to 
cause him to be named “George Bush”? Naming someone or something seems to 
require a certain intention on the part of the namer; something had to make it the case 
that Bush’s mother was naming George, rather than naming something else (his crib, 
for example), and rather than not naming anything at all (as if she had muttered, “(By) 
George, (I’m) bush(ed)”). We don’t as yet have any causal analysis of intending; 
some philosophers claim we never will. 
 Whatever constitutes the denoting relation between words and the world, on 
this view of meaning, what one has when one grasps or understands a concept, rule, or 
phrase is a knowledge of some aspect of the denoting relation. You understand one 
sense of the English word “male” because you know that one kind of occurrence of 
“male” denotes the property of being male. You understand another sense of “male” 
because you know that another kind of occurrence of “male” denotes the property of 
being the convex half of a concave-convex coupling device. Similarly, you 
understand a sentence such as “George Bush is male” because you know the condition 
for its truth. Clearly, you can know the truth condition for a sentence without knowing 
whether the sentence is true, or in Frege’s terms, you can know the sense of a 
sentence without knowing its reference. 
 Many philosophers have complained that the analysis of meaning through 
truth conditions isn’t very illuminating. The analysis tells us that we can know the 
truth condition for a sentence of our own language only if we already know the 
meaning of another sentence that looks just like the sentence whose truth condition is 
being given. The truth condition for “George Bush is male” makes essential use of our 
understanding of the meaning of “George Bush is male.” Truth conditions may 
provide a good technique for translation from one language to another, but meanings 
can be acquired even by someone who speaks no language at all. Imagine for a 
moment trying to teach someone who speaks no language at all, a child, to understand 
English by giving the person truth conditions for English sentences. Suppose the child 
is willing and intelligent and learns all of the truth conditions by heart. Even so, the 
child won’t have a glimmer of how to use English sentences, and she won’t 
understand their meanings. 
 About 1960 Willard Van Orman Quine produced an argument against truth-
conditional theories of meaning. Quine’s argument concluded that if meanings are 
truth conditions, there are no meanings. Quine’s argument began with the case in 
which a truth conditional analysis of meaning seems most informative: the case of 
translating sentences in one language into another language. Assume that we are 
translating the language of a people we know almost nothing about; suppose to start 
with that we understand their words for affirmation and for denial, but nothing else. 
Then, Quine claimed, no matter how much we study their behavior, no matter how 
much evidence we gather about what they say in various circumstances, we will not 
be able to construct a unique translation manual from their language into ours that 
gives English truth conditions for the sentences of their language. Quine maintained 
that this sort of “radical translation” always allows alternative translations that are 
incompatible with one another. For example, Quine argued that if we were to find that 
the people we are studying seem to apply the word “gavagai” to rabbits, then 
“gavagai” could be translated as rabbit or equally well as “undetached rabbit part.” It 
must be admitted that Quine’s examples of this sort of underdetermination of 
translation by behavior are not particularly shocking or even interesting. But from this 
claim, Quine infers that since not even all possible observations of behavior would 
determine the correct translation, there is therefore no correct translation and no 
correct set of truth conditions in English for the sentences of the people’s language. 
We should then apply the same conclusion to ourselves, Quine claimed, and conclude 
that there are no conditions in English that give the requirements for the truth of 
English sentences. 
Study Questions 
1. Suppose that a defender of truth conditions as analyses of meaning were to reply 
that the imaginary case of a child who speaks no language and who memorizes 
English truth conditions is not really a counterexample to the claim that understanding 
a language consists in knowing the truth conditions of its sentences. For, the reply 
continues, the child doesn’t understand the truth conditions it is taught to memorize, 
and therefore, even though it knows how to repeat utterances that sound like 
statements of the truth conditions, the child doesn’t really know the truth conditions. 
What do you say in response to this reply? 
2. Another objection to the analysis of meaning by truth conditions is that notions of 
meaning also apply to sentences that aren’t declarative. “Close the door!” is a 
sentence that means something, but it isn’t true or false and doesn’t have a truth 
condition. How might the meanings of imperative sentences be analyzed at least in the 
spirit (if not the letter) of truth-conditional analyses? 
3. “Juliet is the sun” is a metaphor from Shakespeare. Explain some of the 
difficulties metaphors present for truth-conditional analyses of meaning. 
4. Quine’s argument seems to require the assumption that nothing can be true of 
people unless its truth can be determined (at least in principle) from observations of 
their behavior. This view, championed by Quine’s colleague of many years, the 
psychologist B. F. Skinner, is often called behaviorism. What can be said for and 
against this idea? 
Meaning as Use 
A quite different approach to meaning was advocated by Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
Wittgenstein was an Austrian who turned to philosophy while studying engineering in 
England. He first wrote a celebrated book defending a version of the truth-conditional 
approach to meaning. In Wittgenstein’s early view, simple facts in the world join 
individuals, properties, and relations, and more complex facts are formed by Boolean 
combinations of simple facts. The structure of facts is isomorphic to the logical 
structure of language. A sentence is true if the corresponding facts obtain. Toward 
midcentury Wittgenstein completely rejected his earlier view and wrote a number of 
works advocating a different approach to meaning, which has become very 
influential. Wittgenstein’s later writings are notoriously allusive and unsystematic, 
and his followers and critics have argued at length about what he was saying. The 
view we will consider mixes Wittgenstein’s themes with those of a number of other 
philosophers. 
 The idea is this. Understanding a phrase or sentence is knowing how to use it. 
Knowing how to use a phrase such as “red apple,” for example, is knowing that the 
term applies to paradigm examples of red apples, knowing that it doesn’t apply to 
green figs, being able to make standard inferences in language involving “red apple,” 
and so on. For example, someone who understands the English “red apple” is able to 
infer that a red apple is a fruit, that red apples are not usually painted red, and that 
apples grow on trees. There is no single analysis of terms nor a single truth condition 
for a sentence. Instead, there is a range of applications and nonapplications, contexts 
where the sentence is appropriate to utter and contexts where it is not, and inferences 
to be made using a phrase or sentence. This much of Wittgenstein’s doctrine seems 
like good sense, and many philosophers have adopted some version of it. 
Nevertheless, the view naturally raises many unanswered questions: Are some 
applications of a word more central to its meaning than others? Are some inferences 
more important than others? If so, which and why? I won’t attempt to answer these 
questions here. 
 Another doctrine is associated with Wittgenstein’s name, although whether he 
actually endorsed it is controversial. The doctrine is that there is no such thing as the 
meaning of any part of language or any act of speech or expression. There are no 
meanings. Nothing means anything. The argument for this apparently absurd 
conclusion goes as follows:2 
Premise 1: Meanings, if anything at all, are normative. They constitute partial rules or 
standards for correct and incorrect uses of language. If someone systematically 
violates these standards in his use of some phrase, we say that he does not know the 
meaning of the phrase. If, for example, someone sincerely says “Two plus two is 
five,” we conclude that he does not understand the meanings of his words. Norms are 
about what ought or ought not to happen or to be done. One ought not to say “Two 
plus two is five.” Norms are not about what actually does happen: perhaps some 
people do say “Two plus two is five,” and in any case, everyone sometimes makes 
errors in addition. 
Premise 2: Nothing about what actually exists or about what used to exist entails 
anything about what ought to exist. Hume makes this point in his discussion of 
morals: 
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d 
that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and 
establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; 
when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of 
propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an 
ought or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last 
consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or 
affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same 
time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this 
new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.3 
Inference: Therefore, absolutely no statement of any fact about what exists or did 
exist entails that any usage is erroneous or incorrect in the sense of failing to accord 
with a norm or standard. 
Conclusion: Therefore, absolutely nothing makes errors of usage errors. Our 
individual or collective dispositions to use words in a certain way do not themselves 
entail norms of usage; we as a community just happen to say on particular occasions 
that some usages of words are incorrect and others are not. But our saying so is a bare 
fact, and there isn’t any property of a speaker, the world, or the speaker’s audience 
that makes a sentence erroneous or otherwise inappropriate. There isn’t, in other 
words, any such thing as a meaning that constitutes a norm or standard of usage. 
 Almost no one believes the conclusion of this argument. So where is the 
fallacious inference or the false premise? Many philosophers would reject the 
inference of (3) from (2), and some would reject (2) altogether. They would say, for 
example, that one of the things that might exist in the world is a norm or standard at a 
particular time, and a norm may very well entail that a particular action violates the 
standard. For example, there is in fact a norm about how “plus” is to be used, and that 
norm entails which possible uses of “plus” in addition are correct and which are 
incorrect. The argument overlooks the possibility that meanings are among the things 
that exist. 
 Almost everyone would reject the conclusion that nothing means anything, but 
arguments of this sort can be turned around. From the spirit of Hume’s observation 
that statements about what there is (other than norms) do not imply statements about 
what ought or ought not to be, the observation that meanings are norms, and the banal 
conclusion that people really do mean things by their words and thoughts, it seems to 
follow that the notion of a person cannot be reduced to any structure of physical or 
functional relations. By the very fact that they mean something by their words and 
thoughts, persons instantiate norms, and norms are not reducible to physics or to 
function. We can put this backward argument this way: 
1. Meanings are normative. 
2. Thoughts have meanings. 
3. Nothing physical or functional has normative attributes. 
4. Therefore, thoughts are not physical or functional. 
 Is the possibility of reducing mental phenomena to physical or functional 
phenomena and structures thus refuted? Let me distinguish among four things, any of 
which may be connected with the notion of meaning: 
1. In use, words may denote objects and properties. Although the physical details of 
the denoting relation are complex and generally not known to us, of itself, denotation 
is supposed to be some relation (like floating or dissolving or being between) that 
aspects of the world stand in. Whatever denoting may be, there is nothing normative 
about it. 
2. Some utterances may be true, and some false. We may prefer that people speak 
the truth (sometimes), but because of the denotation relations of their language, 
whether they do speak the truth or not is a mater of fact, not a matter of norms. 
3. There are approvals or disapprovals of usages. You may disapprove of how I use 
the word “or,” which, because I am from Montana, is a little nonstandard. (Like many 
other Montanans, I would say “Butte or Missoula are in Montana.” whereas standard 
English is “Butte and Missoula are in Montana.” My usage can be understood in this 
way: pick either one, Butte or Missoula; no matter whether you pick Butte or 
Missoula, it’s in Montana.) Disapproval is a natural attitude, and no reason has been 
given in the preceding argument to believe that it is impossible to give physical or 
functional reductions of disapproval. 
4. There might conceivable be norms of usage that are distinct from facts of 
approval and disapproval and also distinct from facts of denotation and truth. Because 
of what words in fact denote and what the truth values of sentences are, over and 
above all this, some usages might be wrong. In saying that a usage is wrong in this 
sense, we are not claiming just that what is asserted is not true or just that what is 
asserted is disapproved of by other speakers of the language. In this sense, a speech 
act might be logically wrong even though what it asserted is true and even though no 
one disapproved, or was disposed to disapprove, of the act of speech. 
 Now the antireductionist argument establishes only that the fourth aspect of 
meaning cannot be reduced to physics or function. But the fourth aspect seems 
gratuitous and quite unnecessary for our understanding of the notion of meaning. 
Suppose that someone did a mathematical calculation and that because of what her 
mathematical symbols denoted, the outcome of her calculation was false. We would 
ordinarily say that she made an error, a mistake, and that sounds normative. Even if 
no one else caught her mistake, ever, we would still say that an error was made. But 
that does not mean that the notion of meaning requires some norm that we now know 
is not a matter of physics or function. When we say that she made an error, we mean 
that she intended to obtain the true result and did not do so. We do note mean that she 
failed to abide by some supernatural norm. We can understand the phenomena of 
meaning very well without the fourth aspect. So the argument that the phenomenon of 
meaning demonstrates the impossibility of physicalism or functionalism seems 
inconclusive. 
Study Question 
Reconsider Boole’s difficulty with the fact that people make errors of reasoning. 
THE PRIVATE-LANGUAGE ARGUMENT 
I began this chapter by contrasting private phenomena, the mental, with public 
phenomena, the nonmental. That very contrast assumes that each of us has features of 
his or her experience over which he or she has authority. You are the final authority 
on whether you are in pain and on whether something tastes and looks to you like 
what you call a tomato. Of course, other people might have very good evidence that 
you are in pain or, knowing you very well, might be very good judges of whether 
something tastes and looks to you like what you call a tomato. But were there to be 
conflicting opinions, your judgements of your private experience are authoritative, 
and others’ judgements defer to yours. Not only does this picture of things seem 
natural, it also seems to be morally important. If it were not true, a great deal of the 
notion of individual autonomy would be lost. 
 That the mental can be private seems to entail that there is a part of language 
that can be used to name and describe features of experience, and you are the ultimate 
authority for the correct use of that language. Wittgenstein’s most famous argument is 
that no such language is possible. Some commentators on Wittgenstein have given 
very lengthy reconstructions of Wittgenstein’s argument, but I do not believe these 
reconstructions clarify it very much or improve on a fairly simple statement of the 
idea. Here is a version of the argument that is not a quotation from Wittgenstein: 
 Let us agree that by a “private language” we will mean a language used by a 
person for which she is the sole authority about correct usage. For there to be a 
language, there must be meanings. Meanings are normative and determine standards 
for correct and incorrect use. Now a standard, norm, or criterion for anything is 
something at least possibly distinct from that thing, something against which the thing 
can, ideally, be measured. The standard for someone’s correct usage of a phrase or 
sentence cannot be just the mere fact that the person used the phrase or sentence. 
There must be something other than the mere use that provides the standard. But were 
there such a thing as a private language, the actual use of the speaker of that language 
would be the standard for use, no matter what the person might say. Hence there can 
be no private language. 
 The argument is engaging, and it captures a real tension in the notion of 
private experience. On the one hand, we think of private experiences as objective, 
about which someone can be right or wrong in describing. On the other hand, we 
think of private experiences as like conventions or stipulations in that whatever the 
speaker decides to say of her private experience counts as the truth. We cannot have it 
both ways. 
 There are at least two lines of reply, according to which side of the tension one 
prefers to endorse. One reply is to insist that sometimes a standard and what it is a 
standard of can be one and the same. A professional baseball umpire once replied to a 
protest over a called strike, “It ain’t nothin’ until I call it.” And while his remark is not 
true of pitches in general, it was indeed true of the particular pitch in question. It was 
the umpire’s saying “strike” that made the pitch it strike. The disadvantage of this 
reply is that it seems to concede that no facts can be reported in a private language 
that are facts independent of the report. 
 A second reply to the private-language argument is that it person’s authority 
over his own utterances need not rest simply on the fact that he uttered them. The 
words of the speaker of a private language denote features of her experience, and in 
virtue of what that experience really is, the statements of the speaker are true or false. 
So she could be wrong in what she says. She is the authority about her own usage of 
her own private language not because she is necessarily infallible but because she is 
the most reliable judge of correctness. No one else has access to her evidence about 
what she experiences. This reply allows that it is imaginable that circumstances could 
arise in which you are no longer the authority about usage in your hitherto private 
language. We could imagine, for example, that neuroscience becomes so detailed and 
so powerful that by monitoring your brain, it can determine how things appear to you, 
and that this determination is more reliable than even your own testimony. Some 
philosophers have accordingly reformulated Wittgenstein’s thesis as the claim that 
there could not exist a necessarily private language. But this way of putting the issue 
equivocates over the notion of possibility in a way we have seen before. In the vague, 
scientific senses of “possibility” and “necessity,” neither Wittgenstein nor anyone else 
is or has been in a position to know whether the language in which each of us 
describes his or her own experiences is necessarily private. The reformulated thesis 
might be this: there could not exist a language that could not be imagined not to be 
private. And that reformulated claim may be true, but it has lost interest, since the 
claim no longer calls into doubt the existence of private experience or individual 
autonomy. 
CONCLUSION 
Putting the phenomena of mind together with our understanding of the natural world 
is possibly the most difficult intellectual challenge to modern thought. The problem 
has, if anything, been made more difficult by twentieth-century science. On the one 
hand, through psychological and biological investigations we have come to see 
ourselves as more like biological machines; on the other hand, through developments 
in physics we have come to see the physical world as more mysterious and less 
intelligible. Essential aspects of mental life remain unexplained in physical or 
functional terms, most central among them the phenomena of consciousness and 
associated aspects of mental life. 
 We have considered only a few of the philosophical arguments that aim to 
show that no unification of the human and mental with the natural and physical is 
possible. The arguments do not seem decisive. In the next chapters I turn to giving a 
say to the reductionist, functionalist side. Right or wrong, the results of pursuing the 
reductionist idea constitute some of the great achievements of twentieth-century 
philosophy. 
Review Questions 
1. What are some of the arguments against the possibility of reducing mental 
states to physical states? 
2. Why would the private-language argument, if sound, be important? 
3. What are some of the senses of “possibility” that arise in philosophical 
argument? 
4. What is the leading idea of the causal theory of reference and denotation, and 
what problems present difficulties for the theory? 
5. What is Brentano’s mark of the mental? 
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Chapter 12 
THE COMPUTABLE* 
The theory of computation belongs as much to philosophy as to other disciplines. The 
modern form of computation arose from the application of mathematical logic to 
philosophical issues concerning the foundations of mathematics. Moreover, at least a 
rudimentary understanding of the theory of computation is essential to understanding 
important areas of contemporary philosophical concern, including theories of knowledge and 
philosophies of mind. Finally, the theory of computation forms an important part of the 
modern theory of rationality. 
 Although the word derives from Arabic mathematics, the notion of an algorithm 
seems as ancient as any idea in mathematics. Greek geometers thought of procedures for 
constructing figures with rule and compass. Thus, in translation, the first proposition of 
Euclid’s elements states a procedure for using rule and compass to construct an equilateral 
triangle on any given line segment in any given plane containing that line segment. But it was 
in the theory of arithmetic and in algebra that the idea of an algorithm became explicit. Today 
the teaching of arithmetic in elementary schools consists in large part of the teaching of 
algorithms for computing simple arithmetic functions: addition, subtraction, multiplication, 
division (although the availability of cheap electronic calculators may make such skills 
obsolete). In algebra, much of the focus of research by Arab and then Christian 
mathematicians was on finding algorithms for the solution of various classes of equations. 
Thus in algebra we learn algorithms for solving linear equations and for solving systems of 
linear equations; we learn algorithms for solving quadratic equations and for solving third-
degree equations. 
 In the seventeenth century a remarkable idea began to emerge: thought, any thought, 
is some form of computation. Thomas Hobbes articulated this idea clearly in the middle of 
the century. Others who did not take such a view of mentation nonetheless thought of 
algorithms as means to improve human rational capacities. In the same century Gottfried 
Leibniz, the great philosopher, mathematician, and diplomat, proposed the development of a 
kind of calculus in which every proposition on any subject could be stated formally and 
unequivocally and for which an algorithm would determine the truth or falsity of every 
proposition that could be so stated. Of course, Leibniz did not have such a calculus or any 
such algorithm, but he envisioned their development as a principal goal of science. 
 As we will see, the idea of an algorithm is not even yet fully understood, but roughly 
it means a mechanical or automatic procedure that, at least ideally, will compute something 
for any of an infinity of different possible cases. If the something is a function, an algorithm 
will compute the value of the function for any argument over which the function is defined. 
Such an algorithm is always an algorithm for computing some specific function or other. 
There might be many ways to compute one and the same function, and so many distinct 
algorithms that compute one and the same function. You can imagine many different ways to 
use a telephone book to find someone’s phone number; similarly, you can imagine many 
different algorithms for arithmetic functions. Rather than adding multidigit. numbers by 
forming them in columns and adding the rightmost column and carrying to the left, for 
example, you could get the same results by starting the additions with the leftmost column 
and for any column in which the sum is more than nine, backtracking to change the sum in 
the column to the immediate left. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPUTATION THEORY FROM LOGIC 
In the first chapter of this book I briefly discussed Cantor’s theory of sets and his arithmetic 
of infinites. Cantor’s mathematical work and the theories that developed from it set off a line 
of research that led to the modern theory of computation. Some mathematicians, notably 
Leopold Kronecker, did not believe Cantor’s mathematical results, and did not even regard 
them as real mathematics. Cantor’s theory, you will recall, proved the existence of certain 
infinite sets and infinite collections that are, in a well-defined sense, larger than the infinity 
constituted by the natural numbers. Although criticises of Cantor’s work were sometimes 
clothed in nineteenth-century metaphysical jargon, one theme in the criticisms was this: The 
principles of arithmetic are the most certain and sure foundation for mathematics. Any new 
mathematical theory must be proved consistent by the methods of arithmetic, and any new 
mathematical objects or functions should be computable ,from elementary arithmetic 
functions. That is, there should he arithmetic algorithms for any such novelties. Kant’s 
philosophy, which gave a special status to arithmetic, provided important support for this 
view. 
 At about the same time that the conflict between Cantor and Kronecker developed, 
Frege had published the first presentation of modern logic. We have already seen that modern 
logic permits the explicit formulation of nearly every mathematical theory, including number 
theory, geometry, and set theory. The power of Frege’s conception had already been 
exploited by many mathematicians and philosophers as early as the 1920s. David Hilbert, 
who ranked among the greatest of mathematicians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, saw in formal logic a means of meeting Kronecker’s objections to set theory and, 
indeed, a means of reducing the question of the consistency of any mathematical theory to 
questions of elementary arithmetic. 
 One of Hilbert’s ideas can be derived from a simple reflection on how mathematics is 
applied in the physical sciences. (it is perhaps relevant that Hilbert was also a great 
mathematical physicist and, with Einstein, the codiscoverer of the general theory of 
relativity.) When we apply mathematics, we count things, or assign numbers to things or to 
states of things. We assign numerical measures to objects when, for example, we weigh them. 
By counting and assigning measures, we are able to make inferences about things by doing 
arithmetic. 
 Consider weighing things on a scale. We do so by adopting some convention that 
correlates states of the scale with numbers. The same number is also correlated with the body 
we have weighed on the scale. The convention we use may be built into the scale (as with 
modern chemical scales that have a digital readout) or we may have to mentally assign a 
number to the state of the scale according to some rule (as with an old-fashioned pan 
balance). There are lots of different systems by which numbers can be associated with states 
of the scale: we can measure in grams or ounces or some other unit. The important thing is to 
use one such system; it doesn’t matter which. 
 When we use a scale and a standard of measurement to assign weights to objects and 
we weigh first one object and then another on the scale, we use our measurement convention 
to assign a number to the state of the scale in each case. We call that number the weight of the 
object on the scale. Now the interesting and useful thing about measurement scales is this: we 
can use arithmetic to determine what the state of the scale will be when, for example, two 
objects are placed on it. To get the answer we need do only the following: weigh each object 
separately; add the numbers representing the weights of the two objects; use our 
measurement convention to infer the state of the scale associated with the number that is the 
sum. Our measurement practice enables us to represent properties of weights as simple 
arithmetic relationships. 
 Hilbert’s idea was this: we can associate numbers with the language of a 
mathematical theory in such a way that properties of the mathematical theory, such as its 
consistency, are represented by arithmetical relationships among numbers associated with 
parts of the language. Formal properties of a theory, such as its consistency, then become 
equivalent to arithmetical properties of sets of numbers. We could then prove (or disprove) 
the consistency of a mathematical theory by using nothing but arithmetic. Since no one 
doubted arithmetic proofs, doubts about the consistency of various mathematical theories, 
such as set theory, could be resolved. (One important disanalogy with the previous example 
should be noted. It is an empirical fact, established by experiment, that weights are additive: 
the weight of two objects together is the sum of their individual weights. By assigning 
numbers to weights, that empirical fact is represented by an arithmetic relation. In contrast, 
the consistency of a theory is a logical property, not an empirical property, and one hopes to 
be able to establish consistency by an a priori proof rather than by experiment.) 
 When a mathematical theory, set theory, for example, is completely formalized, there 
is a definite vocabulary of symbols in the language of the theory. Each symbol can be 
assigned a natural number in any arbitrary but mechanically computable way. The sentences 
of the language of the theory can then also be assigned numbers, because each sentence is 
just a sequence of vocabulary elements. Suppose, for example, that a formal language had 
only nine symbols. The rules of the language specify that only certain finite sequences of 
symbols are well formed. Then we could assign one of the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 to 
each of the symbols of the language, and every sentence of the language consisting of a well-
formed sequence of symbols would correspond to a finite sequence of nonzero digits. Since 
every finite sequence of nonzero digits denotes a unique natural number, every sentence of 
the language would have a corresponding natural number. Similar correspondences can be set 
up even when the number of symbols is infinite. 
 If we insist that our formalized languages be constructed so that there is an algorithm 
to determine whether or not any arbitrary string of vocabulary elements is a well-formed 
formula, there is some arithmetic algorithm to determine the numbers that correspond to well-
formed formulas of the language of the formalized mathematical theory under study. 
 Let us suppose that when formalized, the mathematical theory we are considering is 
axioniatizable. The axioms of the theory are then in correspondence with some determinate 
set of numbers. Since there is an algorithm for determining the axioms of the theory, there is 
a numerical algorithm for determining the numbers that correspond to the axioms. 
 A proof, or derivation from the axioms of the formalized theory, according to a proof 
theory such as Frege’s, then corresponds to a finite sequence of numbers. Since, you will 
recall, one of the requirements of proof theory is that there be an algorithm to determine 
whether or not any, given sequence of formulas is a proof, there will also be a numerical 
algorithm that decides whether or not a sequence of numbers is the sequence of a proof. The 
number of the last sentence in a proof is a number of a theorem of whatever theory is being 
considered. 
Definition A theory is said to be consistent if and only if there is no sentence s such that 
both s and s are theorems of the theory. 
 Whether or not a specific theory, say set theory, is consistent thus becomes equivalent 
to a question that is purely about arithmetic: whether there are or are not pairs of sequences of 
numbers of the appropriate kinds corresponding to a proof of some sentence and its denial, 
both within the same theory. 
 If for a formalized theory there exists an algorithm that determines whether or not any 
given sentence is a theorem of the theory, then it would seem that the spirit of Kronecker’s 
objections would be fully met. One could prove a theory consistent by purely arithmetic 
means, or as Hilbert put it, by “finitary” means. One could do so by 
• formalizing the theory, 
• arithmetizing its language, 
• proving the existence of a computable number-theoretic function for deciding whether 
or not an arbitrary sentence is a theorem, 
• showing that the function has the property that no sentence and its denial are both 
theorems of the theory whose consistency is in question. 
Hilbert called this program metamathematics. It is mathematics done on the language of 
mathematics. 
CÖDEL’S THEOREMS 
In 1931 a young Viennese logician, Kurt Gödel, proved two theorems that were understood to 
mean that Hilbert’s program as originally conceived could not succeed. Gödel’s theorems 
used a generalization of Cantor’s diagonalization strategy. Gödel applied Hilbert’s program 
to arithmetic itself. If the goal of Hilbert’s program were to succeed, one could decide the 
question of the consistency of any axiomatizable theory by using nothing more than 
arithmetic. So we could in principle formalize the theory of arithmetic itself (as we already 
did in part in an earlier chapter), and in formalized arithmetic one could represent the 
sentences of the language of any formalized axiomatic theory—represent them as collections 
of numbers, or special functions on the natural numbers. Then in formal arithmetic one could 
give a formal proof of the consistency or inconsistency of the formalized theory, whatever it 
might be. 
 Gödel proved two extraordinary theorems. The first theorem implies that arithmetic 
itself cannot be represented as an axiomatizable formalized theory. That requires some 
explanation. In the nineteenth century Giuseppe Peano had developed an axiomatic system 
for arithmetic. In their first-order formulation Peano’s axioms are infinite in number, but they 
can be formalized, and they form a set of sentences for which there is an algorithm to 
determine membership. So Peano’s axioms could be the object of arithmetic study, as in 
Hilbert’s program. In fact, one can formalize Peano’s axioms for arithmetic and then, in the 
language of that formal theory, assign a numeral (a term in the language of the theory) to 
each sentence of that very language. To understand Gödel’s first theorem, it is necessary to 
recall the definition of a complete theory: 
Definition A first-order theory is complete if and only if, for every sentence s in the 
language of the theory, either s is in the theory or s in the theory. 
Gödel’s first theorem says the following: 
Gödel’s theorem Any axiomatizable theory in which the recursive functions can be 
represented and that is true in the natural numbers is incomplete. 
 What does this mean? Well, like any other structure, the structure determined by the 
natural numbers, N = [N, +, x, s, <, =], determines a complete theory, call it T, namely the set 
of all sentences true in the structure N. T includes all of the sentences that are logical 
consequences of the formalized counterparts of Peano’s axioms, but T contains much else 
besides. Gödel’s theorem says something about theory T: it is not axiomatizable. To say that 
the theory is not axiomatizable is to say something about the nonexistence of algorithms. It is 
to say that there does not exist a possible algorithm that assigns 1 or 0 to sentences so that the 
set of sentences assigned the value I consists of a set of axioms that entail all of the sentences 
true in the natural numbers (that is, in the structure [N, +, x, s, <, =]), and of no other 
sentences. 
 Gödel’s theorems actually say more than that the complete theory of arithmetic is not 
axiomatizable. They say that there is an algorithm that, if given as input a finite description 
of any axiomatizable theory that is true in Ɲ and entails Peano arithmetic, will produce as 
output a sentence that is true in Ɲ but is not a theorem of the theory. 
 Why should we care whether the theory of the natural numbers or other complete 
theories that extend Peano’s arithmetic are axiomatizable? For at least two reasons. One is 
that Hilbert’s program supposed that we could axiomatize theories that interest us. Gödel’s 
result says that we can’t always do so: the complete theory of the natural numbers is such a 
theory that cannot be axiomatized. But there is a second philosophical reason why we should 
care that the theory of the natural numbers cannot be axiomatized. If a formalized theory 
cannot he axiomatized, there exists no possible algorithm that will decide for each sentence 
of the language of the theory whether or not that sentence is in the theory. For if there were 
such an algorithm, we could let the set itself of all sentences that the algorithm says are in the 
theory be the axiomatization of the theory. Actually, something stronger is true. If a theory is 
not axiomatizable, there is not even an algorithmic means to list the theorems of the theory; 
there is no mechanical procedure that will, every now and then, output some sentence that is a 
theorem of the theory, never outputting a sentence that is not in the theory, and, for every 
sentence of the theory, eventually output it. We have no effective means of specifying a 
theory that cannot be axioniatized. 
 We all know an algorithm that, for any natural numbers n1, n2, and n3, will determine 
whether or not n1 + n2 = n3. The procedure is just the addition algorithm we learn in 
elementary school. We know algorithms that will determine the answers to other classes of 
arithmetic questions, for example, whether or not an arbitrary number is prime. So we might 
hope that there is an algorithm that will answer every question of arithmetic. Such an 
algorithm would decide the truth or falsity in the natural numbers of any proposition we 
might choose to put to it. Such an algorithm would be part of the fulfillment of Leibniz’s 
dream. Gödel’s theorem says that no such algorithm exists; it is not just that we have not 
found such an algorithm yet. Rather, no such algorithm is logically possible. 
 The notion of an axiomatizable theory was defined in terms of the notion of an 
algorithm, or alternatively in terms of a computable function (i.e., a function for which there 
is an algorithm) that assigns the number I to formulas that are in an axiom set and the number 
0 to formulas that are not in the axiom set. As I have stated it, Gödel’s theorem, thus asserts 
the nonexistence of certain kinds of algorithms; it asserts that certain functions are not 
computable. To prove his claims, Gödel therefore had to characterize the computable 
functions, and that effort, quite as much as his astonishing theorems, led to the development 
of computation theory. But rather than describe Gödel’s characterizations of the computable 
functions as recursive functions, we will instead consider the characterization provided 
shortly after by Alan Turing. 
Study Questions 
1. Gödel’s second theorem, also proved in 1931, is this: there is an algorithm that, given a finite 
description of any consistent, axiomatizable theory, entails formalized Peano arithmetic, 
outputs a sentence asserting the consistency of the theory, and that sentence cannot be proved 
in the theory. 
 Sir Ronald Fisher, the late and distinguished statistician, remarked in connection with 
the observation that a contradiction implies anything, that Gödel’s result ought not to have 
been a surprise to anyone: “After all, suppose a Ph.D. student came, breathless with 
excitement, and said, ‘Sir, I have proved that this system of axioms is free from all 
contradictions.’ You’d say, ‘Did you prove it using only those axioms?’ He might say, ‘Yes, I 
have here written out a chain of propositions which demonstrate that these axioms are free 
from all contradiction.’ Well, perhaps you’d look at him with mild surprise, and you might 
say, ‘I suppose you know that if this system of axioms did contain a contradiction, you could 
prove exactly those same propositions.’ And so you have the situation that certain 
propositions which purport to prove the truth, the truth of the theorem, could be equally well 
demonstrated by the ordinary rigorous processes of deductive reasoning if they were false. 
And I don’t know how much we would give, then, for the chain of theorems which purported 
to prove that the system of axioms was free from contradictions. It would seem a little absurd 
to imagine that such a thing was possible.”1 Consider carefully whether this passage is a 
sound attack on Hilbert’s program and on the significance of Gödel’s results. 
2 An algorithm that lists all of the theorems of a theory does something intuitively less 
difficult than does an algorithm that, for every sentence, correctly decides whether or not the 
sentence is a theorem of a theory. Suppose, however, that you had a procedure that lists all 
the theorems of a theory T and that you had another procedure that lists all the sentences that 
are not theorems of that same theory T. Explain how these two listing procedures could be 
used together to form a procedure that, for every sentence, decides whether or not the 
sentence is a theorem of T. 
TURING MACHINES 
Turing conceived of a kind of machine for computing functions, a machine whose operations 
are so simple that it would be absurd to think that they are in any way mysterious. The idea is 
that the machine somehow represents a function on the natural numbers, so that if, in a fixed 
code, you enter the representation of any number or finite sequence of numbers, the machine 
gives back the value of the function for that number or sequence of numbers. The coding of 
numbers can be done in many ways. Any number base provides a system of digits whose 
finite sequences encode all the numbers. We are used to representing numbers in base 10, 
with 10 digits; but we could just as well represent numbers in base 2 or any other base. Given 
a finite sequence of digits in some specified base, Turing’s machine would compute another 
sequence of digits, in that base, representing the value of a function for the number input. 
 The machines Turing conceived can read a square of a tape on which some number 
has been written (see figure 12.1). The machine has a finite list of instructions that tell the 
machine, when it is in a particular state reading a particular square of the tape, to erase the 
digit on the square and write some other digit in its place, or to move to the next square to the 
left or right on the tape and to change its state. The tape is unbounded; that is, should the 
machine reach the end of the tape, more tape is always added. The machine starts with its 
reading and writing device over a blank square of the tape, and all of the squares to one side 
of the read/write head, say to the left, are blank. A finite number of squares on the other side, 
to the right, contain symbols representing the input to the machine, and the rest are blank. A 
computation is carried out with such a machine by starting the machine in its start state. The 
machine reads a square and does its thing: reading, writing, moving, sometimes to the right, 
sometimes to the left, changing its internal state as it does its work. Eventually the machine 
may stop, and when it does, there will be some sequence of symbols written on the tape. That 
sequence is the output of the machine for the given input. 
 Behaviorally, a Turing machine can do just three things: 
• It can erase a symbol on a square of tape and write another symbol in its place. 
• It can move the read/write head one square to the right. 
• It can move the read/write head one square to the left. 
Internally, the machine can only do one kind of thing: change its state. 
 Such machines can be physically realized in many ways. The tape could be a 
magnetic tape or even a section of paper tape; the read/write head of the machine could be a 
simple optical scanner connected to a printer in one movable unit. The instructions in each 
state could be implemented by cogs, pulleys, and ropes, by electronic tubes as in early digital 
computers, or by silicon chips. 
 There is nothing special about numbers save that certain functions on the numbers 
form our clearest examples of computable functions. But we know that, given any finite 
alphabet, the finite sequences of letters from that alphabet, or words as they are called, can be 
systematically coded as numbers, so functions from words to words can be represented as 
numerical functions. Thus we could just as well have Turing machines that have some finite 
vocabulary other than a system of digits and that compute functions from words on that 
vocabulary to words on that vocabulary. 
 You can think of the instructions, or program, of a Turing machine as a system of 
annotated points and lines. Represent each distinct state of the machine as a point or node, 
and draw an arrow from one node to another if some inscription on a tape square will cause 
the Turing machine when in the first state to go into the second state. Annotate the arrow with 
the symbol that the machine must read when in the first state to go to the second and with the 
symbol it writes or the direction in which it moves. Figure 12.1 illustrates a machine that 
operates on the vocabulary {B, 0, l}, where B represents a blank square of tape, and that 
changes every digit to 1. 
 The machine starts, in state 1, at square 1, which is blank by convention. Then it 
moves one square to the right and changes to state 2. If the square to the right of square 1 is 
blank (no input), the machine halts and does nothing further. If that square has a 0, the 
machine writes a 1 in its place and stays in state 2. If that square has a 1, the machine moves 
to the right one square and stays in state 2. 
 To describe the sequence of states of the machine and tape, let the first number 
represent the number of the state of the machine, let the second number represent the number 
of the square that the read/write head is over, counting the square initially underneath the 
read/write head as 1 and counting positively to the right, and let the remaining sequence of 
numbers be the sequence of digits on the tape. For example, if the input tape reads B1001, the 
sequence will be as follows: 
1, 1, B1001B 
2, 2, B1001B 
2, 3, B1001B 
2, 3, B1101B 
2, 4, B1101B 
2, 4, B1111B 
2, 5, B1111B 
2, 6, B1111B 
 A Turing machine can be described as a precise mathematical object, specifically as a 
finite set of 4-tuples of numbers. The first number of such a 4-tuple simply names the state of 
the machine corresponding to that 4-tuple. (Since the 4-tuples each specify what the machine 
does when it is reading a square in a certain state, for most machine states and each possible 
digit that can occur on a square, there will be a distinct 4-tuple.) The second number of the 4-
tuple is a digit that can occur on a square, the third number is a digit that can be written on a 
square or a number representing “move right” or a number representing “move left,” and the 
fourth number is again the number naming a state of the machine. Informally, <n1 n2 n3 n4> is 
the instruction “If in state n1 reading digit n2, erase n2 and write n3, or move one square to the 
right if n3 = the special value; or move one square to the left if n3 = the other special value, 
and go into state n4.” By convention, we specify that state n1 = 1 is the start state of the 
machine. 
 We can define the computation executed by a Turing machine given by a finite set of 
4-tuples as a sequence of instantaneous states of the machine in the way illustrated in the 
previous example. Using the definition of a Turing machine as a finite set of 4-tuples, we can 
provide a precise inductive definition of a Turing-machine computation, but I leave that as a 
(difficult) exercise. 
 Turing proved that there is a single machine that will compute every function that can 
he computed by any Turing machine. Nowadays such machines are referred to as universal 
Turing machines. The idea is this. Since all Turing machines can be enumerated, we can form 
some encoding that assigns each ‘Turing machine a number. Then we can design a Turing 
machine that interprets the first number on its tape as the number of a Turing machine, some 
conventional sequence of digits following that number as a space marker, and the following 
number on its tape as the input to the machine represented by the first number on its tape. The 
universal Turing machine thus simulates the computations that the Turing machine named on 
its tape would do for the input number on its tape. So there is in a sense one universal 
algorithm that will do everything any algorithm can do. 
Study Questions 
1. Write annotated directed graphs representing Turing machines that (a) change all Os 
to 1s and erase the last 1, (b) change all 1s to 0s and add a further 0, (c) for some input, never 
halts. 
2. For exercises 1a and 1b, give a trace of the sequence of instantaneous states of your 
Turing machine for input 1001. 
CHURCH’S THESIS 
It seems indisputable that any function computed by some Turing machine or other should 
count as a computable function. Besides Turing machines, there are many other ways in 
which we could try to model the notion of computation. For example, we could imagine a 
machine with an unlimited number of registers, in each of which a number can be written. 
Suppose that we are allowed to write any finite sequence of instructions of any of the 
following kinds: 
ri := 0 (Set the number in the ith register equal to 0.) 
ri := rj (Set the number in the ith register equal to whatever number is in the jth 
register.) 
ri := ri + 1 (Set the number in the ith register equal to its successor.) 
goto(i, j, k) (If ri = rj, jump to the kth instruction in the list; otherwise, go to the next 
instruction.) 
A program for such an unlimited-register machine (URM) consists of a finite set of 
instructions. Input is given by numbers in a finite set of the registers, with the convention that 
any register that does not have a number in it as input is assumed to have the value 0 in it 
unless given another value in the course of the computation. Output is given by the number in 
the first register when the machine stops. 
 A computation by an URM proceeds from the first program line and the initial state of 
the registers. The registers are changed in accordance with the program line, and a new state 
of the registers and new program line result (which will be the next program line or possibly 
some other program line if the present line has a “goto” instruction.). Thus, just as with 
Turing machines, an URM computation can be described as a sequence of finite lists, where 
each list gives the program line and specifies for each i the value of ri, the number in the ith 
(nonempty) register. As with Turing machines, some URMs may never halt for certain inputs. 
Theorem A function is computable by some URM if and only if it is computable by some 
Turing machine. 
 The characterization of computable functions as recursive functions, as functions 
computable by Turing machine, and as URM-computable functions are all equivalent in the 
sense that exactly the same class of functions satisfies all three descriptions. There are many 
other characterizations of computable number-theoretic functions. Alonzo Church, who gave 
one of the very first characterizations of this class of functions (one different from any of 
those described), formulated the following thesis: 
Church’s thesis Computable number-theoretic functions are Turing-computable functions. 
 Church’s thesis is not a mathematical theorem; it is rather in the nature of a proposal. 
The proposal is that, in view of the coherence of several conceptually very different 
approaches to characterizing one and the same class of computable functions, in view of the 
evidence Turing’s work provides that the functions in this class are indeed computable by 
very simple machines, and in view of the fact that every function over the natural numbers 
that anyone is sure is computable turns out to be Turing computable, we should simply regard 
the computable functions as those computable by some Turing machine. 
 Since we know how to reduce functions defined over finite sequences of objects of 
any specified collection of types to functions over numbers, Church’s thesis has broad 
implications. It is not just about the computability of functions over numbers; it is also about 
the computability of functions over whatever can be counted or enumerated by a computable 
one-to-one mapping or coding of objects to natural numbers. Through the device of 
characteristic functions that assign the value 1 to all members of a set and the value 0 to all 
members of its complement, the computability of (countable) sets can be reduced to the 
computability of numerical functions. Since the extensions of properties and relations are 
sets, the computability of such extensions, if they arc countable, is also reduced to the 
computability of numerical functions. 
 Church’s thesis could be taken more broadly as the claim that whatever can be 
computed can be reduced to the computation of a recursive function. If the world is in some 
respects continuous, as our physical theories assume, then we can use physical systems to 
compute functions defined not just over natural numbers but over the real numbers, or at least 
the rationais. Again, we might find physical processes that compute characteristic functions 
for uncountable sets. There have been attempts to characterize the notion of computability for 
real-valued functions without reducing such computations to computations on the natural 
numbers. 
 Hereafter, whenever I talk about the computation of countable objects, I will simply 
assume that Church’s thesis is correct. 
RECURSIVE AND RECURSIVELY ENUMERABLE SETS 
Any set of numbers (or of objects that can be coded as numbers) can be represented by a 
function from the objects to {0, l}. If S is a set of numbers, then fS, the characteristic function 
of S. has the value 1 for numbers that are members of S and the value 0 for numbers that are 
not members of S. The same idea applies to sets of ordered pairs of numbers, to sets of 
ordered triples, and in general to sets of ordered n-tuples. 
 If fS is a Turing computable function, then S is said to be a recursive set. For any 
recursive set, then, there is an algorithm that will decide for any number (or object coded by 
numbers or n-tuples of numbers) whether or not it is a member of the set. It is easy to see that 
a set S is computable if and only it’ the complement of S, S', is also computable. To prove as 
much, suppose there is a Turing machine T that computes fS. Give the output of T as input to 
a Turing machine that outputs 0 when given 1 as input and outputs 1 when given 0 as input. 
When run in tandem the two machines represent a procedure for computing fS'. Since there is 
a Turing machine that computes fS', by Church’s thesis, S' is recursive. 
 The union of any finite collection of recursive sets is recursive; similarly the 
intersection of any finite collection of recursive sets is recursive. Many familiar sets of 
numbers are recursive. The even numbers are recursive, and therefore so are the odd 
numbers. The prime numbers are recursive; every finite set is recursive; the set of all natural 
numbers N is recursive. 
Definition Suppose that S is a set for which there is an algorithm that computes a function 
whose value is 1 for members of S and 0 or undefined for numbers not in S. In that case, S is 
said to be recursively enumerable. 
 Every recursive set is recursively enumerable. The converse, however, is not true: 
there are recursively enumerable sets that are not recursive. For example, if we formalize the 
Peano axioms for arithmetic, then the set of all logical consequences of these axioms is 
recursively enumerable, but it is not recursive. 
 If S and its complement S' are both recursively enumerable, they are both recursive. 
For let T be the Turing machine that computes the value 1 for all and only members of S (but 
is undefined for all numbers not in S), and let T' be the corresponding machine for the 
complement set S'. Then run T and T' together. First let T execute a computational step, then 
T', then T, then T', and so on. Since any number is either in S or S' but not both, one of T or T' 
must eventually output a 1. Stop when that happens. If T outputs a 1 on input x, then fS(x) = 1 
and fS.(x) = 0; if T' outputs a 1 on input x, then fS(x) = 1 and fS(x) = 0. So there is a procedure 
that computes the characteristic functions of S and of S'. Hence again by Church’s thesis, S 
and S' are recursive. 
 The complement of a recursively enumerable but not recursive set is therefore not 
recursively enumerable. However, the union and intersection of any two recursively 
enumerable sets are again recursively enumerable sets. 
 Sets that are recursively enumerable but not recursive are less familiar than recursive 
sets. Consider another example. Suppose that we effectively number all Turing machines and 
give to each recursive function the number of the Turing machine that computes that 
function. (One and the sane function will therefore have an infinity of different numbers 
assigned to it, since many Turing machines compute the very same function. but given a 
number, we will be able to effectively determine the function that has that number, since the 
number will describe a Turing machine that computes the function.) Some of the functions 
computed by Turing machines will be partial functions. That is, the functions will be defined 
and have a unique value for some arguments but not for other arguments. (Consider the 
function that maps each natural number n into the first digit of its reciprocal, 1/n. The 
function is not defined when n = 0.) For some inputs the Turing machines that compute a 
partial function will eventually stop and give an output, but for other inputs these Turing 
machines will never halt. 
 We denote partial recursive functions by IIx, where x is the number of a Turing 
machine that computes the particular recursive function denoted by IIx. Every partial 
recursive function has a domain, that is, a set of inputs or arguments for which the function is 
defined, or equivalently, a set of inputs for which a Turing machine that computes the 
function halts and gives an output. Since we can number the partial recursive functions, we 
can also number (or index) their domains. We let Wx denote the domain of the partial 
recursive function IIx. Consider the set 
{x : x is in Wx}. 
That set is not recursive, but it is recursively enumerable. Consider the set {x. IIx is defined 
for all natural numbers}. 
The latter set is not recursive and is not recursively enumerable either. 
 There are several equivalent characterizations of recursively enumerable sets. One of 
the most useful is that a recursively enumerable set is the range of a total recursive function 
(hence the name “recursively enumerable”). I will not prove this equivalence, but its 
significance should be noted. Suppose that a set has an associated computable function 
defined over all the natural numbers that will list the members of the set. Then and only then 
the set is recursively enumerable. Recursively enumerable sets are those that can be 
generated, or whose members can be listed, algorithmically. 
 Part of Gödel’s achievement was to show that recursive sets can be represented by 
first-order formulas of number theory. For every recursive set S of numbers, there is a 
formula S(x) in the first-order language of number theory such that under the natural 
interpretation of the language in the natural numbers, S is the set of numbers satisfying S(x). 
Similarly, for every recursive set of n-tuples of numbers, there is a formula of number theory 
with n free variables satisfied by just that set. If R is a recursively enumerable set of numbers, 
there is a formula yS(x, y) of number theory such that the extension of yS(x, y) (that is, the 
set of values of the variable x satisfying the formula) is R and the extension of S(x, y) is a 
recursive set of ordered pairs of numbers. 
Study Question 
1. Using the facts just stated, show that if R is the complement of a recursively enumerable 
set, there is a formula yS(x, y) of number theory such that the extension of yS(x, y) is R 
and the extension of S(x, y) is a recursive set of ordered pairs of numbers. 
2. Why is every recursive set recursively enumerable? 
DECISION PROBLEMS 
Every Turing machine is a finite sequence of 4-tuples. The collection of all finite sequences 
of numbers can be enumerated, and so can be put in one-to-one correspondence with the 
natural numbers themselves. So if we fix a vocabulary for input and output, the collection of 
all Turing machines for that alphabet can he enumerated, and in fact the enumeration can be 
done in a way that is intuitively computable. This is one way to see something interesting 
about the set of all computable functions: Since, by Church’s thesis, the set of computable 
functions is just the set of functions that can be computed by Turing machines, and since the 
set of Turing machines is countably infinite, the set of all computable functions over the 
natural numbers is countably infinite. Since, by Cantor’s results, the set of all functions on 
the natural numbers is uncountabty infinite, this means that the computable functions form 
only a tiny fragment of the set of all functions over the natural numbers. And that means 
something very important: for many functions and for many sets, properties, and relations for 
which we wish to have algorithms, it may be that no such algorithms are possible. 
 Let’s consider an example of an uncomputable function. Consider the function f(m, n) 
that assigns 1 to the pair (m, n) if m is the number of a Turing machine that halts on input n, 
and assigns 0 otherwise, Is this function computable? I will prove that it is not by a reductio 
argument that is reminiscent of the procedure used in Cantor’s diagonalization argument 
discussed in chapter 1. 
 Form a infinite table, listing across the top of the table the natural numbers in 
sequence and listing along the right-hand side of the table the recursive functions (or all of 
the Turing machines) in sequence. Fill in the table as follows. If the Turing machine Пi is 
defined on input number j, put a 1 in row i, column j. If, on the other hand, Пi is not defined 
on input number j, put a 0 in row i, column j. The table then looks like the one in figure 12.2. 
 What the table now records in each row is the characteristic function of the domain of 
the recursive function in that row, The ith row, for example, has an entry of 1 for each 
member of the set of numbers for which Пi is defined and an entry of 0 for each member of 
the set of numbers for which Пi is not defined. In my earlier notation, the set of numbers for 
which Пi is defined is Wi, and the set of numbers for which Пi, is not defined is the 
complement set, N – Wi. So, as I said, the ith row of the table simply gives the characteristic 
function of the set Wi. Every set that is the domain of a partial recursive function has its 
characteristic function given by one of the rows of the table. Hence, if there is a set whose 
characteristic function is not given by one of the rows of the table, that set is not the domain 
of a partial recursive function. But we know that every recursively enumerable set is the 
domain of a partial recursive function. Hence, if there is a set whose characteristic function is 
not given by one of the rows or the table, that set is not recursively enumerable. 
 Consider the diagonal of the table. If a 1 occurs in the ith row and ith column of the 
table, then Пi halts on input i. If a 0 occurs in the ith row and ith column of the table, then Пi, 
does not halt on input i. So the diagonal of the table is the characteristic function of the set 
(call it H) of indices of Turing machines that halt when given their own index as input. Now 
consider what happens if, on the diagonal of the table, we replace each 1 with a 0 and each 0 
with a 1. This new counterdiagonal is then the characteristic function of the complement of H 
(because the characteristic function of the complement of any set S is obtained from the 
characteristic function of S by interchanging the values of 1 and 0 in fS). The characteristic 
function of the complement of H therefore does not occur as any of the rows of the table, 
because where the ith row of the table has a 1 in the ith column, the counterdiagonal has a 0, 
and where the ith row of the table has a 0, the counterdiagonal has a 1. So the 
counterdiagonal differs from every row in the table somewhere. Therefore, the 
counterdiagonal, which is the characteristic function of the complement of H, is not the 
domain of any recursive function. Hence the complement of H is not recursively enumerable. 
If f (m, n) were computable, then by Church’s thesis H, and so the complement of H, would 
be recursively enumerable, which is a contradiction. 
 The halting problem gives us one example of a function that is not computable. There 
are many others. Consider the problem of deciding whether an arbitrary first-order formula is 
valid. A decision procedure for that problem is some algorithm for computing a function that 
assigns 1 to a formula if and only if it is a valid first-order formula, and 0 otherwise. Clearly 
there is such a function, but is it a function for which there exists an algorithm? Is it a 
computable function? The answer is no. There is no algorithm that will determine for us 
whether or not an arbitrary first-order formula is valid. That means also that there is no 
algorithm that will determine for us whether an arbitrary first-order argument is valid, and 
therefore we cannot have a mechanical procedure that takes as input a finite list of formulas 
and determines for us whether or not the set consisting of all but the last member of the list 
entails that last member. 
 The philosophical consequences of this result, in combination with Church’s thesis, 
are enormous. It means, for example, that the idea of solving all mathematical problems by an 
algorithm is hopeless. It means that Leibniz’s vision of a calculus in which all knowledge can 
be expressed and its consequences algorithmically obtained must fail. It also means that a 
rich and difficult question emerges that only makes sense given the fact that first-order 
validity is not decidable: Which first-order theories are decidable? That is, which sets of 
sentences have an algorithm that will determine, for any sentence, whether or not it is a 
consequence of the set. Put another way, since theories are deductively closed collections of 
sentences, which theories have computable characteristic functions? These questions form 
what is known in logic as the decision problem. 
 Consider the theory of numbers. Part. of what Gödel proved is that the set of theorems 
of Peano arithmetic is not decidable. Now consider the set of valid Boolean formulas. That 
set is computable. Consider any first-order theory that is both axiomatizable and complete. 
The set of sentences in that theory is computable, and the theory is said to be decidable. It is 
easy to see that if a complete, axiomatizable theory is decidable, then for given any sentence 
in the language of the theory, either that sentence or its denial is in the theory. Since the 
theory is axiomatizable, there is an algorithm that will decide whether or not a sentence is in 
an axiom set for the theory. We can also effectively enumerate all finite sequences of 
sentences in the language and computably determine, for any such sequence, whether or not it 
is a proof from axioms of the theory. For any sentence in the theory, such a proof will exist. 
Thus we can computably enumerate all the proofs from axioms of the theory until we find a 
proof of either a given sentence or its denial. If we find a proof of its denial, our procedure 
reports that the sentence is not in the theory; if we find a proof of the sentence, our procedure 
reports that the sentence is in the theory. So while much that we might wish to compute is not 
computable, many important functions, properties, and relationships are computable. The 
theory of elementary Euclidean geometry, for example, is axiomatizable and complete, and 
hence there is an algorithm that will decide, for any sentence in the language of geometry, 
whether or not the sentence is a theorem of Euclidean geometry. 
 These examples scarcely touch the intricate structure of the decision problem for first-
order theories, a problem that is still an active area of research. 
Study Question 
Consider any axiomatizable first-order theory T with axiom set A. A sentence S is a theorem 
of T if and only if there is a proof of S from A. There is an algorithm that effectively lists all 
of the proofs from A. Explain why the set of theorems of T is recursively enumerable. (Hint: 
consider the relation between a theorem T and a proof S of T.) 
WHAT IS A COMPUTATION? 
Cognitive psychologists sometimes write programs that they intend to be descriptions of the 
computational processes in the human brain. They often view the brain as a biological 
computer from the computations of which human cognitive abilities result. Often the 
psychologists’ programs are intended not only to describe people’s behavior but also to 
describe the very procedures, the very program, that people use in performing a cognitive 
task. Since the “programming language” of the brain must be very different from the LISP or 
Pascal in which the psychologists’ programs are written, the psychologist is tacitly claiming 
that a program in one computational system describes, or is algorithmically equivalent to, a 
program in another computational system. 
 What can such claims mean? We have some idea of what is required for first-order 
theories to be syntactically equivalent when they are formulated in different formal 
languages, but what does it mean for two programs to be equivalent when they are in 
different programming systems’? What makes a particular Pascal program equivalent to one 
LISP program but not to another? Clearly this is a question of fundamental importance for 
making sense of one of the most interesting applications of the computer. In this section I will 
try to sketch an answer. 
 The theory of computability began with two questions that have not been answered: 
What is a computation? What is an algorithm? Rather than answering either one of those 
questions, the development of the theory of computation proceeded by providing specific 
computational systems and then characterizing the computable as whatever can be computed 
in any one of these several systems. But this strategy does not give us any general 
characterization of a computational system, and so it does not give any general 
characterization of the notion of a computation. Nor does it give us a general account of the 
the notion of an algorithm. Each specific computational system gives us the notion of a 
program—for example, the list of instructions of an URM program or the first number on the 
input to a universal Turing machine—but we do not have any characterization of when two 
programs in different computational systems, say an URM program and a program on a 
universal Turing machine, are or are not implementations of one and the same algorithm. 
 We can get a taste of the variety of alternative computational systems by considering 
a few examples. The Pascal and LISP programming languages, when implemented on a 
computing machine, form a computational system. Moreover, they are computational systems 
capable of computing any recursive function if the machine memory can be increased 
whenever more is needed. 
 Consider what can be done with Turing machines. Rather than a Turing machine, 
which has a single tape on which the input, the intermediate work, and the output must all be 
done, we could consider a machine designed like a Turing machine but having several tapes: 
one for input, one for output, and any number for intermediate computations. For any number 
of tapes k, the class of k-tape Turing machines can compute exactly the Turing-computable 
functions, that is, the class of functions computable by a one-tape machine. A different sort of 
computational system is obtained if we introduce probabilities into Turing machines, but the 
class of computable functions is not thereby expanded. 
 It should not be thought that every imaginable computational system will be capable 
of computing the Turing-computable functions. To the contrary, there are many systems that 
can only compute a more restricted class of functions. For example, consider computational 
systems called finite-state automata. A finite-state automaton looks rather like the graph 
representing the machine-state transitions of a Turing machine. There are nodes, including a 
unique, distinguished initial node, and a nonempty set of final nodes. Each node has a certain 
number, say k, of arcs from it to other nodes (including possibly to itself), where k is the same 
number for all nodes and where the k arcs out of a node are given k distinct labels (figure 
12.3). 
 A finite-state automaton executes a computation by taking a finite string of labels as 
input. The automaton begins in the initial state and then follows the arc with the label 
corresponding to the first element of the input string, then the arc with label corresponding to 
the second element of the input string, and so on. The automaton is said to accept the input 
string s if the automaton ends tip in one of its final states. Accepting string s is the same as 
computing a function that assigns 1 to a string if it is accepted and 0 to it otherwise. In 
representations of finite-state automata a final state is represented by a double ring. There are 
Turing-computable functions that cannot be computed by any finite-state automaton. The 
automaton shown will acept any string beginning 01 followed by any finite sequence of 1s. It 
will not accept any string that begins with l or that has two or more occurrences of 0. 
 Such computational structures as finite-state automata have an important role in 
representations of problems that humans might have to solve. Consider, for example, the task 
of making a telescope lens from a glass blank. The blank must be ground, polished, and 
aluminized to make it into a lens. These actions—grinding, polishing, and aluminizing—each 
affect the state of the glass. Moreover, to obtain a suitable lens, the operations must he 
applied in the correct order. If you aluminize the glass, then polish it, then grind it, the result 
will not be a telescope lens but simply a glass ground to the correct shape. In a problem such 
as this, the various states of the glass can be represented by nodes of a finite-state automaton, 
and the alternative actions are each represented by a label (for example, g, p, and a). There is 
a start state, representing the untreated glass blank, and a final state, representing the desired 
state achieved when the appropriate sequence of actions is taken. Each node or state has three 
arcs coming out of it, one arc for each action that could possibly be applied to the glass blank 
in the state represented by the node. 
 We can also consider stochastic finite automata, in which each label corresponds to a 
probability function connecting one node with other nodes. 
 Other computational systems are modeled, at least crudely, on the neural linkages of 
the brain. For example, parallel-distributed-processing or connectionist machines consist of a 
system of nodes connected by arcs. Each node can be on or off. Except for input nodes, 
whether a node is on is a stochastic function of the on/off state of the nodes immediately 
connected to that node. Some of the nodes can record input; that is, the external environment 
determines whether they are on or off. Other nodes are designated as output nodes, and their 
final or equilibrium state after the system has been given some input is the output of the 
system. 
 Clearly, the range of systems that can intelligibly be called “computational” is very 
large and diverse; we have no characterization that provides necessary and sufficient 
conditions for something to be a computational system. Though we have nothing comparable 
to Church’s thesis, we can say something. Many of the computational systems just considered 
have the following features: 
• A finite input vocabulary and a characterization of well-formed strings from this 
vocabulary. 
• A finite output vocabulary and a characterization of well-formed strings from this 
vocabulary. 
• A finite programming vocabulary and a characterization of finite sets of well-formed 
strings, or programs, from this vocabulary. 
• Another finite vocabulary and set of well-formed strings characterizing 
“instantaneous states” of the computing process—including, for URMs, which instruction 
line is active and what numbers are in which registers and, for Turing machines, the location 
of the read/write head, the machine state, and the entries on the tape at a given moment. 
• A computable function that takes each pair consisting of a program and an 
instantaneous state into another instantaneous state. This transition function is often tacit, but 
it is the heart of the matter. In a Turing machine it is the function that executes the machine 
instruction when the machine is in a specific state in which that instruction applies. In most of 
our examples, this function is one to one. 
• A convention about how strings from the input vocabulary, together with a program, 
determine an initial instantaneous state. 
• An analogous convention giving a computable function from programs and 
instantaneous states to the output language. 
 In each case, a computation for a program P and input string s is a sequence of 
instantaneous descriptions. The first member of the sequence is the instantaneous description 
determined by the input string, the program, and the input convention. Subsequent 
instantaneous descriptions are determined by the transition function. The final instantaneous 
description, if there is one, is correlated with an output by the output convention. 
 For computational systems that have these features, we can roughly say what it is for 
two programs in different programming systems to be implementations of the same 
algorithm. Roughly, two programs are algorithmically equivalent if there is a one-to-one 
(recursive) correspondence between their input languages, between their output languages, 
and between the languages in which their instantaneous states are described, and for every 
input s, these correspondences establish a one-to-one correspondence between the 
instantaneous descriptions of the two systems in the computations for the programs and for s. 
In the case of probabilistic machines, the one-to-one correspondence between instantaneous 
state descriptions in computations should preserve the probability measure. That is, the 
probability of any finite sequence of steps in a computation by one program for a given input 
should be the same as the probability of the corresponding finite sequence of steps in a 
computation by the other program for the corresponding input. 
Study Questions 
1. Describe the set of strings that the finite-state automaton for making a telescopic lens 
will accept. 
2. Describe a finite-state automaton that will accept any input that is a sequence of an 
even number of 1s, but no other input. 
3. Describe a finite-state automaton for making a telescopic lens. 
COMPLEXITY 
A problem you are given to solve may be easy or hard, depending on your abilities and your 
knowledge. If you happen already to know the answer to the problem (say you saw the 
answer sheet), the problem is very easy. If you do not, solving the problem may require a lot 
of work. So the intuitive, informal notion we have of the difficulty of a problem makes 
difficulty a relation between persons and tasks; a task is easy or hard not in itself but only for 
some person. 
 There is an obvious notion of the difficulty of a computational task, a notion that is 
likewise relational. Suppose, for example, that we have some total function and a Turing 
machine that can compute that function. If we give a number to the Turing machine as input, 
we will get an output. 1n computing the output, the Turing machine will go through a certain 
number of steps; more exactly, if we write down the sequence of instantaneous descriptions 
of the Turing machine as it goes through the computation, that sequence will have some 
definite number of members. We can use that number, whatever it is, as a measure of the 
effort that the computation requires of the machine. If each step requires the same amount of 
time, the measure can be thought of as a measure of the time required for the computation. 
 Evidently, for one and the same input, different. Turing machines may require 
different numbers of steps. Even machines that compute the very same function may differ in 
the number of computational steps they require. Given any specific Turing machine, we can 
always form another Turing machine that computes the very same function as the first one 
but requires more steps for some inputs. In fact, we can always find a machine that requires 
more steps for every input. We simply have to tack on extra initial states and add state 
transitions that do nothing. 
 It is easy enough to say roughly how difficult it is for a particular Turing machine to 
compute its output for a specific input. But can we say something more general? Suppose we 
have two Turing machines that compute one and the same total function f. Is there some way 
to compare the difficulty they have in computing the function? There is. 
 For each machine T, we look at how the number of computational steps the machine 
takes varies with the size of the input given to the machine. Suppose, for example, that we are 
representing numbers in some base, so each number is represented by a sequence of digits. 
We can measure the size of an input by the number of digits it contains. For any given size, 
there are only a finite number of possible inputs of that size. 
 For inputs of size 1, any particular machine T will require a number of computational 
steps. T might require 10 steps if the input is 0, 15 if the input is 1. Again, for inputs of size 2, 
T will require a number of computational steps, say 12 for 00, 13 for 10, 15 for 11, and 30 for 
01. In principle, we could make a table listing the possible inputs of each size and the number 
of computational steps that T requires for each input (table 12.1). 
 Let’s get the pieces straight. We are considering a Turing machine T that computes a 
function f (x); we have a measure s(x) of the size of inputs; we have a measure c(T, x) of the 
computational cost for T to compute a value from input x. 
 Now if we have two different Turing machines, say M and N, each of which computes 
the same function, we can compare the two functions c(M, x) and c(N, x). It might be, for 
example, that for every input size, c(M, x) > c(N, x). Or it might be that for all but a finite 
number of inputs, c(M, x)> c(i , x). Or it might be that c(N, x) is never greater than c(M, x), 
but c(M, x) > c(N, x) infinitely often. Each of these conditions is distinct, but in each case we 
would be inclined to say that the computation is more difficult for machine N than for 
machine M. Of course, it might turn out that none of these conditions obtain and that we can 
say no more than that for some inputs, M has it easier, and for other inputs, N has it easier. 
 This measure of computational cost is not very precise. it might be that in a real 
machine some steps require more time than others; it might be that in a real machine some 
steps get faster (or slower) if they are repeated. But we have at least a crude way of 
comparing the time requirements of different machines, and thus of comparing the difficulty 
they have in computation. 
 Here is a more difficult issue. We have made some sense of the notion of the 
difficulty of a problem as a relation between a task and a problem solver. We have even made 
some sense of the difficulty or complexity for the infinite set of tasks involved in computing a 
function: each input presents what we might call a problem instance, and the problem as a 
whole is to be able to compute the value of a given function for every input. That task may be 
more difficult for some Turing machines that compute the function than for others. We have 
not yet, however, characterized the intrinsic difficulty of a problem. We know that some 
functions are simply not computable, but of computable functions, we still do not have a way 
to say that some are intrinsically more difficult to compute than others. We have not yet 
found a way to clarify difficulty as a property of computational tasks themselves, rather than 
as a relation between a problem and a problem solver. We can do so. 
 For each input size there is an input for which the number of computational steps that 
T requires is the largest, or at least as large as any other. For inputs of size 1, the biggest 
value of the number of computational steps T requires for inputs of that size is 15; for inputs 
of size 2, the largest value is 30. So we can construct another table (table 12.2). And we have 
a function, call it W(T, s), that measures the computational cost for T of the most difficult 
input of size s. The function W(T, s) enables us to begin to talk more systematically about the 
difficulties of computation. In general, W(T, s) will increase as s increases, but not always. 
 For a given Turing machine, W(T s) may he quite a ragged function not easy to 
describe. But we can ask about functions that hound W(T, s). That is, we can ask whether a 
given well-behaved function of s is always greater than W(T, s). For example, we can ask 
whether the function g(s) = as + c, where a and c are constants, is such that g(s) > W(T, s) for 
all s. If that is true for some a and c, then we say that W(T, s) is linearly bounded. Or we 
might ask whether there is any polynomial function of s, call it P(s), such that for all s, P(s) > 
W(T, s). If there is, we say that W(T, s) is polynomially hounded. Again, we might ask 
whether there is any exponential function, call it X(s), such that X(s) > W(T, s) for all s. If so, 
W(T, s) is exponentially bounded (see figure 12.4). We also say that T computes the function 
in polynomial time or exponential time. 
 Recall that the issue is whether there is a way to describe how difficult it is to 
compute a computable function. We are interested in a notion of difficulty that is not a 
relation between the function to be computed and the machine that computes it but is instead 
a property of the function itself. We know that if we have a Turing machine that computes a 
function with a worst-case computational difficulty given by the function W(T, s), we can 
always build a Turing machine that has a harder time of it. By adding extra steps to T that do 
nothing useful, we can always find a machine T' such that W(T, s) < W(T', s) for all s. It is 
easy enough to find a machine that computes a given function in a harder way, but it isn’t 
always easy, or even possible, to find a machine that computes a given function in a 
sufficiently easy way. There is, for example, no guarantee that for an arbitrary f we can find 
a Turing machine such that W(T, s) is polynomially bounded. Whether or not such a Turing 
machine exists depends on the function f. Similarly, whether or not there is a Turing machine 
that computes f such that W(T, s) is exponentially bounded depends on f. 
Definition We say that a computable function is computable in polynomial time if there is a 
Turing machine T that computes f and such that W(T, s) is polynomially bounded. 
Definition We say that a computable function is computable in exponential time if there is 
a Turing machine T that computes f and such that W(T, s) is exponentially bounded. 
 Clearly, every function computable in polynomial time is also computable in 
exponential time, but the converse is probably not true. This classification of computable 
functions orders them by their intrinsic difficulty. 
 If a function is computable in exponential but rrot in polynomial time, we may expect 
that no Turing machine will offer a feasible means of computing the function. Every Turing 
machine that computes such a function will require exponentially increasing time for some 
inputs as the problem instances become larger. We can see what happens with a simple 
example. Suppose that W(T, s) is of the order of l0s. Then for the most difficult instances of 
each size, the time required increases as in table 12.3, or graphically as in figure 12.5. 
 Are there any interesting computable functions of the exponential class? There are a 
great many functions whose computation is of enormous practical importance that, so far as 
we know, are in this class. Since our interest here is principally in the theory of rationality, 
consider an example germane to that theory. We know that there is an algorithm that, given 
any well-formed Boolean formula p compounded of n variables, will determine whether or 
not p is made true by any assignment of truth values to the propositional variables in p. In 
principle, we could implement any such algorithm on a Turing machine. But every known 
algorithm for this problem requires a number of steps that increases exponentially as n 
increases. 
 Something more remarkable is true. Suppose that we fix the number of simple 
sentences or sentential variables at any number k > 2, and suppose that we measure the size 
of a problem by the length of (that is, the number of symbols occurring in) a sentential 
formula. Then every known algorithm that decides the consistency of Boolean formulas (that 
is, whether or not there exists an assignment of truth values to the variables of a formula that 
makes the formula true) requires computational time that, in the worst case, increases 
exponentially with size. 
 There are thousands of other problems for which every known algorithm is worst-
case-exponential (if implemented on a Turing machine). Some of them are quite simple. 
Recall that a graph is any nonempty collection of nodes or vertices, some pairs of which may 
be connected by lines. A connected pair of vertices is said to be adjacent. Consider the 
following problem: determine for any graph whether or not each of its vertices can be given 
one of three colors so that no two adjacent vertices have the same color. So far as we know, 
in the worst case the number of steps any Turing machine will require to solve this problem 
increases exponentially. 
 Up to this point I have ignored an important question: What is special about Turing 
machines? That a function is exponential may be a property of that function, but it isn’t a 
very interesting function if some computational system other than Turing machines can 
compute the function in polynomial time. What about multitape Turing machines or Turing 
machines with several read/write heads or URMs or random-access-memory machines, like 
ordinary computers? The particular computational bound (for the worst case) for a function 
depends on the class of machines considered. For example, if a function is computed by a 
two-tape Turing machine with a worst-case time bound W(T, s), then some one-tape Turing 
machine will compute the same function with a worst-case time bound of W(T, s)2. Moreover, 
there are functions for which any Turing-machine computation requires (up to a constant 
times) the square of the time that a two-tape machine requires. 
 The fact that different kinds of computational systems will have different worst-case 
bounds for one and the same function suggests that there is no intrinsic measure of the 
complexity of a function that is independent of the computational system considered. While 
that is true, it is not as serious as it seems, since some important distinctions do appear to be 
invariant. For example, whether or not a function is computable in polynomial time seems to 
be invariant over all familiar computational systems. We can’t claim this invariance as a 
mathematical fact, since we do not know exactly what the class of computational systems 
includes, but every computational system we know of seems to have this property. 
 Another important question I have ignored has to do with the focus on the most 
difficult case in assessing the complexity of a computational task. There are algorithms that 
are used everyday without difficulty but. that are worst-case-exponential. The practical 
success of these algorithms is due not to the fact that the inputs given to them are small but 
rather to the fact that the computationally difficult cases of any large size are very rare. 
 Probability and decision theory suggest an alternative way to measure the intrinsic 
difficulty of computing a function. For a given function f, a given size measure s, and a 
Turing machine T that computes f, consider the average number of computational steps that T 
requires for inputs of size s. 
Definition Denote the average number of computational steps that T requires for inputs of 
size s by E(T s), and call it the expected complexity of T for inputs of size s. 
 E(T, s) can be regarded as a function of s. We can now ask about any computable 
function f and any function g(s), which may be a linear function, a polynomial function, an 
exponential function, etc., whether or not there exists a Turing machine such that E(T, s) < 
g(s). This mathematical apparatus enables us to compare expected computational complexity 
and worst-case computational complexity for one and the same function. If a function has a 
very low expected complexity, it may in practice be feasible to compute the function even 
though its worst-case complexity is very high. In fact, that sometimes turns out to be the case. 
 Consider again the three-color graph problem discussed earlier. Every known 
algorithm for deciding the problem is worst-case-exponential. But there is an algorithm for 
solving the problem that has constant expected complexity. The constant is not even very 
large: 192. What happens is that as the size of the graph increases, the proportion of graphs 
whose three-colorability is difficult to assess decreases exponentially. While there are always 
hard cases, they become increasingly rare. Here is another kind of problem where 
comparisons of worst-case and expected complexity can be surprising. Let me put this one in 
the form of a puzzle: 
 Consider the products of the BVD company. BVD (Bank Vaults by Dumbo) makes 
bank vaults. They make combination locks with as many dials and as many numbers on each 
dial as the buyer wishes. Their locks don’t work in the usual way, however. For a lock with 
one dial having k settings, for example, the BVD company chooses at random a subset of the 
set of all k settings and fixes the lock so that it will open if and only if the dial is set to a 
number that is in the chosen subset. All subsets are equally probable. if a lock is preferred 
that has several dials, say ten of them, the BVD company will consider the set S of all 
sequences s1, ... , s10 of dial settings, where the first number is the number of a setting of the 
first dial, the second that of the second dial, and so on. BVD then chooses a subset of S at 
random and arranges the lock so that it will open when and only when the dials are set on a 
sequence in this subset, Again, all subsets are equally probable. BVD advertises, truthfully, 
that in the worst case the difficulty in cracking its vaults increases exponentially with the 
number of dials on the vault door. For consider the cases in which the subset that opens the 
vault consists of a single sequence of dial settings. In those cases, if there are k dial settings 
and m dials, there are km sequences of settings. A safecracker who knows nothing about the 
combination other than the general procedure by which BVD makes locks cannot do any 
better than to enumerate all of the possible sequences and try them one after another. In the 
worst case (worst, that is, for the safecracker), the true combination will be the last one in the 
enumeration, and so he will have had to try km sequences. On the basis of this convincing 
argument, BVD sold a great many vaults, The Enumeration Boys, a gang of safe-crackers, 
started specializing in cracking BVD vaults using an enumeration procedure like the one 
BVD claimed to be worst-case-exponential. They attempted to crack a great many BVD 
vaults, and they preferred vaults with a large number of dials because these vaults cost more 
and usually contained more loot than cheaper vaults. On the average, how many 
combinations (that is, how many trial settings of each dial) did the Enumeration Boys have to 
test before they found one that opened a BVD vault? The answer is that on the average the 
Enumeration Boys require no more than two guesses to open. a BVD safe! 
Review Questions 
1. Define the term “algorithm.” 
2. Describe Hilbert’s conception of metamathematics. 
3. Discuss the implications of Gödel’s theorem. 
4. Characterize a Turing machine. Characterize a finite-state automaton. 
5. State Church’s thesis. 
6. Distinguish between recursive and recursively enumerable sets. 
7. What is the characteristic function of a set? 
8. What are some commonly shared characteristics of computational systems? 
9. What does it mean for one function to be bounded by another? 
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Numbers of computational steps required by T for various inputs 
Input No. of computational steps required by T 
0 10 
1 15 
00 12 
10 13 
01 30 
11 15 
Table 12.2 
Largest number of steps required by T for various sizes of input 
Size of input Largest no. of steps T requires for input of 
that size 
1 15 
2 30 
Table 12.3 
The computational cost for T of inputs of various sizes 
s W(T, s) = 10s 
1 10 
2 100 
3 1,000 
4 10,000 
5 100,000 
6 1,000,000 
7 10,000,000 
8 100,000,000 
9 1,000,000,000 
 
  
Chapter 13 
THE COMPUTATIONAL CONCEPT OF MIND 
INTRODUCTION 
 Thomas Hobbes didn’t think of computation as an aid to reasoning. Reasoning, he 
held, is computation. Hobbes thought of our brains as composed of particles. The particles 
somehow serve as counters, as in an abacus, and ideas, or thoughts, are represented as 
numbers by these counters. When we reason, our brains do arithmetic. 
 There were no computers when Hobbes wrote, and no theory of computation. 
Experimental methods had only begun to be applied in the natural sciences, and not at all to 
questions of psychology. Hobbes’s vision could not then constitute a project that people 
could pursue. 
 The science of psychology developed rapidly in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. In the late nineteenth century a number of neuropsychologists and 
psychiatrists developed the notion that the brain is a kind of machine in which nerve cells 
function as computational units and in which thoughts and desires are represented by physical 
states and processes in the brain. Perhaps the most prominent figure in this tradition was 
Sigmund Freud, whose early psychological work was premised explicitly on such 
assumptions. 
 The logical revolution inaugurated by Frege toward the end of the nineteenth century 
gave Hobbes’s vision new support of a different kind. Frege’s logic showed how to make 
theories of many kinds formally explicit, and it led Gödel, Church, and Turing to the modern 
formal theory of computational procedures. Even before the work of these men, Rudolf 
Carnap had applied Frege’s system to produce an explicit procedural theory of cognitive 
states and features. 
 Hobbes’s conception was remarkably prescient. It is nearly the conception of 
contemporary cognitive psychology, or “information-processing psychology” as it is 
sometimes called. The contemporary restatement of the view was developed by many people, 
but foremost by Allen Newell and Herbert Simon. Today it is a conception endorsed by most 
people (including psychologists, linguists, philosophers, computer scientists, and engineers) 
working on the topics vaguely characterized as “cognitive science.” It forms a diverse 
intellectual project that occupies thousands of people. Our task in this chapter is to try to 
understand that project a little more fully. 
THE COMPUTATIONAL CONCEPTION OF MIND 
The description of a computational system requires a lot of structure. An input-output 
“convention” is required, a means for describing instantaneous states of the system, and a 
“transition function” that determines which states succeed which other states. In any physical 
realization of a computational system, these various formal structures must be realized by 
real, physical structures that somehow carry out the tasks formally described in the 
computational model. Any physical computer that is also to be an actor in the world will 
require transducers that turn physical effects into discrete input. It will require a mechanism 
(like the Turing machine’s tape or the URM’s registers) for storing information. It will 
require some physical means for implementing the transition function: the physical computer 
will have to make the appropriate states arise after one another. It will require other 
transducers to turn computational output into action, into motion in the physical world. 
 The project of cognitive science is to understand us as computational systems of this 
kind. To get a sense of the difficulty of the task, it may help to indulge your imagination. 
Suppose that an alien with a sophisticated understanding of computation came to study IBM 
personal computers. The alien, for whatever reasons, can’t talk to us or to IBM or read 
descriptions of IBM computers. 
 What would the alien find? Well, for one thing, IBM personal computers are pretty 
much alike physically. For another, IBM computers exhibit a considerable range of different 
behaviors. The differences are subtle and have to do with what appears on the screen when 
the keyboard is struck. The alien might reasonably conclude that the keyboard and the screen 
are transducers, devices that change physical interactions with the environment into 
computational data structures, or vice versa. On that assumption, if the alien were a pretty 
good engineer, some idea could be obtained of the input and output conventions of the 
computational system. But how could the alien explain the enormous differences in the 
behaviors of different computers? 
 From a computational point of view, different behavior is to be expected if the many 
different IBM computers have different programs. So the alien must try to separate the 
capacities and dispositions of IBM personal computers that are general from those that are 
specialized and have to do with the particular programs that have been entered into the 
various computers. 
 The cognitive psychologist’s task is roughly similar to the alien’s. We humans are 
pretty similar physically. We exhibit a wide range of different patterns of behavior. The 
psychologist has a fair idea as to which of our organs—eyes and ears and such—are 
transducers but not a very clear idea at all as to the code of the computational inputs produced 
by physical stimuli or outputs producing physical action. Each human behaves a little 
differently from every other human because of different physical capacities, but more 
important, each human behaves a little differently from other humans because of a different 
history of inputs to the computational system. The psychologist assumes that all of us are 
born with a program wired into us, as it were; psychologists sometimes call this fundamental 
computational structure our functional architecture. What our innate program does is altered 
by our experience. In the same way, the IBM personal computer is born with a kind of 
universal program determined by its computational structure, and it acquires other more 
specific capacities when other programs, such as an operating system, are entered into it. 
 From the perspective of cognitive science, then, we are like the androids of science 
fiction; the only respect in which we are unlike androids is that no one deliberately fashioned 
us. We arose through natural processes. Not surprisingly, many people do not especially like 
this view of us. We will consider some of the arguments that have been advanced against it. 
THE ARGUMENT OF LUCAS AND PENROSE 
A version of the following argument was advanced some years ago by the philosopher John 
Lucas and has been restated with a slightly different emphasis by Roger Penrose, a 
distinguished mathematical physicist. Here is the argument in Lucas’s own words. (In reading 
the argument, it may help if you understand “consistent formal system” as “consistent theory” 
and “provable-in-the-system” as “theorem of the theory.”) 
 Gödel’s theorem states that in any consistent system which is strong enough to 
produce simple arithmetic there are formulae which cannot be proved-in-the-system, but 
which we can see to be true. Essentially, we consider the formula which says, in effect, “This 
formula is unprovable-in-the-system.” If this formula were provable-in-the-system, we 
should have a contradiction: for, if it were provable-in-the-system then it would not be 
unprovable-in-the-system, so that “This formula is unprovable-in-the-system” would be false; 
equally, if it were provable-in-the-system, then it would not be false, but would be true, since 
in any consistent system nothing false can be proved-in-the-system, but only truths. So the 
formula “This formula is unprovable-in-the-system” is not-provable-in-the-system, but 
unprovable-in-the-system. Further, if the formula “This formula is unprovable-in-the-system” 
is unprovable-in-the-system, then it is true. ... 
 The foregoing argument is very fiddling, and difficult to grasp fully. The whole labor 
of Gödel’s theorem is to show that there is no catch anywhere, and that the result can be 
established by the most rigorous deduction; it holds for all formal systems which are (i) 
consistent, (ii) adequate for simple arithmetic, i.e., contain the natural numbers and the 
operations of addition and multiplication, and it shows that they are incomplete, i.e., contain 
unprovable, though perfectly meaningful formulae, some of which, moreover, we, standing 
outside the system, can see to be true. 
 Gödel’s theorem must apply to cybernetical machines, because it is of the essence of 
being a machine, that it should be a concrete instantiation of a formal system. It follows that 
given any machine which is consistent and capable of doing simple arithmetic, there is a 
formula which it is incapable of producing as being true, i.e., the formula is unprovable-in-
the-system, but which we can see to be true. It follows that no machine can he a complete or 
adequate model of the mind, that minds are essentially different from machines.1 
 The crux of Lucas’s argument is in the first sentence and the last paragraph. The stuff 
in between is to remind you of what he is talking about. 
 Many philosophical arguments that seem to establish something of great importance 
from assumptions of very little importance give that appearance by confusing the reader. The 
confusion is often in a “fudge phrase” which has no one exact sense or several exact senses 
between which the argument equivocates. In Lucas’s argument the fudge phrase is “which we 
can see to be true.” 
 Gödel did not prove that for every consistent formal system adequate for arithmetic, 
there is a sentence of arithmetic that is not a theorem of the system but that we can see to be 
true. There are no theorems of logic or mathematics about what we can see to be true. Gödel 
might have proved either of two things: 
1. For every consistent theory adequate for Peano arithmetic, there exists a sentence that is 
true of the natural numbers but is not a theorem of the theory. 
2. There exists an algorithm that, for every consistent theory adequate for Peano arithmetic, 
finds a sentence that is true of the natural numbers but is not a theorem of the theory. (This is 
the logically stronger claim.) 
 The first claim does not at all imply that, given a description of a consistent formal 
system adequate for arithmetic, we have the power to find a truth of arithmetic not entailed by 
the system. The first claim implies that such a sentence exists, not that it can be produced by 
us or by an algorithm. So if the first claim is what Gödel proved, then Gödel’s theorem 
provides no support for Lucas’s assumption that we have the power to locate, for each 
consistent theory adequate for arithmetic, a truth of arithmetic that the theory does not entail. 
Hence the first claim provides no support for his conclusion. 
 If the second claim is true and if, as Lucas says, given any theory adequate for 
arithmetic, we have the power to find a truth of arithmetic that is not a theorem of that theory, 
then a machine can do the same thing we can. The machine need only compute the algorithm 
that Gödel proved to exist.2 Either way, Gödel’s theorem does nothing to support the 
conclusion that humans are not computationally bounded. (Actually, Gödel proved the 
second, stronger claim.) 
Study Question 
Lucas says, “In any consistent system nothing false can be proved-in-the-system, but only 
truths.” By “system” he means a formal first-order theory. Explain why his claim is false. 
ARE MENTAL STATES IN THE HEAD? 
What, in the computational conception of mind, are mental states? The computational 
conception says that cognitive capacities are computational capacities and that in exercising 
those capacities, we are executing a computer program, because we are nature’s androids. 
That of itself says nothing exact about what thoughts are, or wishes or beliefs or any of the 
mental states that we attribute to ourselves and to others. 
 One proposal that fits rather naturally with the computational concept of mind is that 
mental states are computational states. Under the computational conception of mind, if we 
were fully to describe the cognitive structure of a person, we would specify an elaborate 
computer program, or perhaps a set of programs. Perhaps to each mental state of the person, 
e.g., to the desire for a pineapple, there would correspond a syntactic or formal feature of 
instantaneous descriptions of the person’s computational system. The person would be in a 
state of desiring a pineapple whenever the person was also in a computational state that had 
that feature, whatever it might be. 
 We know that a computational system, abstractly described, has many possible 
physical realizations. With Turing machines, for example, we can use paper tape or plastic 
tape; it makes no difference. A recent article in Scientific American (in an April Fools’ issue) 
shows how to make the components of digital central processing and memory units from 
ropes and pulleys. If features of a computational system that a person realizes characterize 
mental states, then perhaps the sensible view is that anything, any physical system at all, that 
realizes the same computational system as does a person will have the same mental states. 
Thus, as Ned Block, a contemporary philosopher, once pointed out, according to 
functionalism, if all the people in China got out flashlights some dark night and sent signals 
to one another, perfectly imitating the signals between neurons in a fragment of one person’s 
brain, and if those neural signals in that person’s brain constituted an instance of a mental 
state, then the system consisting of all the people of China flashing signals to one another 
would also have that mental state. 
 We already know this view of mental states as functionalism. Although it was a 
creation of philosophers (in fact, the view can be found among Christian philosophers as 
early as the fifth century A.D.), it corresponds nicely to what some artificial intelligence 
researchers like to say. John McCarthy, the inventor of LISP, was once asked whether a 
thermostat has beliefs. His reply was that the thermostat was capable of three beliefs: “Its too 
cold in here,” “Its too hot in here,” “Its just about right in here.” 
 Hilary Putnam, who was one of the first to articulate the functionalist view of mental 
states in computational terms, subsequently produced an argument to show that mental states 
cannot be computational states. The argument is as follows: 
 We can consistently imagine that there exists somewhere a planet that is the twin of 
Earth. Everything happens exactly as on Earth, but with one difference. On this planet water 
is not H2O, but something else, maybe deuterium oxide. Anyway, everything happens on 
Twin Earth as on Earth. So when I want a drink of water, my double on Twin Earth also 
wants a drink of water. When that happens, we are both in the very same computational state. 
But are we in the same mental state? Arguably not. For our mental states, in this case our 
wants, have a content, which is that some proposition be true. If we want different 
propositions to be true, then the mental states consisting of those wants must also be 
different. But the proposition that I want true is not the same as the proposition that my 
double on Twin Earth wants true when we are in the computational state that he and I both 
describe as wanting a drink of water. For my word “water” denotes H2O, while my double’s 
word “water” denotes something else. Hence the propositions we want to be true, the 
circumstances we want realized, are different. Indeed, I might be very unhappy if, instead of 
a drink of H2O, I received a drink of whatever my double calls “water.” Since the contents of 
our wants are different, we cannot be in the same mental state. But we are, by assumption, in 
the same computational state. Therefore, our mental states, my double’s and mine, are not 
identical with our computational states. But if in the actual world mental states are identical 
with computational states, then in every possible world they must also be identical, because 
identity is a relation between entities (or properties) that, if true, is necessarily true, and what 
is necessarily true is true in every possible world. 
 We might object to this argument at length. Suppose, however, that we grant it and 
allow that mental states are not, or at least not all, in the head. Mental states are not 
computational states. Instead, mental states are pairs, consisting of a computational state and 
a semantic relation of some kind. The Twin Earth argument imagines a case where the first 
element of the pair is the same but the second element is different: features of the 
computational state denote different properties for me and my double. 
 It seems a bit mean that some philosophers maintain that this result about mental 
states constitutes a difficulty for the computational conception of mind (after all, 
psychologists didn’t invent the functionalist doctrine; philosophers did!). The argument goes 
like this: Psychology is about mental life and its relation to behavior. But mental life consists 
of a sequence of mental states. Mental slates in turn are not features of people’s 
computational states, or of their computational states and behavior. The Twin Earth argument 
shows that mental states depend on semantic features, that is, on relations of denotation 
between symbols and features of the world, on relations of synonymy, and so on. Semantic 
relations in turn are at least in part a social creation. What words and phrases denote, which 
words and phrases are synonymous with each other, and so on, is at least in part (presumably 
in large part) the result of social practice. Hence the study of mental life cannot be separated 
from the study of society as a whole, and the idea of a cognitive science that confines its 
attention to individual behavior and individual computational processes rests on a mistake. 
 Should cognitive psychologists, faced with this argument, give up their enterprise and 
start doing sociology? I don’t think so. The idea is that each instantiation of a mental state has 
two parts. One part is an instantiation of a computational or functional state consisting in 
momentary (or enduring) physical features of someone’s brain, while the other part is an 
instance of a semantic relation between the person, or the physical features of the person’s 
brain that constitute the instantiation of the computational state, and the rest of the world. 
Cognitive psychology often tries to study the first part, not the second. Why shouldn’t it? 
Every psychologist is embedded in the society as fully as are her subjects. The psychologist 
knows what words mean and how to use them. Part of the competence of the psychologist is a 
social facility that does not have to be stated in an explicit theory and is not itself the subject 
of the psychologist’s study. The psychologist, simply by being a member of society, has a 
practical knowledge of the second part of mental states—the relations of denotation, 
synonymy, and so forth—in almost every case. Her interest is in discovering the functional 
architecture of the brain and the rules by which the first parts of mental states succeed one 
another and interact with behavior. Nothing in the Twin Earth argument shows that there is 
no such architecture or that there are no such rules or that the psychologist cannot find them. 
Study Question 
Does the Twin Earth argument assume the Cartesian principle that if one can imagine that p 
then p is possible? 
THE CHINESE ROOM 
Cognitive psychologists and computer scientists interested in artificial intelligence sometimes 
do the following sort of thing. They find some interesting and complex human capacity that 
requires intelligence, and they write a computer program that, when executed, simulates that 
activity. The construction of the computer program might take into account, and attempt to be 
faithful to, human accounts of how the capacity is carried out. So one might simulate chess 
players, or one might simulate the puzzle-solving activities of experts and amateurs, whether 
at games or at textbook problems; one might even simulate the kind of understanding that 
people have when they read newspaper articles on various topics. One might, for example, 
write a program that will read articles on airplane hijackings and answer questions about the 
articles, questions that require the kind of inferences that we humans make. Or one might 
write a program that knows what to say and what to expect when ordering in a restaurant. 
Programs of all of these kinds have been written. 
 The aim of these simulations is often to attempt to give an explanation of how it is 
that humans are able to do what they do. The explanation offered is that we do what we do by 
executing a computer program like the one used in the simulation. Of course, if we execute 
such a program, it is internal to us, and we may not execute it deliberately, although there 
may be elements of deliberateness, as in problem solving. Some artificial-intelligence 
workers go on to say that if the computer program correctly describes the procedure that 
humans follow when they exercise the capacity being simulated, then the computer genuinely 
has that capacity as well: the computer understands or thinks or whatever. This view goes 
quite naturally with functionalism and is even consistent with the view that a mental state is a 
pair consisting of a computational state and a semantic relation. 
 John Searle, a philosopher, produced an argument against both of the views in the 
preceding paragraph. He used as his example programs written by Roger Schank, a computer 
scientist, designed to simulate reading and understanding a story. Schank’s programs could 
answer reasonable questions about stories they were given on a particular topic. Searle denies 
(a) that the machine can literally be said to understand the story and provide answers to 
questions and (b) that what the machine and its program do explains the human ability to 
understand the story and answer questions about it. 
 Searle’s objection is not to Schank’s programs in particular but to all and any 
computer programs that, when implemented, are said to understand or to explain human 
understanding. Searle’s argument is in the form of another thought experiment. Suppose that 
he is locked in a room with a large batch of Chinese writing, which he does not understand, 
since he does not understand Chinese. After this first batch of Chinese writing (the story), he 
is given another batch of Chinese script (the questions), and a set of rules, written in English, 
for producing Chinese script in response to the second batch of Chinese writing, the 
questions. He can follow the rules, even though he has no idea what the Chinese characters 
mean, because he can recognize and copy their shapes, and that is all that the rules, written in 
English, require him to do. 
 To complicate the story a little bit, imagine that these people also give me stories in 
English which I understand, and they then ask me questions in English about these stories and 
I give them back answers in English. Suppose also that after a while I get so good at 
following the instructions for manipulating the Chinese symbols and the programmers get so 
good at writing the programs that from the external point of view—that is, from the point of 
view of somebody outside the room in which I am locked—my answers to the questions are 
indistinguishable from those of native Chinese speakers. Nobody looking at my answers can 
tell that I don’t speak a word of Chinese. ... From the external point of view, from the point of 
view of someone reading my “answers,” the answers to the Chinese questions and the 
English questions arc equally good. But in the Chinese case, unlike the English case, I 
produce the answers by manipulating uninterpreted formal symbols. As far as the Chinese is 
concerned, I simply behave like a computer. ... For the purposes of the Chinese, I am simply 
an instantiation of the computer program.3 
 Now Searle claims that it is obvious that he does not understand Chinese, even 
though he is, in this thought experiment, an instantiation of a computer program that behaves 
as though it understands Chinese. Hence it is false that a system can have mental states and 
understanding simply by instantiating the right program and exhibiting the right behavior. 
Furthermore, he claims, these examples give us good reasons to doubt that a computer 
simulation contributes anything toward explaining understanding. 
 In the Chinese case, Searle has everything that artificial intelligence can put into him 
by way of a program, and he understands nothing. In the English case, he understands 
everything, and there is so far no reason at all to suppose that his understanding has anything 
to do with computer programs, i.e., with computational operations on purely formally 
specified elements. As long as the program is defined in terms of computational operations 
on purely formally defined elements, what the example suggests is that such operations by 
themselves have no interesting connection with understanding. They are not sufficient 
conditions, and not the slightest reason has been given to suppose that they are necessary 
conditions or even that they make a significant contribution to understanding. Notice that the 
force of the argument is not that different machines can have the same input and output while 
operating on different formal principles—that is not the point at all—but rather that whatever 
purely formal principles you put into the computer will not be sufficient for understanding, 
since a human will be able to follow the formal principles without understanding anything. 
 Searle claims that the human brain has special “causal powers” that produce 
understanding, intentionality, and mental states, and we have no reason to think that any 
computer executing a program that simulates human behavior has any such powers: 
“Could a machine think?” My own view is that only a machine could think, and 
indeed only very special kinds of machines, namely brains and machines that had the 
same causal powers as brains. And that is the main reason why strong AI has had 
little to tell us about thinking: it has nothing to tell us about machines. By its own 
definition it is about programs, and programs are not machines. Whatever else 
intentionality is, it is a biological phenomenon and it is as likely to be as causally 
dependent on the specific biochemistry of its origins as lactation, photosynthesis, or 
any other biological phenomena. No one would suppose that we could produce milk 
and sugar by running a computer simulation of the formal sequences in lactation and 
photosynthesis; but where the mind is concerned, many people are willing to believe 
in such a miracle, because of a deep and abiding dualism: the mind they suppose is a 
matter of formal processes and is independent of specific material causes in the way 
that milk and sugar are not. 
 In defense of this dualism, the hope is often expressed that the brain is a digital 
computer. ... But that is no help. Of course the brain is a digital computer. ... The point is that 
the brain’s causal capacity to produce intentionality cannot consist in its instantiating a 
computer program, since for any program you like it is possible for something to instantiate 
that program and still not have any mental states. Whatever it is that the brain does to produce 
intentionality, it cannot consist of instantiating a program, since no program by itself is 
sufficient for intentionality.4 
 There are several ways to view Searle’s argument. In one perspective the argument 
might be viewed as an instance of the general argument against the reduction of meanings 
considered in chapter 10. More directly, however, Searle’s argument appears to be an 
instance of the Cartesian fallacy: I can imagine that p. Therefore, p is possible. Let us 
consider this aspect a little more fully. 
 Searle is surely correct that even if we execute procedures in the process of 
understanding, not every possible system that executes those same procedures will 
understand. But no one ever seriously thought differently. An important aspect of many 
actions is the time it takes. A system that executes the very same computational procedures 
that I carry out in catching a baseball or reading a story or solving a problem but that takes 
considerably longer than I do to carry out those procedures does not do what I do. Nor does a 
system that carries out the same procedures I do but remarkably faster. Behavioral 
equivalence implies approximate temporal equivalence. The advocates of machine 
intelligence never meant (or never should have meant) that a system that takes thousands of 
years to parse a sentence understands English. The only interesting and plausible thesis for 
artificial intelligence is that systems that carry out the appropriate formal procedures on 
symbols that have the appropriate semantic roles, and do so in such a way as to approximate 
human behavior, understand. To approximate human behavior, the procedures must be 
executed with sufficient speed. 
 We can certainly imagine that Searle in a locked room can carry out instructions fast 
enough to simulate a Chinese speaker. But that does not entail that Searle in a locked room 
can possibly carry out instructions fast enough to simulate a Chinese speaker, and in fact, it 
seems quite unlikely that Searle could possibly do so. The range of topics over which a 
Chinese speaker can converse is enormous and unbounded. We can imagine that Searle has a 
huge set of volumes that list the correspondences between questions and answers in Chinese 
script (depending, of course, in complicated ways on what exchanges took place previously). 
Searle can’t look them up fast enough to simulate a Chinese speaker. He can’t memorize 
them either, any more than a child could learn English by memorizing all of the well-formed 
English sentences he might ever meet. If by “instantiating” a program that describes human 
behavior we mean instantiating it so that it can be executed rapidly enough to simulate human 
behavior in “real” time, then Searle’s implicit claim that any program can be instantiated by 
having a human manipulate formal symbols seems to be flatly false. 
 The brain does have special causal powers. But perhaps the question about 
computation and intentionality is whether the special causal power of the brain is simply the 
power to compute certain programs rapidly enough. Perhaps nothing save an organic 
computer can compute the brain’s programs rapidly enough to produce human behavior. Or, 
to the contrary, perhaps other systems, made of silicon and optical fibers or whatever, can. 
But still, no human trying to execute such a program given as a set of deliberate instructions 
can. 
 These considerations don’t show that Searle’s thesis is false, if his thesis is that 
computational structure is not the cause of intentionality and understanding and that the 
biological features that cause intentionality and understanding merely happen to have a 
computational structure, or perhaps even cause or constitute an instance of that computational 
structure. He could be correct. It might even be the case that there are physically possible 
systems that compute as we do and as fast as we do, but that don’t feel, intend, or understand 
at all. Nothing has been established on either side. 
CHALLENGES OF THE COMPUTATIONAL CONCEPTION OF MIND 
We have looked at several arguments that attempt to show that there is something wrong with 
the very idea of cognitive science as it is now pursued, or something incoherent in the 
computational conception of mind. None of these arguments succeed, or even come close to 
succeeding. That does not show that the computational conception of mind is free of troubles: 
In fact, it has two very different challenges: there are too many possible computational 
theories of mind, and there are too few. The challenges for the computational theory of mind 
are not conceptual, they don’t have to do with some subtle puzzle that has been overlooked. 
They are empirical; they have to do with whether and how the truth about mind can be 
discovered by observation and experiment. 
 One can get a sense of how difficult it is to find a computational account of mind by 
considering what is called the frame problem. To illustrate the problem, I will use an example 
due to the contemporary philosopher Daniel Dennett. 
 Imagine a robot that must get its spare battery from a room. It enters the room and 
finds its battery, and a bomb, both on a wagon. So it pulls the wagon from the room. The 
battery comes along, but so does the bomb. Result: no robot. The robot’s problem is that it 
does not understand the consequences of its actions. It understands that pulling the wagon 
will bring the battery along, but not that it will bring along any other medium size object 
resting stably on the wagon. So we might give the robot a complete theory of the 
consequences of its actions. Let us suppose the theory specifies, for any action the robot 
might take, all of the circumstances that will change in consequence and all of the 
circumstances that will not change because of that action. The new robot enters the room and 
considers whether or not to pull the wagon with the battery (and the bomb) on it from the 
room. Before acting, it must compute the consequences of the action. One of the 
consequences is that the Earth will continue to rotate; another is that the stars will continue to 
shine; 2 plus 2 will still equal 4. The robot computes away until the bomb goes off. The 
problem with the second robot is that it did not compute the relevant consequences of its 
actions. So design a third robot that has, in addition to a theory of the consequences of its 
actions, a theory of relevance. It can tell which consequences are relevant and which 
consequences are not relevant to its interests. It isn’t interested in the fact that the stars 
continue to shine; it is interested in the fact that if it pulls the wagon, both the battery and the 
bomb come along. Now the third robot enters the room and starts to compute relevant 
consequences of pulling the wagon out. It computes that a consequence is that the Earth will 
continue to turn, and that that fact is not relevant to its interests at the moment; it computes 
that the stars will continue to shine, and that is not relevant; it computes that 2 plus 2 will 
equal 4, and that is not relevant. And the bomb goes off again. 
 One moral to this story about the frame problem is about the difficulty of reliable 
prediction. From limited evidence where we have observed or manipulated physical systems 
of various kinds, we are able to form theories about the effects of our actions. Infants have a 
sophisticated capacity to learn enough very quickly about the everyday physical principles 
governing our world so that by the age of four or so they get around just fine. Scientists have 
a capacity to predict the effects of policies or actions from observations and experiments. 
Most of the relevant inferences in these cases have to do somehow with causal relations 
among events and properties. The question is whether there are general, reliable principles 
about causal inference that a computational system, whether infant or scientist or digital 
computer, can use to predict the effects of actions. 
 Another moral to the story is that to give a computational account of any human 
capacity, we must explain how it is possible for a computational system to generate and 
consider only relevant hypotheses or consequences. Philosophy has traditionally been 
concerned with characterizing relevance. Ideas of confirmation, explanation, responsibility, 
causation, and so on can all be thought of as ideas about particular kinds of relevance. But it 
is one thing to define or characterize a relevance relation and quite another to show how, 
from a given A, a relevant B or all and only the relevant Bs can be found by a computational 
process. That is what the computational theory of mind must do. Moreover, it must do it for 
the kind of computer we appear to be. So finding any computational theory that accounts for 
our behavior is very difficult, and it is fair to say that for really complicated human 
capacities, we as yet have no such theory. There is, for example, no artificial computational 
system that will learn a human language from the kind of data available to a child. At the 
same time, there are too many possible theories of how we do what we do, and it may be that 
the evidence we have, or normally use, is insufficient to decide among them. 
 Suppose that we are trying to figure out how an android works, knowing that the 
android’s cognitive behavior is produced by computational processes. We can get lots of 
copies of basically similar androids, although each android may have a slightly different 
history than every other android and so will behave slightly differently. We can observe the 
android’s actions, subject it to whatever psychological experiments we please. We can 
measure the time it takes for the android to do various tasks. Can we discover the truth about 
how the android works? To see how difficult the task is, let’s consider a simpler problem and 
assume that we (somehow) already have relevant prior knowledge. Suppose that there is a 
huge box we cannot open; a tape feeds into the box (input) and another tape feeds out of the 
box (output). The box eats trees, which it internally turns into more tape. Suppose that there 
is a limitless supply of these boxes and that we know they all have the same program. We 
know that the box is some kind of Turing machine. Can we determine the program of that 
Turing machine? 
 The boxes represent a discovery problem. All of the boxes compute the same 
function. Our task is to determine how they compute it. We can put whatever we want on the 
input tape to one of the boxes and see what the output is. We can do so for as many inputs as 
we wish, conjecturing some program at each step. Is there a procedure that will reliably 
identify the program of the boxes? Not if by “reliably” we mean that for every possible 
program for the box that computes a total function, when given a sequence of evidence from 
that function (that is, given argument, value, or input-output pairs for that function, in any 
order) the procedure eventually conjectures the correct program and conjectures it ever after. 
Let us say that a procedure identifies a collection of programs if it can, in this sense, discover 
each of them. Recall that a function is total if it is defined for every input value. Then if we 
think of each program as given by a Turing machine, we have the following: 
Theorem Let K be the collection of all Turing machines that compute total functions. No 
computable procedure identifies K. 
 We need only consider computable procedures, because the very assumption of the 
computational conception of mind is that we, the would-be discoverers, are computational 
systems. If we cannot succeed in this rather weak, long-run sense of “function,” we cannot 
succeed in stronger senses either. Success is possible only if we have prior knowledge that 
will restrict the set of possible programs (in fact, restrict it considerably) or if we have access 
to some further form of evidence. 
 Cognitive psychologists have access to additional evidence besides the input-output 
behavior of people. One thing they can determine in addition is the time required to process 
various inputs and produce an output in response. So the data really consist of a triple: an 
input, an output, and a real number representing the time required to get the output from the 
input. Time measurement is more useful if we know a bound on the time required for any 
computational step. If we know, for example, that the Turing machine inside the box requires 
at least 103 seconds to carry out the instructions in any state, we can use that information to 
reduce the number of alternative programs consistent with the data. What we get from the 
black boxes is input and output data and the time required to produce the output from the 
input. The time, together with the bound on the time required for each individual 
computational step, gives us a bound on the number of steps in sequence that the program can 
have executed in computing the output from the input. We need never conjecture any 
program that requires (for the input-output data we have already seen) more steps than the 
bound allows. Clearly, this provides us with a lot of information restricting the alternative 
Turing-machine programs. 
 The psychologist’s problem is in some ways more difficult than the problem of the 
android boxes, because the psychologist must also identify what counts as input and output. 
Consider a psychologist doing research in which subjects are given oral instructions and an 
example and then are asked to carry out some problem-solving task that requires perception, 
reasoning, and some mechanical skills. Do the instructions constitute an input to a program 
instantiated in a subject’s brain, and does the subject’s consequent behavior constitute the 
output? Or do the instructions constitute a mixture of inputs to several different programs, 
and the behavior the output of these several distinct programs? Perhaps these programs are 
not completely distinct, and in the task assigned they interact. The psychologist’s task is more 
difficult than in the case of the android boxes, because the psychologist has to identify the 
input and the output as well as the program. That task goes hand in hand with determining 
which human “faculties” are carried out by autonomous programs, which are identical, and 
which are carried out by programs that interact with one another. Vision, for example, might 
be carried out by a program in us that interacts with the program that carries out imagining; it 
might be that data structures that arise in the execution of one program have an effect on 
concurrent (or subsequent) executions of the other program. 
 I can illustrate this problem simply enough with the android boxes. Suppose that you 
can examine the input tape and the output tape that results from any android box, but you 
don’t know whether the box contains one Turing machine that reads all of the symbols on the 
input tape and writes all of the symbols on the output tape or whether the box instead 
contains several Turing machines, some of which read and write some of the symbols and 
others of which read and write other symbols. Indeed, the symbol sets (or vocabularies) for 
the several Turing machines that might be in the box need not be completely disjoint. The 
space of possibilities is larger, and the identification problem more difficult. 
 Actually, the psychologists’ problem is even harder. I have assumed throughout that 
the android box is a Turing machine or a collection of Turing machines. But what if we don’t 
know that? Suppose that the android box can be an instantiation of any computational system 
whatsoever, so long as it is consistent with certain time bounds. It can be a multitape Turing 
machine. It can consist of several nondistinct Turing machines. They may share tapes or 
maybe just have some tape squares in common. It may be that some of the Turing machines 
in the box share symbols and parts of tape, so they can (internally) write over one another. It 
may he that the state transitions of one are influenced by the instantaneous states of another 
(two read/write heads can’t be over the same square at once, for example). Or the box might 
contain a URM or a RAM machine or a production system or any of an infinite number of 
alternative computational systems. The bound on the number of steps that a computation can 
take between a given input and the output is not of much use in identifying the program 
inside the box. We know, for example, that if a function is computable by a two-tape Turing 
machine in time that is proportional to the size of the input, then it is computable by a one-
tape Turing machine in time that is proportional to the square of the size of the input. Parallel 
results hold for three-tape, four-tape, and n-tape Turing machines. So if there is a Turing-
machine program that meets the time bounds for given input-output behavior, there is an 
infinity of different programs (in different programming systems, namely Turing machines 
with different numbers of tapes) that do so. 
 The psychologist’s task begins to look very hard indeed. Finding a computer program 
that, when run on a digital computer, simulates a piece of human behavior begins to look like 
very weak evidence that the program describes just how the human mind executes that 
behavior. We might begin to think that Searle’s skepticism is warranted, but for different 
reasons than those he gives. There are, however, some reasons for optimism about the 
possibility of a successful cognitive science. 
 When people are asked to do a task, they are often able to report how they do it. In 
solving a puzzle or playing a game, one can describe at each moment the move one is 
considering. Sometimes one can even say why a particular move is under consideration. So it 
is as if we were android boxes that can describe some of their own computational steps. We 
are able to give away major pieces of our own program. Of course, that sort of information 
makes the task of finding the program much more feasible. 
 But perhaps not feasible enough. It might be objected that the parts of our internal 
program that we are able to articulate are, in a sense, superficial. We can articulate what we 
can deliberate on. But a lot of our cognitive capacity is not deliberate at all. When you see a 
sign written in English, you don’t deliberately grasp what it says; you can’t help yourself. If 
you are struck by a ball, or bitten by a horse, you may not deliberate the next time a ball or a 
horse comes by. If you deliberate when you learn a first language, we certainly don’t know 
how you deliberate, even in those rare cases (as with Helen Keller) in which a first language 
is acquired at a comparatively mature age. The ways in which we deliberate seem likelier to 
be learned, and thus to he variable from person to person, than the ways in which we do 
things without deliberation (or in spite of it). One might reasonably doubt that the strategy of 
collecting introspective reports of deliberations will provide enough information to enable 
psychologists to characterize the functional architecture of the mind. 
 There is something further that can be done: open up the box. It would be a great deal 
more feasible to figure out how an IBM personal computer works if one could take the 
computer apart to determine its physical properties and components and how they function. It 
would be easier to determine how our imaginary android boxes work if we could open the 
boxes. According to the computational conception of mind, our brains constitute biological 
computers, and it would seem more feasible to determine our functional architecture if we 
discover how the pieces of our brains work, how they function in cognition. Much of the 
work on the physiology of the brain tells us very little about cognition and behavior, but 
increasingly there are examples of scientific arguments about human capacities that tell us 
more because in one respect or another they open up the box. 
CAN THE COMPUTATIONAL CONCEPTION OF MIND BE WRONG? 
I have left out some possibilities. They are not possibilities that will reassure those of us who 
want humans to have a. special place a little outside of nature, but they are possibilities that 
are quite serious and contrary to the computational conception of mind. That conception has 
taken form within the confines of Church’s thesis. It assumes, at least tacitly, that 
computation is discrete and limited to Turing-computable functions, and that an appropriate 
theory of humans is thus a theory of a device for computing Turing-computable functions. 
But there need be nothing supernatural or mystical in supposing that we are not such a 
device. 
 Consider the system of the planets. If you do certain things to that system, you get 
certain results. If for example, you shoot a space ship off the Earth with a certain thrust, the 
spaceship will follow a particular trajectory through the planets, depending on where the 
planets were located when the rocket took off. We can call input and output whatever we 
choose. If we think of the thrust and mass of the rocket and the positions of the planets as 
input, and the trajectory of the spaceship as output, this system does not look like a Turing 
machine, nor does the dependence between input and output look like a recursive function. 
For one thing, the inputs and outputs are continuous variables; the functional dependence 
between input and output is not given by a function on the natural numbers but by a function 
on systems of real numbers to systems of real numbers. The solar system is a dynamic 
systerm. Perhaps we are as well, although, of course, a very different dynamic system than 
the system of the planets. Perhaps the dependencies in our nervous system and between our 
nervous system and the external world are properly described not by Turing-computable 
functions but by functions over other number systems besides the natural numbers. Not only 
is this imaginable, it seems plausible. We could not do physics very well if we confined our 
physical descriptions to Turing-computable functions. Since we ourselves are physical 
systems, it would be surprising if we could describe ourselves adequately by Turing-
computable functions. 
 If we are dynamic systems, we may still be computational systems, of course. An 
instantiation of a Turing machine is a dynamic system that is a computational system as well. 
So is the computer on which I wrote this book. The point is that, while being dynamic 
systems, we might have cognitive capacities that are explained not by any computational 
system we instantiate but instead by the kind of dynamic system we are—just as the behavior 
of the spaceship after leaving the Earth is explained by the dynamic properties of 
gravitational systems generally and by the configuration of the solar system in particular. 
 Perhaps we should generalize the notion of computation and consider the solar system 
as a kind of computer: you put the rocket in, and the system gives you its trajectory out. So if 
the mass and thrust of the rocket code any other real-valued quantities and the trajectory of 
the rocket codes still other real-valued quantities, the solar system serves as a kind of analog 
computer. Considering ourselves as dynamic systems is thus something like considering 
ourselves as continuous, analog computers. The very idea raises questions about the general 
characterization of analog computation, about the connections between computation on the 
real numbers and on the rational numbers, and about the computational properties of various 
kinds of dynamic systems. Unfortunately, I must leave these issues to more advanced texts. 
BOUNDED RATIONALITY 
In the first chapters of this hook we thought through the implications of a very banal fact: one 
doesn’t always see what is entailed by a sentence, even though one understands it perfectly 
well. Later, in the discussion of probability, we also considered the implications of the fact 
that one does not usually simply believe a claim entirely or reject it entirely, but instead one 
puts some stock in it, gives it some credence, and the confidence one has varies from claim to 
claim. One result of these inquiries was a theory of meaning and a theory of entailment that 
together provide a normative theory of belief. That theory says what you ought to believe if 
you wish to believe all and only the necessary consequences of what you believe. These 
theories were presented as the logic of sentences and the logic of quantifiers, tied together in 
the theory of the logic of first-order languages. A further result of these inquiries was the 
theory of subjective probability, understood as a theory about how degrees of belief ought to 
be distributed. 
 Each of these theories is, in its way, very tolerant. Neither the logicians nor the 
Bayesians try to tell us very much about what we ought to believe. Instead, these theories 
impose constraints on our beliefs and partial beliefs. Logic tells us that if we have certain 
beliefs, we are obliged to have certain other beliefs as well. It doesn’t tell us much about 
which initial beliefs to have or about what to do if our beliefs have consequences that we 
don’t believe. Subjective probability theory tells us constraints on how our degrees of belief 
should be distributed. It doesn’t tell us that any particular proposition must be believed to a 
particular degree, except, of course, that logical truths must he given a degree of belief of 1 
and logical contradictions must be given a degree of belief of 0. Decision theory doesn’t tell 
us what to do; it tells us what to do given a specification of our utilities and degrees of belief. 
 Together these theories constitute the core of the best normative theory we have, the 
theory of rationality. It would, then, be a shock to discover that the theory does not apply to 
us and that, as it stands, the theory of rationality gives us no guidance in belief and in action. 
if, as cognitive science assumes, we reason by computation, that is the conclusion that seems 
to follow. 
Rationality and Computationally Bounded Systems 
With a little imagination, many of the things we do can be thought of as determining values 
of a function. For example, we recognize certain sequences of symbols as grammatical 
sentences of English, and we recognize certain other sequences as ungrammatical English. In 
doing so, we can be thought of as determining values for a function, the characteristic 
function of the set of grammatical English sentences. When we do arithmetic in our heads, or 
even with the help of a pencil and paper, we can again be thought of as evaluating a function, 
namely the arithmetic function in question. On any occasion when we are involved in a 
problem-solving task with a variety of discrete, sequential possible steps, say playing tic-tac-
toe or playing chess or carrying out the actions required to make an omelet or to make a 
telescope lens, we can be thought of as evaluating a function, In these cases the function 
gives our moves in various positions (in games), or the actions we take at each step in the 
relevant states (in making an omelet or making a telescope lens). 
 What functions can we determine or evaluate, and how quickly can we determine or 
evaluate them? One view, which I will call the computational thesis, is this: Given any 
“natural” decomposition of the actions a human can perform and any “natural” description 
of the selection of a sequence of actions as the evaluation of a function defined on discrete, 
finite objects and having discrete finite objects as values, all functions that humans evaluate 
are Turing-computable. Because of the use of the phrase “natural description,” this is quite 
vague, and it may not be possible to make the thesis a lot more precise. When someone is 
given, for example, a pair of natural numbers to add together, she produces a number in 
response. We understand the function she evaluates to be the arithmetic function over the 
natural numbers. When someone plays chess, we understand the function evaluated to be a 
function from positions to moves. Of course, when someone makes a move in chess, a lot 
more happens than simply the making of the move. The player may rub his chin, groan, move 
his arm in a certain fashion, put the piece down delicately, furrow his brow, wink, change the 
center of mass of the solar system, and on and on. We ignore all this. 
 The theory of computation is not a normative theory; it doesn’t tell us what we ought 
to do. But if the computational thesis is true, the theory of computation tells us many things 
that are beyond our power to do. On that assumption, it is beyond our power to evaluate a 
function that is not Turing-computable; it is beyond our power to evaluate, in polynomial 
time, a function that has no polynomial-time algorithm. All the results of the previous chapter 
about the limits of computability, and many others not described in that chapter, are limits on 
us. 
 Suppose that people are computationally bounded systems. From this assumption it 
follows that there are certain things we cannot do. In particular, we cannot evaluate the 
validity of all deductive arguments in a first-order language if the language contains even a 
single binary predicate. Furthermore, we cannot determine, for every sentence in such a 
language, whether or not it is consistent. We cannot determine the set of all theorems of any 
theory adequate for arithmetic. If, as computational theorists generally believe (but have not 
yet proved), there is no polynomial-time algorithm that computes the characteristic function 
for the set of consistent formulas of sentential logic (with three or more atomic sentences), 
then we cannot determine the consistency of such formulas in polynomial time. Since a 
nondogmatic probability function must give a probability of 0 only to the inconsistent 
sentences of the language over which it is defined, it follows that we cannot evaluate a 
nondogmatic probability function over a first-order language, no matter how much time we 
take, and we cannot evaluate a nondogmatic probability function over Boolean formulas in 
polynomial time. 
 There are further limitations we should expect if we are computationally bounded 
systems. I have talked about computational complexity in terms of time, but there are also 
considerations of space that arise in computation. Any probability distribution over a set of 
propositions formed from sentences in a language for sentential logic is determined uniquely 
by the value of the probability function over the propositions that are conjunctions 
containing, for each atomic sentence in the language, either that sentence or its negation (but 
not both). These conjunctions are sometimes called state descriptions. If the language has n 
atomic sentences, there are 2n different state descriptions. That is, there are 2n logically 
nonequivalent sentences of this kind. So if we consider a relatively simple language in which 
there are only 50 atomic sentences, there are 250 logically distinct state descriptions. 
 To represent an arbitrary probability distribution, we must specify the value of the 
probability function for each of the state descriptions. So with 50 atomic sentences, for many 
probability distributions we must store 250 numbers to represent the entire distribution. Of 
course, there are particular distributions that can be characterized with many fewer 
parameters, but in the worst case, the amount of space required to represent a probability 
distribution increases exponentially with the number of atomic sentences in the language. 
 We cannot keep 250 parameters in our heads, let alone 2 raised to the power of a few 
thousand, which is what would be required to represent a probability distribution over a 
realistic language. So if we can maintain probability distributions in our heads at all (as we 
must in some form if we are to compute their values), we can do so only for a very limited 
class of probability distributions. We cannot determine validity, consistency, and logical 
equivalence for all propositional formulas in time that inceases as a polynomial function of 
the length of the sentences, and we cannot take extremely long times to make decisions. 
Therefore, if we must make decisions in realistic time, we cannot be consistent, and we 
cannot be probabilistically coherent over sentences that are very long. We cannot determine 
validity, consistency, and logical equivalence for all sentences in a first-order language. For 
such a language, therefore, there will be cases in which our beliefs are inconsistent and our 
degrees of belief incoherent. 
 So we are in the following odd philosophical situation. We have normative theories 
that tell us what we ought to do, and perhaps we recognize the force of these theories. At the 
same time, we recognize that it is not in our power to act as the normative theories require. 
We simply cannot do it, any more than we can jump over the moon. But then, of what force is 
the nonnative theory? What is the point of a normative theory that tells us that we ought to do 
things that we cannot possibly do? 
 One answer is this: The normative theory of rationality imposes constraints on 
collections of beliefs and degrees of belief. We recognize that those constraints cannot be 
satisfied everywhere in the collection of beliefs and partial beliefs of computationally 
bounded humans. But they can be satisfied locally. The normative theory of rationality tells 
us what a mistake is. When we discover that a particular belief we hold is inconsistent, we 
can give up that belief. When we discover that a particular subset of probability numbers 
attached to propositions violate the axioms of probability, we can change some of those 
degrees of belief until our degrees of belief in those propositions no longer violate the axioms 
of probability. Whenever we find a mistake, we can correct that mistake. Moreover, 
whenever we find a mistake in our degrees of belief or our beliefs, we ought to correct the 
mistake. We cannot correct all possible mistakes, because we are computationally bounded, 
but we can correct any mistake we recognize, and we should. 
 Is this a good answer? Why, exactly, should a computationally bounded agent correct 
his logical and probabilistic mistakes when he finds them? It cannot be because correcting the 
mistakes will make the agent perfectly rational. If he is computationally bounded, it won’t. 
Can it be that, by correcting our mistakes, we become, not perfectly rational, but more 
rational? That we move closer to the ideal of rationality? Perhaps, but we don’t know what 
“closer” means. What is it for one inconsistent set of beliefs to be closer to a consistent set of 
beliefs, or “less inconsistent,” than another inconsistent set of beliefs? What does it mean for 
one distribution of degrees of belief that violates the axioms of probability to be “closer” to a 
coherent distribution of degrees of belief than is another distribution that also violates the 
probability axioms? There are as yet few answers to these questions. There is no developed 
theory of approximate rationality. That does not mean that there could not be a theory of 
approximate rationality; it means only that no one has fully developed such a theory and 
given persuasive reasons for it. (In fact, there are scarcely any attempts at such a theory.) So 
we don’t know what it means to get closer to being rational or to increase our degree of 
rationality. 
 If we did know what it meant to be a better or worse approximation to rationality, it 
still might not be the case that we ought to correct our mistakes. It might very well be, for 
example, that since we are computationally bounded systems, correcting one mistake will 
only cause us to make another mistake. Perhaps the mistake we make somewhere else by 
correcting a first mistake is worse than the first mistake itself. Perhaps the policy of 
correcting our mistakes will make us less rational rather than more. Or perhaps the best thing 
to do is to correct certain kinds of mistakes and not others. (I, for example, have never 
become expert in the word-processing system in which this book is written, even though I 
have written two books and dozens of articles using it. I have not done so because I think that 
the formatting errors I make are of minor consequence, and on the occasions when they are 
not, I can get help from others, and also because I think that the time required to become fully 
expert would cause me to make other mistakes of more consequence in other parts of my 
professional life. If I am correct in this, is it irrational for me not to correct my formatting 
mistakes?) The answers to these questions will depend not only on having a theory of 
approximate rationality but also on our understanding of ourselves, on what science may 
reveal about the particular limitations we have. 
Study Question 
Explain why no “computable” probability distribution can assign probability zero to all and 
only the logically contradictory sentences in a rich first-order language.* 
CONCLUSION: ANDROID EPISTEMOLOGY AND ANDROID NORMS 
The computational concept of mind is partly the fruit of a long tradition of philosophical 
work. Cognitive science itself has provided, and continues to provide, a rich source of 
philosophical issues, problems, and perplexities. The very idea that cognition is computation 
has prompted attempts at refutation that, if not convincing, are at least interesting. The 
practice and ambition of cognitive science present an abundance of conceptual problems that 
have attracted the attention of philosophers, psychologists, and computer scientists. But the 
richest lode of issues lies in two related questions. First, how can a computationally bounded 
agent possibly do what humans do? We might regard this question as the fundamental issue 
of android epistemology. It is remarkably like the kind of question that Kant posed, and it is 
an a priori question, not an empirical one. It is a question about how computation can be 
organized so that cognitive competence at least equal to that of humans is possible; it is not 
the more restricted empirical question about how we humans are actually able to do what we 
do. The issue of android epistemology is typically philosophical. 
 The other fundamental question posed by cognitive science has to do with normative 
principles of rationality for computationally bounded agents, in other words, with the 
principles of android rationality. For a computationally bounded agent, our standard 
normative theories of rationality do not provide a guide in life, or any set of standards that the 
agent ought to live up to. In the present state of our understanding of these normative 
theories, there is not even a good argument that a computationally bounded agent ought to 
correct particular violations of the norm when those violations are recognized. 
Review Questions 
1. Paraphrase the argument of Lucas and Penrose that no machine can be a complete or 
adequate model of the mind. 
2. What is meant by the term “transducer”? 
3. What is functionalism, and how does this perspective interpret mental states? 
4. Define “functional architecture.” 
5. In your own words restate Putnam’s argument to show that mental states cannot be 
computational states. 
6. Discuss Searle’s ideas concerning the intentionality and causal powers of human cognition. 
How do time constraints on procedures fit into this computational conception of mind? 
7. What is a normative theory of belief? 
8. Discuss some current problems facing the computational conception of mind. 
9. State the computational thesis presented in this chapter. How is it related to the idea of 
approximate rationality? 
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Chapter 14 
THE ENTERPRISE OF PHILOSOPHY 
A philosopher is someone who has no laboratory, performs no experiments, usually collects 
little data of any kind, has no resources except the knowledge others have provided together 
with her own perspicacity and powers of reasoning. With so little, the philosopher 
nonetheless claims to be engaged in an enterprise that furthers human understanding. The 
claim may seem unlikely, but in many cases it is nonetheless true. How can that be? Part of 
the reason, of course, is that the world is always full of foolishness, and anyone with a mind 
to can try to further understanding by debunking silly claims and projects. But philosophers 
claim to do more than that. How can they? 
 While philosophy is an a priori enterprise, it is not really separated from empirical 
knowledge, or at least it should not be. Great philosophical inquiry has always been informed 
by empirical understanding of nature and ourselves, and by mathematical knowledge. The 
problems of bounded rationality illustrate the point. But that is still only a fragment of the 
answer. The better part is that a great deal of what we need to understand our world, 
ourselves, and other creatures, actual or possible, involves thinking through the implications 
of fundamental concepts and assumptions. 
 The chapters in this book have considered some of the background of philosophical 
thought that led to branches of contemporary knowledge, including mathematical logic, 
computer science, cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, and statistics. There are other 
subjects, such as economics, for which the philosophical tradition has been equally important 
but that we have not considered at all. Even for the subjects we have considered, only a few 
of the more prominent contributions of philosophy have been described. Other pieces of 
philosophical work have been of real importance to the sciences, and still other works of 
great importance are in the making. A few examples, chosen simply because I know of them, 
can serve as illustrations. 
 Some years ago Donald Davidson and Patrick Suppes carried out empirical studies of 
how people actually make decisions. Davidson later gave fascinating, nontechnical accounts 
of familiar human phenomena, such as weakness of will, by supposing that each of us has an 
internal decision-theoretic framework. Suppes, among many other things, helped to develop 
the mathematical theory of psychological measurement. The best philosophical work on the 
foundations of physics has formed a part of physics itself. For example, David Malament at 
the University of Chicago and John Earman at the University of Pittsburgh have made 
interesting contributions to our understanding of the structure and implications of modern 
space-time theories. In recent years the mathematical structure of reliable inference has been 
pursued by Scott Weinstein, a logician and philosopher, in collaboration with Michael Stob, a 
mathematician, and Daniel Osherson, a psychologist; and also by Kevin Kelly, a young 
philosopher and logician at Carnegie-Mellon University. Some of the most interesting present 
work on causal inference and prediction is being carried out by Peter Spirtes, a philosopher 
and computer scientist. The project of investigating how probabilistic and decision-theoretic 
norms may be adapted to agents whose rationality is bounded in one way or another has been 
pursued by Teddy Seidenfeld, a philosopher-statistician, and in a quite different way by Brian 
Skyms, a philosopher at the University of California at Irvine. There are too many 
philosophers to name who have contributed and continue to contribute to the development of 
logical systems for representing formal aspects of our theories of belief, obligation, and 
necessity. Still others, such as Donald Nute at the University of Georgia, John Pollock at the 
University of Arizona, and Wilfried Sieg at Carnegie-Mellon have worked in different ways 
toward developing logical systems for computationally bounded systems. 
 What Makes any of this and other contemporary work philosophy rather than 
statistics, physics, economics, computer science, or something else? One thing that marks 
philosophical work is the attempt to make sense of entire enterprises that on reflection seem 
profoundly puzzling or obscure in some fundamental respect. That, for example, is part of 
what distinguishes the work of such philosophers as Jerry Fodor, Daniel Dennett, and Paul 
and Patricia Churchland, who have worked for decades to clarify the enterprise of cognitive 
science. It is also what distinguishes some of the best philosophical work on the foundations 
of physics. There is no reason, of course, why the philosophical business of making sense of 
an enterprise must be done by professional philosophers. Zenon Pylysyn is a psychologist 
who has given a great deal of thought to how to make sense of the idea of a computational 
theory of mind, and more physicists than philosophers have worried about the interpretation 
of quantum mechanics. 
 Another mark of philosophical work is that, while addressing a discipline, it 
deliberately and self-consciously violates the assumptions of that discipline, not from 
ignorance or incompetence but for good reason. Thus Seidenfeld’s work denies some of the 
axioms of the usual theory of probability to better represent the human situation, or simply in 
the interest of working out a possible case. 
 A third mark of philosophical thought is that it brings to bear rational standards that 
may, for accidental reasons, be ignored within a discipline. John Rawls’s work on the theory 
of justice, for example, provided a decision-theoretic realization of ideals of fairness to argue 
for constraints on political and economic institutions in a way that was rather foreign to 
economics and political science. Again, Spirtes’s work applies to causal inference the 
standards of reliability that statisticians have used for other sorts of inference problems but 
have failed to apply to the problem of determining causes. 
 Finally, philosophical work has its peculiar motives: it asks who we are and how we 
stand in the world, how it is possible for there to be creatures like us, what we can and cannot 
know, and how we can best conduct our lives. 
 These marks are the good effects of considering the history of philosophical 
perplexity, theory, and argument, free from the conventions of any particular contemporary 
scientific discipline but informed nonetheless by scientific and mathematical knowledge. 
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